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 In the two and a half years I spent preparing to write this dissertation, I found 
myself living in The Hague or as it proudly refers to itself, the “International City of 
Peace and Justice.” Host city to an array of international courts and tribunals, including 
the International Criminal Court (ICC), working in The Hague allowed me to regularly 
engage with an array of academics, jurists, and human rights activists, many of whom 
have made the creation and sustenance of the field of international criminal law their 
life’s work. Their focus on the ICC in particular was remarkable in its sophistication and 
ambition. Not only was it rooted in the vision of a global institution that could 
competently and fairly try those accused of international crimes (a formidable task in 
itself) but one that could also spark the domestic pursuit of accountability in countries 
around the world. 
  
This dissertation seeks to explore the belief in this spark—its origins, capacities, 
and permutations—as well as the ICC’s ability to deliver upon it. As the Court enters its 
second decade, debates about its potential impact on domestic criminal jurisdictions, and 
the legal systems of states more broadly, loom ever larger. At the center of much of this 
discussion lies the principle of complementarity: the idea that the ICC is designed to 
supplement, not supplant, national courts.  This appealing idea is at once both 
straightforward and deeply complex.  Beginning as a technical admissibility rule for 
determining when the ICC can pursue a case within its jurisdiction, complementarity has 
since become the cornerstone for what is now commonly referred to as the “Rome 
Statute System,” one in which “States remain responsible and accountable for 
investigating and prosecuting crimes committed under their jurisdiction.”1 A core 
aspiration is that complementarity will spur domestic jurisdictions to action. As put by 
two commentators,  “The [ICC] is intended to not only investigate and prosecute crimes 
under its jurisdiction but to act as a catalyst for genuine national justice by applying the 
principle of complementarity.”2 
 
During my time in The Hague, I also traveled to three of the ICC’s “situation 
countries” to interrogate this idea of the ICC-as-catalyst further: Uganda, the first 
country to come before the Court, and referred there by the government itself in 2004; 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, the second situation so referred; and Kenya, a 
country that became the source of the Prosecutor’s first proprio motu investigation 
following the post-election violence of late 2007. These trips were field research, an 
attempt to explore the expectations that have attended the Court’s establishment through 
interviews with international and domestic NGOs, ICC staff, judges, human rights 
advocates, and diplomatic representatives. In the course of those months, I conducted 
over 50 interviews with these individuals. Three are described below. 
 
  
                                                
1 “Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor,” September 2003, 5, at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/1fa7c4c6-de5f-42b7-8b25-
60aa962ed8b6/143594/030905_policy_paper.pdf. 
2 Jonathan O’Donohue and Sophie Rigney, “The ICC Must Consider Fair Trial Concerns in Determining 




1. Uganda: “We Have to Look Like We Are Doing Something” 
 
 The International Crimes Division—a special division of the Ugandan High 
Court’s eight divisions—sits mid-way up a tall hill in the already hilly city of Kampala, 
Uganda’s capital. The Division is not easy to reach. The easiest way, if you are without a 
car and unwilling to walk, is to grab one of the ubiquitous matatus that populate the city. I 
made three trips to the ICD in the course of my visits to Uganda but on this day we were 
to meet with one of the judges of the Division who was part of the bench then 
overseeing early proceedings in the trial of former LRA commander, Thomas Kwoyelo.3  
 
As it happened, that morning we had also met with the legal counsel for 
Uganda’s Amnesty Commission. The Commission had certified Kwoyelo’s amnesty 
petition in January 2010 but was now engaged in a protracted battle with the Director of 
Public Prosecutions over its validity. Established by the Amnesty Act in 2000 as a way to 
incentivize defections from the Lord’s Resistance Army, the Commission was the 
Division’s institutional opposite: it granted ex-combatants protection from prosecution, 
while the ICD was meant to be the putative forum for prosecuting them. Curious, I 
asked the counsel what kind of impact he thought the ICC had had in Uganda. “A big 
one,” he said. “The ICC has a lot of powers; it says some of these Africans need to 
behave.” What about the ICD, I asked? “It has increased international pressure,” he 
replied. “The donors have invested some money in that court so we have to look like we 
are doing something.”  
 
One long walk later, I sat before the judge who, over the course of an hour, 
answered a string of questions. How many judges sit on the Division? (Four, at that time.) 
When did it change from the War Crimes Division—its name when first established in 
2008—to the International Crimes Division? (In 2010.) What rules of procedure would 
they use? (The rules had to be originated by the Division, but they would have to “reflect 
the best practices in the world.”) The judge indicated that ICD colleagues had received 
multiple trainings in subjects ranging from substantive international criminal law and 
procedure, to organized crime and the laws of war. On the subject of the ICC, the judge 
expressed disappointment that the ICD itself did not have any interactions with the 
Court, and stressed the need for more “positive complementarity”—a proper witness 
protection program, judicial trainings, even perhaps “attaching” the Division to other 
“courts of complementarity” in countries like Australia or Canada. “I wish they [the ICC] 
could help with that, but I think they prefer to keep safe,” the judge said.  
 
2. Democratic Republic of Congo: la poursuite de la pérennité  
 
 Kinshasa, the DRC’s dense and sprawling capital, is known as “Kin la belle,” 
although the description is at times difficult to appreciate. We arrived in Kinshasa after 
two weeks in Kampala and Nairobi, and it was quickly apparent—even in this capital city, 
which sits far from the violence that grips the east of the country—what a daunting 
challenge the DRC, with its dense, complex histories of conflict, must be for a young 
institution like the ICC. Our arrival preceded the DRC’s second presidential elections by 
several months, although it was clear that their imminence was already consuming most 
of the diplomatic community’s energies.  
 
                                                
3 Interviews with legal counsel to the Amnesty Commission and ICD judge, Kampala, 13 December 2011. 
“We” refers to Sara Kendall, with whom I conducted most interviews jointly. 
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On the first day, an interview that had been scheduled with the European Union 
delegation provided us, fortuitously, with an opportunity to meet two Congolese human 
rights advocates whose NGO had been engaged around the ICC’s intervention for 
several years.4 Much of their work focused on facilitating the participation of victims in 
Court proceedings, as well as advocating for the passage of Rome Statute implementing 
legislation. As they explained, their mandate was to “simplify” the Statute and make it 
understandable to people—in French, la vulgarisation (“popularizing work”). The 
advocates were there to brief the EU delegation’s Working Group on Human Rights, a 
monthly gathering of donor states, but with elections looming the long table they were 
meant to address was almost empty. Except for one representative, no one had shown 
up. 
 
The Working Group’s loss was our gain: over coffee, we seized the opportunity 
for a conversation. It quickly became apparent that despite our interlocutors’ support for 
the ICC’s work in the DRC, they were deeply critical of its performance. They spoke of 
the poor quality of investigations and of the investigator one of them met who had never 
even been to the DRC before. How were they selected? How were they vetted? They 
recalled that the best years for contact with the Court were probably between 2002 and 
2005—the early years of its intervention—and expressed frustration with the many ICC 
staff changes since then. “People leave, and you don’t know where they go,” one 
remarked. Il faut que le peu qui est fait, soit bien fait (“the little that is done must be done 
well”) said the other but, in her view, too much had not been done well. Although there 
was “a lot of hope” amongst victims in the beginning, it was not as strong now, and 
people could not understand why the first trial in The Hague (that of Thomas Lubanga, 
for the recruitment of child soldiers) had gone on for so long.    
 
Towards the end, the discussion turned to the prospects for domestic 
accountability in the DRC. What about the prospect of a mixed chamber for these 
serious crimes, of the sort that was then being proposed?  They were skeptical. “It is not 
just about the judges—it is about the prisons, the personnel, the system at large,” one 
replied. It was the need for long-term sustainability within the criminal justice system that 
concerned them—la poursuite de la pérennité. A special chamber would only deal with one 
category of crimes; it would be an “itinerant” court unconnected to the domestic 
judiciary. What, they asked, about the rest of the country? 
 
3. Kenya: “One Long Game” 
 
On my third trip to Nairobi, I met again with the director of the Kenyan country 
office for a prominent international NGO, someone I had first interviewed 18 months 
prior, shortly after the OTP announced its summons for the defendants that would 
become known as the “Ocampo Six.” From my first visit to Nairobi, the sophistication 
of Kenyan civil society was quickly apparent,5 as was the jolt that the ICC’s intervention 
had brought to the human rights community there. As the same director said at our first 
meeting, Kenya had a long history of impunity for political violence such that, when the 
ICC first arrived, many Kenyans embraced it. “They were so used to seeing people get 
away with things,” he said.6 
 
                                                
4 Interview with Congolese human rights advocates, Kinshasa, 20 June 2011. 
5 On the emergence and accomplishments of modern civil society in East Africa, see Makau Mutua, ed., 
Human Rights NGOs in East Africa: Political and Normative Tensions (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2009). 
6 Interview with Kenyan NGO director, Nairobi, 17 June 2011.  
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Indeed, the Court’s arrival brought with it, for a time, great hope. Members of 
Kenyan civil society set about supporting the ICC’s work in a variety of ways: registering 
and interviewing victims, supporting an “underground” witness protection system, 
conducting outreach in conflict-affected communities, gathering evidence, and 
continuing to push for the establishment of a special domestic tribunal.7 In Kenya, as 
elsewhere, national NGOs came to serve as a kind of shadow network for the Court.  
 
By the time of our second meeting, however, that hope had dimmed 
considerably.8 Two of the “Ocampo Six” had not had their charges confirmed and there 
was fear—well founded, as it would soon turn out—that other cases might collapse.9 I 
asked my interlocutor what kind of impact he thought the Court had had, despite its 
missteps. What had it catalyzed? The answer came in two parts. On the one hand, “the 
only time you hear about something being set up [in Kenya] is when the ICC moves.” 
That was what led Parliament to attempt to set up a domestic tribunal in 2009, and later 
to the creation of a special “task force” within the Director of Public Prosecutions to 
investigate the post-election violence cases. But none of that, apparently, mattered. “All 
that has supposedly been done for complementarity,” he said with a sigh, “It has just 























                                                
7 These examples were offered through interviews with Kenyan civil society advocates, Nairobi, June 2011 
and January 2012.  
8 Second interview with Kenyan NGO director, Nairobi, 3 December 2012. 
9 Following the confirmation of charges decisions, the ICC Prosecutor announced in March 2013 that her 
Office was withdrawing the charges against Francis Muthaura.  The charges against Kenyan President 





Since its inception, a central preoccupation of and for the International Criminal 
Court has been the nature of its relationship to national jurisdictions. A permanent body 
intended to investigate and adjudicate crimes conceivably without geographical 
restriction, the ICC is structurally designed to work at the intersection of the 
international and the domestic. Complementarity—the idea that the Court is intended to 
supplement, not supplant, national jurisdictions—has been the dominant juridical logic 
through which this relationship has been expressed but, as the prologue’s three narratives 
suggest, the principle occupies a charged space in the political imaginary, replete with 
tensions and ambiguity. To a Ugandan judge it suggests that the ICC might serve as a 
kind of “big brother” court to its domestic counterpart, while to a Kenyan human rights 
advocate it represents little more than a “long game” by a government determined to 
evade The Hague.  
 
Meanwhile, for many of the Court’s supporters, complementarity is the 
“cornerstone of the Rome Statute”: it represents the very future of international criminal 
justice. In the words of the International Center for Transitional Justice, “How the 
complementarity principle is put into practice will be the key to the fight against 
impunity and thus the future of international justice will largely turn on these efforts.”10 
So understood, complementarity is no longer a legal concept confined to the 
courtroom—an organizing principle for the regulation of concurrent jurisdiction—but a 
policy tool for catalyzing progressive change in post-conflict countries’ legal frameworks 
and institutions.11  
 
1. Research Aim, Problem Statement, and Research Questions 
 
This dissertation aims to examine what effects framing the ICC as a “catalyst” for 
domestic investigations and prosecutions has had in three distinct situation-country 
contexts. Pursuant to this research aim, it examines how both state and non-state actors 
in Uganda, Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of Congo have relied upon the principle 
of complementarity as the logic through which the Court’s catalytic potential can be best 
                                                
10 International Center for Transitional Justice, “The Future of International Justice: National Courts 
Supported by International Expertise,” at https://www.ictj.org/news/future-international-justice-national-
courts-supported-international-expertise 
11 As detailed further in the dissertation, there has been a rapidly proliferating literature that frames its 
inquiries around the ICC’s catalytic potential through the principle of complementarity. One of the earliest 
articles to employ the phrase was Jonathan Charney, “Editorial Comments: International Criminal Law and 
the Role of Domestic Courts,” American Journal of International Law (2001), 120 (viewing the effective 
success of the ICC as “having first served as a catalyst, and then as a monitoring and supporting 
institution”). See further Jo Stigen, The Relationship between the International Criminal Court and National 
Jurisdictions: The Principle of Complementarity (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008); Jann K. Kleffner, 
Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); 
Géraldine Mattioli and Anneke van Woudenberg, “Global Catalyst for National Prosecutions? The ICC in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo,” in Nicholas Waddell and Phil Clark (eds.), Courting Conflict? Justice, 
Peace and the ICC in Africa (Royal African Society, March 2008); Nidal Nabil Jurdi, The International Criminal 
Court and National Courts: A Contentious Relationship (UK: Ashgate, 2011). See also Janine Natalya Clark, 
“Peace, Justice and the International Criminal Court: Limitations and Possibilities,” Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 9 (2011), 521-545; Clark argues that, “through the implementation and practice of 
complementarity, the Court can potentially have a significant catalytic effect,” 538. The most recent, and 
best, work to date is Sarah M.H. Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire: The Catalysing Effect of the 
International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).  
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realized, as well as a transnational site and adaptive strategy for entrenching the norm of 
international criminal accountability domestically. In so doing, it asks three principal 
research questions. First, how has the understanding of complementarity evolved since 
the ICC’s inception and what role have non-state actors, in particular, played in this 
evolution? Second, how have ICC judges understood and interpreted complementarity’s 
requirements in the courtroom, and how has the Office of the Prosecutor sought to 
implement it as a matter of policy? Finally, to what extent and how have the ICC’s 
interventions in Uganda, Kenya and the DRC affected these countries’ institutional and 
normative frameworks for carrying out domestic criminal proceedings? 
 
2. Framing the ICC as a Catalyst 
 
Framing international legal institutions as catalysts dominates much of a growing 
literature on their effects and impact at the national level. While the ICC may represent a 
more recent iteration, the presumption that other institutions—from regional human 
rights courts to UN human rights mechanisms—would have or have had a salutary effect 
on state behavior has drawn the interest of legal scholars and political scientists alike.12 
The political scientist Kathryn Sikkink writes that, “Well before the creation of the ICC, 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of 
Rights … played a catalytic role in pushing for individual criminal accountability.”13 
Sikkink contends that these courts were part of an array of actors and norm 
entrepreneurs, “including NGOs, regional human rights organizations, and members of 
transnational governments,”14 who collectively contributed to the rise and legitimation of 
individual criminal accountability as a new international norm.  
 
Describing this new norm as part of a “justice cascade,” Sikkink argues that 
“states and non-state actors worked to build a firm streambed of international human 
rights law and international humanitarian law that fortified the legal underpinnings of the 
cascade, culminating in the Rome Statute of the ICC in 1998.”15 The prosecutions of 
several high-level political figures, which drew legal scholars to examine the domestic 
effects that such efforts might augur, illustrate the fortification of this cascade.16 These 
developments continued with the establishment and evolution of the ad hoc tribunals for 
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, both of which preceded the ICC. Here, too, the 
trope of the “catalyst” has been summoned: William Burke-White argues that, “the 
ICTY has encouraged the development of domestic courts in [Bosnia and Herzegovina] 
and catalyzed the activation of domestic judicial institutions,” while Diane Orentlicher 
concludes that, “[T]he ICTY became a key catalyst for ramping up Bosnia’s domestic 
                                                
12 See, e.g., Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions Are Changing World Politics 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2011); Ted Piccone, Catalysts for Change: How the UN’s Independent 
Experts Promote Human Rights (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2012). 269.  
13 Sikkink, The Justice Cascade, 105. 
14 Ibid., 245. 
15 Ibid., 97 
16 See, e.g., Ellen L. Lutz and Caitlin Reiger (eds.), Prosecuting Heads of State (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009). See also Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Effect: Transnational Justice in The Age of 
Human Rights (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005). Roht-Arriaza, noting the “burgeoning field of 
transnational prosecutions” that followed the attempted extradition of former Chilean General Augusto 
Pinochet from the United Kingdom in 1998 (the same year as the Rome Statute’s adoption), argues that 
the case “played a catalytic role in stimulating and accelerating judicial investigations” in countries like 
Chile and Argentina. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “Of catalysts and cases: transnational prosecutions and 
impunity in Latin America,” in Madeleine Davis (ed.), The Pinochet Case: Origins, Progress and Implications 
(London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 2003), 210. 
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capacity to prosecute wartime atrocities.”17 Similarly, Yuval Shany observes that the 
“practical importance of international criminal proceedings is mainly symbolic and 
catalytic,” insofar as they “may trigger or nurture domestic and international legal and 
political processes.”18 
 
Interest in the capacity of international courts and prosecutions to serve as 
“catalysts” at the national level has strong affinities with a growing literature on the 
socializing power of international law and legal institutions, and their role in shaping state 
behavior.19  Seminal texts like the Power of Human Rights20 and the early work of such 
scholars as Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes21 opened up a new literature amongst 
social scientists on compliance with international norms and institutions, one that has 
proliferated rapidly in the last two decades. Interest in the ICC as a catalyst for domestic 
criminal proceedings thus reflects a converging interest of two distinct, though 
interconnected, disciplines—international relations and international law—in how legal 
institutions can influence state behavior and, more particularly, how they can encourage 
“rule-consistent” behavior.22 In this sense, interest in complementarity is part of a larger 
                                                
17 William W. Burke-White, “The Domestic Influence of International Criminal Tribunals: The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Creation of the State Court of Bosnia 
& Herzegovina,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 46 (2008), 282; Diane F. Orentlicher, That Someone 
Guilty Be Punished: The Impact of the ICTY in Bosnia (Open Society Justice Initiative/International Center for 
Transitional Justice, 2010), 108. Orentlicher advances a similar argument in the context of the Serbian 
experience, arguing that “one of the ICTY’s most acknowledged, if nonetheless limited, achievements in 
Serbia has been its role in spurring the creation of a local war crimes court and helping to empower that 
court to function professionally.” See Diane F. Orentlicher, Shrinking the Space for Denial: The Impact of the 
ICTY in Serbia (Open Society Justice Initiative, 2008), 45. More recent scholarship has focused on the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone’s contributions to domestic justice advancements as well. See, e.g., Sigall 
Horovitz, “How International Courts Shape Domestic Justice: Lessons from Rwanda and Sierra Leone,” 
Israel Law Review 46(3) (2013), 339-367. 
18 Yuval Shany, “The Legitimacy Deficit of Exceptional International Criminal Jurisdiction,” in Fionnuala 
Ni Aolain and Oren Gross (eds.), Guantanamo and Beyond: Exceptional Courts and Military Commissions in 
Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 370. 
19 See, e.g., Karen Alter, The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, Politics, and Rights (Princeton University 
Press, 2014); Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights Through International 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Beth A. Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International 
Law in Domestic Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Goodman and Jinks, in particular, 
have advanced a theory of “acculturation as a distinct mode of social influence,” arguing that this model 
best accounts for changes in state behavior, in part, “because ‘conforming’ and ‘belonging’ themselves 
confer substantial affective returns,” 30-31.  
20 Drawing on quantitative and qualitative case studies, The Power of Human Rights suggested that a five-
phase “spiral model” explains the socialization process of states with human right norms; the model links 
interactions among governments, domestic opposition groups, and transnational human rights networks. 
See Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights: International Norms 
and Domestic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); see also Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, The 
Persistent Power of Human Rights: From Commitment to Compliance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2013). 
21 The Chayes’ scholarship forms part of an important strand in compliance literature focusing on 
“managerial” compliance, suggesting that limitations on the capacity of states and the absence of domestic 
regulatory apparatuses, rather than the ability to sanction, better explains why states comply with 
international law. See Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, “On Compliance,” International 
Organization 47(2) (1993). 
22 See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. Pollack (eds.), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and 
International Relations: The State of the Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Michael Barnett 
and Martha Finnemore, Rules for The World: International Organizations in Global Politics (Cornell: Cornell 
University Press, 2004); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello, and Stepan Wood, “International 
Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship,” American 
Journal of International Law 92 (1998), 367-397. For an account of the rise of global governance through 
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contemporary moment in global governance, wherein supranational judicial bodies are 
increasingly scrutinized in terms of their effects on state compliance with international 
norms, rules, and judgments.23  
 
These developments in scholarship and the rise of the accountability norm 
described by Sikkink resonate with a view of international criminal law and its 
institutions as progressive, catalytic forces on states. As a discursive structure, 
characterizing these institutions as “catalysts” also recalls what Thomas Skouteris has 
called the notion of progress in public international law discourse. In the context of the 
“new tribunalism” of which the ICC is a part, this “vocabulary of progress” becomes a 
“legitimizing language”—a narrative of evolution and disciplinary progress.24  In 
Skouteris’ words, “It is a compelling story about how international law may finally be 
able to travel the coveted distance from a power-oriented approach to a rule-oriented 
approach, from indeterminacy to determinacy, from impunity to accountability.”25 Thus 
figured, international tribunals are “not only the latest addition to the repertoire of 
international legal action: they are also the catalyst for coping with the realist challenges 
of the 21st century.”26 
 
3.  Complementarity as a Catalyst for Compliance 
 
 Most writing about the ICC’s power to catalyze domestic investigations and 
prosecutions has interpreted complementarity as a matter of compliance with rules. As 
stated in the ICC Prosecutor’s first policy paper: “[T]he system of complementarity is 
principally based on the recognition that the exercise of national criminal jurisdiction is 
not only a right but also a duty of States.”27  In this duty-based understanding, these 
“rules” include a legal obligation on states to implement the Rome Statute within their 
domestic penal code; to ensure that their courts are capable of accommodating 
prosecutions for international crimes; and, as the Statute’s preambular language affirms, 
to investigate and prosecute those responsible.28 A number of legal scholars, notably Jann 
Kleffner’s pioneering work on complementarity, have sought to locate these duties 
                                                                                                                                      
international institutions, see Mark Mazower, Governing The Word: The History of an Idea, 1815 to the Present 
(New York: Penguin Books, 2013). 
23 On compliance, see Dinah Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance: The role of Non-binding Norms in the 
International Legal System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Sonia Cardenas, Conflict and Compliance: 
State Responses to International Human Rights Pressure (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007); 
Courtney Hillebrecht, Domestic Politics and International Human Rights Tribunals: The Problem of Compliance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). Attendant with this turn has been a growing interest in 
identifying “indicators” for measuring compliance. See, e.g., Sally Merry, “Measuring the World: Indicators, 
Human Rights, and Global Governance,” Current Anthropology 52(3) (April 2011), 83-93. 
24 Thomas Skouteris, The Notion of Progress in International Law Discourse (Leiden: Proefschrift, 2008), 187. 
On the discourse of progress as the “dominant narrative of modern international law,” see also David 
Koller, “… and New York and The Hague and Tokyo and Geneva and Nuremberg and…: The 
Geographies of International Law,” European Journal of International Law 23(1) (February 2012); Gerry 
Simpson, “The sentimental life of international law,” London Review of International Law 3(1) (2015), 4. 
25 Skouteris, The Notion of Progress in International Law Discourse, 137. 
26 Ibid. 
27 “Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor,” ICC-OTP 2003 (September 2003), at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/1fa7c4c6-de5f-42b7-8b25-
60aa962ed8b6/143594/030905_policy_paper.pdf.    
28 Rome Statute, Preamble, para. 10; see also Kampala Declaration, RC/Decl.1, para.5 (“Resolve to 
continue and strengthen effective domestic implementation of the Statute, to enhance the capacity of 
national jurisdictions to prosecute the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of international concern in 
accordance with internationally-recognized fair trial standards, pursuant to the principle of 
complementarity.”).   
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within the Rome Statute itself. For Kleffner, complementarity is understood as “aiming 
to induce and facilitate the compliance of States with their obligation ‘to exercise [their] 
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes,’ which underlies the 
Rome Statute.”29  Furthermore, he argues, “The detailed content of the obligation 
imposed by the [Rome] Statute, as derived from the complementarity requirements, 
demands that State Parties conduct effective, genuine, independent and impartial 
investigations into allegations of ICC crimes without unjustified delays.”30  
 
This duty-based approach has involved two key strategies for complementarity. 
On the one hand, complementarity signals the Court’s potential to act as a coercive 
stimulant on national jurisdictions (a threat-based relationship); on the other, it signals 
the ICC’s ability to serve a more cooperative, managerial function, wherein it supports or, 
literally, “complements” national jurisdictions. While these divergent approaches have 
important implications for the realization of complementarity in practice, both share a 
vision in which the ICC can precipitate or spur progress in conducting investigations and 
prosecutions at the domestic level. This understanding of complementarity was actively 
developed under the tenure of former Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo, who identified 
“positive” complementarity—defined as the active encouragement of “genuine national 
proceedings”—as a principal pillar of his Office’s strategy.31   
 
 This dissertation argues that complementarity’s evolution as a tool for 
compliance has cast the domestic forms and possibilities for post-conflict justice in 
Uganda, Kenya, and the DRC within a predominantly retributive model, furthering “the 
criminal trial, courtroom, and jailhouse as the preferred modalities to promote justice for 
atrocity.”32 In this process, complementarity has largely been interpreted in a manner that 
privileges (even when it does not legally require) a mirroring of the ICC’s normative and 
institutional frameworks. Domestic accountability is thus commonly understood as 
requiring, for instance, the establishment of exceptional courts that mimic the ICC’s 
structures rather than prosecutions enabled through the “regular” criminal justice system. 
Prosecutions, too, are thought to necessitate adjudication as international crimes rather 
than “ordinary” crimes, while accountability itself is increasingly understood and 
prioritized as a project of criminal justice, rather than the plural approaches more 
commonly associated with transitional justice policy and practice.33  Indeed, the ICC is 
                                                
29 Jann K. Kleffner, “Complementarity as a Catalyst for Compliance,” in Jann K. Kleffner and Gerben Kor 
(eds.), Complementary Views on Complementarity: Proceedings of the International Roundtable on the Complementary 
Nature of the International Criminal Court, Amsterdam, 25/26 June 2004 (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2006), 
80. See also Stigen, The Relationship between the International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions, 473-478; 
Jann Kleffner, “The Impact of Complementarity on National Implementation of Substantive International 
Criminal Law,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 1 (2003), 113 (noting that, “complementarity provides 
for a supervision of national criminal courts, supported by the threat that they relinquish the primary right 
to exercise jurisdiction if they fail to meet the relevant requirements”); Florian Jessberger and Julia 
Geneuss, “The Many Faces of the International Criminal Court,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 10 
(2012), 1088 (“The ICC’s possible intervening looming over the affected states’ reputation serves as a tool 
to trigger domestic prosecution and is a ‘catalyst for compliance.’”). 
30 Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions, 307.  
31 “The Office of the Prosecutor - Report on Prosecutorial Strategy” (14 September 2006), II.2.a.  
32 Mark A. Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 5. Ruti Teitel similarly refers to the growing “enforcement of international human rights norms 
through judicial proceedings,“ in particular international criminal law enforcement. Ruti G. Teitel, “The 
Universal and the Particular in International Criminal Justice,” in Globalizing Transitional Justice: Contemporary 
Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
33 See, e.g., Lisa J. Laplante, “Outlawing Amnesty: The Return of Criminal Justice in Transitional Justice 
Schemes,” Virginia Journal of International Law 49(4) (2009), 915-984. On the persistence (and necessity) of 
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itself now commonly referred to as a “transitional justice mechanism.” Domestic 
accountability is thus increasingly understood and measured in retributive, outcome-
oriented terms.  
 
 Judged by these terms, the ICC may appear to have accomplished little in 
Uganda, Kenya, or the DRC.34 In Kenya, no senior official or political leader has been 
held to account for crimes committed during the 2007-08 elections and, while there have 
been a handful of scattered domestic prosecutions, they have been charged as “ordinary” 
crimes, in the ordinary criminal justice system.35 Efforts to establish a domestic special 
tribunal have repeatedly failed and despite the appointment of various working groups 
and a domestic “task force” to review hundreds of PEV case files, the vast majority of 
them have been deemed unfit for prosecution due to an alleged lack of evidence.36 There 
have been more, but still limited, domestic prosecutions in the DRC through mobile 
military courts; however, as I argue, these are primarily due to the efforts of human 
rights advocates who summon complementarity as a principle of burden-sharing and 
cooperation (rather than admissibility) to animate their work. The ICC itself is barely 
present.37 Finally, in Uganda, there has been only one attempted prosecution to date of a 
former LRA member before its International Crimes Division, a proceeding which itself 
has been rife with fair trial violations.  
 
 Yet, from a process-oriented perspective, the “idea of the ICC” has been deeply 
alive in domestic politics and there has been considerable national-level activity pursued 
in complementarity’s name.38 Indeed, as this dissertation illustrates, the absence of 
domestic proceedings has not meant that states are inactive, but nor has it meant that 
compliance with rules necessarily produces greater accountability. Furthermore, an 
approach defined principally by outcome rather than process underscores the extent to 
which legalism animates the catalyst/compliance framework. More particularly, it 
underscores the dominance of what Bronwyn Leebaw has called “human rights legalism,” 
which “not only insists upon the promotion of law and courts in general, but on the 
                                                                                                                                      
amnesties, see Mark Freeman, Necessary Evils: Amnesties and the Search for Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009). 
34 Nouwen’s “most striking” finding in her commanding study of the Court’s interventions in Uganda and 
Sudan was that the relevant compliance sought—an increase in domestic proceedings for crimes within the 
ICC’s jurisdiction—was “barely observable in either state.” She is careful to note, however, that an absence 
of domestic proceedings did not mean that complementarity was without catalytic effect. See Nouwen, 
Complementarity in the Line of Fire, 10, 33.   
35 See, e.g., Irene Wairimu, “Kenya: First Life Sentence in Local PEV Trial,” The Star (12 June 2012); 
Human Rights Watch, “‘Turning Pebbles’: Evading Accountability for Post-Election Violence in Kenya” 
(December 2011). 
36 In June 2008, Kenya’s Attorney General constituted a “task force” within the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (then subordinate to the AG’s Office) to undertake a national wide review of the PEV cases; 
it later released two reports on domestic investigations and prosecutions, in 2009 and 2011. For a more 
detailed assessment of these figures, see Sosteness Francis Materu, The Post-Election Violence in Kenya: 
Domestic and International Legal Responses (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2015), 102-111. The Attorney 
General also established a “Working Committee on the International Criminal Court” in 2012, following 
the government’s failed admissibility challenges. See “Report of Government’s Working Committee on the 
International Criminal Court” (March 16, 2012) (on-file).   
37 For a similar conclusion, see Milli Lake, “Ending Impunity for Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes: The 
International Criminal Court and Complementarity in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” African Conflict 
& Peacebuilding Review 4(1) (Spring 2014). Lake concludes that, “while the ICC may have inspired certain 
aspects of legal reform in DRC, the Court itself has remained largely disengaged from domestic 
developments,” 3. 
38 My thanks to Rod Rastan for this felicitous phrase.  
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centrality of criminal law in the aftermath of atrocities and political violence.”39 
 
 Scholars have noted for some time the dominance of legalism—defined by the 
political theorist Judith Shklar as “the ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a 
matter of rule following, and moral relationships to consist of duties and rights 
determined by legal rules”40—in transitional justice literature. Kieran McEvoy notes, for 
instance, that, “a strongly positivistic trend of scholarship and practice persists in the 
legal understanding of transitional justice.”41 This, he suggests, is the product of the 
“institutionalization of transitional justice in major legal edifices,” including the ICC.42 In 
McEvoy’s view, legalism is seductive, for it “encourages a notion of a rational and 
ordered place based on universal understandings.”43 Similarly, Shklar notes the influence 
of legalism as a “matter of rule following,” one that seeks to separate legal analysis from 
politics as well as other disciplines. She writes: 
 
The urge to draw a clear line between law and non-law has led to the 
 constructing of ever more refined and rigid systems of formal definitions. This 
 procedure has served to isolate law completely from the social context within 
 which it exists. Law is endowed with its own “science,” and its own values, which 
 are all treated as a single “block” sealed off from general social history, from 
 general social theory, from politics, and from morality.44 
 
Legalism thus shares with compliance an emphasis on rule abidance, wherein political 
problems are often subordinated to legal categories. In Shklar’s words, “Politics is 
regarded not only as something apart from law, but as inferior to law.”45  
 
By contrast, this dissertation underscores the primacy of political context in 
understanding the ways in which domestic actors have negotiated ICC interventions at 
national level.  Building on Leebaw’s insight, it argues that these interventions and the 
goals they seek to achieve have not transcended “the influence of local politics or the 
impact of global asymmetries” but are, in fact, constituted by them.46 Nevertheless, in 
The Hague the ICC has articulated a complex set of rules that states must satisfy in order 
to successfully challenge the admissibility of cases before the Court, leaving little room 
(or the perception of little room) for agency or political discretion. As I argue, these rules 
                                                
39 Bronwyn Leebaw, Judging State-Sponsored Violence, Imagining Political Change (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 6 (emphasis in original).  
40 Judith N. Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), 1. 
For a similar, contemporary critique from a conservative legal scholar, see Eric Posner, The Perils of Global 
Legalism (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009).  
41 Kieran McEvoy, “Letting Go of Legalism: Developing a ‘Thicker’ Version of Transitional Justice,” in 
Kieran McEvoy and Lorna McGregor (eds.), Transitional Justice from Below: Grassroots Activism and the Struggle 
for Change 15-45 (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2008), 19.  
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., 20. For a qualified defense of legalism and international criminal tribunals, see Gary Jonathan Bass, 
Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). 
44 Shklar, Legalism, 2-3.  
45 Ibid., 111. For a similar argument in the context of humanitarianism, see David Kennedy, The Dark Sides 
of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).   
46 Leebaw, 179. Leebaw emphasizes instead the importance of political judgment in the examination of 
systematic atrocities, which “informs the ways in which clashing local and international standards will be 
treated,” 178.  Sarah Nouwen and Wouter Werner have also called for an evaluation of the ICC’s activities 
that acknowledge and understand its political dimensions; however, their framework of analysis emanates 
from the friend/enemies framing advanced by Carl Schmitt. See Sarah M.H. Nouwen and Wouter G. 
Werner, “Doing Justice to the Political: The International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan,” European 
Journal of International Law 21(4) (2010), 941-965. 
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perpetuate a mirroring effect between international and domestic institutions, often at 
the expense of more pluralistic approaches.  
 
A catalyst/compliance framework also tends to privilege the ICC as the 
institutional locus for triggering domestic change, wherein rules and practices devised in 
The Hague radiate outwards. A central premise here, however, is that the effects of ICC 
engagement cannot be interpreted in institutional isolation. Indeed, the perpetuation of 
the ICC’s mirroring effect is not only (or even mostly) the work of Court actors. It is also 
the result of private actors and norm entrepreneurs—international human rights NGOs, 
academics, influential donors—who have powerfully and deliberately sought to shape the 
public understanding of justice in the ICC’s image. This constellation of global civil 
society actors, technical advisors, and international consultants that attend Court 
interventions are equally, if not more, important actors in spurring domestic reform 
agendas and influencing political priorities.47 Indeed, while ICC case law and the Rome 
Statute are both sources of legal authority, it is often these entrepreneurs who play the 
most active role in mediating the normative content of complementarity and in framing 
the Court as a catalytic force.48 
 
 Notably, this vertical approach to change places a heavy burden on the Court 
itself. To catalyze, the ICC must be seen as a credible threat by states: its coercive power 
depends on safeguarding this perception. But the Court’s lackluster record of 
confirmations and convictions to date indicates that it has largely failed to live up to 
these expectations, thus imperiling its catalytic potential. Furthermore, the Court and its 
political stakeholders (notably, the Assembly of States Parties) have often struggled to 
reconcile complementarity’s more ambitious policy goals, particularly its cooperative 
dimensions, with the ICC’s so-called “core function” as a court of law. In practice, then, 
a more narrow approach to the Court’s relationship with domestic jurisdictions has been 
pursued, limited not only by geographical and institutional constraints but, increasingly, 




 The following chapters address how the ICC, through the exercise of the 
principle of complementarity, has been framed as a catalyst for one particular set of 
                                                
47 Recent work has drawn attention to the vital role played by these actors in the ICC’s establishment and 
functioning. Nouwen, for instance, points out that, “In practice, most catalyzing effects are not the result 
of direct ICC-state interaction.” Complementarity in the Line of Fire, 22. See also Lake, “Ending Impunity for 
Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes,” 4 (concluding that “many of the developments within the Congolese 
justice sector have been propelled not by the ICC, but by the work of international and domestic NGOs”). 
On the significance of civil society’s role in the ICC’s creation and evolution, see Marlies Glasius, The 
International Criminal Court: a global civil society achievement (New York: Routledge, 2006); Fanny Benedetti, 
Karine Bonneau, and John L. Washburn, Negotiating the International Criminal Court: New York to Rome, 1994-
1998 (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2014).  
48 For a similar assessment in the context of the work of other international tribunals and human rights 
institutions, see Xinyuan Dai, “The Conditional Effects of International Human Rights Institutions,” 
Human Rights Quarterly 36 (2014), 589 (arguing that IHRIs “in and of themselves, do not directly impact 
states’ policies or behaviors”; rather, “others—interested stakeholders and human rights activists—may (or 
may not) use them to gain additional leverage to push for improvement in human rights practices”); 
Patrice C. McMahon and David P. Forsythe, “The ICTY’s Impact on Serbia: Judicial Romanticism Meets 
Network Politics,” Human Rights Quarterly 30 (2008), 433 (arguing that “the court’s effects must be 
considered in the context of the networked order in Europe”). 
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outcomes: domestic investigations and prosecutions.49 As highlighted in the problem 
statement and research questions above, I seek to trace not only how the understanding 
of complementarity has evolved since the ICC’s inception, but also how judges in The 
Hague have interpreted the principle and how it has been implemented in practice by key 
Court actors, notably the Office of the Prosecutor.  The dissertation then examines the 
process by which such proceedings have sought to be realized in the contexts of Uganda, 
Kenya, and the DRC, focusing in particular on the institutional and normative 
frameworks that have emerged in these countries.50  
 
 Chapter two examines how complementarity has evolved from a legal rule of 
admissibility—an organizing principle for the regulation of concurrent jurisdiction—to 
an instrument of policy. This policy, often referred to as “positive” complementarity, is 
one that promotes the ICC and the “Rome Statute System” as proactive agents for 
domestic accountability.  In seeking to understand the meaning and purpose of this 
evolution, the chapter traces this more ambitious articulation of the ICC’s relationship to 
national jurisdictions and argues that its ascendance reflects the work of norm 
entrepreneurs who, through a duty-based reading of the Statute, have progressively 
sought to articulate a more catalytic vision for the Court and a broader array of policy 
goals. It concludes that complementarity’s evolution in this regard is testament to the 
significant influence of non-state actors, and of a growing effort on their part to route 
human rights norms through the framework of international criminal law.   
 
 This discursive project runs alongside the Court’s jurisprudence, which, thus far, 
has established a largely conservative, Hague-centric interpretive framework for 
determining admissibility. Chapter three thus focuses on complementarity in its juridified 
form: it undertakes a detailed review of Article 17 jurisprudence and argues that the ICC 
has developed a body of case law that requires states to effectively mirror the same 
conduct (and arguably the same incident) that the OTP investigates as a precondition for 
rendering a case inadmissible. Although the Court’s more recent case law in the context 
of Libya’s admissibility challenges has unsettled this mirroring regime somewhat, the 
chapter contends that such a strict approach to admissibility challenges may serve to 
stymie, rather than catalyze, domestic proceedings. Furthermore, while Court officials 
and some commentators have defended the ICC’s approach, suggesting that it is not 
inconsistent with the policy goals of complementarity, I argue that this division is 
symptomatic of legalism: it relies on an artificial division between the Court as a legal and 
political actor.  
 
 Chapter four shifts from doctrine to practice, and examines the role of the Office 
of the Prosecutor. Responsible for undertaking the investigations and prosecutions that 
are brought before the Court, the OTP is arguably the most significant actor shaping the 
ICC’s catalytic potential, perched as it is between The Hague and national jurisdictions. 
The chapter thus queries in what ways the Office has sought to influence state behavior 
towards domestic proceedings through two key areas of its work: preliminary 
examinations and investigations. As the only country of the three to have been placed in 
preliminary examination, the dissertation offers a case study of the Kenyan experience in 
order to closely explore the political dynamics at play in that period, and what 
                                                
49 While the focus here is predominantly on whether and how the ICC has catalyzed domestic proceedings, 
I do not suggest that Court interventions have not had other, multi-dimensional effects.  
50 While the research presented herein endeavors to take account of recent developments in each country, 
the analysis centers most closely on national developments that took place between 2010 and 2013, during 
which time field research was carried out. 
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presumptions guided the OTP as it sought to push the state to establish a national 
accountability mechanism that, thus far, remains elusive. The second half of the chapter 
addresses the Office’s investigatory practices, focusing on Uganda and the DRC in 
particular. It argues that while investigations could be a material site where a positive, 
cooperative approach to complementarity could be more meaningfully enacted, for the 
most part it has not been. This has often been to the detriment of the OTP’s relationship 
with state and non-state actors at the national level, but also to the Office’s confirmation 
and conviction record, which itself imperils the Court’s catalytic potential. 
 
 Chapters five and six move away from Hague-based actors to national-level 
actors in Kenya, Uganda, and the DRC. Together, they address two key areas of “rule 
following” associated with the catalytic frame: the transformation of domestic judiciaries 
for the prosecution of atrocity crimes and the reform of national legal frameworks. 
Chapter five examines the emergence and attempted establishment of specialized 
domestic courts or chambers for the prosecution of serious crimes as one of the most 
frequently cited outcomes of ICC interventions, even though, as I argue, the link 
between these efforts and the Court’s work is sometimes tenuous. In Kenya and Uganda, 
these divisions have been created or proposed to satisfy perceived obligations under the 
ICC’s complementarity regime, although there has been only one attempted domestic 
prosecution (in Uganda) by such a division to date. By contrast, in the DRC, domestic 
military courts have undertaken a far greater number of prosecutions, even though they 
were not created in response to, and indeed preceded, the ICC’s involvement. In 
describing these various courts, the chapter highlights the shifting, multiple ways in 
which complementarity has been invoked as a basis for their establishment. The 
chapter’s second half identifies several concerns that these institutions have produced, in 
particular the enduring tensions between the exceptionalism that underwrites the 
creation of special courts and their relationship to ordinary criminal justice systems.  It 
also examines the ways in which the establishment of domestic institutions in 
complementarity’s name have accommodated to state power, leading in certain instances 
to outcomes that are themselves at odds with human rights norms.  
 
 Chapter six explores the normative impact of the ICC on the legal frameworks of 
these three states. It first argues that implementation has become a sophisticated and 
technocratic exercise in applying the Rome Statute as a “global script”; this, in turn, has 
contributed to an increasingly disciplinary approach to implementation, one that 
privileges conformity with the Statute. Second, I argue that it was less the ICC’s 
intervention or the threat of domestic proceedings that catalyzed the passage of national 
implementation legislation in any of these countries; rather, implementation of the 
Statute was accelerated in order to “perform” complementarity for predominantly 
international audiences. The union of these two factors—uniformity of application and 
the power of external constituencies—was largely responsible for driving the 
implementation process in both Kenya and Uganda, but it glossed over deeper political 
fissures about the desirability of international criminal law as a framework for domestic 
accountability. In the DRC, by contrast, domestic politics have continually thwarted 
efforts to press for comprehensive implementing legislation (though looming presidential 
elections may yet contribute to its passage). Despite these different outcomes, the 
chapter queries the outsized role of external actors and constituencies in the 
implementation processes, raising questions about the content and form of the domestic 
legislation that was enacted. 
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 In the final chapter, I offer several tentative conclusions arising out of this work. 
First, complementarity contains multiple meanings: it is not merely a rule of admissibility, 
but the juridical logic through which the ICC’s potential as a catalytic force has been 
expressed. Second, although complementarity was initially seen as a mechanism to 
influence the choices of state actors, its effects on non-state actors appears to have been 
far more profound. Third, while legalism is central to the pursuit of a rules-based global 
order, the effects of ICC interventions in Uganda, Kenya, and the DRC—all peri-
transitional countries, with long histories of political autocracy—underscore how global 
asymmetries, and the patronage networks they produce, are deeply entwined with the 
catalytic project. The increasing focus on “compliance” with ICC standards and 
procedures is partially a function of these asymmetries: it belies the outsized influence 
that external constituencies can hold over what activities states undertake in the name of 
complementarity. Finally, and for these reasons, the ICC’s “catalytic effect” on state 
behavior is better understood as part of a complex political process, rather than a 
singular desired outcome of the complementarity regime. In light of these observations, I 
conclude with several suggestions for future inquiry and practice.  
 
5. Terms, Methodology, and Country Selection 
 This dissertation draws upon a wide variety of primary and secondary sources, 
ranging from books and articles in the emerging complementarity canon, to news articles 
and parliamentary debates in Kenya and Uganda, to international and domestic 
jurisprudence. The primary approach is thus textual. Through discourse analysis I seek, 
in particular to trace how complementarity has been understood and portrayed by 
different actors and stakeholders as a shifting, protean principle, one that does not admit 
of a singular understanding.51 In so doing, a note on terminology is warranted. Formally, 
the ICC is an institution and complementarity a principle of limitation: it governs the 
priority of the Court’s jurisdiction. Yet regardless of formal ICC intervention in a 
country, complementarity is also invoked as a duty of member states. For instance, it can 
be said to “catalyze” the passage of implementation legislation merely as a precaution 
against the threat of ICC intervention. In the context of Kenya, Uganda and the DRC, 
however, where the Court itself has formally intervened, the operation and invocation of 
complementarity is fundamentally intertwined with the work of the ICC itself. Thus, in 
Uganda, a dedicated unit for adjudicating international crimes was seen as a necessary 
step to (potentially) displace the ICC, but complementarity was the principle that 
justified its creation. Throughout the dissertation, I have sought to make this conceptual 
distinction clear but I occasionally use the terms “ICC” and “complementarity” 
interchangeably.  
 In addition, the ideas reflected herein are deeply informed by several field 
research trips carried out in Nairobi, Kenya; Kampala, Uganda; and Kinshasa, DRC, over 
the course of 2011 and 2012, as well as the two and a half years I spent living and 
working in The Hague.52  While not a work of legal ethnography, the dissertation adopts 
                                                
51 See, e.g., Solomon T. Ebobrah, “Towards a Positive Application of Complementarity in the African 
Human Rights System: Issues of Functions and Relations,” European Journal of International Law 22(3) 
(2011), 669 (nothing that “although the term may appear universal, its application or functioning in 
practice differs according to each specific context”).  
52 Research trips were conducted in the periods of June 2011 (four weeks), December 2011 (two weeks), 
January 2012 (one week), and November-December 2012 (ten days). All interviews were conducted in 
French or English.  
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a “multi-sited” focus,53 one that shares an interest in using ethnographic methods as 
useful tools for “accessing the complex ways in which law, decision-making and legal 
regulations are embedded in wider social processes.”54 Though rooted in legal analysis, it 
seeks to contribute to a growing field of interpretive social science that uses 
interdisciplinary, qualitative methods to capture a wider, more situated perspective on the 
value and impact of global legal institutions.55  
 
 Understanding the theatre of the ICC’s work outside of its institutional center in 
The Hague also afforded me the opportunity to better understand the complex 
circumstances in which its interventions unfold. Principally, the research trips allowed 
me to undertake interviews with a wide array of actors engaged in ICC-related work: 
Court officials working (either long-term or on mission) in Kampala, Kinshasa, and 
Nairobi; practitioners in the field of human rights and transitional justice, either in the 
national offices of international NGOs or for national organizations; domestic lawyers, 
judges, and bar associations; government officials; and an extensive community of 
international diplomats and donors. In addition, I was able to gather numerous 
documents—court judgments, parliamentary debates, draft laws, brochures—that were 
generally not available outside of the countries, and occasionally not publicly available 
within.  On several occasions, I also attended and observed private meetings and public 
programs convened by NGOs working in country.  
 
 Informants were initially approached through personal contacts that my co-
researcher and I had developed prior to the first research trip in June 2011, on the basis 
of their expertise in some aspect of the ICC’s intervention at national level, as well as 
their engagement in domestic political or legal aspects of the Court’s work.56 Following a 
“snowball” approach, these initial meetings became important points of connection to 
other interlocutors: we relied on referrals from initial informants to identify additional 
interview subjects.57 Despite the debt that this work owes to those individuals who gave 
of their time, I reference these interviews relatively sparingly in the chapters that follow.  
                                                
53 See George E. Marcus, “Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-Sited 
Ethnography,” Annual Review of Anthropology 24 (1995), 95-117.  
54 June Starr and Mark Goodale, “Introduction,” in June Starr and Mark Goodale (eds.), Practicing 
Ethnography in Law (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 2.  
55 Other literature from outside the field of international criminal law that has taken up more critical 
perspectives on the ICC and/or international criminal tribunals includes: Adam Branch, Displacing Human 
Rights: War and Intervention in Northern Uganda (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Kamari Clarke, 
Fictions of Justice: the International Criminal Court and the Challenge of Legal Pluralism in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Jelena Subotic, Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the 
Balkans (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 2009). See also Hugo van der Merwe, Victoria Baxter, Audrey 
R. Chapman (eds.), Assessing the Impact of Transitional Justice: Challenges for Empirical Research (Washington, 
D.C.: USIP Press, 2009). 
56 Interviews were formal but followed a semi-structured format: questions were prepared in advance, 
although the discussions frequently evolved to accommodate unexpected insights or new lines of inquiry.  
57 Given that the risk of selection bias is always present (particularly so for the snowball approach; the 
technique has been criticized for reducing the likelihood that the sample of informants represent a 
representative cross-section of the population), I should note that we generally had greater success in 
speaking with and accessing representatives of international and national NGOs, although in all three 
countries we were at least able to meet with several senior representatives from the domestic judicial 
sector, in-country ICC staff (from the OTP as well as the Registrar), and individuals engaged in donor 
work on behalf of the diplomatic community. It should be noted, however, that this study did not use 
interviews as a means of sampling the country populations or determining the factual accuracy of their 
views; rather, as noted, the interviews provided important contextual information for the claims that I 
develop herein. On snowball interviewing, see Paula Pickering, Peacebuilding in the Balkans: The View from the 
Ground Floor (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2007) 
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Because of the sensitivity of the subject matter, many interlocutors only spoke with the 
express understanding that their views were not for attribution. While others imposed no 
such restrictions, the sensitive nature of their work and its attendant security risks 
compels caution in identifying them. For these reasons, references to interview subjects 
occur only where the assertions provide explicit, additional validation of claims central to 
my analysis.58  
 
 Defined as “a person or thing that causes a change,”59 I employ catalyst here in a 
causal sense. As a methodological approach to understanding the relationship between 
the ICC’s work and the “rule following” examined in chapters five and six, then, I rely 
on process tracing. As defined by Bennett:  
 
 Process tracing involves looking at evidence within an individual case, or a 
 temporally and spatially bound instance of a specified phenomenon, to derive 
 and/or test alternative  explanations of that case. In other words, process tracing 
 seeks a historical explanation of an individual case, and this explanation may or 
 may not provide a theoretical explanation relevant to the wider phenomenon of 
 which the case is an instance.60 
  
Such an approach is necessary in light of the ambitious, often overly eager claims to 
validate Court interventions as the cause of domestic change. The challenge of 
understanding whether the relationship between relevant national-level events—the 
passage of domestic Rome Statute legislation, the establishment of a domestic war crimes 
court—and the ICC’s actions is indeed causal (rather than contributory) is therefore 
crucial: more than one factor contributes to change. My intent is thus two-fold: to clarify 
to what extent the Court’s interventions, as opposed to the influence of mediating actors 
and events, have catalyzed domestic change, and to better understand the nature of this 
mediated relationship as a catalytic force in itself.   
 
 A final note on country selection: at the time that this project began in mid-2010, 
the ICC had five active situations, from which I selected three.61  For the purposes of 
this dissertation, ICC “intervention” is defined as those countries where the Court’s 
engagement has advanced to at least an investigatory stage.62 This was a minimum 
criterion in selecting the DRC, Kenya, and Uganda (as opposed to other countries, like 
Colombia, where the Court’s engagement has been substantial but has not advanced to 
this threshold.) On the spectrum of Court engagement, intervention has thus entailed, at 
                                                
58 Needless to say, however, my interlocutors do not necessarily endorse the conclusions advanced herein.  
59 Oxford Dictionary. The etymology of “catalyst” is chemical: it was introduced in the mid-19th century 
by a Swedish chemist as “change caused by an agent which itself remains unchanged.”   
60 Andrew Bennett, “Process Tracing: A Bayesian Perspective,” in Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry E. 
Brady, and David Collier (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 704. See also Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool (Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. 
Checkel, eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).  
61 Security concerns, resource constraints, and the sheer complexity of each of these diverse situations 
required selectivity for the purposes of conducting meaningful field research. On this basis, the Sudan and 
the Central African Republic (CAR) were excluded: Sudan principally because of the political difficulty of 
conducting such research inside the country, and CAR because of the apparently limited scope of the 
ICC’s investigations there (which, to date, have led to an arrest warrant for only the former DRC Vice 
President Jean-Pierre Bemba) and the substantial implications that those proceedings, while formally part 
of the CAR referral, have had in the DRC. While subsequent developments in other ICC situations inform 
parts of my analysis, they are not addressed in depth here. 
62 On the term “international judicial interventions,” see David Scheffer, “International Judicial 
Intervention,” Foreign Policy (1996), 34. 
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the least, active deployment of ICC personnel to the countries in question, as well as a 
substantial (if developing) body of case law ranging from questions of admissibility and 
victim participation, to individual criminal liability and reparations.  
 
 This focus on direct Court engagement should not obscure, however, more 
“indirect” forms of intervention, including the use of preliminary examinations (explored 
further in chapter four) or the evolving, normative impact of the Rome Statute on 
national legal frameworks. Indeed, as the first two chapters argue, the treatment of 
complementarity as both policy concept and legal doctrine has had a profound effect on 
the popular understanding of the principle, as well as what it purports to require of states, 
regardless of whether or not they are the subject of a formal Court intervention. 
Nevertheless, such forms of intervention demand considerably less of the ICC’s financial 
and material resources, and the connection between its work and national-level change is 
even more difficult to delineate.  For these reasons, while the conclusions advanced 






Tracing an Idea, Building a Norm: Complementarity as a Catalyst 
 
 Since the signing of the Rome Statute in 1998, complementarity has increasingly 
expanded from a legal concept to an instrument of policy. This policy sees the ICC not 
only as a forum for prosecution where states fail to undertake criminal investigations and 
prosecutions themselves, but also as a means to enable or encourage proceedings at the 
national level.  As stated by former Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo in a speech to the 
ICC’s Assembly of States Parties, one of his Office’s “core policies” would be to pursue 
a “positive approach to cooperation and to the principle of complementarity.” This 
meant, in his words, “encouraging genuine national proceedings where possible, relying 
on national and international networks, and participating in a system of international 
cooperation.”63 
 
Such a description of complementarity might now seem commonplace; however, 
the expansion of its definition, and of its popular understanding, was neither obvious nor 
ordained. Furthermore, while the vision of “positive” complementarity outlined by 
Moreno-Ocampo may have been “an inherent concept of the [Rome] Statute,” it was 
also a policy invention. As Carsten Stahn notes, “In Court policy, complementarity was 
slowly discovered as a virtue, … as an instrument to foster legitimacy and enhance the 
efficiency of justice.”64 This discovery was chiefly driven by non-state actors—
international human rights NGOs, influential donors, and academics—many of whom 
had initially sought a stronger role for the Court vis-à-vis national courts (primacy, rather 
than complementarity); had themselves served in previous leadership positions with 
other criminal tribunals; and, in certain cases, came to occupy important leadership 
positions in the early years of the ICC itself. These “norm entrepreneurs” have 
persuasively advanced the conception of complementarity as a catalyst, awhile framing it 
as a series of obligations upon states to legislate, investigate, and prosecute international 
crimes at the national level.65  
 
This chapter traces the expansion in complementarity’s meaning and purpose as 
a catalyst and queries how it has come to dominate so much of the ICC’s discursive 
space. It is divided into three parts. First, it offers an overview of the Rome Statute’s 
drafting history, emphasizing how the predominant understanding of complementarity 
among states at the time was as a principle of constraint. Unlike the ad hoc tribunals for 
Rwanda (ICTR) and the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the drafters of the Statute chose not 
to grant the ICC primacy over national jurisdictions. This issue was deeply contested in 
the negotiations over the Court and reflected a delicate process that sought to balance 
supranational jurisdiction with an enduring concern for state sovereignty.  Furthermore, 
in line with this process, a deliberate choice was made to permit states substantial leeway 
in their prosecution of international crimes, including, for instance, their ability to 
prosecute Rome Statute crimes as “ordinary” crimes.  
                                                
63 Third Session of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
Address by Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo (The Hague, 6 September 2004), 2, at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/asp/LMO_20040906_En.pdf.  
64 Carsten Stahn, “Taking complementarity seriously: On the sense and sensibility of ‘classical’, ‘positive’ 
and ‘negative’ complementarity,” in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M. El Zeidy (eds.), The International 
Criminal Court and Complementarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 235. 
65 The concept of “norm entrepreneur” has a long history explored further below. Cass Sunstein is first 
believed to have introduced the phrase in a 1996 article, wherein he defines entrepreneurs simply as 
“people interested in changing social norms.” See Cass R. Sunstein, “Social Norms and Social Roles,” 
Columbia Law Review 96(4) (May 1996), 903-968. 
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Despite these careful negotiations, the second section of the chapter examines 
the evolution of complementarity from a technical rule of admissibility crafted by states 
towards a more catalytic vision driven by private actors. In so doing, it traces 
complementarity’s growth as a policy concept, which was embraced early on by the OTP 
as a way of encouraging national accountability for grave crimes. The intellectual history 
of complementarity is also considered, including the experiences of the ICTR and ICTY, 
whose completion strategies vis-à-vis the states of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
played an important role in academic writing on the concept of positive complementarity 
and, in turn, influenced early ICC practice. Finally, the role of non-state actors in 
advancing the normative content of this concept is examined. Through this discourse 
analysis, the chapter demonstrates how the carefully negotiated compromises that 
informed the Rome Statute’s drafting have been progressively reshaped through the 
principle of complementarity.  
 
 The final section attempts to better understand the means by which 
complementarity’s polysemy (its meaning as both a rule of admissibility and a catalyst 
that compels domestic reform) evolved with such apparent speed. Indeed, rather than 
complementarity’s “slow discovery” as a virtue, the pace of this discovery—given the 
degree to which it altered the perceived obligations of states, and the extent to which 
states have ratified that perception66—is perhaps more notable for its swiftness. One 
reason for this swiftness, I suggest, is that the framing of complementarity as a catalyst 
benefited from the unprecedented and influential role that non-state actors played in the 
establishment of the ICC itself. I also suggest that a growing literature on transnational 
“communities of practice,” a concept advanced by the political scientist Emanuel Adler, 
offers a helpful lens through which to understand how this new norm has proliferated. 
In highlighting this dynamic interplay between practice and discourse the chapter 
concludes that, rather than a static legal concept, complementarity is better understood 
as an evolving, adaptive principle. 
 
1. Complementarity as Constraint 
 
While negotiations around the ICC’s establishment inaugurated a wave of interest 
in complementarity, the principle itself is not new. As Mohammed El Zeidy notes, “the 
conditions or the parameters of [complementarity’s] operation developed over a lengthy 
period of time until the adoption of the 1998 Rome Statute.”67 For example, the principle 
was the subject of much debate around the creation and operation of a UN War Crimes 
Commission during World War II, where the role of the Commission vis-a-vis Allied 
states played an “antecedent role” to the Rome Statute.68 Still, most academic 
                                                
66 For instance, the successful negotiation of duty-based language in the resolutions that emerged out of 
the Rome Statute Review Conference was seen as significant victories by civil society. See, e.g., Kampala 
Declaration, RC/Decl.1, para.5 (adopted 1 June 2010)(“Resolve to continue and strengthen effective 
domestic implementation of the Statute, to enhance the capacity of national jurisdictions to prosecute the 
perpetrators of the most serious crimes of international concern in accordance with internationally-
recognized fair trial standards, pursuant to the principle of complementarity.”); Resolution RC/Res.1 – 
Complementarity (adopted 8 June 2010), para. 2 (“Emphasizes the principle of complementarity as laid 
down in the Rome Statute and stresses the obligations of States Parties flowing from the Rome Statute”). 
67 Mohamed El Zeidy, “The genesis of complementarity,” in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M. El Zeidy 
(eds.), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 
77. 
68 Mark S. Ellis, Sovereignty and Justice: Balancing the Principle of Complementarity between International and Domestic 
War Crimes Tribunals (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014), 19.  
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commentary on the subject did not emerge until the early 1990s, spurred on by the end 
of the Cold War and, relatedly, the International Law Commission’s (ILC) efforts to 
study the question of international criminal jurisdiction.  
 
1.1 The International Law Commission: 1990-1994 
 
Trinidad and Tobago first requested that the UN General Assembly consider the 
question of establishing an international criminal court in 1989.69 In its initial report 
responding to that request, the Commission presaged much of the debate that would 
follow by emphasizing that the main questions to resolve in establishing such a court was 
whether it was intended to “replace, compete with or complement national 
jurisdictions.”70 The General Assembly subsequently requested that the Commission 
prepare a formal draft statute for an international court “as a matter of priority.” It did so, 
culminating in the ILC’s 1994 Draft ICC Statute, which proposed jurisdiction over 
genocide, aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.  
 
Of note in that 1994 draft was article 42, which drew upon the principle of ne bis 
in idem (the principle that a person should not be prosecuted more than once for the 
same criminal conduct) as embodied in the ICTY and ICTR statutes.71 As proposed, a 
person could be retried under the proposed court’s if the offense for which he or she 
had been tried by another court was “characterized as an ordinary crime,” or if the 
proceedings “were not impartial or independent or were designed to shield the accused 
from international criminal responsibility or the case was not diligently prosecuted.”72  
 
Support for this provision was far from unanimous, with substantially differing 
views as to the ICC’s relationship with national jurisdictions. As Kleffner notes:   
 
Some members of the ILC envisaged the court as supplementing rather 
than superseding national jurisdiction, while others envisaged it as an 
option for prosecution in case the State concerned was unwilling to 
unable to do so. A third group of members suggested providing the court 
with limited inherent jurisdiction for a core of the most serious crimes, 
thus presumably envisaging exclusive jurisdiction of the international 
criminal court for these crimes.73 
 
Although no final decision was taken on a specific model at the time, the draft statute 
presented by the ILC endorsed the third option: the court should be “complementary to 
national criminal justice systems in cases where such trial procedures may not be 
                                                
69 Notably, this initial request focused on a court with far narrower subject matter jurisdiction: drug 
trafficking. After the Prime Minister drafted a motion (with the assistance of former Nuremberg 
prosecutor Benjamin Ferencz and law scholar M. Cherif Bassiouni) proposing that the International Law 
Commission study the idea, the General Assembly adopted it in 1989. Crucially, the language of that 
motion was to consider a court with jurisdiction to try crimes including, but not limited to, illicit drug 
trafficking. See, e.g., Benjamin N. Schiff, Building the International Criminal Court (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 37-38.  
70 El Zeidy, “The genesis of complementarity,” 111. 
71 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court (1994), at 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/7_4_1994.pdf.  
72 Draft Statute, Article 42(2)(a); see also James Crawford, “Current Developments: The ILC’s Draft 
Statute for an International Criminal Tribunal,” American Journal of International Law 80 (1994).  
73 Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions, 73. 
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available or may be ineffective.”74 The ILC further proposed, in article 35, a regime 
according to which jurisdiction would be allocated based on a determination of the 
admissibility of a case.75  
 
In the commentary to this paragraph, the Commission explained to the General 
Assembly that the international court was “intended to operate in cases when there is no 
prospect of [the suspect] being duly tried in national courts.”76 Thus, “the emphasis is … 
on the Court as a body which will complement existing national jurisdictions and existing 
procedures for international judicial cooperation in criminal matters and which is not 
intended to exclude the existing jurisdiction of national courts [.]”77 With respect to a 
situation where a person had already been tried by another (domestic) court, the 1994 
draft retained the provision that subsequent trial by the ICC would not be barred where 
the initial trial had been for an ordinary crime, or in the case of sham, i.e., non-genuine, 
proceedings.78 The ILC report thus reflected the “classical” conception of 
complementarity as a limiting jurisdictional principle. In Stahn’s words, it was a “concept 
to regulate potential conflicts as between the (primary) jurisdiction of national courts and 
the residual jurisdiction of the ICC.”79 
 
1.2 The Ad Hoc and Preparatory Committees: 1995-1998 
 
Whereas complementarity appeared only in passing in the ILC’s earlier draft, it 
featured prominently in the discussions of the Ad Hoc Committee that was set up by the 
General Assembly to discuss the ILC’s report, in advance of the Assembly’s 1995 
session.80 The topic appeared under three general headings in the Committee’s 1995 
report: the “significance” of the principle, its jurisdictional implications, and the role of 
national jurisdictions.81 As the report noted, many state delegations “stressed that the 
principle of complementarity should create a strong presumption in favor of national 
jurisdictions.”82 In so doing, a number of advantages were highlighted, including that 
“evidence and witnesses would be readily available,” “language problems would be 
minimized,” and the “applicable law would be more certain and developed.”83 
Furthermore, states had a “vital interest in remaining responsible and accountable for 
prosecuting violations of their laws—which also served the interest of the international 
community.”84 An additional point of debate was whether the principle should be 
reflected in the Preamble of the Statute or its operative part.85 
 
 Other delegations expressed support for national courts retaining current 
jurisdiction with the proposed ICC but insisted that “the latter should also have primacy 
                                                
74 ILC Draft Statute, Preamble. 
75 Ibid., Article 35 (“Issues of Admissibility”). The Rome Statute retains this provision: admissibility 
assessments are case-specific.  
76 Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1994, Vol. II, A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.1, Part Two, 27 
(commentary 1).  
77 Ibid.  
78 See ILC Draft Statute, Article 42(2) 
79 Carsten Stahn, “Complementarity: A Tale of Two Notions,” Criminal Law Forum 19 (2008), 90. 
80 Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions, 76. 
81 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, A/50/22 
(1995), at http://www.legal-tools.org/uploads/tx_ltpdb/doc21168.pdf. See generally paras. 29-37. 
82 Ibid., para. 31.  
83 Ibid., paras. 31, 129. 
84 Ibid., para. 31. 
85 Ibid., paras. 35-37. 
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of jurisdiction.”86 A particular point of contention remained the principle of ne bis in idem, 
as it was seen by some delegations as “incompatible with what they considered to be the 
intention of the ILC not to establish a hierarchy between the ICC and national courts or 
to allow the ICC to pass judgment on the operation of national courts.”87 To that end, it 
was suggested that the distinction between ordinary crimes and international crimes that 
had survived previous drafts be deleted. In particular, “It was stressed that the standards 
set by the Commission were not intended to establish a hierarchy between the 
international criminal court and national courts, or to allow the international criminal 
court to pass judgement on the operation of national courts in general.”88  
 
A Preparatory Committee (“PREPCOM”), whose task it was to further develop 
the draft Statute replaced the Ad Hoc Committee in 1996, with the idea that a 
plenipotentiary conference would follow. Over the course of the next three years, “the 
original 43-page 1994 ILC draft Statute expanded into a draft Statute of 173 pages 
replete with bracketed options, alternative phrasing, and footnotes for consideration at 
the Rome Conference.”89 John Holmes, the head of the Canadian delegation that was 
asked to coordinate informal consultations on what then became article 35, produced a 
draft that, for the first time, introduced the terms “unwilling,” “unable,” and “genuine” 
into the text of the proposed Statute, along with a set of conditions for determining 
where those conditions would render a case admissible.90  
 
 According to Holmes, inability was not controversial in principle: relevant agreed 
upon factors were the “total or partial collapse” of a state’s national judicial system,” the 
state being unable to secure the accused, or being “otherwise unable to carry out its 
proceeding.”91 Unwillingness, however, proved more contentious, “as some delegations 
had concerns with regard to State sovereignty and constitutional guarantees in domestic 
systems against double jeopardy.”92 To assuage concerns about the subjectivity inherent 
in such a test the word “genuinely” was inserted, as it was thought to carry a more 
objective connotation.93 Debates around the ne bis in idem principle also persisted, leading 
to the deletion of the ordinary crimes exception that had survived previous drafts.94 The 
Statute instead refers to the “same conduct” of an accused, “to make clear that a national 
prosecution of a crime—international or ordinary—did not prohibit ICC retrial for 
charges based on different conduct.”95 
                                                
86 Ibid., paras. 32, 218.  
87 Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions, 77. 
88 Ad Hoc Committee Report, para. 43. 
89 Schiff, 70. See also Immi Tallgren, “Completing the ‘International Criminal Order’: The Rhetoric of 
International Repression and the Notion of Complementarity in the Draft Statute for an International 
Criminal Court,” Nordic Journal of International Law 67 (1998), 107-137. . Tallgren offers a compelling 
account of the PREPCOM negotiations through the analogy of “Master” and “Butler,” the latter “see[ing] 
complementarity as a means of restricting the role of the ICC and its scope of jurisdiction” (i.e., constraint) 
and the former “represent[ing] the process of internationalization,” 124. 
90 See J.T. Holmes, “The Principle of Complementarity,” in R. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court – 
The making of the Rome Statute (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999). 
91 Ibid., 45-49. 
92 Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions, 85. 
93 In addition to concern that sham proceedings might be used to shield an accused, two other forms of 
unwillingness were agreed upon: undue delay inconsistent with an intent to bring the person to justice, and 
lack of independence or impartiality. 
94 Holmes, 57-58. Stigen also confirms that, the “ordinary crime” criterion, initially endorsed by the [ILC], 
“was proposed but rejected [in the negotiations] as it met too much resistance.” Stigen, The Relationship 
between the International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions, 335. 
95 Kevin Jon Heller, “A Sentence-Based Theory of Complementarity,” Harvard International Law Journal 
53(1) (2012), 224. For a similar conclusion, see Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire, 50.  Article 
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1.3 The Rome Statute: Article 17 and the Substance of the Principle 
 
In the end, the term “complementarity” itself hardly appears in the Rome Statute. 
The Statute only notes, in its tenth preambular recital and in Article 1, that the ICC  
“shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.”96 Article 17 sets out the 
substantive criteria for determining the admissibility of a case, though it does not use the 
term “complementarity” as such. The article states that  “a case is inadmissible where . . . 
[it] is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the 
State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”97 A case 
will also be inadmissible when “the State has decided not to prosecute, unless the 
decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State to genuinely prosecute,” or 
when the person “has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the 
complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under article 20, paragraph 3.”98  
 
The Statute thus sets forth a two-step test, “the first explicit question of which is 
whether a State is investigating or prosecuting the case or has done so.”99 Where there 
are no such proceedings evident at the national level – which under ICC case law 
requires, as the following chapter discusses, similar charges of conduct – the case is 
admissible. The more difficult assessment to be made is the second step: whether a state, 
even where proceedings are underway, is “unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the 
investigation or prosecution.”  This prong of the test has generated significantly more 
controversy, as it invites the ICC to scrutinize the quality and standard of national 
proceedings.100 As noted, it involves a more subjective assessment of the standards by 
which such proceedings should be judged. 
 
 The text of Article 17 makes clear that complementarity is a case-based 
assessment; the question is not whether a “situation” in general is or has been the subject 
of domestic investigations or prosecutions.101 To that end, commentators and Court 
                                                                                                                                      
93(10) further supports this interpretation, as it refers to the Court providing assistance to a state party 
“conducting an investigation into or trial in respect of conduct which constitutes a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court or which constitutes a serious crimes under the national law of the requesting 
State.” Article 93(10) is discussed further in chapter three.  
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parameters.” Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Decision on the Applications for Participation in the 
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documents alike have noted that, “complementarity does not require an assessment of [a] 
state’s overall justice system … merely that is it capable of conducting genuine 
proceedings in the particular case.”102 While the condition of that system can 
undoubtedly influence the ability to investigate or prosecute a particular case, it is not a 
determinative basis for admissibility. As explored further in the dissertation, however, 
arguments have emerged to the effect that a national system should be considered 
“available” only when it “incorporates the entire spectrum of substantive and procedural 
safeguards enshrined in the Statute and by which the ICC is to abide.”103  
 
 Complementarity also combines optional and mandatory features. Article 17 
provides that the “Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible” in response to a 
challenge lodged by a state or individual.104 States, however, may also “refer” cases to the 
ICC, as both Uganda and the DRC have done.105 El Zeidy has termed this “optional 
complementarity” and notes that it is the “reversed scheme of ‘mandatory 
complementarity,’” in that it is not due to the Court’s determination that a state was 
inactive, unwilling or unable, but rather the “state itself voluntarily decided to renounce 
the exercise of its jurisdiction in favor of the [ICC].”106 This practice has generated a 
significant literature amongst commentators who contend that such referrals are 
unsupported by the Statute and the intention of the drafters.107 Robinson, however, 
persuasively contests this view, noting that Article 14 expressly provides for state party 
referrals, and that they were a “recurring and explicit topic of deliberation throughout the 
negotiations.”108 
 
 Articles 18 and 19 set out the procedural framework for complementarity. The 
former sets out a notification requirement of one month for the OTP when a situation 
has been referred, or where the Office initiates an investigation. Notably, states may also 
pre-empt an OTP investigation by invoking Article 18. Doing so obligates the requesting 
state to initiate an investigation, but compels the Prosecutor to “defer” to the domestic 
jurisdiction.109 (To date, however, this procedure has “largely remained a dead letter.”110) 
                                                                                                                                      
Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and VPRS 6, ICC-01/04-101, PTC I, 17 
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Justice 6 (2008).  
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Where the OTP has decided to prosecute, Article 19 grants the right to challenge 
admissibility to an accused, as well as to “a State which has jurisdiction over a case.” 
Such challenges may be brought only once—and, for states, “at the earliest 
opportunity”—and “prior to or at the commencement of the trial.”111  
 
Taken together, the Rome Statute’s complementarity criteria establish a 
“horizontal relationship between national and international courts:  they constitute 
jurisdictional alternatives to one another with right of way normally given to national 
courts.”112 This “horizontal paradigm” in turn, appeared to “cement a systematic 
preference in the Rome Statute for domestic prosecution … and affirm[ed] that States 
may represent the most effective way of repressing international crimes.113 Added to this 
were the decisions on the part of the drafters to explicitly depart from the primacy that 
characterized the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda the former Yugoslavia, to not include the 
absence of domestic due process rights as a condition for admissibility, and, relatedly, to 
reject the distinction between international and ordinary crimes as a basis for the ne bis in 
idem provision.  
 
Unsurprisingly, these compromises were met by dismay on the part of many who 
sought a stronger role for the Court. Federica Gioia notes, for instance, that “despite the 
ambitious objectives set forth in the Preamble of the Statute, the ICC still pays too great 
a tribute to state sovereignty,”114 while Frédéric Mégret observes that human rights 
NGOs, in particular, found the Statute’s “compromises” to “have been fundamentally 
unrepresentative of the state of international law, or least at variance with the better 
objectives of international criminal justice.”115 Ultimately, then, the Statute was a 
“bargained document,” one in which the complementarity principle “emerged early …  
as a key protection of state sovereignty.”116  
 
2. From Constraint to Catalyst: The Evolution of Complementarity 
 
The drafting history recounted above affirms that the Rome Statute was the 
result of extensive negotiation and significant compromise. The decision to vest the ICC 
with jurisdiction secondary to that of domestic courts was critical: many states insisted 
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upon it, even as many human rights advocates had, at least initially, hoped that the new 
institution would possess the same jurisdictional primacy enjoyed by the ICTY and ICTR. 
As Markus Benzing argues, “The most apparent underlying interest that the 
complementarity regime of the Court [was] designed to protect and serve is the sovereignty 
both of State parties and third states.” 117 So understood, complementarity was thought 
to primarily be an instrument of limitation, a “technical term of art for a priority rule set 
out in Article 17 of the Rome Statute.”118  
 
2.1 Early ICC Policy: The Office of the Prosecutor  
 
 A “thicker” notion of the complementarity principle grew swiftly in the wake of 
the ratifications that brought the ICC formally into existence in the summer of 2002. 
While the Court did not start functioning until late the following year—after Prosecutor 
Luis Moreno-Ocampo had been elected and other key staff appointed—a “start-up team” 
within the Office of the Prosecutor suggested that an expert consultation process on 
complementarity be convened early on, to consider the “potential legal, policy and 
management challenges which are likely to confront the OTP as a consequence of the 
complementarity regime of the Statute.”119 Comprised of independent experts, the 
“Informal Expert Paper” that emerged from this process reflects the early seeds of a 
broader approach to complementarity. In its words, “The principle of complementarity 
can magnify the effectiveness of the ICC beyond what it could achieve through its own 
prosecutions, as it prompts a network of over 90 States Parties and other States to carry 
out consistent and rigorous national proceedings.”120  
 
The Paper took as its premise —both as a matter of “respect for the primary 
jurisdiction of States” and of the limits on the number of prosecutions the ICC could 
“feasibly conduct”—that the complementarity regime thus “serves as a mechanism to 
encourage and facilitate the compliance of States with their primary responsibility to 
investigate and prosecute core crimes.”121 The report argued that two principles should 
guide this approach: 1) partnership, which may include “possibly provid[ing] advice and 
certain forms of assistance to facilitate national efforts,” as well as situations where the 
OTP and a state “agree that a consensual division of labour is in the best interest of 
justice”; and 2) vigilance, which “marks the converse principle … that where there is an 
indicia that a national process is not genuine, the Prosecutor must be poised to take 
follow-up steps, leading if necessary to an exercise of jurisdiction.”122  
 
The distinction between partnership and vigilance signaled an emergent 
distinction between complementarity as a contentious, competition-oriented principle 
and as the framework for a more consensual relationship between the Court and national 
jurisdictions. For the latter, the Paper envisioned a range of direct assistance and advice 
functions, including “exchang[ing] information and evidence to facilitate a national 
investigation or prosecution,” providing technical advice (the OTP would, it was 
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presumed, “build up a unique and unparalleled in-house expertise”), and training.123 As to 
its “vigilance function,” the Paper noted that “certain background contextual 
information … may be gathered in order to inform an admissibility assessment under 
either the ‘unwillingness’ or ‘inability’ branches” of the Statute. Such contextual 
information might include a state’s legislative framework “(offences, jurisdiction, 
procedures, defenses);” “specific jurisdictional regimes (military tribunals);” and the 
“legal regime of due process standards, rights of accused, procedures.”124 Factors 
affecting the inability test could include a “lack of judicial infrastructure,” as well as a 
“lack of substantive or procedural penal legislation rendering [the criminal justice] system 
‘unavailable.’”125 
 
In this indexing, the Expert Paper articulates a number of possible indicia that 
have assumed a more determinative character over time in the course of their uptake in 
scholarship and a range of advocacy materials. Furthermore, it paints an early picture of 
both the coercive and cooperative dimensions of complementarity, and of the OTP’s 
wide-ranging and discretionary role in its application. To that end, the Office’s first 
policy paper, also published in 2003, emphasized that a “major part of [its] external 
relations and outreach strategy … [would] be to encourage and facilitate States to carry 
out their primary responsibility of investigating and prosecuting crimes.”126  The paper 
further developed the idea of a division-of-labor relationship between the Court and 
national jurisdictions, noting that it “will encourage national prosecutions, where possible 
for the lower-ranking perpetrators, or work with the international community to ensure 
that the offenders are brought to justice.”127 Such an approach suggested a two-tiered 
arrangement between the ICC and states, with those “most responsible” being 
prosecuted in The Hague. Architecturally, the OTP reflected the prioritization of this 
policy as well.  The establishment of a separate division responsible for jurisdiction and 
complementarity issues (the Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division) 
underscored the importance attached to this aspect of the Office’s work.128  
 
2.2 Emergent Theories: Cooperation and Coercion 
 
From the outset, then, complementarity’s potential was understood as more than 
a tool for regulating jurisdiction but also, as Stahn notes, “a forum for managerial 
interaction between the Court and States.”129 This “systemic dimension” of 
complementarity, Stahn argues, “institutes a legal system under which the Court and 
domestic jurisdictions are meant to complement and reinforce each other in their mutual 
efforts to institutionalize accountability for mass crimes.”130 Scholars have offered 
different descriptions to explain this relationship. The ICC as “backstopping” national 
courts has been one, more passive iteration, while the Court as a “reinforcement” 
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mechanism has been another.131  
 
By contrast, a catalytic relationship is more active in its design. Burke-White, for 
instance, has argued that,  “international and domestic institutions are engaged in 
complex interactions whereby the international level, and particularly the ICC’s 
complementarity regime, may catalyze changes at the national level.”132 Likewise, 
referencing complementarity’s dynamic component, Stahn has written that, 
“complementarity serves as a catalyst for compliance by virtue of the construction of 
articles 17 and 19 of the Rome Statute.”133 And, as noted earlier, Kleffner argues that 
complementarity should be a “catalyst for compliance,” insofar as it is “understood as 
aiming to induce and facilitate the compliance of States with their obligation ‘to exercise 
[their] criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes,’ which 




Kleffner’s reference to inducement and facilitation again suggests two different 
models for the Court’s role as a catalyst: one coercive, the other cooperative.135 In the 
latter, the ICC’s relationship with domestic jurisdiction is fundamentally beneficent: the 
Court and national jurisdictions complement each other not only in a “negative” 
dynamic, wherein the ICC’s competences are engaged by the absence (or non-
genuineness) of state action, but “also in a positive fashion, i.e. through mutual assistance 
and interaction.”136 This policy of “positive” complementarity received early 
endorsement from the OTP. As Stahn argues, however, “positive” complementarity is 
not only a policy invention; it is also an “inherent concept of the Statute,” reflected, for 
instance, in its cooperation regime. 137  Thus, “positive” complementarity is “focused on 
problem-solving, i.e. the ability of the Court to strengthen domestic jurisdictions and to 
organize a division of labor based on ‘comparative advantages.’”138  
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Even if it was “hardly … contemplated by all the [Rome Statute] negotiators,” 
numerous commentators and jurists have endorsed this approach to complementarity.139 
Former ICC Judge Mauro Politi, for instance, notes that there is “no doubt” that one 
important goal of complementarity “is to establish a division of labor between national 
jurisdictions and the ICC, under which the Court should essentially concentrate on those 
who have major responsibility for the crimes involved.”140  Cherif Bassiouni likewise 
identifies that an “important ancillary function of the ICC is to prod national 
jurisdictions to assume their international legal obligations,” which may extend to the 
Court providing technical assistance and capacity-building support to national criminal 
justice systems.141 Cooperation also animates complementarity’s affinity with a 
“managerial model of compliance,” or a “global compliance system for the enforcement 
of international criminal law,”142 wherein the ICC and states participate in a “cooperative 
venture to ensure accountability of perpetrators.”143 Gioia likewise writes that, “A 
‘friendly’ version of complementarity relies on the assumption that the ICC is not meant 
to act as a censor of national jurisdictions but rather to allow for the most efficient 
sharing of competencies between the national and international level.”144  
 
Burke-White’s scholarship has perhaps been the most well-known and influential 
articulation of the ICC’s relationship to national jurisdictions, casting it explicitly in 
catalytic terms. An early article, from 2005, on the influence of the ICC in the DRC 
posited that the Court was not merely an institution acting against domestic states but 
rather part of a “multi-level global governance model,” one that also “participates in the 
domestic process, altering political as well as legal outcomes.”145  As part of such a multi-
level system, his elaboration of a “Rome System of Justice” is rooted in a “virtuous circle 
in which the Court stimulates the exercise of domestic jurisdiction through the threat of 
international intervention.”146  Burke-White’s invocation of the ICC as the apex of an 
organic judicial chain (the “virtuous circle”), while also recognizing its coercive 
properties (the “threat of international intervention”), comes together in his idea of 
“proactive complementarity,” in which the ICC “can and should encourage, and perhaps 
even assist, national governments to prosecute international crimes.”147  
 
Burke-White’s writing—part of a growth of scholarly interest on the impact of 
the ICTY’s proceedings on domestic jurisdictions more generally—also drew heavily on 
the introduction of a completion strategy for the Tribunal to support the notion of 
shared responsibility between national and international courts.148 Characterizing the 
completion strategy as a catalytic force for domestic accountability in states like Bosnia 
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and Serbia, he argued that such an approach could be instructive for the ICC’s 
complementarity regime. In his words, “The structural changes in the ICTY’s jurisdiction 
and mandate undertaken as part of the Completion Strategy essentially shifted the 
governance structure from one of absolute international primacy toward a new 
relationship with incentives similar to those of complementarity.”149 These changes 
occurred in the same period as the ICC’s operations began to take shape, contributing to 
the developing concept of “positive” complementarity.  
 
Under the completion strategy the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
were amended, such that the Tribunal could effectively incentivize domestic institutions 
by “send[ing] cases back to national jurisdictions, monitor[ing] domestic proceedings, 
and remov[ing] cases back to the international forum only if key targets were not met.”150 
UN Security Council Resolution 1503, issued in August 2003, endorsed the Tribunal’s 
strategy and called upon the international community to “assist national jurisdictions, as 
part of the completion strategy, in improving their capacity to prosecute cases transferred 
from the ICTY.”151 Coordinating mechanisms initially set out in the 1996 Rome 
Agreement, which governed the relationship between the ICTY and local courts, were 
likewise strengthened under the so-called “Rules of the Road,” with the Tribunal, after 
years of delay, fulfilling its obligation to review locally-initiated cases before an arrest 
warrant could be issued by domestic authorities.152    
 
 This approach found early endorsement in OTP policy (not coincidentally, 
Burke-White served as an early advisor to Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo). “Positive” 
complementarity was described as a deliberate way to promote national proceedings 
through the provision of information to states, advice, and the development of legal 
tools to empower domestic criminal jurisdictions.153 The metaphor of catalyst was also 
embraced by those affiliated with the Office. In the words of Juan Mendez, the OTP’s 
then Special Advisor on Crime Prevention, “Under its policy of positive 
complementarity, the Office of the Prosecutor can act as a catalyst for national action.”154  
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The division-of-labor approach to cooperation as a means towards this end was 
also closely linked to the OTP’s policy of “invited” referrals under Article 14. The 2006 
report of the Office stated for instance, that, over the course of the first three years 
(2003-2006), it had adopted a formal policy “of inviting and welcoming voluntary 
referrals by territorial states as a first step in triggering the jurisdiction of the Court.”155 
As subsequent chapters detail, such a division of labor was the explicit basis for seeking 
the DRC government’s referral, where it was made clear that the OTP’s role was to 
prosecute senior leaders and those “most responsible,” while domestic authorities would 
handle other responsible actors. More recently, Prosecutor Bensouda’s statement 
suggests a similar approach to the situation in Libya. After not contesting Libya’s 
admissibility challenges, she told the UN Security Council that, “Joint complementary 
efforts of both the Government of Libya and the ICC, strongly and actively supported 
by the international community, are … crucial for ending impunity in the country.”156 
She further added that her Office would “prioritise its investigations and prosecution of 
those who are outside the territory of Libya and who are thus largely inaccessible to the 





Coercion, in which the threat of ICC intervention is meant to function as a 
leveraging device on national jurisdictions, has arguably been the more predominant 
iteration of complementarity, rooted as it is in a compliance-oriented model of state 
interaction with the Court. Stigen, for instance, has posited that the Court’s catalytic 
effect is fundamentally one of ICC-avoidance. In his words, “An ICC finding that the 
territorial state or the suspect’s home state is unwilling or unable to proceed genuinely 
may well be perceived as a considerable stigma that states will seek to avoid.”157 In order 
to avoid such stigma, states would be compelled to act. Similarly, in his early work, Bruce 
Broomhall suggested that the ICC would “spur” on national prosecutions in order to 
avoid “adverse attention, the diplomatic entanglements, the duty to cooperate and other 
consequences of ICC activity.”158 
 
Kleffner’s work on complementarity also explores the principle’s coercive 
potential, “as a mechanism through which States Parties are induced to and facilitated in 
complying with [the] obligation [to investigate and prosecute ICC crimes].”159  In his 
view, 
 
the novelty of complementarity lies in the fact that, for the first time in the 
 history of international criminal law, States Parties have agreed ex ante that this 
                                                
155 OTP Report 2003-2006, 7.  
156 To that end, the OTP and the Libyan government “recently concluded a burden-sharing Memorandum 
of Understanding, the purpose of which is to facilitate our collaborative efforts to ensure that individuals 
allegedly responsible for committing crimes in Libya as of 15 February 2011 are brought to justice either at 
the ICC or in Libya itself.” See “Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou 
Bensouda, to the United Nations Security Council on the situation in Libya, pursuant to UNSCR 1970 
(2011),” remarks delivered in New York, 14 November 2013.  
157 At the same time, Stigen correctly notes that the auto-referrals of Uganda and the DRC to the ICC 
suggest that, at least in some case, “being labeled as unable is something that some states can live well 
with,” 475. 
158 Bruce Broomhall, International Justice and the International Criminal Court: Between Sovereignty and the Rule of 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 84, 87.   
159 Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions, 309.  
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 failure [to investigate and prosecute] will entail a concrete legal consequence: 
 States forfeiting the claim to exercise jurisdiction, including over their own 
 nationals and officials.160  
 
Kleffner’s conception of the Court’s role is similarly compliance-oriented. In his words, 
the ICC “can generate a pull-effect towards complying with the obligation to investigate 
and prosecute.”161 One reason for this anticipated effect is, he contends, the Court’s 
“high degree of legitimacy” and its potential as a vehicle to “bestow legitimacy on 
national proceedings,” which further “generates a pull towards compliance.”162 
Additionally, in his view, the “procedural setting of complementarity contains elements 
of an interaction between the Court and national criminal jurisdictions, which may serve 
to induce states to carry out investigations and prosecutions.”163 A final reason is the 
threat of sanction, which “finds support in the largely antagonist premise on which the 
regime of complementarity is based.”164  
 
As with “positive” complementarity, the experience of the ad hoc tribunals in 
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia also played an influential role in elaborating the 
catalytic potential of jurisdictional “forfeiture.” The ICTR, like the ICTY, amended its 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence in 2004 under pressure from the UN Security Council, 
in order to allow the referral of cases from the Tribunal to “competent national 
jurisdictions, as appropriate, including Rwanda.”165 Notably, the requirement of a fair 
trial was explicitly included amongst the conditions that had to be satisfied for referral, 
leading in turn to the 2007 passage of a national law in Rwanda that sought to implement 
the ICTR’s due process standards (including abolition of the death penalty).166  
Notwithstanding this accommodation, the Tribunal denied the first five requests for 
transfer to Rwanda, using the antagonist premise on which the primacy regime was based 
to strengthen, ostensibly, fair trial guarantees at the domestic level.167  
                                                
160 Ibid., 319-320.  
161 Ibid., 311.  
162 Ibid., 313. Kleffner sees the ICC as carrying both procedural and substantive legitimacy, insofar as it “is 
based on the specific consent of States to the Rome Statute,” while also safeguarding the sovereignty of states, 
“in as much as it reaffirms rather than encroaches upon their primary role in the investigation and 
prosecution of core crimes,” 311, 314. Further, complementarity “benefits from a large degree of 
determinacy” and “leaves no doubt” that “the soel role of the ICC is to supply the deficiencies of national 
criminal jurisdictions,” 315.  
163 Kleffner, “Complementarity as a Catalyst for Compliance,” 82.  
164 Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions, 320.  
165 UNSC Resolution 1503, preambular para. 8; Rule11bis of the ICTR’s rules was so amended in April 
2004. As with the ICTY, there is a similarly abundant literature on the ICTR’s referral process and its 
impact at the national and local level in Rwanda. For a fuller treatment see L.J. van den Herik, The 
Contribution of the Rwanda Tribunal to the Development of International Law (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2005); Jesse Melman, “The Possibility of Transfer(?): A Comprehensive Approach to the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s Rule 11bis To Permit Transfer to Rwandan Domestic Courts,” Fordham 
Law Review 79(3) (2011), 1271-1332.  
166 See Organic Law No. 11/2007 of 16 March 2007 concerning Transfer of Cases to the Republic of 
Rwanda from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Rwanda, 19 March 2007; the law has subsequently been amended. For a fuller exploration of the 2007 law 
and domestic accountability in Rwanda, see Phil Clark, The Gacaca Courts, Post-Genocide Justice and 
Reconciliation in Rwanda: Justice without Lawyers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). For an 
incisive reading of the death penalty’s abolition as more than the result of top-down pressure from the 
ICTR, see Audrey Boctor, “The Abolition of the Death Penalty in Rwanda,” Human Rights Review 10 
(2009), 99-118.  
167 See “Complementarity in Action: Lessons Learned from the ICTR Prosecutor’s Referral of 
International Criminal Cases to National Jurisdictions for Trial,” International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (February 2015), para. 43, at http://www.unictr.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legal-
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 Under this threat-based approach, complementarity’s catalytic potential rests on 
several presumptions. One presumption is that states necessarily want to avoid the ICC, 
or that the political costs of pursuing domestic prosecutions will necessarily prevail over 
the desire to keep the Court at bay. Put another way, the ICC may not be a court of “last 
resort” (as it is so often described), but rather a forum conveniens for states. Thus, the 
cooperative dimensions of complementarity might well stifle its coercive potential, 
insofar as a state could seek the ICC’s assistance (as in the case of Uganda and the DRC), 
or may seek to “offload” complex cases to another judicial forum. Robinson makes a 
similar point when he acknowledges that “an over-strong regime might resist ICC 
intervention as a threat to government, [while] an under-strong government might 
welcome impartial and effective intervention as a reinforcement of governance.”168 Another 
presumption—one increasingly tested by the current posture of African states towards 
the ICC—is that the Court commands a high degree of “legitimacy,” as Kleffner claims.  
 
Notwithstanding these concerns, the Court’s coercive capacities have been taken 
up as part of the OTP’s approach to complementarity. In his first address to the ASP, 
the ICC Prosecutor noted that, “due to the dissuasive effect that the mere existence of 
the court generates, the possibility of presenting a case at the International Criminal 
Court could convince some states with serious conflicts to take the appropriate 
action.”169 Furthermore, one sees in the Office’s approach to certain situation countries a 
more adversarial approach towards domestic jurisdictions. In Uganda, for instance, later 
attempts by the government to negotiate with the Lord’s Resistance Army clashed with 
the ICC’s outstanding arrest warrants. Similarly, in Kenya, the Prosecutor adopted a 
threat-based approach to complementarity in an attempt to force the government to 
establish a domestic tribunal to prosecute its post-election violence. This history is 
examined more fully in chapter four.  
 
2.3 A Catalyst for Compliance: The Duties of Complementarity? 
 
Complementarity’s power to advance domestic accountability relies upon a duty-
based reading of the Rome Statute. These duties have commonly been understood to 
encompass not only the prosecution of serious crimes through national criminal fora, but 
also the domestic implementation of the Rome Statute’s substantive and procedural 
provisions. Most commentators root these duties in a purposive reading of the Statute, 
particularly its preambular language, which recalls “that it is the duty of every State to 
exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.”170 As 
Padraig McAuliffe has noted, “the open-ended and aspirational language of the 
Preamble,” in particular, supports a “teleological impulse to apply expansive modes of 
interpretation to admissibility provisions in the interest of maximizing the impact of its 
                                                                                                                                      
library/150210_complementarity_in_action.pdf. For a critical analysis of the ICTR’s referral jurisprudence, 
see Nicola Palmer, “Transfer or Transformation: A Review of the Rule 11bis Decisions of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,” African Journal of International and Comparative Law 20(1) (2012). 
168 Darryl Robinson, “The Controversy over Territorial State Referrals and Reflections on ICL Discourse,” 
Journal of International Criminal Justice 9 (2011), 383.  
169 Press Release, “ICC – Election of the Prosecutor, Statement by Mr. Moreno Ocampo,” ICC-OTP-
20030502-10 (22 April 2003).  
170 Para. 6, Rome Statute. See, e.g., Gioia, “State Sovereignty, Jurisdiction, and ‘Modern’ International 
Law,” 1113. Gioia states that only investigations and prosecutions that “abide by the highest standards of 
fair trial” can be regarded as “proper implementation of the obligations at stake [in the Rome Statute],” 
and that “failure to comply with such standards should be construed as tantamount to failing to perform 
the obligation and result in the Court legitimately stepping in.” 
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main institution, the ICC.” 171 Much of the literature cited above exemplifies this 
teleological impulse.  
 
In fact, as its careful drafting illustrates, there is no provision on states parties’ 
prosecutorial duties in the operative part of the Statute.172 While states may be obliged to 
investigate or prosecute crimes based on other rules of international law, the Statute itself 
obliges states only to cooperate with the Court (as Part IX of the treaty enumerates), to 
ensure that its domestic law facilitates cooperation with the ICC, and that offenses 
against the “administration of justice” be criminalized domestically.173 Furthermore, as a 
matter of treaty interpretation, the preambular recital was deliberately not made part of 
the Statute’s operative text; rather, it merely “recalls” a suggested pre-existing duty, not 
one arising from the treaty itself.174As Nouwen notes, the recital itself “merely reflects an 
aspiration, just like many of the other preambular considerations.”175 Similarly, it is not 
the case, as Kleffner and the ICC Appeals Chamber have both suggested, that states 
“forfeit” or “relinquish” their claims to jurisdiction merely by virtue of the ICC 
intervening.176 Rather, until such time as an accused is convicted or acquitted for the 
same crimes, “states can, in theory, conduct national proceedings simultaneously with 
those of the Court.”177  
 
With respect to implementation, there is also no positive obligation on member 
states to implement the Rome Statute’s substantive (or procedural) provisions.178 As 
Alain Pellet (himself a member of the ILC that authored the 1994 draft Statute) states, 
“neither the signatory States nor even the States Parties have any clear obligations to 
bring their domestic legislation into harmony with the basic provisions of the Rome 
                                                
171 McAuliffe, “From Watchdog to Workhorse,” 285, 294. See also Darryl Robinson, “The Identity Crisis 
of International Law,” Leiden Journal of International Law 21 (2008), 944-946 (noting that, through “victim-
focused teleological reasoning aggravated by utopian aspirations,” ICL seeks to “end” crime rather than 
merely manage it). 
172 See, e.g., Payam Akhavan, “Whither National Courts? The Rome Statute’s Missing Half,” Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 8(5) (2010); Anja Seibert-Fohr, “The Relevance of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court for Amnesties and Truth Commissions,” in A. von Bogdandy and R. Wolfrim 
(eds.), Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 7 (Koninklijke Brill, 2003), 559 
173 Such rules may arise under relevant human rights treaties that impose a duty to criminalize and 
investigate, see, e.g., UN Convention Against Torture (Articles 4, 5, and 7) and the International 
Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Arts. 4, 6, 9 and 11). Regional 
human rights treaties may also impose such obligations: the Inter-American Court on Human Rights has, 
for instance, held that “[t]he State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights 
violations and to use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations committed 
within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure 
the victim adequate compensation.” Velásquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, para. 174; Diane Orentlicher, “Settling 
Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime,” Yale Law Review 100 (1991): 
2539-615. Arguably, customary international law may also impose a duty to investigate and prosecute. See, 
e.g., International Law Commission, Second Report on the Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute, para. 26, UN Doc. 
A/CN.4/585 (June 11, 2007).   
174 Robinson, “The Mysterious Mysteriousness of Complementarity,” 94-95. 
175 Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire, 39.  
176 See, e.g., The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. 
Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of 
the Case, ICC-01/04-01/07-1497, Appeals Chamber, 25 September 2009 (“Katanga Appeals Judgment”), 
para 85.  
177 Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire, 78-79.  
178 Article 88, Rome Statute. 
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Statute.”179 Indeed, as noted during the drafting of Article 20(3) on ne bis in idem, states 
explicitly rejected a proposal that would have made a case admissible before the ICC 
where the national proceeding failed to consider the international character or grave 
nature of a crime. For this reason, the Statute instead refers to the “same conduct” of an 
accused, “to make clear that a national prosecution of a crime—international or 
ordinary—did not prohibit ICC retrial for charges based on different conduct.”180 
 
In a related vein, the difference between “ordinary” and international crimes has 
also been advanced as a basis for domestic implementation. In the context of the ICC, 
Kleffner has again been one of the strongest proponents of this position. He argues that:  
 
 Implementation can only be considered satisfactory if it comprehensively and 
 effectively covers the entire range of conduct criminalized by the Rome Statute, 
 without adversely affecting pre-existing obligations under international law that 
 go beyond the Rome Statute, and while taking into account the need to fill gaps 
 in the legislation that may lead  to impunity, such as those resulting from the 
 absence of universal jurisdiction.”181   
 
Notably, key ICC actors have also endorsed this view. Sylvana Arbia, the Court’s former 
Registrar, writes:  
 
 Without [implementing legislation], states could be left in the position of 
 prosecuting only for some of the constitutive acts of the crimes, such as murder 
 and rape. This could undermine the basis of national prosecutions, and may 
 invite the ICC’s Judges to take jurisdiction where this might not be needed.182 
 
Arbia’s qualification that the ICC “may” take jurisdiction grants that outcome it is not 
mandatory but the language of both she and Kleffner is equally impact driven and threat-
based: failure to conform with the Rome Statute risks jurisdictional forfeiture. 
 
Influential non-state actors have advanced similarly expansive interpretations. Of 
particular relevance are individuals whose organizations often act as a bridge between 
academic or policy communities and advocacy-oriented organizations engaged in 
accountability work. For instance, Mark Ellis, who serves as Executive Director of the 
International Bar Association (described as “the world’s leading organisation of 
international legal practitioners, bar associations and law societies”183), is unequivocal that 
state failure to “effectively incorporate the Rome Statute into its domestic body of 
                                                
179 Alain Pellet, “Entry Into Force and Amendment of the Statute,” in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, and 
John R.W.D. Jones (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, Vol. 1 (Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 153.  
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criminal and procedural law” would trigger a finding of “inability” under the Rome 
Statute.184 In his view,  
 
[A] State Party must incorporate the Rome Statute’s substantive criminal law 
 provisions into its domestic body of law. This is the complementarity part of the 
 test. It requires States Parties to take steps such as criminalizing all offences 
 contained in the Statute, ensuring that the principle of command responsibility is 
 incorporated into domestic legislation, removing any statute of limitations for 
 Rome Statute offences, and perhaps most importantly, denying immunity to 
 heads of state.185 
 
Similarly, David Donat Cattin, Secretary-General of the influential Parliamentarians for 
Global Action’s (a “non-profit, non-partisan international network” of legislators whose 
“vision is to contribute to the creation of a Rules-Based International Order for a more 
equitable, safe and democratic world”186), argues that the principle of complementarity 
“implies that States shall fully implement the Rome Statute in their domestic legal orders 
in order to comply with their primary responsibility to realize the object and purpose of 
the treaty (and [Rome Statute] system),” which is to put an end to impunity and deter 
future crime.187 The PGA, in turn, describes complementarity as follows: 
 
 Complementarity means that states have the primary obligation to investigate and 
 prosecute those responsible for international crimes, but also that the Court will 
 only intervene when states do not have the genuine will or the capacities to do 
 so. ... To this effect, the first and minimal condition enabling States to abide to 
 this obligation of accountability for genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
 crimes and crime of aggression is the existence of legislation that incorporates in 
 their National law the crimes and general principles of law contained in the 
 Rome Statute.188 
 
Notably, as chapter six illustrates, the PGA played a crucial role in the implementation of 
the Statute in Uganda and Kenya, as well as the DRC. 
 
 Other views of complementarity encompass even more ambitious policy goals, 
including that domestic criminal justice systems satisfy “international standards.”189 
                                                
184 Ellis, Sovereignty and Justice, 123. 
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view, see Kevin Jon Heller, “The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The Effect of Article 17 of the Rome 
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Linking these goals to the juridical foundation of complementarity, Ellis contends that 
“inability” as set forth in Article 17(3) should encompass states that “lack the type of 
judicial systems that is required under the international standard of legal fairness, or have 
failed to incorporate implementing legislation necessary to cooperate with the Court, or 
have failed to ensure fair trial proceedings.”190 To that end, he has proposed the 
establishment of an International Advisory Group that could, at the request of the ICC 
or a state party, provide an “objective, impartial and non-political evaluation regarding a 
state’s ability to carry out judicial proceedings with international standards.”191 In his view, 
questions this Group should ask in making its assessments would include the following:  
 
 Does the domestic court have extensive backlogs resulting in long pre-trial 
 detention? Does the state have a sufficient number of trained defense lawyers 
 and an effective legal aid program for indigent defendants? Are there sufficient 
 guarantees against outside pressure on the judiciary? Does the state impose the 
 death penalty? Can the court provide witnesses and victims with medical, 
 psychological and material support during and after trial through a witness and 
 victim support office? Can the court provide these same witnesses and victim 
 security protection prior to, during and after the trial? Is there ongoing political 
 strife and repression in the country? Does the state have detention facilities that 
 meet international standards?192  
 
While Ellis’ ambitious criteria could be asked of any country’s criminal justice system, 
here it is the language of complementarity that animates them.  
  
 “Positive” complementarity is also summoned by many human rights and rule-
of-law actors in their efforts to engage criminal justice sector reform more broadly. For 
instance, at a 2011 workshop on witness protection held in Uganda, a paper prepared by 
the OHCHR drew explicitly on the ICC, noting that the Court has “emphasized the 
importance of witness protection in recent decisions, demonstrating that [it] is a key 
concern.” To that end, and “in line with the doctrine of positive complementarity, the 
application of witness protection standards by the Court will serve a great role in 
demonstrating adequate capacity, competence and credibility” of Ugandan courts.193 
Similarly, in his work on witness protection, Chris Mahony has argued that Uganda 
“must now consider the requirements of ICC complementarity.”194 According to Mahony, 
“the creation of a witness protection programme is a critical element of ICC 
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complementarity considerations,” as it “may well be a future driver of African protection 
mechanisms.”195  
 The “requirements” of complementarity, as Mahony puts it, underscores the 
centrality of compliance to this catalytic framing. Materials that domestic NGOs circulate 
in countries like Kenya, Uganda, and the DRC reinforce this discourse. The Ugandan 
Coalition for the ICC, for instance, urges Uganda’s “compliance with the Rome 
Statute,”196 while a study on the DRC prepared by Protection International”—an 
international NGO dedicated to the protection of human rights defenders—notes that 
the passage of domestic implementing legislation would “enable the DRC to comply 
with its obligation … to integrate the Rome Statute in its internal legislation.”197 A 
convening of government officials throughout southern Africa (supported by the 
University of Pretoria’s Centre for Human Rights, International Criminal Legal Services, 
and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation) even notes in its workshop report that the 
“[p]erception that [Rome Statute] crimes can be prosecuted as ordinary crimes”198—itself 
a correct statement of the law—is an “obstacle” for promoting greater domestication of 
the Statute.  
 Framing complementarity as a duty for states, and the bridge that this builds to 
compliance, offers a way to route broader governance objectives through the authority 
of the ICC. Indeed, Ellis’ suggested questions are themselves reflected in the views of the 
Ugandan government, which states that, “Complementarity is … envisioned and 
approached more broadly in Uganda, encompassing the adoption of relevant institutional, 
legal and judicial measures to strengthen the rule of law institutions and the 
administration of justice more generally.”199 Rather than a constraint on the ICC, then, 
complementarity effectively extends the Court’s authority.  
 
3. Networks and the Social Production of a (New) Norm 
 
Complementarity’s transformation from constraint to catalyst represents a 
significant evolution away from the carefully negotiated compromises that informed the 
Rome Statute’s drafting. Rooted in the grammar of compliance, this evolution is 
noteworthy both for the relative speed with which it has evolved (given that it imposes a 
greater burden on states parties), and the degree to which it has come to dominate the 
public discourse about complementarity. But how should the uptake and proliferation of 
this new norm be understood?  
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3.1 Norm Entrepreneurs 
 
 In her commanding study of complementarity’s “catalytic effect” in Uganda and 
Sudan, Sarah Nouwen persuasively focuses on the efforts of norm entrepreneurs, whom 
she defines as “activists, often foreigners working in cooperation with local actors, who 
promote the adoption of international norms (or what in their view should be 
international norms) at the domestic level.”200 Driven by a “pro-ICC” ideology, Nouwen 
argues that these activists have in turn sought to build a network of actors—ICC officials, 
diplomats, domestic human rights advocates, rule-of-law and development experts—who 
have increasingly turned to complementarity not as a rule of admissibility, but as a 
normative ordering principle.201 Significantly, however, she also suggests that the latter 
understanding is not only the work of entrepreneurs but also of norm “hijackers,” whom 
she accuses of “misrepresentation” when invoking complementarity in the literal sense—
to describe, for instance, a division of labor between the ICC and national jurisdictions, 
or to endorse certain standards and benchmarks for domestic proceedings that “are 
laudable from a human rights perspective, but do not fit complementarity.”202 
 
 There is a growing literature on norm diffusion, much of which helpfully 
illustrates the means by which a broader understanding of complementarity – one that 
imposes a range of duties upon states – has acquired such currency in the public’s 
imagination. In particular, by focusing on the role that non-state actors have played as 
agents of this new discourse, the significance of the network of ICC supporters, rather 
than the Court as an institution in itself, comes more clearly into focus.  Aaron 
Boesenecker and Leslie Vinjamuri note that, “International human rights NGOs are 
quintessential [norm] facilitators; they both participate in global networks and discussions 
on justice and accountability and work locally in conflict and post-conflict situations to 
diffuse norms through a power of socialization.”203 Many of these organizations, ranging 
from Human Rights Watch to Avocats sans Frontieres, and Amnesty International to the 
International Center for Transitional Justice, also maintain national offices in key ICC 
situation countries, creating a vital, network between those sites where international 
criminal law is produced—The Hague, Brussels, Geneva, New York—and enacted. 
 
 The motivations of these influential “trans-sovereign entrepreneurs”—the 
interpretive community they inhabit204—is informed through the views advanced by 
scholars like Burke-White, Kleffner, and Stahn, who have sought to expand the earlier 
consensus around complementarity and explore more deeply the policy dimensions of 
this new ordering principle. In part, these efforts offered new readings of the Rome 
Statute (through systematic and teleological interpretation), but their purpose in doing so 
was the same as those working within the ICC: to magnify the Court’s influence. These 
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“teleological impulses” also match well with the community of NGOs engaged in 
developing the “cascading” international accountability norm that Sikkink has described. 
Indeed, as she and Martha Finnemore have noted, “Ideational commitment is the main 
motivation when entrepreneurs promote norms or ideas because they believe in the 
ideals and values embodied in the norms”; in so doing, they construct new “cognitive 
frames,” which, when successful, “resonate with broader public understandings and are 
adopted as new ways of talking about and understanding issues.”205 
 
 The desire to diffuse and entrench more deeply a norm of international 
accountability dovetailed with the desire to think about complementarity not merely as a 
principle of admissibility but as the basis of a new “Rome Statute System.” Thus, while 
many of the entrepreneurs advancing this new, more ambitious norm may have initially 
wished more for the ICC —that it, too, would be a court of primacy like the ICTY and 
ICTR—this shortcoming was progressively reinvented post-Rome. Complementarity as a 
“catalyst” became the new cognitive frame.  
 
3.2 Transnational Networks 
 
 While complementarity’s intellectual history is important to understand, so too is 
the sociology of its transformation. Here, Emanuel Adler’s work on transnational 
“communities of practice” is instructive as it points to the dense array of ICC-engaged 
actors who helped advance the complementarity-as-catalyst framework.206  Adler’s work 
is illuminating insofar as it examines the social construction of shared norms and ideas, 
as well as how a group of actors “develops a common body of knowledge and common 
practices by engaging in their field in relation with each other.”207 Extrapolating this 
insight to the transnational, Adler suggests that “we can take the international system as a 
collection of communities of practice”— diplomats, human rights activists, lawyers—
who may share “a sense of joint enterprise that is constantly being renegotiated,” as well 
as shared practices, which “are sustained by a repertoire of communal resources, such as 
routines, words, tools, ways of doing things, stories, symbols, and discourse.”208 In a 
similar vein, Margaret Keck and Sikkink point to the role of “transnational advocacy 
networks,” which can be understood as one component of Adler’s communities of 
practice. Keck and Sikkink define such a network as “those actors working 
internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common 
discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services.”209 It is through 
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participation in these relationships that information is not only transmitted, but also 
where meaning itself develops. These relationships and repertoires underscore “the role 
of knowledge communities, communities of discourse, and, more generally, 
‘communities of the like-minded’ in the structuration and dynamic evolution of social 
reality.”210   
  
 An attention to communities and networks resonates in the general context of 
international criminal law, which remains a specialized field (if one that enjoys significant 
influence), and in the context of a singular body like the ICC, popularly seen as the 
institutional apex of the international justice “movement.” ICC staff not only share a 
sense of joint enterprise (to combat impunity), but so do the transnational communities 
of human rights NGOs, advocates, and academics that played a pivotal role in the 
Court’s establishment. As Gerry Simpson argues, “Never before had non-state actors 
played such a prominent role in bringing a treaty into existence. NGOs such as Amnesty 
International, No Peace Without Justice and Human Rights Watch were highly 
influential – providing expertise and advice, drafting and circulating proposals and 
cajoling delegates.”211   
 
 Marlies Glasius’ monograph on the establishment of the ICC also captures well 
the development of these network ties and the sense of community among them. 
Describing the “organization of national and international conferences, expert meetings, 
public debates, seminars, symposia, and workshops” that were organized in the years 
leading up the Rome conference, she writes that the conferences were “characterized by 
an intermingling of officials with the NGO and the activist communities, and by high-
level legal debates, rather than political confrontations.”212 International, regional, and 
national meetings alike “often boasted one or more international guests drawn from the 
ranks of the NGO Coalition, the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals, or from the 
academic community.”213 This intermingling of networks focused on the normative 
growth of ICL and the institutional growth of the ICC endures post-Rome, concomitant 
with the expansion in complementarity’s definition and meaning.214 In Elena Baylis’ 
words, “in the ICL tribunal context, [networks] are also acting as the framework for a 
transnational community that conceives of itself as building the field of ICL.”215 
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 The dominant framing of complementarity as a catalyst for compliance/rule-
following amongst these transnational communities of practice is also significant in 
illuminating their vertical engagement with advocates and civil society organizations at 
national level.  As Adler argues, “learning means redefining reality by means of 
‘contextual’ community knowledge, from which [practitioners] borrow in order to get 
their bearings.”216 Here, the transmission of information has also helped redefine the 
meaning of complementarity away from a technical rule of admissibility to a normative 
ordering principle, one that emphasizes the obligation of states to undertake domestic 
investigations and prosecutions in conformity with the Rome Statute. The pursuit of this 
framework has, in turn, brought international and domestic actors together in a series of 
joint “capacity-building” projects, a number of which were highlighted at the ICC 
Review Conference in 2010. From Avocats sans Frontieres’ “Integrated Project on 
Fighting Impunity and the Reconstruction of the Legal System in the DRC” to “Danish 
Support to the War Crimes Court and the Judiciary in Uganda,” these efforts have 





 Over the past decade, complementarity has become the normative site and an 
adaptive strategy for realizing a broad array of ambitious goals, wherein the ICC is meant 
to not only complement national forums, but to actively encourage domestic proceedings 
as well. As mediated by a dense, interconnected web of non-state actors—NGOs, ICC 
officials, human rights advocates, and academics—complementarity has thus become 
increasingly polysemous, imbued with multiple meanings (admissibility rule, as well as 
catalyst) and dimensions (cooperative, as well as coercive). Furthermore, in the shift 
towards a more “positive,” policy-based vision for complementarity, states are 
understood to have not only the right to investigate and prosecute international crimes 
under the Rome Statute, but the duty to do so. Rather than a concession to sovereignty, 
then, the popular understanding of complementarity now sees it more as a condition of 
sovereignty, i.e., a series of benchmarks that states must satisfy in order to successfully 
challenge the ICC’s control over a case. The following chapter examines the juridical 
nature of these challenges in further detail.   
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Mirror Images: Complementarity in the Courtroom 
 
The previous chapter explored complementarity’s discursive shifts, tracing its 
ascension from an admissibility principle to a more expansive norm focused on the 
ICC’s ability to catalyze accountability efforts at the national level. In light of this 
ambitious and expanding norm, it might be expected that states would be granted a 
relatively wide margin of discretion over the contours of their criminal proceedings. 
Indeed, several commentators—expressing concern at the risk of an overly permissive 
admissibility regime—have suggested that the ICC’s “institutional bias” might “give too 
much deference to national proceedings.”218 Other scholars have counseled in favor of a 
more flexible approach, suggesting that would be a “smart way of stimulating national 
proceedings.”219 
 
This chapter argues that, rather than encouraging such flexibility, a series of strict 
tests for admissibility have instead characterized the Court’s Article 17 practice. Most 
notable amongst these is an emphasis on whether proceedings initiated by the OTP and 
a state that would seek to successfully challenge admissibility are sufficiently similar. As 
described by the Appeals Chamber, “What is required is a judicial assessment of whether 
the case that the State is investigating sufficiently mirrors the one that the Prosecutor is 
investigating.”220 Furthermore, when faced with competing claims about domestic 
proceedings (particularly challenges brought by an individual accused), ICC judges have 
undertaken a relatively superficial review, while setting a high evidentiary threshold for 
challengers to satisfy. The Court has also effectively narrowed the opportunity to bring 
admissibility challenges by restricting the scope of review for pre-trial chambers when 
determining whether to issue an arrest warrant.  
 
While much of the ICC’s early complementarity jurisprudence unfolded in the 
context of individual defendants who raised admissibility challenges following the 
referral of situations to the Court by the state itself (as in Uganda and the DRC), more 
recent decisions have been triggered at the behest of states, notably in Kenya, Libya, and 
in the recent case of Simone Gbagbo, the Ivory Coast. This chapter explores the 
evolution of the ICC’s admissibility jurisprudence and identifies its key elements as 
developed and articulated by the Court to date.  Particular attention is paid to the 
Appeals Chamber’s 2009 and 2011 decisions in the challenges brought by Germain 
Katanga and the Kenyan government, as well as the challenges filed by the Libyan 
government to the cases brought against Saif Gaddafi and Libya’s former chief of 
intelligence, Abdullah al-Senussi. To date, the challenge filed on behalf of al-Senussi has 
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been the only one to succeed. Attention is also paid to the judicial treatment of Article 
93(10), which provides a statutory basis for the policy of “positive” complementarity. 
Here, too, however, the Court has taken a restrictive approach, choosing to separate its 
treatment of requests for ICC cooperation—a core tenet of “positive” 
complementarity—from admissibility challenges.221  
 
In reviewing this body of case law, I suggest that the ICC has largely followed a 
strict approach to complementarity, adopting standards for admissibility that would 
require domestic proceedings to be framed in much the same way as the OTP’s cases—
in effect, to mirror them. While this approach is consistent with the coercive dimension 
of complementarity, insofar as it seeks to pull states towards compliance with the Rome 
Statute framework, it also places a heavy burden on states, one that they may be 
unprepared (or unwilling) to meet. Rather than catalyzing domestic proceedings through 
greater judicial dialogue, then, the Court’s admissibility regime way well thwart them. 
Furthermore, while some commentators have responded to this criticism by seeking to 
bifurcate the juridical operation of complementarity from its treatment outside of the 
courtroom, I suggest that this division is unsustainable and symptomatic of legalism: it 
relies on an artificial division between the Court as a legal and political actor.  
 
1. Complementarity as Admissibility Rule 
 
1.1 “Same Case” Test: Person, Conduct, and Incident? 
 
The “same case” test has its origins in the ICC’s investigations in the DRC, 
following the government’s referral to the Court in April 2004.  Thomas Lubanga Dyilo 
was the first accused to be surrendered to the ICC and also the first to be found guilty: in 
March 2012, he was convicted on the sole charge of recruiting, conscripting, and 
enlisting child soldiers.222  Two other former rebel leaders, Germaine Katanga and 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, have also been tried: Ngudjulo Chui was acquitted in December 
2012, while Katanga was convicted in March 2014.223 Notably, as these were cases in a 
situation that the government itself had referred to the Prosecutor, they raised little 
opposition with Kinshasa. Indeed, at the time that the OTP lodged its application, 
Lubanga had been in the custody of Congolese authorities since March 2005, where he 
was being held on several charges, including genocide and crimes against humanity.224 An 
arrest warrant for Lubanga was first sought in January 2006 and issued under seal by the 
Pre-Trial Chamber the following month.225  In its application, the Prosecutor 
acknowledged that proceedings against Lubanga were underway in the DRC; however, it 
argued that this was not a bar to admissibility since, at the time of the Congolese 
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government’s referral to the ICC in March 2004, the government had stated that it was 
not able to prosecute crimes falling within the Court’s jurisdiction.226   
 
In deciding whether to approve the requested warrant, Pre-Trial Chamber I 
actively examined whether the case was admissible since, in its view, such a 
determination had to necessarily precede the issuance of a warrant.   The Chamber 
rejected the OTP’s argument that the Congolese government’s referral of the situation 
rendered the case admissible per se.  Importantly, it noted that for the purpose of the 
admissibility analysis, the DRC national judicial system “ha[d] undergone certain changes 
since March 2004, particularly in the region of Ituri,” where Lubanga’s alleged crimes had 
been committed, and where the OTP had opted to begin its investigations.227  As a result, 
the Court found the Prosecutor’s “general statement that the DRC national judicial 
system continues to be unable in the sense of article 17 … of the Statute does not wholly 
correspond to … reality any longer.”228  
 
The Pre-Trial Chamber nevertheless determined that the case was admissible.  In 
so doing, it concluded that, “it is a condition sine qua non for a case arising from the 
investigations of a situation to be inadmissible that national proceedings encompass both 
the person and the conduct which is the subject of the case before the Court.”229 
Drawing on its earlier definition of a case in the context of victim participation, the 
Chamber noted that the word “case” referred to “specific incidents during which one or 
more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court seem to have been committed by one or 
more identified suspects.”230  Because Lubanga was charged with crimes other than those 
related to the recruitment of child soldiers – even where those crimes were broader in 
scope than those charged by the ICC – the case was not being investigated or prosecuted 
by the DRC within the ambit of Article 17(1)(a).231 There was thus no bar to admissibility. 
 
In decisions reviewing other arrest warrants, the Court has subsequently applied 
the “same person, same conduct” test.232 In these instances, the relevant pre-trial 
chambers have acted proprio motu under the discretionary power provided under Article 
19(1) of the Rome Statute, leading them to conclude that the while the proceedings in 
question concerned the same person, they did not concern the same conduct. In several 
cases, the Prosecutor advanced an even narrower test, arguing in subsequent motions 
that the “same conduct” test required domestic proceedings to involve not only the same 
acts, but also the same incidents, i.e., the same factual allegations.233 While there has been 
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no explicit judicial endorsement of these additional requirements, Pre-Trial Chamber III, 
in the case of former Cote d’Ivoire President Laurent Gbabgo, indicated that a case 
encompasses “specific incidents during which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Court seem to have been committed by one or more identified suspects.”234  
 Katanga was the first accused to challenge the admissibility of his case. In March 
2009, before Trial Chamber II, he filed an application under Article 19(2)(a) on the basis 
that, inter alia, the same conduct test was overly strict and constituted “flawed” 
precedent.235 Instead, he argued that the Court should adopt a more flexible approach to 
admissibility, one based on a “comparative gravity” or “comprehensive conduct” 
standard.236  While there was “no mathematic formula” for such a standard, Katanga 
averred, “Only when the ICC Prosecutor’s scope of investigation is significantly more 
comprehensive than the scope of national investigations, would there be a basis for 
admissibility.”237 Furthermore, even if the same conduct test did apply, Katanga argued 
that he was being investigated by the DRC at the time the ICC issued its arrest warrant 
and that these investigations encompassed crimes committed on or about 24 February 
2003 in the village of Bogoro, which was the basis of the ICC’s case as well.   
The Trial Chamber dismissed the challenge, but rather than opine on the validity 
of the test (around which Katanga’s motion had primarily been framed), it found that the 
DRC authorities were unwilling to prosecute Katanga.238 The Chamber implicitly 
affirmed the validity of the test, however, insofar as it rejected Katanga’s claim that the 
prosecution had failed to produce documents about the attack on Bogoro that he alleged 
were relevant to admissibility, on the grounds that they were not “decisive.”239  The 
presumption that domestic proceedings had to encompass the same conduct (the attack 
on Bogoro) was thus implicit in the Court’s dismissal.  The Appeals Chamber clarified 
this determination on review—finding that inaction at the domestic level, not 
unwillingness, rendered the case admissible—but it did not address the alternative 
standard (“comprehensive conduct’”) that Katanga had proposed.240  Other defendants 
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before the ICC have raised similar challenges. In Gbagbo, the chamber was also asked to 
“interpret ‘conduct’ in a flexible manner, focusing on the general conduct of the suspect 
in relation to the context in which the crimes were committed.” The petition noted that 
the “short-sighted view of complementarity” endorsed by the Court “fails to take 
account of the wider goals of international criminal justice, in particular the need for 
national jurisdictions to build capacity to try such crimes domestically … as part of the 
overall process of reconciliation and peace building.”241 But the Court declined. 
 
Significantly, the context for these cases was one in which the state had 
supported the ICC’s intervention (at least initially) through self-referral. As Stahn notes, 
“state authorities sided with the ICC, rather than the defence, since they had an interest 
in seeing the case being tried internationally.”242 By contrast, the proceedings in Kenya 
and Libya present an alternative picture, as those challenges were both brought by 
governments under Article 19(2)(b).  In Kenya, the government disputed the correctness 
of the test on the basis that the “same person” element of the test was flawed. Instead, 
national investigations should cover “the same conduct in respect of persons at the same 
level in the hierarchy being investigated by the ICC.”243  It also offered a “proposed 
timetable for investigative processes” at the national level, including a report on PEV 
investigations under a new Director of Public Prosecutions (one that would “extend up 
to the highest levels, and on the cooperation with the ICC Prosecutor”) and, by 
September 2011, a “report on progress made with investigations and readiness for trials 
in light of judicial reforms.”244 The Pre-Trial Chamber rejected the state’s challenge 
within two months, finding that the proposed measures “fall short of any concrete 
investigative steps regarding the … suspects in question.”245 
 
On appeal, the government continued to press its view that, “it cannot be right 
that in all circumstances in every Situation and in every case that may come before the 
ICC the persons being investigated by the Prosecutor must be exactly the same as those 
being investigated by the State”; rather, “[t]here simply must be a leaway [sic] in the 
exercise of discretion in the application of the principle of complementarity.”246 To that 
end, it averred, much as Katanga did, that a better test should query whether national 
proceedings capture the “same conduct in respect of the persons at the same level in the 
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the “Document in Support of the ‘Appeal of the Government of Kenya against the Decision on the 
Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 
19(2)(b) of the Statute,’” ICC-01/09-02/11, 21 June 2011, para. 43. 
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hierarchy being investigated by the ICC.”247By a majority, the Appeals Chamber affirmed 
the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision. It clarified that “where summonses to appear have 
been issued, the question is no longer whether suspects at the same hierarchical level are 
being investigated by Kenya, but whether the same suspects are the subject of 
investigation by both jurisdictions for substantially the same conduct.”248 The majority 
further rejected Kenya’s appeal to domestic discretion, noting that the only purpose of 
admissibility proceedings under Article 19 is to determine if there is a jurisdictional 
conflict. While complementarity might favor national jurisdictions, the Chamber noted, 
“it does so only to the extent that there actually are, or have been, investigations and/or 
prosecutions at the national level.”249 Finally, it specified that a successful challenge 
required concrete investigative steps: “mere preparedness” to take such steps would not 
suffice.250  
 
Like Kenya, the Libyan government also contended in its challenges to the 
Gaddafi and Al-Senussi cases that the “same case” test should be broadened, recognizing 
that “the state is to be accorded a margin of appreciation as to the contours of the case 
to be investigated, and the ongoing exercise of the national authorities’ prosecutorial 
discretion as to the focus and formulation of the case.”251 Further, domestic authorities 
should not be “unduly restrained in pursuing a national accountability agenda by being 
compelled to conduct an investigation and prosecution that mirrors precisely the factual 
substance” of the OTP’s investigation.252 Conformity to ICC practice should instead 
yield to a more flexible standard, Libya argued, “with a policy of giving the benefit of 
doubt to States exercising jurisdiction.”253 
 
 While not discarding the test, Pre-Trial Chamber I took a noticeably broader 
approach in both cases than in previous admissibility decisions. In each challenge, it 
rejected the suggestion that “conduct” must be understood as “incident specific,”254 but 
it affirmed that domestic investigations must be “case-specific,” meaning that: 
 
 [I]t must be demonstrated that: a) the person subject to the domestic proceedings 
 is the same person against whom the proceedings before the Court are being 
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 conducted; and b) the conduct that is subject to the national investigation is 
 substantially the same conduct that is alleged in the proceedings before the 
 Court.255 
As to the question of what constitutes “substantially” the same conduct, the Chamber 
found that will “vary according to the concrete facts and circumstances of the case, and, 
therefore, requires a case-by-case analysis.”256 Significantly, contrary to duty-based 
arguments over the need to implement Rome Statute legislation domestically, the 
Chamber took the opportunity in both decisions to clarify that “the question of whether 
domestic investigations are carried out with a view to prosecuting ‘international crimes’ is 
not determinative of an admissibility challenge.”257 In its words, “the decision to exclude 
reference to the ordinary crimes exception [of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes] was a 
deliberate decision that followed extensive discussions during the negotiating process.”258 
 Pre-Trial Chamber I nevertheless rejected the challenge brought on behalf of 
Gaddafi—chiefly because the Zintan militia was holding him, thus making the state 
“unable” to obtain him for purposes of trial259—but it found al-Senussi’s case 
inadmissible. It did so, in part, on the ground that while “it is not required that domestic 
proceedings concern each of those events [mentioned in the arrest warrant] at the 
national level,” the “incidents” or “events” in Senussi’s case were “indeed the same as 
the one before the Court.”260 The Appeals Chamber affirmed both rulings, holding:  
 
 What is required is a judicial assessment of whether the case that the State is 
 investigating sufficiently mirrors the one that the Prosecutor is investigating. The 
 Appeals Chamber considers that to carry out this assessment, it is necessary to 
 use, as a comparator, the underlying incidents under investigation both by the 
 Prosecutor and the State, alongside the conduct of the suspect under 
 investigation that gives rise to his or her criminal responsibility for the conduct 
 described in those incidents.261  
 
Notably, Judge Anita Usacka took issue with the Court’s continued fidelity to the “same 
case” test. In dissent, she argued: 
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 Establishing such a rigid requirement would oblige domestic authorities to 
 investigate or  prosecute exactly or nearly exactly the conduct that forms the 
 basis for the “case before the Court” at the time of the admissibility proceedings, 
 thereby being obliged to “copy” the case before the Court. Instead of 
 complementing each other, the relationship between the Court and the State 
 would be competitive, requiring the State to do its utmost to fulfil the 
 requirements set by the Court.262  
Echoing Judge Usacka, Kevin Jon Heller has remarked that, “the same-conduct 
requirement expects states to be mind-readers: if [states] do not accurately anticipate the 
precise conduct that will draw the ICC’s attention—no small task, given the ‘universe of 
criminality in atrocity-crime situations’—they will be deemed ‘inactive’ with regard to the 
international proceedings and the Court will admit the case.”263  
 Despite such criticism, the “same case” doctrine appears to have become an 
interpretive mainstay of the Court’s jurisprudence. It was most recently applied in the 
Appeals Chamber’s May 2015 judgment rejecting the Ivory’s Coast challenge to the 
proceedings against Simone Gbagbo, notwithstanding the fact that Ms. Gbagbo had 
already been convicted and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, on different charges, by 
a domestic court in March of that year.264 Thus, while the test might be defensible as a 
matter of statutory interpretation,265 it is an exacting one with the potential of placing the 
Court in awkward disjuncture with national jurisdictions. Rather than encouraging 
flexibility in the manner and method by which states pursue domestic accountability, the 
came conduct test, as it has been applied to date, promotes the opposite. 266  
1.2 Admissibility Challenges and Timing 
 
In addition to the substantive constraints imposed by the same conduct 
requirement, the Court has also applied substantial procedural limitations on 
admissibility challenges.  As noted, most ICC pre-trial chambers have addressed 
admissibility challenges pursuant to Article 19(1), which the Court interprets with broad 
discretion to determine proprio motu the admissibility of a case.267 In July 2006, however, 
the Appeals Chamber issued a decision that significantly restricted the scope of such 
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review, holding that “the Pre-Trial Chamber should exercise its discretion only when it is 
appropriate in the circumstances of the case, bearing in mind the interests of the 
suspect.”268 Rather than the Pre-Trial Chamber conducting its own review of 
admissibility, then, the Appeals Chamber suggested that it would be possible (indeed 
preferable) for the accused to do so, noting that such a challenge could theoretically be 
lodged after an arrest warrant had issued but prior to the accused’s arrest. 
 
This decision has attracted significant criticism. As Gilbert Bitti and Mohamed El 
Zeidy note, the decision ignores the fact that admissibility is “a general principle in the 
Rome Statute which does not need to be reiterated in every single provision.”269 
Furthermore, the Chamber’s decision ignores, or overlooks, the practical context of ICC 
arrest warrants, many of which are often issued under seal. In practice, this effectively 
prevents a defendant from challenging admissibility prior to his or her surrender to the 
ICC.  As the Katanga Trial Chamber noted, “[T]he DRC did not challenge the 
admissibility of the case when this warrant of arrest was communicated to it and … as 
soon as said warrant was unsealed, Germain Katanga’s transfer to The Hague was 
ordered immediately.”270  
 
The logic of the Appeals Chamber’s decision implies a circular approach to 
assessing prosecutorial or judicial activity at the national level, particularly in situations of 
self-referral.  In Katanga’s admissibility decision, for instance, the Chamber affirmed that 
the case was inadmissible but the grounds of its determination focused on the first-prong 
of the admissibility test: inactivity.271  Specifically, the Chamber found that there were no 
proceedings against Katanga at the time he raised his challenge because the DRC had 
closed them upon his transfer to The Hague.272  This approach to the admissibility 
provision thus subordinated the presence of domestic proceedings to a narrow question: 
Were proceedings ongoing “at the time of” the Court’s actual determination of the 
admissibility of the case?273  
 
The Chamber appeared untroubled by the potentially chilling effect that such 
relinquishment of jurisdiction might have on the duty of states to exercise their criminal 
jurisdiction. In its words, “It is purely speculative to assume that a State that has 
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refrained from opening an investigation into a particular case or from prosecuting a 
suspect would do so, just because the [ICC] has ruled that the case is inadmissible.”274 
While the Chamber’s reasoning is consistent with the plain language of Article 17(a)(1), 
judicial inquiry into the broader context of domestic proceedings becomes immaterial.  
As other chambers have similarly ruled, the nature of any past investigations—who 
initiated them, for what crimes, based on what evidence—is irrelevant.275 
 
 The insistence that concrete investigative steps must be underway at the time the 
Court makes a determination on an admissibility challenge is further compounded by 
Article 19(5) of the Statute, which stipulates that such challenges be made “at the earliest 
opportunity.”276  This requirement is particularly difficult for states that may have a 
genuine desire to conduct domestic proceedings, but suffer from the challenges common 
to many post-conflict states, e.g., collapsed (or compromised) judicial systems, limited 
capacity, or inadequate national legal frameworks.  Indeed, it is on this basis that the 
Libyan government lodged its objection, in part, on the grounds that “no State emerging 
from conflict could ever benefit from the complementarity principle.”277   
 
 Similarly, in Kenya’s admissibility challenge, the government averred that the Pre-
Trial Chamber had erred by failing to give it sufficient time to submit additional evidence 
before ruling on the application.  The Appeals Chamber rejected this argument, 
concluding that a two-month period was sufficient between the receipt of an 
admissibility challenge and a ruling upon it.  Further, relying on the two-stage test 
articulated in the Katanga judgment, the Chamber reiterated that the admissibility 
challenge must be “sufficiently substantiated” at the time the motion is filed. States 
cannot expect to be allowed to make further submissions.  
 
1.3 Evidentiary Thresholds  
 
An additional limitation is the scrutiny, or lack thereof, with which ICC chambers 
have assessed claims of ongoing domestic proceedings as part of admissibility challenges. 
In this regard, Katanga’s proceedings illustrate the negative consequences of the Appeals 
Chamber’s 2006 judgment, which resulted in the Pre-Trial Chamber conducting a “very 
limited review of the admissibility of the case against Katanga in the context of issuing 
the arrest warrant against him and in the light of the restricted information provided by 
the Prosecutor.”278  As a result, when Katanga brought his admissibility challenge before 
the Trial Chamber, the Chamber was thrust into the “difficult position of trying to 
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respect the 13 July 2006 Appeals Chamber Judgment and to guess the Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s attitude if it had been engaged in a detailed review of the admissibility of the 
case during the issuance of the arrest warrant.”279 
 
The Trial Chamber’s reasoning is noteworthy for its approach to the question of 
state “willingness,” which has otherwise yet to be addressed by the Court.  Notably, the 
Trial Chamber did not address the activity or inactivity of the DRC authorities (as the 
Appeals Chamber later did); rather, it proceeded directly to what Robinson has termed 
the “slogan” version of the test, i.e., it proceeded directly to an unwillingness/inability 
assessment.280 It examined the intent of the DRC to bring Katanga to justice, and 
considered that the evidence presented to date supported the “clear and explicit 
expression of unwillingness of the DRC to prosecute [the] case.”281  Indeed, echoing an 
argument that had initially been rejected by the Pre-Trial Chamber in Lubanga, the Trial 
Chamber held that, regardless of the conduct for which the accused was being tried, 
because the Congolese authorities had willingly surrendered him to the Court, the 
national system must be deemed “unwilling” within the meaning of Article 17.282   
 
In arriving at this conclusion, the trial judges uncritically accepted the DRC’s 
submissions that it had voluntarily relinquished jurisdiction. It cited to a letter from the 
government, which stated the DRC’s “official position” that the ICC must reject 
Katanga’s admissibility challenge because, in so doing, the ICC would be “doing justice” 
to “His Excellency Mr. Joseph Kabila, President of the DRC, [who] has demonstrated to 
the world his determination to fight resolutely against impunity by making the DRC to 
date an unequalled model of cooperation with the ICC.”283  The Court further appeared 
to accept as dispositive a letter submitted to the OTP by the Director of the Immediate 
Office of the Chief Prosecutor of the High Military Court in Kinshasa, which stated that 
“the Military Prosecuting Authority had not initiated any investigation against Germain 
Katanga in relation to the attack on Bogoro on 24 February 2003.”284  Such “clear and 
explicit” expressions of unwillingness, according to the Chamber, meant that the “DRC 
clearly intend[ed] to leave it up to the Court” to prosecute Katanga for the attack in 
Bogoro.285 
 
Yet, by the Chamber’s own admission, disagreement did exist as to whether 
domestic criminal proceedings against Katanga had been initiated and whether there was 
unwillingness to prosecute.  One of the threshold questions was defense counsel’s claim 
that the Prosecutor had “inadvertently or negligently” failed to provide the Pre-Trial 
Chamber with information of the existence of domestic proceedings against Katanga at 
the time the arrest warrant was issued.286  These documents included a request filed by 
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the Kinshasa High Military Court in March 2007 to extend Katanga’s provisional 
detention, which contained reference to Bogoro “as one of the ten locations where 
people had allegedly been killed in the course of systematic attacks against the civilian 
population.”287  In light of this submission, the Chamber even acknowledged that the 
document contained “objective information indicating that Germain Katanga was one of 
several persons under investigation for crimes …  between 2002 and 2005 in, among 
other locations, Bogoro.”288   
 
The awkward posture in which the Trial Chamber found itself – effectively 
second guessing the issuance of Katanga’s arrest warrant, following the Pre-Trial 
Chamber’s limited review – likely contributed to its cursory analysis of the documents 
that had allegedly not been provided.289 These documents suggest, at the least, 
discrepancies between the DRC government’s representation and the situation on the 
ground at the time, but the Chamber declined the opportunity to query the matter 
further.  In particular, the judges found “no need to answer the question” as to whether 
the materials would have led the Pre-Trial Chamber to exercise its discretion differently 
because, in its view, the document did not contain “decisive information” on the 
question of whether there had been domestic proceedings, nor was it “conclusive as to 
whether the acts allegedly committed there could be attributed to Germain Katanga.”290  
As with the Court’s later decisions, this apparent endorsement of a “conclusive” and/or 
“decisive” standard sets a high threshold for indicia of domestic activity.  
 
The Trial Chamber’s conclusions also appeared to rest on an uncritical 
acceptance of the representations of the Congolese executive. In effect, it treated the 
state as a unitary actor, overlooking evidence that there had been disagreement within the 
state on the status of Katanga’s case, as well as on the ability to try cases at the sub-state, 
i.e., provincial, level.291 Phil Clark, for instance, notes that the ICC’s Ituri-only focus at 
the time of Katanga’s challenge had raised concerns amongst senior judicial officials 
since Ituri then had one of the better functioning local judiciaries in the DRC.  Clark 
quotes Chris Aberi, the Sate Prosecutor in Bunia:  
 
When the ICC first came here, we showed them the dossiers we had already 
 assembled on Lubanga and others.  We were ready to try those cases here.  We 
 had the capacity to do this and it would have had a major impact for the people 
 here, to see these [rebel] leaders standing trial in the local courthouse.292  
 
Michael Reed of the International Center for Transitional Justice poses a similar question: 
“We have little sense of how the ICC measures willingness.  Is willingness determined 
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according to what a country’s executive branch says?  By the judicial system’s choice of 
cases?”293 
 
The evidentiary threshold established by the Trial Chamber in Katanga is 
compounded by the Appeals Chamber’s treatment of the Kenyan admissibility challenge.  
There the Chamber clarified that a state challenging the admissibility of a case “bears the 
burden of proof to show that the case is inadmissible” and that, to “discharge that 
burden,” the state “must provide the Court with evidence of a sufficient degree of 
specificity and probative value that demonstrates that it is indeed investigating the 
case.”294 Concrete evidence would have to be submitted that pointed to “specific 
investigative steps,” including, inter alia, “interviewing witnesses or suspects, collecting 
documentary evidence, or carrying out forensic analyses.”295 Despite these requirements, 
the Appeals Chamber refused to grant the Kenyan government’s requests to submit 
additional evidence or to present its argument in an oral hearing, where it had wanted the 
state police commissioner to testify concerning the progress of national proceedings. In 
the Chamber’s view, “although there might have been reasons to hold an oral hearing,” 
the decision not to do so was not an abuse of discretion.296   
 
Judge Usacka again dissented strongly from this view. She criticized the Pre-Trial 
Chamber for not seeking submission on such “pivotal matters” as the “definition of 
investigation and prosecution, standard of proof, and the type of evidence that was 
required to meet the burden, even though the Appellant had requested a hearing on 
those matters.”297 She further argued that the Pre-Trial Chamber abused its discretion in 
failing to consider Kenya’s submissions that investigations were underway (it had, for 
instance, included a case file referring to Ruto as a suspect with information on the scope 
of the investigation) or about their prospective nature, i.e., the possibility that, while in an 
early stage, the investigations might satisfy Article 19’s standards at some point in the 
near future since “the assessment of complementarity is the outcome of an ongoing 
process.”298  In her view, the Kenyan government should have been allowed more time 
to submit further evidence; moreover, the Pre-Trial Chamber could (and should) have 
used its authority to request additional documentation.  
 
The Court’s approach in both the Katanga and Kenya’s admissibility challenges 
suggests that the level of scrutiny applied to investigations and prosecutions at the 
national level has been less than thorough, and that a desire for speed or “efficiency” has 
overwhelmed the opportunity for more careful analysis and dialogue with national (or 
local)-level courts and prosecutors.299  Notably, the Court appeared to adjust this 
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297 Ibid., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Usacka, 20 September 2011, para. 25; see also para. 8. 
298 Ibid., para. 20; see also para. 27 (“The Court should not circumvent [the high threshold] created by 
unwillingness or inability by requiring a State to prove e.g. the existence of a full-fledged investigation or 
prosecution of a case in order to establish that there is no situation of inactivity.”) 
299 One commentator has also suggested that the Pre-Trial Chamber’s imposition of a “high legal burden 
of proof” on the Kenyan challenge was because of its lack of faith in the government’s intentions: “the real 
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approach in the course of Libya’s admissibility challenge to the case against Gaddafi, 
when it requested further clarifications on a variety of issues to obtain “concrete, tangible 
and pertinent evidence that proper investigations are currently ongoing” in Libya.”300 
While this additional information did not alter the Pre-Trial Chamber’s admissibility 
determination, the breadth of the additional information it sought—and the year it took 
to reach its decision—suggests the possibility of a more probing approach in assessing 
future challenges, albeit still an exacting one.301  
 
1.4 Due Process: Domestic Legal Systems on Trial 
 
Following the two-stage test for dealing with admissibility challenges, states are 
not first evaluated as to their willingness and ability to prosecute. This determination 
comes second, and has only rarely been dealt with in the complementarity case law to 
date. When it has, however, the legal framework applied suggests a similarly exacting 
approach to admissibility determinations. In Uganda, for instance, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
invoked its proprio motu powers to examine the continued admissibility of the case against 
LRA leader Joseph Kony, following the creation of a new special division within the 
Ugandan High Court meant to prosecute serious crimes. In finding that it remained 
properly seized of the case notwithstanding this development, the Chamber suggested a 
strict approach to complementarity, consistent with the expanded concept of it as a tool 
for compliance. In its words, “Pending the adoption of all relevant texts and the 
implementation of all practical steps, the scenario … remains therefore the same as at the 
time of the issuance of the warrants, that is one of total inaction on the part of the relevant 
national authorities.”302  
 
The adequacy of a state’s domestic legal framework was considered most 
extensively in the context of Libya, where the fairness of domestic proceedings and the 
adequacy of the country’s national criminal code were central issues. Whereas the 
Kenyan accused were aligned with the government’s admissibility challenges, in Libya 
both Gaddafi and al-Senussi sought transfer to The Hague on the basis that they would 
not be afforded a fair trial domestically. These challenges have presented perhaps the 
most complex set of questions for the Court to consider, in a political environment 
where there is little desire to cooperate with the ICC’s warrants but where genuine 
                                                                                                                                      
issue is that it simply did not believe that Kenya was acting in good faith.” See Clare Brighton, “Avoiding 
Unwillingness: Addressing the Political Pitfalls Inherent in the Complementarity Regime of the 
International Criminal Court,” International Criminal Law Review 12 (2012), 658.  
300 The Prosecutor v. Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah Al-Senussi, Decision requesting further submissions on 
issues related to the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, ICC-01/11-01/11, PTC I, 7 
December 2012, para. 9. These documents included: 1) issues relating to the status of domestic 
proceedings (including what investigative steps have been taken, whether evidence has been collected, and 
of what type); 2) issues relations to the subject-matter of the domestic investigations (including the 
“anticipate contours” of the case at the national level”; 3) issues of Libyan national law (including progress 
made in relation to law reform and the incorporation in Libyan law of international crimes as defined 
under the Rome Statute, and whether such reform would impact on the proceedings against Gaddafi); 4) 
issues relating to Gaddafi’s exercise of his rights under Libyan national law; and 5) issues relating to the 
capacity of Libyan authorities to investigate and prosecute (including questions of resource allocation, 
witness protection, and custody). Ibid., paras. 14-47. 
301 Notably, however, Pre-Trial Chamber I did not seize a similar opportunity in rejecting the Ivory’s Coast 
admissibility challenge to the case against Simone Gbagbo; it concluded that, despite evidence suggesting 
national proceedings had been initiated, the document provided was “contrary, sparse and disparate.” 
Further clarification was not sought.  See The Prosecutor v. Simone Gbagbo, Decision on Cote d’Ivoire’s 
challenge to the admissibility of the case against Simone Gbagbo, ICC-02/11-01/12, PTC I, 11 December 
2014, para. 65. 
302 Uganda Admissibility Decision, para. 52 (emphasis added).  
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political transition offered—at least for a time—greater prospects for domestic 
accountability. Put differently, the concern was not that Libyan authorities were unwilling 
to prosecute Gaddafi and al-Senussi, but rather that they were too willing.303  
  
 In its challenge to the case against Gaddafi, Libya submitted that an active 
investigation—broader than but including the same incidents and conduct as those 
contained in the ICC warrant—was ongoing since the date of Gaddafi’s capture, and that 
it was willing and able genuinely to carry out the proceedings.304 The government focused 
on efforts made to strengthen judicial capacity building and to improve the security 
situation, but argued that, “It is not the function of the ICC to hold Libya’s national legal 
system against an exacting and elaborate standard beyond that basically required for a fair 
trial.”305 Similar arguments were made in the challenge to the al-Senussi case, with Libya 
asserting that an appropriate courtroom complex and prison facilities would be 
available.306 It noted, however, that due process need not “ensure that the domestic 
proceedings accord with a particular ideal as determined by the ICC.”307 In this case, the 
Prosecutor agreed.308  
 
 As noted, the Court issued divided rulings. In the case of Gaddafi, the Chamber 
rejected Libya’s challenge chiefly on the grounds of “inability,” insofar as it was unable to 
“obtain” both the accused as well as testimony from witnesses who were being held in 
detention facilities not yet under the government’s control.309 A third main line of 
reasoning, however, was that national due process standards were relevant to the principle 
of complementarity. Specifically, the Chamber found that the failure to provide Gaddafi 
with a defense attorney, despite the guarantee of counsel under Libyan law, was “an 
impediment to the progress of proceedings,” as it meant that, “a trial cannot be 
conducted in accordance with the rights and protections of the Libyan national justice 
system.”310 In short, while a state’s failure to satisfy international standards of due 
process might not render a case inadmissible, the failure to respect national due process 
standards—“in the context of the relevant national systems and procedures”—could.311 
 
 The Chamber, however, granted the state’s challenge to the admissibility of al-
Senussi’s case.  While that case was substantially different than Gadaffi’s (for one, he was 
                                                
303 As Mégret and Samson put it, “Violating someone’s due process rights denotes not unwillingness, but if 
anything, its opposite in an extreme form.” See Frédéric Mégret and Marika Giles Samson, “Holding the 
Line on Complementarity in Libya: The Case for Tolerating Flawed Domestic Trials,” Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 11 (2013), 574. For a “modified” approach to this thesis, advocating a focus on “core fair 
trial elements … without turning the ICC into a traditional human rights body,” see Elinor Fry, “Between 
Show Trials and Sham Prosecutions: The Rome Statute’s Potential Effects on Domestic Due Process 
Protections,” Criminal Law Forum 23 (2012).  
304 Libya Admissibility Application, para. 101. 
305 Ibid., para. 99.  
306 Al-Senussi Admissibility Application, paras. 176, 181, 193. 
307 Ibid., para. 111.  
308 OTP Response to Libya Application, para. 28 (“The Statute requires that the State with jurisdiction 
must establish a genuine willingness and ability, but it need not also establish that its domestic procedural 
protections comport with the ICC Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence.”). 
309 Gaddafi PTC Decision, paras. 206-11.  
310 Ibid., para. 214. 
311 Ibid., 200 
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in the custody of the Libyan government), the Court’s approach suggests a modified 
approach to due process questions.312 In affirming the decision, the Appeals Chamber, 
 
 recall[ed] that, in the context of admissibility proceedings, the Court is not 
 primarily called upon to decide whether in domestic proceedings certain 
 requirements of human rights law or domestic law are being violated. Rather, 
 what is at issue is whether the State is willing genuinely to investigate or 
 prosecute.313  
 
The Chamber concluded that, even accepting the fair trial violations that would flow 
from lack of access to a lawyer during the investigation stage of proceedings, “such 
violations would not reach the high threshold for finding that Libya is unwilling 
genuinely to investigate or prosecute Mr. Al-al-Senussi.”314 In its view, such a high 
threshold meant proceedings that would “lead to a suspect evading justice … in the 
equivalent of sham proceedings that are concerned with that person’s protection.”315 
 
 While the Court’s decision in al-Senussi has been criticized,316 its general 
approach to both of the Libyan cases suggests that there may be an overall loosening of 
other admissibility doctrines, particularly where, in an environment of political transition, 
the desire of state authorities to investigate and prosecute is not in doubt. 
Complementarity-as-admissibility in this context thus hews more closely to the goals of 
complementarity-as-catalyst. At the same time, the Appeals Chamber’s effective rejection 
of the “due process” thesis, as well as its explicit affirmation that conduct need not be 
charged as international crimes, suggests that there may be a greater margin for 
discretion in future admissibility assessments, even if the restrictive “same case” test 
endures.  
 
2. “Positive” Complementarity in the Courtroom 
  
 The ascendance of the concept of “positive” complementarity within the OTP 
and amongst non-state actors seeking to maximize the ICC’s catalytic properties is partly 
rooted, as chapter two argued, in a cooperative spirit of mutual assistance and 
interaction. Article 93 sets forth the ways in which states parties are obligated to 
cooperate with the Court and also the way in which the Court may cooperate with states 
(both state and non-state parties.) Article 93(10), in particular, provides the legal basis for 
such cooperation. It authorizes (but does not require) the ICC to, upon request: 
 
 [C]ooperate with and provide assistance to a State Party conducting an 
 investigation into or trial in respect of conduct which constitutes a crimes within 
                                                
312 The Pre-Trial Chamber’s apparent emphasis on the fact that al-Senussi’s lack of counsel “at the present 
time” was not dispositive of “inability” (as it appeared to be in the case of Gaddafi), suggests a more 
permissive temporal approach by the Court as well. Ibid., paras. 307-308.    
313 Al Senussi Admissibility Appeals Judgment, para. 190.  
314 Ibid., 190 
315 Ibid., par. 218. 
316 See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, “It’s Time to Reconsider the Al-Senussi Case. But How?” (2 September 
2014), at http://opiniojuris.org/2014/09/02/time-reconsider-al-senussi-case/. Similarly, civil society 
reaction to the Court’s decision was decidedly mixed. The only international NGO to explicitly welcome 
the ruling was No Peace Without Justice, which considered it “a positive answer to Libyans’ aspirations to 
see the alleged perpetrators of crimes against them face justice where those crimes were committed.” See 
“Libya: NPWJ and NRPTT welcome ICC ruling on the Al-Senussi case” (24 July 2014). 
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 the jurisdiction of the Court or which constitutes a serious crime under the 
 national law of the requesting state.317  
 
While a broad array of information can be provided—ranging from the “transmission of 
statements, documents or other types of evidence obtained in the course of an 
investigation or trial conducted by the Court,” to “the questioning of any person 
detained by order of the Court”—the Statute provides certain safeguards for the 
provision of such information, including if the documents or information sought were 
provided by another state, or a witness or expert.318  
 But while the Court has endorsed, as in Katanga, positive complementarity’s 
vision of certain division-of-labor relationships between the Prosecutor and national 
jurisdictions,319 direct assistance under Article 93(10) has found little judicial support to 
date.320 It was raised directly in the course of the Kenyan litigation when the government 
filed, along with its admissibility challenge, a request for assistance from the Court 
seeking the “transmission of all statements, documents, or other types of evidence 
obtained by the Court and the Prosecutor in the course of the ICC investigations.”321 
Other than that request, however, judicial precedent is scant. The only previous occasion 
in which such a request appears was in Katanga’s challenge, where defense counsel 
pointed to “evidence that the DRC was keen on investigating this case at the national 
level” and noted that the government had “submitted a request for legal assistance to the 
Prosecutor, making use of the mechanism in Article 93(10).”322 Counsel stated that it was 
“unaware of the fate of that request,” but, two weeks later, the OTP noted the following 
in its reply: 
 The ICC was not created to be an international investigative bureau with 
 resources to support national authorities. It is instead a judicial body with 
 jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of international concern and established 
 to be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. Furthermore, Article 
 93(10), which addresses requests for cooperation from States to the Court, does 
 not impose an obligation on the ICC to render assistance to States. Compliance 
                                                
317 Rome Statute, Article 93(10)(a). As noted, non-state parties may also be granted requests for assistance 
as well. Ibid., Article 93(10)(c).  
318 Ibid., Article 93(10)(b)(i)-(ii). Christopher Hall urges an added set of safeguards, namely that the OTP 
develop criteria for determining whether, consistent with Article 21(3), the assistance the Office might 
provide could have “a seriously detrimental impact on human rights,” for instance through application of 
“the death penalty, torture or other ill-treatment, unfair trial or other human rights violations.” See 
Christopher Hall, “Positive Complementarity in Action,” in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M. El Zeidy 
(eds.), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 
1032-1033.   
319 As the Appeals Chamber noted, “[T]here may be merit in the argument that the sovereign decision of a 
State to relinquish its jurisdiction in favor of the Court may well be seen as complying with the ‘duty to 
exercise [its] criminal jurisdiction’ as envisioned in the … Preamble.” Katanga Appeals Admissibility 
Judgment, para. 85. 
320 For similar conclusions, see Nidal Nabil Jurdi, “Some lessons on complementarity for the International 
Criminal Court Review Conference,” South African Yearbook of International Law 34 (2009), 36 (“No traces of 
positive complementarity can be found in either the Lubanga, Katanga, and Ntaganda cases, or in the 
Ugandan situation.”); Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire, 101; Karolina Wierczynska, “Deference in 
the ICC Practice Concerning Admissibility Challenges Lodged by States,” in Deference in International Courts 
and Tribunals, 369 (“At the moment the complementarity principle, as interpreted by the ICC, seems 
mainly focused on the mechanism of control.”).  
321 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Request for Assistance on behalf of the Government of the Republic of 
Kenya pursuant to Article 93(10) and Rule 194, ICC-01/09, 21 April 2011, para. 2.  
322 Katanga Admissibility Challenge, para. 50 
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 with a request is discretionary and dependent on the fulfillment of the factors 
 listed therein, including considerations of witness protection and the principle of 
 originator consent.323  
 
Subsequent proceedings indicate no judicial determination as to the outcome of 
Katanga’s request.  
  
 The Court’s assessment of the Kenyan government’s 93(10) application, 
considered in June 2011, preceded the onset of its more overtly volatile relationship with 
the state (President Kenyatta himself was not elected until two years later), as well as 
serious allegations of witness intimidation and interference. While these subsequent 
developments raise legitimate questions about the good faith of the government’s 
application (and its intention to undertake a genuine investigations), at the time the Court 
appeared unwilling to indulge the state’s request for assistance. First, it explicitly stated 
that any requests for assistance under 93(10) should be assessed apart from 
complementarity: in the Pre-Trial Chamber’s words, “a determination on the 
inadmissibility of a case pursuant to article 17 of the Statute does not [necessarily] 
depend on granting or denying a request for assistance under article 93(10) of the 
Statute.”324 Then, in a subsequent, terse opinion, the Chamber articulated relatively strict 
conditions for such requests, stating that “the requesting State Party must show that it is 
at a minimum investigating or has already investigated” Rome Statute crimes.325 Referring 
only to the cooperation request—not the information provided in the government’s 
admissibility challenge—the Chamber concluded that, “The Government submitted … a 
two-page [request], which lack[s] any documentary proof that there is or has been an 
investigation, as required pursuant to article 93(10)(a) of the Statute.”326 
 The relationship between a state’s admissibility challenge and a related Article 
93(10) request is difficult to ignore, particularly where the need to satisfy a high 
admissibility standard may well depend on information in the Court or Prosecutor’s 
possession.327 Indeed, read alongside the  “same case” jurisprudence highlighted above, 
                                                
323 Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Public Redacted Version of the 19th March 2009 
Prosecution Response to Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case by the Defence of Germain 
Katanga, pursuant to Article 19(2)(a), ICC-01/04-01/07, TC II, 30 March 2009, paras. 100-101 (“OTP 
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the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, para. 39 (on-file).  
324 Ruto et al. Admissibility Decision, para. 34. 
325 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision on the Request for Assistance Submitted on Behalf of the 
Government of the Republic of Kenya Pursuant to Article 93(10) of the Statute and Rule 194 of the Rules 
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investigations were underway at the time of the admissibility challenge. See Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Anita Usacka, 20 September 2011, para. 8. 
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the ‘Decision on the Request for Assistance Submitted on Behalf of the Government of the Republic of 
Kenya Pursuant to Article 93(1) of the Statute and Rule 194 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence,” 
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the Chamber’s fleeting treatment of Kenya’s cooperation request establishes both a high 
bar to merit assistance but also a paradox: in order for states to receive assistance they 
must demonstrate that they have investigated the same person as the Court, yet to do so 
they may lack the very evidence for which they seek assistance.328 As Stahn agues, “this 
approach leaves limited space to take into account emerging justice efforts under 
domestic jurisdiction.”329  
 Judge Usacka has again been a dissenting voice on this issue. In the Kenyan 
cases, her dissent correctly suggests that the Pre-Trial Chamber “did not take into 
account that … [it] has the power to adapt the admissibility proceedings to … changing 
circumstances,” or on how it could “facilitate the Appellant by asking for more 
information or awaiting additional evidence on the start of investigations.”330 While 
subsequent actions of the Kenyan government may give Furthermore, in her dissent in 
Gaddafi, she specifically endorsed that the Court “is in an ideal position to actively assist 
domestic authorities in conducting [investigations and prosecutions], be it by the sharing 
of materials and information collected or of knowledge and expertise.”331 Such explicit 
approval of the Court’s role in encouraging domestic accountability has yet to find 
similar endorsement from other judges.  
3. Complementary as Policy and Law 
 
Complementarity’s evolution in both legal and policy discourse underscores the 
dynamic, shifting nature of the principle. Given the ambitious goals that animate 
“positive” complementarity in particular, one desirable approach is to conceive of it as 
“primarily a device to accommodate diversity.”332  Under this view, a broad conception 
of the interpretive principles that underwrite admissibility is necessary if the Court is to 
play a catalytic role in a world of multiple, complex states. Furthermore, if the ICC is to 
encourage national investigations and prosecutions, then it will likely have to do so in a 
way that preserves political discretion and flexibility to states.  
 
This approach rests uneasily, however, with the ICC’s complementarity 
jurisprudence to date. Commentators have defended the Court’s “refusal to import the 
policy aspects of positive complementarity into the admissibility regime,” contending 
that it “does not detract from the existence and importance” of such a policy; rather, “It 
is simply to say that this decision of complementarity is not one which is enforced by 
judicial decisions.”333 The ASP has attempted a similar partition of the juridical approach 
to complementarity from its policy goals as a catalyst. For example, the Assembly’s 2012 
report on complementarity states: 
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formal partition 93(10) requests from admissibility challenges. 
328 It should be noted that the Court’s decision, as well as t 	  
329 Stahn, “Admissibility Challenges before the ICC,” 237. 
330 Kenya Admissibility Appeals Judgment, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Usacka, para. 28. 
331 Gaddafi Admissibility Appeals Judgment, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Usacka, para. 65.  
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Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M. El Zeidy (eds.), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity 
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Admissibility,” 600. For an opposing view, see Charles Cherner Jalloh, “Kenya vs. The ICC Prosecutor,” 
Harvard International Law Journal 53 (August 2012),  
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 As stressed in the Court’s first report, two aspects of the term 
 “complementarity” have to clearly be separated. The first aspect is the question 
 of admissibility as provided for in the  Rome Statute, this being a judicial issue to 
 be ultimately determined by the judges of the  Court. The second aspect of 
 complementarity relates to the complementary roles of the Court and national 
 jurisdictions in contributing toward ending impunity. Within this second aspect, 
 the term “positive complementarity” is sometimes used to refer to the 
 active encouragement of and assistance to national prosecutions where 
 possible.334 
The OTP has also ratified this dichotomy, stating that complementarity has two 
dimensions: “(i) the admissibility test, i.e. how to assess the existence of national 
proceedings and their genuineness, which is a judicial issue; and (ii) the positive 
complementarity concept, i.e a proactive policy of cooperation aimed at promoting 
national proceedings.”335  
 Such a bifurcated approach may be appealing insofar as it allows the OTP to 
summon different versions of complementarity, for different purposes and audiences. 
Whereas the Office took a dim view of cooperation in Katanga and the Kenyan cases, it 
has otherwise championed (at least rhetorically) such a relationship outside of the 
courtroom. But the goal of promoting national proceedings and questions of judicial 
admissibility are intimately linked; they cannot be “clearly separated.” Indeed, while the 
Court’s apparent endorsement of a burden-sharing component to “positive” 
complementarity lends support to complementarity’s more cooperative dimensions, it 
simultaneously “downplays the significance of the national duty to investigate and 
prosecute.”336 As noted in a 2009 report on the DRC:  
 Despite the intention spelled out in the ICC Rome Statute to complement and 
 give precedence to investigations and prosecutions in national courts, the 
 national justice sector seems to use the ICC as an excuse for not pursuing such 
 cases. UN officials working to strengthen national capacities have been frustrated 
 when, in at least one case, a judge insisted he should not take up a case if there 
 were a chance that the ICC might prosecute it. 337  
Thus, just as ICC prosecutions can create an incentivizing environment for states 
consistent with the complementarity-as-catalyst framework, they may also have a chilling 
effect.  
 
 Furthermore, even if judicial proceedings must, as a matter of statutory 
interpretation, “mimic” those of the ICC, that requirement cannot be easily reconciled 
with broader goals for the Court to function as a catalyst for domestic accountability. As 
Drumbl notes, “Should [such] trials become the expected baseline of post-conflict justice, 
the result may be the universalization of a methodology that is unaffordable to nearly all 
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states or would only remain affordable if the justice narrative were limited to a tiny 
subsection of perpetrators.”338 Evidence of such “universalization”—or “mirroring,” as 
the Appeals Chamber termed it—can be seen in Uganda, where, in the absence of clear 
precedents for challenging complementarity, the “safer route” appears to be following 
the ICC as closely as possible. Nouwen quotes the then Principal Judge of the Ugandan 
High Court as follows, “The ICC wants us to do everything the way they did it: we must 
use the same Statute and the same standards.”339 
 
 The ICC’s reluctance thus far to develop a more pro-active approach to its 
admissibility jurisprudence suggests that the Court has been cautious to incorporate 
explicit policy considerations into its admissibility jurisprudence. Ultimately, however, the 
policy goals of complementarity and the body of law the principle produces are linked. 
Legalism suggests that the political imperatives of complementarity-as-catalyst can be 
separated from, or subordinated to, legal questions, yet both have a powerful influence 




 Despite the ascension of the complementarity-as-catalyst norm, ICC judges have 
appeared noticeably more reticent to incorporate this goal as part of their interpretive 
framework. At the same time, the weight of Article 17 jurisprudence has seen the ICC 
emerge as the privileged forum for prosecution. Specifically, under the Court’s case law, 
in order for a state to successfully challenge admissibility, domestic proceedings must be 
conducted in relation to the same “case” as that of the ICC, such that they concern the 
same person, conduct, and possibly even the same factual incidents. This already 
substantial threshold is even more pronounced in the case of “self referrals,” where the 
practical value of Article 17 to individuals contesting admissibility appears increasingly 
unclear. Furthermore, when faced with competing claims about the existence of national-
level proceedings, the ICC has undertaken a relatively superficial level of review, while 
setting a high evidentiary threshold for challengers to satisfy. And despite otherwise 
endorsing the “burden sharing” model that has accompanied the policy of “positive” 
complementarity, as a cooperation regime under Article 93(10) it has barely registered. 
 
Thus, despite many claims about the Court’s complementary nature to domestic 
jurisdictions, a de facto primacy regime—not unlike the Rule 11 referral system pioneered 
by the ICTY and ICTR, though without their explicit “conditional referral” authority—
appears to have instead been erected. Complementarity thus appears less as a space for 
constructive engagement and dialogue than a set of unifying criteria with which states 
must comply.340 The Libyan admissibility challenges may signal a more rigorous approach 
to Article 17 assessments and a partial loosening of the Court’s interpretive commitment 
to the “mirror” test, but it remains to be seen whether this approach will prevail in the 
long term.  
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Complementarity and the Office of the Prosecutor 
  
 While the previous chapter focused on complementarity within the ICC’s 
juridical framework, this chapter addresses its policy dimensions as engaged by another 
crucial Court actor: the Office of the Prosecutor. As the organ responsible for 
investigating the situations and prosecuting the cases brought before the Court, the OTP 
is a critical participant in the complementarity landscape. Situated at once between the 
ICC’s institutional center in The Hague and the various country contexts in which it 
operates, the Office—through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and its access to 
local actors working on the ground—shapes not only the overall work of the Court, but 
can also have a significant influence on the contours of domestic accountability efforts. 
Indeed, as a material site for engagement and cooperation with national-level actors, the 
OTP is uniquely positioned to undertake a variety of activities that could further its 
stated interest in “encouraging States to carry out their primary responsibility to 
investigate and prosecute international crimes.”341  
 
 This chapter focuses on two key aspects of the OTP’s work relevant to the ICC’s 
potential for catalyzing domestic proceedings: preliminary examinations and 
investigations. Returning to the dual approach to complementarity outlined in chapter 
two, it first examines the Office’s increasing reliance on preliminary examinations as a 
primary example of complementarity’s coercive power, wherein the threat of 
prosecutorial action might stimulate domestic efforts at accountability. As the only 
country of the three examined herein to have been subject to a preliminary examination, 
a case study of Kenya is offered in order to understand how the Office sought to use the 
potential leveraging power of this period to push for the establishment of a domestic 
criminal tribunal. While ultimately unsuccessful, the Kenyan experience highlights both 
the context-specific nature of the preliminary examination phase but also the diverse 
political dynamics in which ICC interventions unfold. 
 
 The second half of the chapter addresses the Office’s investigatory practices, 
which, I argue, are a material site where a more positive, cooperative approach to 
complementarity could be enacted. To date, however, the OTP has largely done the 
opposite, choosing not to base any of its investigators in situation-countries or to 
develop a more sustained field-based presence. Furthermore, while the Office has relied 
on its relationships with local information providers, known as “intermediaries,” it has 
too often employed a unilateral approach to evidence gathering, failing to integrate their 
concerns and priorities into the investigative process. Particular attention in this regard is 
paid to Uganda and the DRC, where even in the midst of “invited” referrals, the Office’s 
in-country field presence has been minimal. 
  
` A focus on investigations is also important as it has become increasingly clear 
that the ICC has an evidence problem, one that imperils the Court’s ability to serve as a 
credible threat should a state fail to pursue proceedings at the national level. The 
withdrawal of charges against Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta is only the most recent, 
though undoubtedly the most damaging, in a series of setbacks for the OTP.342 Indeed, 
                                                
341 OTP, “Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations” (November 2013), para. 100. 
342 In May 2014, the Prosecutor withdrew charges against President Uhuru Kenyatta on the basis of 
insufficient evidence; in so doing, she noted the Kenyan government’s lack of cooperation and non-
compliance with the OTP’s investigation, as well as the deaths of several important potential witnesses and 
the recanting of earlier testimony by other key witnesses. Furthermore, in March 2013, the Prosecutor was 
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to date, more than one-third of those individuals who have undergone the confirmation 
of charges process before the Court have had the charges against them dismissed or 
withdrawn in their entirety.343 One report notes that this is “a substantially higher rate of 
dismissal than the acquittal rate seen at other international criminal bodies following a 
full trial, even though the standard at trial—beyond a reasonable doubt—is higher than 
the burden at the confirmation stage.”344  Furthermore, in acquitting the ICC’s second 
defendant, Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Trial Chamber II dedicated a portion of its judgment 
to criticizing the OTP’s investigatory methods and the credibility of its witnesses.345 
Similar criticisms were raised in the Lubanga judgment and earlier in the Kenya cases as 
well, when Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert chastised the OTP for its “failure to 
investigate properly” prior to bringing charges against Kenyatta, revealing, in her words, 
“grave problems in the Prosecution’s system of evidence review, as well as a serious lack 
of proper oversight by senior Prosecution staff.”346 If the Court is to safeguard its 
potential as a threat-based catalyst, ensuring effective investigations and prosecutions are 
thus essential. 
 
 This chapter first offers a brief overview of how preliminary examinations and 
investigations have been structured within the overall architecture of the OTP. The 
second part turns to the OTP’s use of preliminary examinations as a key tool in its 
efforts to prod national jurisdictions into action. An overview of the emergent policy 
                                                                                                                                      
also granted permission to withdraw charges against Francis Muthaura, on the basis that “serious 
investigative challenges, including a limited pool of potential witnesses” led her to the conclusion that there 
was no longer a reasonable prospect of conviction. See The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru 
Muigai Kenyatta, Prosecution Notification of Withdrawal of the Charges against Francis Kirimi Muthaura, 
ICC-01/09-02/11, TC V, 11 March 2013, para. 11.  
343 The Prosecutor v. Bahr Idriss Abu Garda, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-02/05-02/09-
243Red, PTC I, 8 February 2010 (“Abu Garda Decision”); The Prosecutor v. Callixte Mbarushimana, Decision 
on the Confirmation of Charges, ICC-01/04-01/10-465-Red, PTC I, 16 December 2011; The Prosecutor v. 
William Samoei Ruto, et al., Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of 
the Rome Statute, ICC-01/09-01/11-373, PTC II, 23 January 2012 (confirming charges against William 
Ruto and Joshua Sang, but declining to confirm charges against Henry Kosgey); The Prosecutor v. Francis 
Kirimi Muthaura, et al., Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the 
Rome Statute, ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red, PTC II, 23 January 2012 (confirming charges against Francis 
Muthaura and Uhuru Kenyatta, but declining to confirm charges against Mohammed Hussein Ali). Note 
that this number does not include those charges levied (and confirmed) against those individuals charged 
with offenses against the administration of justice. More recently, the confirmation decision against former 
Côte D’Ivoire president Laurent Gbagbo was also “postponed” by Pre-Trial Chamber I due to insufficient 
evidence. Though later confirmed, the proceedings raised similar questions about the strength of the 
Prosecutor’s case. See The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbabgo, Decision Adjourning the Hearing on the 
Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute, ICC-02/11-01/11, PTC I, 3 
June 2013. 
344 War Crimes Research Office, Investigative Management, Strategies, and Techniques of the International Criminal 
Court’s Office of the Prosecutor (2012), 9 (“WCRO Report”). The burden of proof during the ICC confirmation 
of charges stage is “substantial grounds to believe,” Rome Statute, Art. 61(7). 
345 The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-02/12, TC 
II, 18 December 2012, para. 516 (“Ngudjolo Judgment”).    
346 The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC-01/04-
01/06-2842, TC I, 14 March 2012, paras. 482-83; The Prosecutor v. Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Decision on 
Defence Application Pursuant to Article 64(4) and Related Requests, ICC-01/09-02/11, TC V, 26 April 
2013, Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, paras. 1, 4-5. Similar concerns have been 
raised over sexual and gender based crimes, which the OTP, particularly under Bensouda’s tenure, has 
identified as a priority but remain those most vulnerable to failing judicial scrutiny. The Women’s 
Initiatives for Gender Justice has noted that gender-based crimes are the “most vulnerable category” of 
crime at the ICC, with more than 50 percent of such charges being dismissed before trial, attributable, in 
part, to “the Prosecution’s use of open-source information and failure to investigate thoroughly.” See 
“Legal Eye on the ICC” (March 2012). 
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framework on examinations is provided, as well as its link to the Office’s policy on 
complementarity. The chapter then offers a case study of the Kenyan experience in order 
to closely explore the political dynamics at play in that period, and what presumptions 
guided the OTP as it sought to support efforts for a national accountability process. 
Focusing on Uganda and the DRC, the chapter finally considers how the OTP’s 
evidence-gathering practices, particularly under Moreno-Ocampo’s tenure, were in fact 
designed to minimize the time investigators spent in affected communities and their 
degree of engagement with local actors, thereby diminishing the investigatory phase’s 
potential to enact a more “positive,” cooperative posture with national jurisdictions. 
 
1. Structure of the Office of the Prosecutor 
 
 The OTP is made up of three divisions: Jurisdiction, Complementarity, and 
Cooperation (JCCD); Investigations; and Prosecutions.347  Led by Phakiso Mochochoko 
since February 2011, the JCCD is, as Stegmiller notes, the “division that heavily 
influences policy decisions and the Prosecutor’s selective choices originate there.”348 Its 
Situation Analysis Section is primarily responsible for conducting preliminary 
examinations, which includes evaluating information the Office receives and making 
recommendations as to whether an investigation has a sufficient basis to process.  
Meanwhile, its International Cooperation Section is regarded as the Office’s “diplomatic” 
arm: it carries out external relations activities, including negotiating cooperation 
agreements, providing legal advice on complementarity and cooperation, and “liais[ing] 
with external actors to implement the complementarity policy.”349  
 
 Notably, the Division’s role has not been without controversy, with sceptics 
suggesting that, as a unit “defined by diplomatic (external relations and complementarity) 
expertise,” it negotiates with states, unduly politicizing what should remain (or appear to 
remain) the OTP’s strict independence.350 While the number of staff engaged in 
preliminary examination analysis has recently increased within the Office, Paul Seils, the 
JCCD’s former Head of Situation Analysis, noted in 2011 that the section “is small, with 
five members of staff at the time.”351 Communication amongst JCCD and Investigations 
analysts is also important. As Seils notes, the former are “usually assisted in the analysis 
                                                
347 See Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-BD/05-01-09 (23 April 2009) (“OTP 
Regulations”), Regulations 7-9.  The OTP also has an Executive Committee, which is responsible for 
strategic, policy and budgetary decisions.  Ibid., Regulation 4(1).   
348 Ignaz Stegmiller, The Pre-Investigation Stage of the ICC (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 2011), 457.  
349 Gregory Townsend, “Structure and Management,” in Luc Reydams, Jan Wouters, and Cedric Ryngaert 
(eds.), International Prosecutors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 289 (citing ICC OTP Operations 
Manual (February 2011)). In full, the JCCD is responsible for the following: “(a) the preliminary 
examination and evaluation of information pursuant to articles 15 and 53, paragraph 1 [of the Rome 
Statute] and rules 48 and 104 and the preparation of reports and recommendations to assist the Prosecutor 
in determining whether there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation; (b) the provision of 
analysis and legal advice to [the Executive Committee] on issues of jurisdiction and admissibility at all 
stages of investigations and proceedings; (c) the provision of legal advice to [the Executive Committee] on 
cooperation, the coordination and transmission of requests for cooperation made by the Office under Part 
9 of the Statute, the negotiation of agreements and arrangements pursuant to article 54, paragraph 3 [of the 
Rome Statute]; and (d) the coordination of cooperation and information- sharing networks.” Regulation 7, 
OTP Regulations.  
350 Schiff, 114. 
351 Paul F. Seils, “Making complementarity work: maximizing the limited role of the Prosecutor,” in 
Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M. El Zeidy (eds.), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 999. 
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of the data on crimes by one or two colleagues from the Analysis Section of the 
Investigations Division, although this will depend on available resources.”352 
 
 The current head of the Investigations Division, Michel De Smedt, has served in 
this position since January 2006.353 The Division’s responsibility, in part, is for “the 
provision of factual crime analysis and the analysis of information and evidence, in 
support of preliminary examinations and evaluations, investigations and prosecutions.”354 
Thus, following a decision to proceed with an investigation, a “joint team” consisting of 
staff from the OTP’s three divisions is formed; one former investigator has referred to 
these teams as the “core operational units” of the Office. 355  With respect to the 
composition of the investigative teams, it appears that the ICC has sought to employ 
investigators from various backgrounds, a decision that some commentators have 
criticized because of their lack of law enforcement training, but others have welcomed 
for the multi-disciplinary approach that it offers.356 
 
 Regulation 32 provides that each team “shall regularly report its progress and 
activities” to an Executive Committee composed of the Prosecutor, Deputy Prosecutor, 
and the heads of the ID and JCCD.357  One former ICC investigator who led 
investigations against Germain Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui described the concept of the 
joint team approach as one in which “investigators, prosecutors and cooperation staff … 
all work together from the very beginning of an investigation… Decisions in the joint 
team are taken jointly.”358 This tripartite approach distinguishes the ICC from its ad hoc 
predecessors, both of which followed a more “linear” model in which “an entire 
investigation team … reports directly to the Chief Prosecutor or to his executive 
office.”359  While this model aims at “adopting a more holistic and balanced investigative 
approach,”360 several OTP staff members have likened the interdivisional concept to a 
                                                
352 Ibid. 
353 Serge Brammertz initially served as the OTP’s Deputy Prosecutor for Investigations; however, that 
position remained vacant after Brammertz’s departure in 2007. Under Prosecutor Bensouda’s tenure, the 
Office has since been reorganized, with three individuals each directing the three divisions and the Deputy 
Prosecutor in charge of them all. In November 2011, the ASP elected James Stewart as the Court’s second 
Deputy Prosecutor, and Fabricio Guariglia has led the OTP’s Prosecution Division since October 2014.  
354 The Division is additionally responsible for “the preparation of the necessary security plans and 
protection policies for each case to ensure the safety and well-being of victims, witnesses, Office staff, and 
persons at risk on account of their interaction with the Court,” in “cooperation and coordination” with the 
Registrar; providing investigative expertise and support; and preparing and coordinating the field 
deployment of Office staff. See Regulation 8, OTP Regulations. 
355 Diane Lupig, “Investigation and Prosecution of Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes before the 
International Criminal Court,” American University Journal of Gender Social Policy and the Law 17(2) (2009), 438, 
n.7.  
356 For instance, Bernard Lavigne, who oversaw the ICC’s early investigations in the DRC, testified during 
the Lubanga proceedings that his team included former members of [NGOs] who could provide better 
open-mindedness to enable the other team members not to limit themselves to their police backgrounds.” 
In his view, this “may have had a negative impact on the quality of their work.” The Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Deposition of Witness DRC-OTP-WWWW-0582, ICC-01/04-01/06- Rule68Deposition-
Red2-ENG, TC I, 16 November 2010, at 16-17; see also “Paper on Some Policy Issues before the Office 
of the Prosecutor,” 8. At the same time, tribunals like the ICTY have also championed a multi-disciplinary 
approach with considerable success. See, e.g., ICTY Manual on Developed Practices (2009), 12; see also WCRO 
Report, 33-34. 
357 OTP Regulations, Regulation 32. 
358 The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjulo Chui, Transcript, ICC-01/04-01/07-T-81-Red-
ENG, 25 November 2009, at 7:4-9; see also 29:17-19. 
359 Hiroto Fujiwara and Stephan Parmentier, “Investigations,” in Luc Reydams, Jan Wouteres, and Cedric 
Ryngaert (eds.), International Prosecutors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 590.   
360 Ibid., 593. 
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“three-headed dragon,” insofar as it “divides authority, requires consensus throughout, 
and can subject all decisions to a difficult interpersonal dynamic.”361  
 
2. Preliminary Examinations 
 
2.1 Legal Framework  
 
 The preliminary examination is a unique pre-investigative stage within the 
statutory framework of the ICC. While the scope and length of the examination falls 
within the discretion of the OTP, Article 15 of the Rome Statute mandates the 
Prosecutor to first determine, regardless of the manner in which a situation comes before 
the Court, whether there is a “reasonable basis to proceed” with an investigation.362 As 
noted by the Court, “reasonable basis” is the lowest evidentiary standard in the Statute; 
as compared to evidence gathered during the investigation stage, the standard is neither 
“comprehensive” nor “conclusive.”363 At a minimum, however, the preliminary 
examination involves assessing whether the jurisdictional and admissibility requirements 
are met in order to open a formal investigation, and whether, “taking into account the 
gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are nevertheless substantial 
reasons to believe than an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.”364  
 
 Once a situation is identified, Article 53(1)(a)-(c) establishes the legal framework 
for a preliminary examination.365 Seeking, in part, to provide clarity on its approach to the 
process, the OTP first published a policy paper on the subject in October 2010 (revised 
as of November 2013).366 The Office identified three general principles—independence, 
impartiality, and objectivity—that guide preliminary examination practice and set forth a 
four-phase procedure: 
 
Phase 1: During this phase, the Office conducts an “initial assessment” of all 
information and communications on alleged crimes received under Article 15.  As an 
initial filtering exercise, the initial purpose is to both exclude information that is 
outside the ICC’s jurisdiction and to analyze the seriousness/gravity of information 
that “appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court.” 
 
                                                
361 Townsend, 292 (citing statements of anonymous OTP staff members).  
362 Rome Statute, Article 15 (“Prosecutor”).  
363 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19, PTC II, 31 
March 2010, para. 27 (“Kenya Article 15 Decision”); Situation in the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire, Decision 
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in 
the Republic of Co ̂te d'Ivoire, ICC-02/11, PTC III, 3 October 2011. In both decisions, the Chamber 
further noted that this standard reflected the Prosecutor’s more limited powers during the examination 
stage as compared to the investigation stage under Article 54. 
364 These criteria are enumerated in Article 53(1)(a)-(c) of the Rome Statute (“Initiation of an 
Investigation”). Notably, the term “interest of justice” is not defined. See “Policy Paper on the Interests of 
Justice” (September 2007) for the Office’s interpretation and approach to applying these criteria, at 
http://icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/library/organs/otp/ICC-OTP-InterestsOfJustice.pdf. For criticism 
of this approach, see Michael Newton, “A Synthesis of Community Based Justice and Complementarity,” 
in Christian De Vos, Sara Kendall, and Carsten Stahn (eds.), Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of 
International Criminal Court Interventions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
365 Rule 104 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and Regulation 27 of the OTP’s Regulations also 
govern preliminary examinations. Regulation 27 requires the Office to make a “preliminary distinction” 
amongst information that pertains to matters that are either manifestly outside the Court’s jurisdiction, 
related to an ongoing examination, or unrelated to an existing situation.  
366 OTP, “Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations.” 
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Phase 2: The second phase represents the “formal commencement” of an 
examination: it includes all communications not rejected in Phase 1, as well as 
referrals by states parties or the Security Council. The purpose at this stage is to 
ascertain whether the pre-conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 12 
are satisfied and “whether there is a reasonable basis to believe” that the crimes fall 
within the ICC’s subject matter jurisdiction. This phase thus entails not only a 
“thorough factual and legal assessment” of the crimes allegedly committed to 
ascertain potential cases falling within the Court’s jurisdiction, but it also includes 
“gather[ing] information on relevant national proceedings if such information is 
available at this stage.” 
 
Phase 3: The third phase focuses on the admissibility of potential cases in terms of 
complementarity and gravity (“the scale, nature, manner of commission of the crimes, 
and their impact.”)  
 
Phase 4: The final phase involves examining whether any “interests of justice”—a 
“countervailing consideration”—should apply before making a final 
recommendation to the Prosecutor on whether there is a reasonable basis to initiate 
an investigation. Once the Prosecutor is satisfied that there is a reasonable basis to 
open an investigation into a situation, the authorization of the Pre-Trial Chamber 
must be sought. 
 
In following this procedure, the Prosecutor has broad discretion as to the means by 
which to assess the “seriousness” of the information the Office receives. In particular, 
“he or she may seek additional information from States, organs of the United Nations, 
intergovernmental or non-governmental organization, or other reliable sources that he or 
she deems appropriate, and may receive written or oral testimony at the seat of the 
Court.”367  
 
 As noted, the discretion afforded the OTP during the preliminary examination 
stage is significant.  Unlike investigations, where the Prosecutor must obtain the 
authorization of the Pre-Trial Chamber to proceed, judicial oversight of preliminary 
examinations is limited, nor are Article 17’s admissibility requirements applicable at this 
stage.368 Furthermore, there is no time limit for conducting preliminary examinations, nor 
any guidance as to what constitutes a “reasonable time” to conclude one. Notably, in the 
first situation in the Central African Republic, Pre-Trial Chamber III noted that 
preliminary examinations were to be conducted “within a reasonable time regardless of 
its complexity” and, to that end, requested the Prosecutor to provide it with a report 
containing information on the current status of the preliminary examination, as well as 
an estimate of when it would be concluded.369 In reply, however, the OTP stated its view 
                                                
367 Rome Statute, Article 15(2). The Office “does not enjoy investigative powers” at the preliminary 
examination stage, however, “other than for the purpose of receiving testimony at the seat of the Court.” 
368 Pre-Trial Chamber I’s decision under Article 53(3)(a), ordering the OTP to reconsider the decision not 
to investigate the situation referred to it by the Union of Comoros (on the grounds that the Prosecutor 
committed material errors in her determination of the gravity of the potential cases) is the first time that a 
decision by the OTP not to investigate has been successfully challenged. See Situation on the Registered Vessels 
of the Union of the Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia, Decision on the request of the 
Union of Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation,” ICC-01/13, PTC I, 
16 July 2015.  
369 See Situation in the Central African Republic, Decision Requesting Information on the Status of the 
Preliminary Examination of the Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC-01/05, PTC III, 30 
November 2006. 
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that, “there is no obligation under the Statute or the Rules to provide such an estimate or 
to give such a date.”370 In the Office’s view, this was intentional on the part of the 
drafters, to accommodate such factors as the degree of state cooperation, the availability 
of information, and the scale of the alleged crimes.371 
 
 The temporal dimension of preliminary examinations—for instance, the setting 
of deadlines for the establishment of domestic proceedings or other, similar benchmarks 
to demonstrate “willingness”— also allows the Office to engage in potentially wide-
ranging dialogue with a state. The Colombian experience, which has remained within the 
examination phase for more than ten years, is instructive in this regard as it has not only 
influenced the government’s approach to accountability, but also helped shaped the 
contours of its protracted peace negotiations.372 As the Kenyan case illustrates, domestic 
political developments can also have a significant influence on the timing or duration of 
preliminary examinations. Importantly, however, while the OTP has stated that its 
examination activities are conducted in the same manner regardless of how a situation 
comes before the Court—in its words, “no automaticity is assumed”373—it would appear 
that, in practice, different standards may well apply. For instance, while several proprio 
motu examinations have lasted for one year or more (Colombia, Kenya), Security Council 
referred situations (as in Libya) have remained in examination status for a matter of days. 
 
 While the outcome of a preliminary examination depends on the circumstances 
of each situation, three options are ultimately available to the OTP. It may first decline to 
initiate an investigation or it may alternatively choose to proceed.374 According to Seils, 
“By the time the process of preliminary examination reaches its conclusion there should 
almost always be substantial clarity on the type of the alleged criminal conduct, the 
numbers of incidents and victims of that conduct and related matters concerning 
aggravation or impact.”375 A third approach is to keep a situation under preliminary 
examination, in order to “collect information in order to establish a sufficient factual and 
legal basis” for a final determination. Seils has, in fact, argued for a more open-ended 
                                                
370 See “Prosecution's Report Pursuant to Pre-Trial Chamber Ill's 30November 2006 Decision Requesting 
Information on the Status of the Preliminary Examination of the Situation in the Central African 
Republic,” 15 December 2006. The Office nevertheless stated that it was “committed to completing its 
analysis of the CAR situation as expeditiously as possible and informing the relevant parties in a timely 
fashion in accordance with the Rules and Regulations of the Court.” Ibid.  
371 By contrast, Olasolo has argued that the Office is required to close preliminary examinations within a 
reasonable period of time, and is obliged to inform information providers if it decides not to initiate an 
investigation. Hector Olasolo, The Triggering Procedure of the International Criminal Court (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2005), 62. 
372 See, e.g., Alejandro Chehtman, “The ICC and its Normative Impact on Colombia’s Legal System” 
(DOMAC/16, October 2011); Kai Ambos, “The Colombian peace process (Law 975 of 2005) and the 
ICC’s principle of complementarity,” in Carsten Stahn and Mohamed M. El Zeidy (eds.), The International 
Criminal Court and Complementarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 1071-1096. 
373 “Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations,” para. 28; see also “Report on Preliminary Examination 
Activities 2013” (November 2013), para. 10. 
374 Closed examinations where the OTP made public its decision not to proceed to investigation include 
the situations in Palestine, Comoros (now under review), the Republic of Korea, Honduras, and 
Venezuela. An examination of Iraq, which concerns allegations of abuses committed by British soldiers, 
was reopened following an earlier decision to close the examination. Notably, while the Office has not 
closed an investigation to date, Prosecutor Bensouda announced her decision in December 2014 to 
“hibernate” the Office’s investigations in Sudan, in order to “shift resources to other urgent cases, 
especially those in which trial is approaching.” See “Statement to the United Nations Security Council on 
the Situation in Darfur, pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005),” 12 December 2014, at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/stmt-20threport-darfur.pdf.  
375 Seils, “Making complementarity work,” 993. 
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approach to examinations as an exercise in “creative ambiguity.”376 According to the 
OTP’s 2014 report, eight situations remain under such review.377  
 
2.2 Relationship to Complementarity  
 
 There has been little empirical examination to date of the effects of preliminary 
examinations, and whether they have indeed catalyzed national accountability efforts. 
Anecdotal accounts support the contention that the preliminary examination procedure 
has had a deterrent effect. Juan Mendez, for instance, argues that the Court’s 
examination of Cote d’Ivoire (which later became an investigation) played an important 
role in deterring a further escalation of violence, following a rise in ethnic hate 
propaganda that was being broadcast on national radio and television in the wake of a 
failed attempt to overthrow then President Laurent Gbabgo.378 Similarly, as noted, 
Colombia is frequently cited as an example of the OTP’s “positive” complementarity 
approach, insofar as the 2005 passage of the so-called Justice and Peace Law—meant to 
establish a criminal accountability process for violence committed during the country’s 
long-running armed conflict—was an outcome, in part, of the OTP’s public scrutiny of 
the situation there.379  
 
 These examples also illustrate the OTP’s adoption of a progressively more public 
approach to preliminary examinations. While earlier examinations were largely 
confidential, their potential virtue as a tool to prompt states into action has, like 
complementarity itself, been discovered over time. As Human Rights Watch notes, “This 
increased publicity is closely tied to the OTP’s policy of using preliminary examination to 
promote two aims at the heart of the Rome Statute: spurring national justice officials to 
pursue their own rigorous investigations (complementarity) and signaling to would-be 
rights violators that the international community is watching (deterrence).”380 
Compliance with these norms is thus reinforced in the approach to preliminary 
examinations as well.  
 
 To that end, the Office now often publicizes, where confidentiality and security 
considerations permit, when it initiates an examination and provides periodic updates of 
its activities.381 These measures include publishing, as of 2011, an annual summary of 
activities performed during the course of the year, as well as including information in the 
                                                
376 Paul Seils, “Putting Complementarity in its Place,” in Carsten Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of the 
International Criminal Court (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 326. 
377 Those situations that remain in Phase 2 include Honduras, Iraq, Ukraine, and Afghanistan; Colombia, 
Georgia, Guinea, and Nigeria remain in Phase 3. See “Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2014” 
(2 December 2014) (“Annual Report 2014”).  
378 See Juan E. Mendez and Jeremy Kelley, “Peace Making, Justice, and the ICC,” in in Christian De Vos, 
Sara Kendall, and Carsten Stahn (eds.), Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court 
Interventions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
379 See Chehtman, “The ICC and its Normative Impact on Colombia’s Legal System”; Ambos, “The 
Colombian peace process (Law 975 of 2005) and the ICC’s principle of complementarity.” 
380 Human Rights Watch, “ICC: Course Correction – Recommendations to the Prosecutor for a More 
Effective Approach to ‘Situations under Analysis’” (16 June 2011). 
381 Regulation 28 governs the publicity of activities taken under Article 15. While the Office is required to 
“send an acknowledgement in respect of all information received on crimes to those who provided the 
information,” it is within the Prosecutor’s discretion to “make public such acknowledgement,” and “to 
make public the Office’s activities in relation to the preliminary examination of information on crimes 
under article 15,” or a determination that there is no reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation. See 
Regulation 28, OTP Regulations. 
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Office’s weekly bulletin, which it began distributing in 2009.382 OTP policy documents 
also provide that it may “disseminate statistics on information on alleged crimes under 
Article 15; make public the commencement of a preliminary examination through press 
releases and public statements; publicize events, such as OTP high-level visits to the 
concerned countries, so that information can be factored in by relevant departments 
within States and [international organizations]; and issue periodic reports on the status of 
its preliminary examination.”383 Collectively, these measures seek to bring greater 
transparency to the examination process but also greater scrutiny to those states under 
review.  
 
 It would also appear that the OTP’s investment in the preliminary examinations 
stage has expanded under Bensouda’s leadership. As noted in her assessment of the 
Office’s current strategic plan: 
 
 As one of the three core activities of the Office, stronger emphasis is now placed 
 on the  Office’s preliminary examinations activities. Through its preliminary 
 examinations work, the Office is committed to contributing to two overarching 
 goals: the ending of impunity,  by encouraging genuine national proceedings 
 through its positive approach to complementarity, and the prevention of 
 crimes.384  
  
The Prosecutor has likewise drawn a direct link between preliminary examinations and 
the catalytic potential of complementarity. Writing in 2012, she noted that the phase 
“gives the States concerned the possibility of intervening to put an end to crimes before 
the Office of the Prosecutor initiates an investigation,” enabling the latter “to act as a 
catalyst for national proceedings.”385  
  
 Despite the threat that opening a formal investigation carries, there are 
potentially important “positive” complementarity components to the preliminary 
examination stage as well. Indeed, according to the OTP, “at all phases of its preliminary 
examination activities, consistent with its policy of positive complementarity, the Office 
will seek to encourage where feasible genuine national investigations and prosecutions by 
the State(s) concerned and to cooperate with and provide assistance to such State(s) 
pursuant to Article 93(10) of the Statute.”386 As chapter three noted, however, the extent 
to which the OTP has affirmatively provided information to national authorities through 
use of the Article 93(10) regime is uncertain: there is no mention, for instance, of such 
assistance in any of the Office’s preliminary examination reports. Moreover, the 
provision of such information appears to itself be at odds with the OTP’s declaration 
that, at the preliminary examination stage, it “does not enjoy investigative powers” and 
“cannot invoke the forms of cooperation specified in Part 9 of the Statute from 
States.”387   
                                                
382 Reports on Preliminary Examination Activities from 2011-2014 are available online at the OTP’s 
website. It would appear, however, that the Office has since discontinued its practice of weekly briefings as 
the last posted briefing is from November 2013. 
383 ICC-OTP, “Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012” (1 February, 2010), paras. 38-39; see also “Policy Paper 
on Preliminary Examinations,” paras. 89-90 and Annual Report 2014, para. 95. 
384 Fatou Bensouda, “Foreword,” Carsten Stahn (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court; 
see also “Interview with Fatou Bensouda, ICC Chief Prosecutor,” VRWG Bulletin, Issue 21 (Fall 2012), 4.  
385 Fatou Bensuoda, “Reflections from the International Criminal Court Prosecutor,” Case Western Reserve 
Journal of International Law 45(1-2) (Fall 2012), 505-511, 508.  
386 “Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations,” para. 94. 
387 Ibid., para. 85; see also Annual Report 2014, para. 11. 
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2.3 Preliminary Examinations in Practice: A Case Study of Kenya 
 
  As a regional actor, the African Union engaged with the Kenyan state in the 
immediate aftermath of the 2007-08 election violence.388 Beginning in late January 2008, 
an AU Panel of Eminent African Personalities, overseen by former UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan, mediated a political settlement through the Kenyan National 
Dialogue and Reconciliation process; this led to the National Accord and Reconciliation 
Agreement (“National Accord”), signed between then President Mwai Kibaki (of the 
Party of National Unity) and Prime Minister Raila Odinga (of the Orange Democratic 
Movement) in February 2008. The National Accord set forth a four-part agenda to 
address the consequences of the violence, including the establishment of a power-sharing, 
coalition government between Kibaki and Odinga; the creation of a Commission of 
Inquiry on Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), also known as the Waki Commission; and a 
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC).389   
 
 The CIPEV’s remit “was to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the [post-election] violence, the conduct of state security agencies in their handling of it, 
and to make recommendations concerning these and other matters.”390 The 
Commission’s mandate expired in October 2008, at which point it published its final 
report. Chief amongst its many recommendations was that a Special Tribunal for Kenya 
(STK)—established by an act of Parliament and operating outside of the existing judicial 
system—be established to “seek accountability against persons bearing the greatest 
responsibility for crimes, particularly crimes against humanity, relating to the 2007 
General Elections in Kenya.”391  It further provided: 
 
 2. The Special Tribunal shall apply Kenyan law and also the International Crimes 
 Bill, once this is enacted, and shall have Kenyan and international judges, as well 
 as Kenyan and international staff to be appointed as provided hereunder.  
 
 3. In order to fully give effect to the establishment of the Special Tribunal, an 
 agreement for its establishment shall be signed by representatives of the parties 
 to the Agreement on National Accord and Reconciliation within 60 days of the 
 presentation of the Report of  the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election 
                                                
388 For a more detailed history of the election violence in Kenya and its historical antecedents, see, e.g., 
Makau Mutua, Kenya’s Quest for Democracy: Taming Leviathan (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2009); Michela 
Wrong, It’s Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistleblower (London: Fourth Estate, 2009); Gabrielle 
Lynch, I Say to You: Ethnic Politics and the Kalenjin in Kenya (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011). 
Daniel Branch’s Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2011 was also published in 2011; like Lynch, he 
traces an escalation of government corruption over time that evolved in conjunction with an increasingly 
ethnicized political landscape, leading to the explosive violence of late 2007. For an account of the violence 
that consumed the 2007 election, see Human Rights Watch, “Ballots to Bullets: Organized Political 
Violence and Kenya’s Crisis of Governance” (March 2008). 
389 The National Accord and Reconciliation Act, 2008; Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation: 
Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence, 4 March 2008; Kenya National Dialogue and 
Reconciliation: Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, 4 March 2008. The TJRC Act provided that 
the Commission’s broad objective would be to “seek and promote justice, national unity, reconciliation 
and peace, among the people of Kenya by inquiring in to the human rights violations in Kenya and 
recommending appropriate redress” (Preamble). Its temporal jurisdiction was enormous: December 12, 
1963 to February 28, 2008 (see General Parameters).  
390 Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (15 October, 2008) (“CIPEV Report”), vii, at 
http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/Reports/Commission_of_Inquiry_into_Post_Election_Violence.p
df  
391 Ibid., 472. 
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 Violence to the Panel of Eminent African Personalities, or the Panel’s 
 representative. A statute (to be known as “the  Statute for the Special Tribunal”) 
 shall be enacted into law and come into force within a further 45 days after the 
 signing of the agreement.392  
 
Crucially, in an effort to ensure these terms were implemented, the Commission 
recommended referral of the post-election violence to the ICC—including a sealed 
envelope with “a list containing names of … those suspected to bear the greatest 
responsibility”—in the event that the STK failed to materialize, or if “having 
commenced operating, its purposes [were later] subverted.”393 In short, it sought to 
leverage domestic criminal prosecutions through The Hague.  
 
 Complementarity’s coercive dimension was thus the dominant logic behind the 
CIPEV’s recommendation. If the STK was not established within the Commission’s 
specified time frame, and if the government proved unwilling or unable to investigate 
and prosecute, the report and its confidential findings would be turned over to the 
Office of the Prosecutor. In this regard, the Commission’s conditioned approach was 
itself a novelty. As Muthoni Wanyeki notes, “This [approach] was … in contrast with the 
recommendations of previous commissions of inquiry [in Kenya], which had been only 
partially implemented, if at all, often preferring to focus on more straightforward legal, 
policy or institutional reforms rather than on more contentious and pressing matters of 
legal and political accountability.”394  
 
2.3.1 Special Tribunal for Kenya: January 2008-February 2009 
 
 Unlike Uganda or the DRC, the ICC’s intervention in Kenya was not by state 
choice. According to the Prosecutor’s submissions, the situation in Kenya formally came 
under preliminary examination “[once] the violence erupted in the context of national 
elections held on 27 December 2007,” and remained in this posture for approximately 
two years. In the interim, the OTP undertook many of the same measures to cajole 
Kenyan authorities into action as those identified in its policy paper. Following the 
formal declaration that President Kibaki had been re-elected and the attacks that 
followed, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo issued a public statement on 5 February 2008, 
recalling that Kenya was both a state party to the Statute and that the Office would 
“carefully consider all information” related to alleged crimes within the Court’s 
jurisdiction.395 From this time onward, communications channels existed between state-
level actors in Kenya and the OTP. The Prosecutor actively sought additional 
information, including a copy of the 2008 report on the post-election violence 
undertaken by the Kenya National Human Rights Commission (a state human rights 
body).396 OTP submissions also indicate that letters dated March 2008 sought additional 
                                                
392 Ibid., 472-473. 
393 Ibid., 473 (paragraph 5).  
394 L. Muthoni Wanyeki, “The International Criminal Court’s cases in Kenya: origin and impact,” Institute 
for Security Studies, Paper No 237 (August 2012), 8, at http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper237.pdf.   
395 “OTP Statement in Relation to Events in Kenya,” 5 February 2008. 
396 The KNHRC report, “On the Brink of the Precipice: A Human Rights Account of Kenya’s Post-2007 
Election Violence” (August 2008) was referenced in the OTP’s Article 15 request and controversially, was 
relied on significantly by the Office in bringing its charges against the six officials initially accused.  See 
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Request for authorization of an investigation pursuant to Article 15, ICC-
01/09, PTC II, 26 November 2009, paras. 29-31 (“Kenya Article 15 Request”); see further the discussion 
on OTP investigations below.  
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information from the government, the Kenya Human Rights Commission (a prominent 
NGO), and the Waki Commission.397  
 
 The coercive dimension to the ICC’s involvement in Kenya lent political urgency 
to the establishment of the STK. Indeed, while the proposed tribunal raised unique 
constitutional challenges, work on preparing a draft statute began promptly after the 
government (unanimously, and without amendment) adopted the Waki Commission’s 
report on 16 December 2008.  Martha Karua, Kenya’s then Minister for Justice, National 
Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs took the lead in its drafting, with the support of the 
Attorney Genera’s office and the Law Reform Commission, the body responsible for 
amendments to Kenyan legislation.  
 
 Known as the “Iron Lady” of Kenyan politics, Karua enjoyed significant 
influence but her style—criticized by many in civil society as imperial and insufficiently 
consultative—led to criticisms of the bill for its perceived concessions to the executive, 
including, the power of presidential pardon.398 Nevertheless, notable features of the 
proposed tribunal included its primacy over local courts for the crimes under its 
jurisdiction (not only crimes against humanity, but also genocide, gross human rights 
violations, and other crimes committed in relation to the 2007 elections); a significant 
effort to internationalize the court’s judicial composition; and, borrowing heavily from 
the ICC Statute, attempts to incorporate the participation of victims within domestic 
proceedings.399  
  
 Significant pressure was placed on parliamentarians to approve a constitutional 
amendment that would establish the STK.  Both Kibaki and Odinga lobbied for the 
legislation’s passage, while opponents of the bill included then Eldoret North MP 
Minister William Ruto. The latter formed a bloc of MPs who favored the ICC in part 
because it was seen to be less of a threat: it would prosecute fewer suspects and the 
proceedings, it was believed, would undoubtedly last longer than the next Kenyan 
election cycle.400 Thus, the failure of Karua’s bill was largely the product of an “unholy 
alliance” between those MPs who opposed it because they feared being implicated and 
those who favoured accountability in principle, but lacked faith in the idea of a domestic 
process, particularly one that would displace the ICC.401 While the phrase “Don’t be 
vague, go to The Hague” emerged as part of Kenya’s political lexicon to ostensibly 
indicate a preference for the ICC’s involvement, it also signalled that many saw the Court 
as a more limited threat. 
                                                
397 Kenya Article 15 Request, para. 7. 
398 See Godfrey M. Musila, “Options for Transitional Justice in Kenya: Autonomy and the Challenge of 
External Prescriptions,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 3 (2009). Musila notes, “The few members 
of civil society who were contacted by the author suggested that it was too late for them to make any 
input, having been given less than two days to respond before the bill was presented to parliament,” 452.  
399 See The Special Tribunal for Kenya Bill, 2009, at 
http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/Bills/2009/The_Special_Tribunal_for_Kenya_Statute_2009.pdf. 
The provisions on victim participation in the proposed Bill are found in Article 50 (“Rights of Victims”) 
and are nearly identical to Article 68(3) of the Rome Statute. Notably, victim participation is not a feature 
otherwise available in Kenya’s judicial system.  
400 This view was expressed by several interlocutors in Kenya. For a similar analysis, see Lydia Kemunto 
Bosire, “Misconceptions II – Domestic Prosecutions and the International Criminal Court” (18 September 
2009), at http://africanarguments.org/2009/09/18/misconceptions-ii-–-domestic-prosecutions-and-the-
international-criminal-court/.  
401 See Wanyeki, “The International Criminal Court’s cases in Kenya,” 9-10; Stephen Brown and Chandra 
Lekha Sriram, “The Big Fish Won’t Fry Themselves: Criminal Accountability for Post-Election Violence in 
Kenya,” African Affairs 111 (2012), 244-260. 
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 Against this backdrop the February 2009 debate in the National Assembly on the 
STK was contentious, particularly as compared to the welcoming debate on 
domestication of the Rome Statute (discussed further in chapter six), which had taken 
place only several months before.402 At the outset, MP Gitobu Imanyara, a noted 
advocate for accountability but one who had favored “The Hague option,” argued that 
the CIPEV’s confidential findings should already be turned over to the ICC, because the 
“45 days period within which the Government had to comply with [its] 
recommendations” had lapsed.403 While he was joined by several MPs in this view, other 
STK advocates, notably Mutula Kilonzo (later Karua’s successor as justice minister), 
insisted on greater time for Parliament to act, noting that the Commission’s timeline 
should not “tie the hands of this august House.”404  
 
 As Kilonzo’s comments suggest, the protection of Kenyan sovereignty loomed 
large in the discussions: supporters and opponents of a domestic tribunal alike 
summoned it. As the Bill’s sponsor, Karua presented the amendment as recognition that 
Kenya had “not been able, up to now, to deal with the issues arising from the post 
election violence,” but also as an opportunity for domestic ownership and agency.405 In 
her words: 
 
 Mr. Deputy Speaker, Sir, this Bill is coming about because we, as a nation, are 
 accepting that there are inherent weaknesses in our national institutions … [It] is 
 time to take responsibility. We are the Assembly as national leaders of this 
 country, and that is why this is a National Assembly. It is our duty to take 
 responsibility to ensure that we put an end to impunity, to ensure that election 
 violence ends once and for all, and that we hold each other to account whenever 
 such things arise.406 
    
MP James Orengo, who seconded the Bill, likewise cast the STK as an affirmation of 
Kenya’s sovereign powers. He stated: 
 
 I am happy that in Kenya, we have not allowed a foreign institution, or power, to 
 either establish a court through some instrument, for example through the UN 
 Security Council, or through some arrangement, regional or otherwise; we are 
 doing it through this sovereign Parliament, which has the authority to establish 
 the tribunal. To that effect, we were saying in the beginning that we cannot allow 
                                                
402 The National Assembly is the lower house of the Parliament of Kenya, while the Senate is the upper 
house. Prior to the structural reforms laid out in the 2010 Constitution, the Assembly served as the 
country’s unicameral legislature; hence, the debate on the STK only took place there.  
403 Hansard records of this debate now appear to be unavailable on-line, though can be accessed through 
the website “Mzalendo,” which describes itself as a non-partisan project whose mission is to “keep an eye 
on the Kenyan parliament,” at http://info.mzalendo.com. Reference herein, however, is to Kenya 
National Assembly Official Record (Hansard), The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Bill, Second 
Reading, 3 February 2009 (“STK Amendment Bill”), 27 (MP Gitobu Imanyara). 
404 Ibid., 30. Other MPs similarly saw the amendment as a matter of parliamentary supremacy. For 
instance, MP Peter Mwathi stated that he would vote against the amendment, “so that the final decision to 
take those people to the Hague, or wherever it will be, will arise from the recommendations of the Waki 
Commission, not here!,” 49. On whether a debate on the constitutional amendment could proceed, 
Imanyara’s procedural concerns over the lapsing of the Waki Report’s 45-day deadline were overruled. The 
Deputy Speaker issued a “considered ruling” that, “ An external body [CIPEV] cannot dictate how 
Parliament conducts business.” Ibid., 35. 
405 Ibid., 36. 
406 Ibid.  
 94 
 ourselves to be guided, or managed by other institutions of government which 
 are not part of the instruments of power in Kenya  as a whole.407 
 
Other parliamentarians, by contrast, argued that the tribunal was itself a concession to 
foreign interference, characterizing it as a “house we want to build with foreign 
materials.”408 
 
 Notably, even with the promise of international involvement, concerns about a 
domestic tribunal’s ability to penetrate the higher ranks of the Kenyan political class 
motivated opposition to the STK amongst those (like Imanyara) who favored an 
accountability process in principle. One parliamentarian, for instance, noted that, while 
he “strongly believed[ed] that the Waki Report [was] correct,” he nevertheless objected 
to the recommendation that “we should have the tribunal in our country.” In his view: 
 
 Our interest is not in the proposals of the magistrates courts and the other issues. 
 Our interest is in the leaders. Who are these people who caused pain to this 
 country? Suppose the investigations point, God forbid, at His Excellency the 
 President, do you want to tell me that this country has the capacity to try him? 
 Suppose the investigation points at the Prime Minister, do you want to convince 
 the Republic of Kenya that we have the capacity to try him?409 
 
He concluded, “[This] tribunal is being set up for the small people. This country has a 
history of punishing the small people when the big ones have committed the crimes!”410 
 
 Despite the criticisms of the bill, the legislation that Karua proposed was the only 
one that would ever come close to receiving parliamentary assent.411 In continued 
exercise of the ICC’s oversight function, the Prosecutor publicly reaffirmed on the eve of 
Parliament’s vote that the OTP was monitoring the situation in Kenya, but that proved 
insufficient to alter the votes. Ultimately, the STK amendment failed to command a 
constitutional majority: on February 12, 2009, it was defeated in a vote of 101(in favor) 
to 93 (opposed).412  
 
2.3.2 Subsequent Efforts: March-November 2009 
 
 Following the government’s failure to establish the STK, more direct and 
frequent contact between the OTP and national-level actors took shape; however, as 
Lionel Nichols notes, the Office’s engagement was still largely conducted “through press 
statements and media interviews, rather than through face-to-face meetings.”413 The 
                                                
407 Ibid., 38. MP Kilonzo invoked a similar call to sovereignty, noting, “I want as a country, to respect our 
sovereignty by acknowledging that we are signatories to the International Criminal Court Charter. … Let 
the citizens of other failed states go to the Hague,” 46. 
408 Ibid., 43 (MP Danson Mungatana).  
409 Ibid., 48 (MP Cyrus Khwa Shakhalaga Jirongo). 
410 Ibid. 
411 Musila, “Options for Transitional Justice in Kenya,” 452. 
412 While a majority of parliamentarians in fact voted in favour of the tribunal (101 to 93), passage of the 
Bill required a 2/3 majority given that it required a constitutional amendment. See Francis Mureithi, “How 
MPs rejected the Proposed Special Tribunal for Kenya Bill,” The Star, 12 March 2011. A full breakdown of 
the votes is recorded at Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard), The Constitution of Kenya 
(Amendment) Bill, Second Reading, 12 February 2009, 30-34.  
413 Lionel Nichols, The International Criminal Court and The End of Impunity in Kenya (Switzerland: Springer 
International Publishing, 2015), 80-81. See, e.g., 9 July 2009, OTP Press Release; 16 July 2009, OTP Press 
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Kenyan government subsequently promised to reintroduce improved legislation but a 
second attempt to do so was rejected in June 2009.414 After two successive extensions 
lapsed, Annan forwarded the Waki envelope and evidence to the OTP in July 2009.  
Thereafter, the Prosecutor met with a formal delegation form Kenya (including then 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, Mutula Kilonzo), which resulted in an 
agreement stating that the government would provide him, by the end of September, 
with a report on the current status of investigations and prosecutions. Furthermore, if no 
“modalities for conducting national investigations and prosecutions” were put in place 
within a year’s time, it was agreed that the government would refer the matter to the ICC 
in accordance with Article 14.415  
 
 Following Annan’s hand over of the envelope and more frequent interactions 
with the OTP, the government made renewed efforts at establishing domestic 
accountability process, but to no avail. Kilonzo, for instance, reintroduced an STK bill 
that sought to ameliorate some of the criticisms of the first draft; however, the Cabinet 
was unable to come to a political agreement and eventually opted to abandon the idea of 
a hybrid tribunal. Ultimately, after a series of meetings, Kibaki announced at a press 
conference (attended by the entire Cabinet) that all suspects would be dealt with through 
regular national courts as well as the TJRC (even though the latter had no prosecutorial 
authority),416 and that the government would first focus its efforts on reforming the 
judiciary and the police.417  
 
 During this time, the OTP ensured that the examination maintained a public 
profile. It held a roundtable discussion in The Hague with Kenyan civil society 
representatives in September 2009 and, in October, Moreno-Ocampo requested another 
meeting with national authorities. A letter was also sent to the Kenyan authorities later 
that month, informing them that the Office’s preliminary examination was complete and 
reiterating that two options were available: either for an Article 14 referral by the 
government, or an independent decision of the Prosecutor to request judicial 
authorization to start an investigation. On 5 November 2009, the Prosecutor met with 
Kibaki and Odinga in Nairobi, and announced in a joint press conference his intention 
to request such authorization. Six months later, in a divided opinion of Pre-Trial 
Chamber II, it was granted.418 
 
2.3.3 Catalytic Effect? The Kenyan Examination Reconsidered 
 
 The Waki Commission’s report and its unique use of the ICC as a self-
enforcement mechanism “brought Kenya closer than it had ever been before to 
                                                                                                                                      
Release; 18 September 2009, OTP Press Release. See also Kenya Article 15 Request, paras. 13-14, 16, 18-
20. 
414 This bill was introduced by Karua’s successor, Justice Minister Mutula Kilonzo. It never reached 
Parliament as it was rejected at the cabinet level.  
415 Agreed Minutes of Meeting of 3 July 2009 between the ICC Prosecutor and Delegation of the Kenyan 
Government (3 July 2009, The Hague).  
416 Notably, the TJRC commissioners also rejected this proposal, as it would have significantly involved 
amending its mandate. 
417 In November 2009, MP Gitobu Imanyara also sought to introduce a private members’ bill, but it did 
not advance on formal grounds as parliamentary quorum was not met. Brown and Sriram note that “a 
boycott by MPs, allegedly with support their party leaders, prevented the Assembly from reaching quorum 
whenever the bill was due to be discussed.” Brown and Sriram, 254.  See further Kenya National Assembly 
Official Report, The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Bill, Second Reading (2 December 2009). 
418 Kenya Article 15 Decision; see, however, dissenting opinion of Judge Hans-Peter Kaul.  
 96 
achieving any judicial accountability for the abhorrent election-related violent crimes.”419 
It also created great interest in and demand for accountability across Kenya, pushing the 
government closer than it had ever before come to setting up a domestic judicial process. 
Two commentators have also suggested that the preliminary examination “raised 
international concern about sexual violence during the post-election violence, giving 
unprecedented exposure to these issues and, for the first time, allowing Kenyans to talk 
about being victims of sexual violence.”420 Yet the history of the ICC’s preliminary 
examination in Kenya underscores several points that merit closer reflection.  
 
 First, the examination procedure did not succeed in producing its desired 
outcome, which was the establishment of a domestic tribunal (later referred to more 
obliquely as “modalities”) for the prosecution of election-related violence. The difficulty 
of such a task should not be overlooked: such a tribunal would have effectively 
functioned outside of the Kenyan “regular” criminal justice system and would have, by 
design, been insulated from a judiciary that had long been criticized for its susceptibility 
to executive influence.421 The defeat of the STK Bill thus largely owed to a political 
calculus on the part of many parliamentarians who saw the prospect of such a tribunal, at 
the time, as a greater threat than the ICC itself.422 Whereas the ICC, by its own 
admission, could only pursue a handful of perpetrators at the highest level, an STK could 
likely have pursued a significantly greater number of individuals; therefore, MPs “who 
were implicated but who were not among the ‘big fish’ had little to fear from the ICC.”423 
Indeed, they may have had much to gain if the Court proved successful in removing 
senior political rivals from the domestic electoral arena. In short, although key factions 
of the Kenyan political elite feared the ICC, it was not feared enough.424 
 
 The two-year period of the Kenyan examination also underscores the importance 
of timing, both in terms of duration but also the domestic political environment in which 
the OTP acts. In Kenya, the power of the examination procedure was arguably at its 
peak during the January 2008-February 2009 period, buttressed as it was by the ongoing 
CIPEV investigation and the active role of Annan, who had yet to hand the 
Commission’s envelope over to The Hague. Yet the OTP became the most publicly 
active and engaged in the examination procedure following the STK Bill’s defeat, by 
which point the Court’s coercive power (having already failed to ensure the setting up of 
a domestic mechanism) had diminished considerably. This dynamic continued and 
deepened ever the course of 2009 such that, by the time Annan handed the 
Commission’s envelope to the OTP in July, it was clear that a domestic tribunal was a 
political impossibility. Retrospectively, then, the wisdom of continuing to engage with 
the government (whose proposals had become increasingly incoherent) should be 
questioned. As Muthoni Wanyeki, writing in late 2009, noted, “The state has done just 
enough, the bare minimum, to maintain the masquerade that it intends to pursue 
criminal justice for the organised violence on both sides of the political divide as well as 
                                                
419 Brown and Sriram, 257.  
420 Christine Bjork and Juanita Goebertus, “Complementarity in Action: The Role of Civil Society and the 
ICC in Rule of Law Strengthening in Kenya,” Yale Human Rights and Development Journal 14 (2011), 218. 
421 See, e.g., Makau Mutua, “Justice Under Siege: The Rule of Law and Judicial Subservience in Kenya,” 
Human Rights Quarterly 23 (2001), 96-118.  
422 For a more detailed discussion of these dynamics, see Wankeyi, “The International Criminal Court’s 
Cases in Kenya: Origin and Impact,” Institute for Security Studies Paper (No. 237, August 2012), 8-9.  
423 Brown and Sriram, 253.  
424 See, e.g., Dayo Olopade, “Who’s Afraid of the International Criminal Court? In Kenya, the answer is no 
one at all,” New Republic (9 March 2013). 
 97 
the state violence last year.”425 The length of the ICC’s preliminary examination may well 
have prolonged this masquerade.  
 
 Finally, a paradox lay at the heart of the Kenyan experiment. Whereas the Waki 
Commission sought to use the threat of the ICC’s intervention as leverage for the 
establishment of a domestic process, many victims and advocates in Kenya, in fact, saw 
the Court’s involvement as a necessary condition of such a process. Kenyan civil society, 
in particular, while not a monolith, took an exceedingly dim view of the government’s 
willingness to pursue accountability absent the assurance of external proceedings, one 
that political leaders could not control. It is precisely because of this distrust in a judicial 
system that was “heavily compromised and ‘beholden to the executive’”426 that the core 
features of the proposed tribunal— located outside of the domestic justice system, with 
international judicial participation—were seen as non-negotiable, and why the perceived 
compromises in Karua’s legislation (for instance, with respect to presidential immunity) 
were viewed with suspicion.  
 
 In short, trust in the Kenyan government and faith in its institutions was so low 
that most within the civil society sector were reluctant to support any domestic legal 
reform efforts until after the ICC intervened. In the words of two prominent Kenyan 
advocates: 
  
 In tandem with the ICC’s intervention, civil society groups have been at the 
 forefront of advocating for [a judicial mechanism], though such advocacy had to take 
 place after the commencement of the Kenyan cases. Given the pervasive climate of 
 impunity, many organisations feared that any domestic accountability processes 
 might be hijacked to justify an admissibility challenge before the ICC.427 
 
Similarly, in their study of the advocacy strategies of Kenyan NGOs during the ICC’s 
preliminary examination, Christine Bjork and Juanita Goebertus conclude that, “in most 
cases, even the NGOs that actually had the power to impact national criminal justice 
system reform were inclined, instead, to encourage ICC intervention at the time that the 
preliminary examination was being conducted.”428 This was because they “feared that 
improvements of the criminal justice system or installment of transitional justice 
mechanisms would avert ICC intervention and create impunity for the main 
perpetrators.”429 
  
 The presumptions thus driving Kenya’s preliminary examination—that Kenyan 
politicians would necessarily prefer a domestic mechanism to international judicial 
intervention; that the latter would be a sufficient threat to create such a mechanism; and 
that accountability advocates would support a domestic process in lieu of (rather than in 
addition to) the ICC—demonstrate again how legalism informs the complementarity-as-
                                                
425 L. Muthoni Wanyeki, “Kenya: We Remember, and Have Evidence,” The East African, 9 November 
2009. Brown and Sriram likewise conclude that, “While performing sham compliance, the government 
dragged its feet and delayed and undermined the process as much as it could, without repudiating it,” 258.  
426 Musila, “Options for Transitional Justice in Kenya,” 456. 
427 Njonjo Mue and Judy Gitau, “The Justice Vanguard: Kenyan Civil Society and the Pursuit of 
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added). 
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catalyst vision. They reflect, in McEvoy’s words, “a capacity to disconnect from the real 
political and social world of transition through a process of ‘magical legalism.”430 In 
actuality, legal formations in Kenya were subordinated to a dynamic politics of transition, 
one that saw MPs on both sides of the accountability divide effectively uniting to defeat 
the STK amendment (if for very different reasons.) Moreover, given the pervasive 
distrust in Kenya’s institutions, most supporters of accountability were unwilling to 
accept complementarity’s catalytic potential without the engagement of the very 




3.1 OTP Framework  
 
 While the Rome Statute is silent as to how evidence collection is to be carried out, 
the OTP adopted early on a policy of “focused investigations.”431  As articulated by the 
former head of the JCCD, “The ICC prosecutor’s policy is to carry out investigations in 
a few months, involving as few witnesses and incidents as possible.”432  Related to this 
policy is the Office’s use of small teams of rotating investigators to carry out its 
investigations.433 Bernard Lavigne, who oversaw the ICC’s early investigations in the 
DRC, testified that his investigation teams never consisted of more than twelve people 
for the entire country, which he considered to be “insufficient.”434 Similarly, in the case 
against former Ivory Coast President Laurent Gbagbo eight investigators reportedly 
worked on the ground “in rotating teams of two.”435 According to the OTP’s proposed 
2012 budget, only 44 professional staff were requested for the “Investigations Teams” 
section of the ID, to be dispersed among its (then) active eight situation countries.436    
 
 The pursuit of this early strategy meant that ICC investigators spent relatively 
little time in the field. Although Moreno-Ocampo indicated in 2004 remarks that some 
investigators would “be based in headquarters and others will be deployed in the field,”437 
in practice all ICC investigators have been Hague-based and travel “on mission.”  
Moreover, they have only been deployed in the field for limited periods of time, 
                                                
430 McEvoy, “Letting Go of Legalism,” 25-26. For a similar conclusion, see Thomas Obel Hansen and 
Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Fighting for Justice (and Survival): Kenyan Civil Society Accountability Strategies 
and Their Enemies,” International Journal of Transitional Justice (2015). Hansen and Sriram quote several 
Kenyan activists as having “now learned that approaches dominated by legal language and influenced by 
international norms may be flawed in facing a government that … can draw upon a range of political, 
historical and ethnic language in a divided society to build counter-narratives,” 20-21.  
431 See ICC-OTP, “Report on Prosecutorial Strategy,” 14 September 2006, 5, para. 2(b); “Prosecutorial 
Strategy 2009-2012,” para. 20. The Office has also developed an Operational Manual as a framework for 
its investigations; however, it is not available to the public.   
432 Katy Glassborow, “ICC Investigative Strategy on Sexual Violence Crimes Under Fire,” Institute for War 
& Peace Reporting, 27 October 2008. Glassborow quotes Beatrice Le Fraper du Hellen, who headed the 
JCCD from 2006-2010.   
433 An early OTP policy paper noted that its “operations are informed by three basic principles’, one being 
that ‘it functions with a variable number of investigation teams.” See ICC Paper on Policy Issues, 8. 
434 Lavigne Deposition, 16:11-16. 
435 John James, “Ivory Coast – Who’s Next After Laurent Gbagbo?,” International Justice Tribune No. 146, 29 
February 2012. 
436 Ibid. The report further notes that the number of professional staff employed in the investigations 
division “has decreased since 2007, despite the increase in the number of situations in which the Court is 
active.”  Ibid., 30-31 (emphasis in original); see also “Proposed Programme Budget for 2012 of the 
International Criminal Court,” ICC-ASP/10/10, 21 July 2011, at 47.   
437 “Statement of the Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo to Diplomatic Corps” (12 February 2004), 2, at 
www.iccnow.org/documents/OTPStatementDiploBriefing12Feb04.pdf. 
 99 
undertaking repeated, short-term trips. In the DRC, the OTP reported that, as of 2006, 
members had “conducted more than 70 missions inside and outside the DRC, 
interviewing almost 200 persons.”438 The same report noted that since opening its 
investigation in July 2004, the Ugandan joint team had conducted “[i]n just ten 
months … over 50 missions to the field,” Darfur investigators have ‘conducted more 
than 50 missions in 15 countries,” although, significantly, not in Darfur itself.439   
 
 The OTP’s approach to investigations is closely linked to limited resources and 
financing. Indeed, the number of small missions conducted in a relatively short period 
was extolled in a 2009 document on “efficiency measures” as part of the “Court-wide 
efficiency drive.”440  The report noted that the Office’s strategy “of having a small, 
flexible office,” as well as “lean and flexible” investigation teams had “enabled [it] to 
perform more investigations and prosecutions simultaneously, with the same number of 
staff.”441 Yet while the commitment to small investigation teams has been praised for its 
cost efficiency, the Office’s “lean and flexible” approach has been criticized for its 
effectiveness and the strain it places on Court staff.  In a private 2008 letter that Human 
Rights Watch sent to the OTP Executive Committee (later made public), the 
organization expressed concern with the high attrition rate of ICC investigators and 
noted that there were “simply not enough of them to handle the rigorous demands for 
conducting investigations.”442 
 
3.2 Investigating from Afar 
 
3.2.1 Limited Field Presence 
 
 Perhaps the most notable aspect of investigations has been the OTP’s failure to 
locate any investigators or analysts in country on a permanent (or semi-permanent) basis, 
or to engage on a more sustained basis with national-level interlocutors. According to 
testimony, investigators working in the DRC spent only an average of ten days in the 
field,443 making it difficult for them to interview witnesses, much less develop the sort of 
long-term connections that a more sustained field presence would enable. Preliminary 
examination analysts have faced similar limitations: according to Seils, “analysts are rarely 
in a country under [ICC] examination for more than one week.”444 Consequently, a 2008 
report by Human Rights Watch noted that, 
 
 The opportunities for Hague-based investigators to interact and develop strong 
 contacts with witnesses are limited in number and timeframe… [E]ven when key 
 witnesses agree to a specified time to meet with investigators, circumstances may 
 change, rendering them unavailable by the time that the Hague-based members 
 of the investigative teams travel to the field.445 
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This small-team approach makes the possibility of a permanent presence in the field 
impossible.  As summarized by the Lubanga trial chamber in Lubanga, “because there 
were only a few investigators it was not possible to have someone in the field 
permanently,” even though, according to Lavigne, “This would have been the correct 
approach.”446  
 
 Pascal Kambale, formerly the DRC Country Director for the Open Society 
Initiative for Southern Africa, followed the ICC’s investigations in the DRC closely and 
has argued that the OTP’s failure to bring charges against other, higher-ranking 
commanders in the DRC situation was “a direct result of the … strategy of conducting 
quick investigations with the lowest cost possible.”447  In his view, the investigative teams 
assigned to Ituri “were too undersized and too short-term to generate good analysis of 
the intricately entangled criminal activities” taking place in the region.448  Kambale 
further recalls a meeting in December 2003, at which Moreno-Ocampo reportedly told a 
group of international NGOs that the investigative teams deployed to the field “would 
be composed almost entirely of temporary staff.”449 Although this plan was later 
reconsidered, the “cost-efficient approach” still meant that investigators were “sent to 
the field for short periods of time.” The Prosecutor’s minimal field presence in the Kivus 
region of eastern DRC—which has been even more limited than its presence in Ituri—
has led to similar results. In December 2011, a majority of Pre-Trial Chamber I declined 
to confirm any of the charges against Callixte Mbarushimana (a Rwandan national 
residing in France) for crimes committed by FDLR troops in the DRC.450   
 
 In its judgment acquitting Ngudjolo Chui, Trial Chamber II also drew attention 
to the OTP’s lack of field presence in assessing deficiencies in the evidence presented.  
While acknowledging the difficulty of conducting investigations in a “region still plagued 
by high levels of insecurity,” the chamber emphasized the importance of “mak[ing] as 
many factual findings as possible, in particular forensic findings … in loci in quo.”451 The 
chamber noted that it would have been “beneficial for the Prosecution to visit the 
localities where the Accused lived and where the preparations of the attack in Bogoro 
allegedly took place, prior to the substantive hearings.”452 The chamber had itself 
travelled to these localities—Bogoro, Aveba, Zumbe, Kambutso—in early January 2012 
as part of a judicial site visit, the first (and only) time an ICC chamber has done so.453   
                                                
446 Lubanga Judgment, para. 166; Lavigne Deposition, 75:16-18. 
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Its visit was described as enabling the Chamber to “gain a better understanding of the 
context of the events,” as well as to “conduct the requisite verifications in situ of certain 
specific points and to evaluate the environment and geography of locations.”454 The 
judgment refers repeatedly to the Chamber’s visit, providing examples of how such 
knowledge would have provided it with a clearer appreciation of the evidence.455 
 
 Notably, the OTP’s approach to investigations (at least its early approach) 
departs from the practice of predecessor tribunals like the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, which had several investigators based in country.456  Moreover, 
while tribunals like the ICTY have also adopted a mission-based approach to 
investigations, unlike the ICC’s small team arrangement, investigation teams at the ICTY 
“consisted of up to twenty members,” with “up to ten separate teams operational at a 
given time, even though the geographic jurisdiction of the Tribunal was limited to the 
territories of the former Yugoslavia.”457 OTP leadership also prioritized field 
investigations. Louise Arbour, the tribunal’s former Prosecutor, “made it an 
organizational priority during the Kosovo period to get as many OTP employees into the 
field ‘on mission’ as possible.”458  Another ICTY investigator recalled fieldwork being an 
“all-consuming” enterprise, where it was “common to work through ten at night, every 
day, for three, four weeks.”459   
 
 The security question Trial Chamber II raised is also one that has informed the 
OTP’s “light-touch” approach, yet it bears noting that the Office has also been criticized 
for being too risk-averse in assessing its ability to operate on the territory of situation-
countries. For instance, although Moreno-Ocampo defended his decision not to 
investigate in Darfur on security grounds, he was sharply criticized by Professor Antonio 
Cassese, chair of the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, whose report 
helped, in part, spur the referral of the situation to the Court. Cassese criticized the 
“[e]xceedingly prudent attitude of the ICC Prosecutor”460 and, in an invited amicus curiae 
brief, the  failure to pursue even “targeted and brief interviews” in Darfur, noting that 
the UN Commission had successfully insisted upon such access during the course of its 
investigations.461  
 
 Andrew Cayley, the ICC’s first senior trial attorney for Darfur, concurs with 
Cassese’s assessment.  Reflecting on the Darfur investigation, Cayley notes: 
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It was a mistake that the court did not establish a presence on the ground in 
Darfur.  ...  It is not to say that establishing an office in Darfur would have been 
easy but it should be emphasized that the OTP was extremely risk averse when 
I worked there.  By encouraging some risks I am not proposing recklessness.  
The reality, as we all know, is that you have to take risks and you have to have 
courage to do this work. Professor Cassese … personally went to Khoba prison 
in Khartoum and interviewed very sensitive witnesses.  He demanded access 
with nothing more than a Security Council resolution in his hand.  The OTP 
ICC got no further than the Hilton Hotel in Khartoum.462  
 
More recent cases conducted by the Court suggest that little has changed with respect to 
the OTP’s strategy.  During the confirmation of charges proceedings against the suspects 
in Kenya—where security risks were considerably less than in DRC or Darfur—
submissions by both defence and victims’ counsel raised questions about the OTP’s lack 
of in-country investigations.463 Similarly, while arrest warrants were issued against the 
three Libyan suspects in May 2011 (just three months after the Security Council’s 
referral), the Office only began conducting in loci investigations in November of that 
year.464  
 
3.2.2 Absence of National Investigators 
 
 In addition to a minimal field presence, none of the ICC’s investigators have 
been nationals of countries where cases are under investigation; indeed, only a limited 
number are African.465 While other OTP staff members have supported such a 
proposal—which was, consistent with “positive” complementarity, identified as an early 
goal of the Office’s plan for investigations466—it was never implemented during Moreno-
Ocampo’s tenure. Kambale’s notes from a 2004 meeting with OTP staff indicate that the 
choice not to seek out experienced national investigators was deliberate. Part of the 
“short and focused” investigative strategy, as articulated by the then Prosecutor, was “the 
fact that it would minimize the need for having local people in the investigative teams, 
thus helping avoid situations where impartiality is questionable.”467 Unlike predecessor 
tribunals the OTP has also hired no country experts as either permanent or temporary 
                                                
462 Andrew Cayley, “Witness Proofing—The Experience of a Prosecutor,” Journal of International Criminal 
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staff. 468 In the DRC, it appears that there was only Congolese national who served for a 
brief period of time, in a formal capacity, as a country expert and advisor to 
investigators.469 
 
 The pursuit of impartiality, or at least its appearance, undoubtedly damaged the 
quality of OTP investigations.  As articulated by one intermediary in Ituri: 
 
 [T]he Court faces difficulties in assessing places and [it] was unfamiliar with the 
 socio-political context [in the DRC.]  It did not understand the complicated war-
 time alliances, and did not grasp the subtleties of “who was close to who” in a 
 toxic environment nor  “who could do what,” etc.470  
 
Similarly, a study conducted by the International Refugee Rights Initiative (IIRI), in 
consultation with the Congolese NGO Aprodivi, notes that, “[T]he fact that Court staff 
was … dominated by internationals did little to diminish the sense that the Court could 
have done more to understand the local context. … Failure to [‘verify the information 
that they got’], and to engage the ‘real community leaders,’ left the ICC ‘looking 
ridiculous a large percentage of the time.’”471  The judgment in Ngudjolo Chui suggests that 
the chamber would have similarly appreciated attention to local context: the judges 
expressed interest, for instance, in questions of “socio-cultural framework,” so as to 
“prompt a more informed debate from the outset.”472 
 
 The OTP’s decision not to locate any of its investigators in the field, or to hire 
nationals of the country being investigated, stands in contrast with others organs of the 
Court. The Registry, for instance, though performing a different function than the OTP, 
has hired Congolese and Ugandan nationals to conduct outreach on behalf of the Court 
in situation countries.473  The role and participation of victims in ICC proceedings further 
provides an interesting counter-example to the Prosecutor’s approach.  During the pre-
trial stage of the Kenya cases, the two counsels who were assigned to represent victims 
each had a staff of three, country-based field assistants.  Kenyan nationals all, these 
individuals had long associations with Kenyan civil society and human rights 
organizations in the country.  Based in Nairobi, they travelled regularly to other conflict-
affected regions of the country, while another was based in the Rift Valley Province, a 
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 While the model adopted in Kenya represented a more directed, streamlined 
approach to the ICC’s victim participation regime that some have criticized,475 the 
victims’ counsels and their assistants played an active role in exposing early gaps in the 
OTP’s case and pushing it (if unsuccessfully) to investigate further.  One filing from the 
victims’ representative in the case against William Ruto and Joseph Sang, in particular, 
sought to make further submissions to the Court about their views and concerns with 
respect to the Prosecutor’s case. The motion stated that the OTP had not conducted a 
“meaningful investigation into eyewitness experiences” and that the victims—who 
numbered nearly 300 at the time—had reportedly not been interviewed by the OTP, 
were not aware of anyone in their locality having been interviewed, nor were they aware 
of the Prosecutor having ever come to their localities to conduct on-site investigations.476 
The victims’ representative further observed that some victims “felt that the failure of 
the OTP to conduct on-site investigations or to interview victims could explain why the 
case as presented … did not fully accord with [their] own personal experiences.”477  
 
3.2.3 Intermediaries: Quasi-Investigators? 
 
 While country nationals have not formally been a part of OTP investigations 
teams, the Office has nevertheless made extensive use of intermediaries. Intermediaries 
are not ICC employees as such, but may assist the Office (and other organs of the Court) 
in a volunteer capacity; in certain cases, intermediaries have also been hired on a short-
term, contract basis.478  No definition of “intermediary” is found in the Rome Statute or 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence; however, the Court defines an intermediary as 
“someone who comes between one person and another; who facilitates contact or 
provides a link between one of the organs or unit of the Court or Counsel on the one 
hand, and victims, witnesses, beneficiaries of reparations and/or affected communities 
more broadly on the other.”479  In short, intermediaries are locally based actors who, 
“[b]ecause of their long-term presence,” carry out important functions for the Court.480 
As summarized by the Trial Chamber in Lubanga, they “undertake tasks in the field that 
staff members cannot fulfil without creating suspicion; they know members of the 
community, and they have access to information and places that are otherwise 
unavailable to the prosecution.”481 
 
 Although intermediaries were also a feature of the ad hoc tribunals, the ICC’s 
limited resources, combined with the multiple countries in which it must carry out its 
operations, means that they are a more permanent part of the Court’s practice.  Indeed, 
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reliance on intermediaries attracted particular attention in the wake of the Lubanga trial, 
where the chamber determined early on that their role, together with the manner in 
which they discharged their functions, had become “an issue of major importance.”482 In 
its judgment, the chamber ultimately found that the “essentially unsupervised actions of 
three of the principal [Prosecution] intermediaries [could not] safely be relied upon,” a 
determination that, in turn, led to the exclusion of the testimony of witnesses who 
claimed to have served as child soldiers in Lubanga’s rebel army.483  
 
 The uncertain relationship of intermediaries to the OTP (and to the Court at 
large) underscores the crucial, but potentially destabilizing, role that they can play in 
investigations.  On the one hand, as the trial chamber concluded, the OTP 
inappropriately “delegated” its investigative responsibilities to intermediaries, relying on 
them, in some cases, to not only contact, but also propose potential witnesses. At the 
same time, the role of intermediaries was apparently “limited, in the sense that [they] 
were excluded from the decision-making process.”484  As it was explained to the Court, 
intermediaries “were not supposed to know the objectives of the investigation team,” 
nor were they “given any substantive information about the case” because it would have 
been “too complicated to enable discussions with anyone who was not a member of the 
investigation division.”485  
 
 Despite recognizing that intermediaries are often better placed to gather evidence 
than many Hague-based investigators, it would appear that, as a matter of policy, they 
remain at the margins of the OTP’s decision-making process.486  Kambale, for instance, 
notes that local Congolese NGOs and activists, “had more raw intelligence on the crimes 
than any other entity, [but] were deliberately sidelined and their invaluable expertise not 
fully integrated into the investigative process.”487 Similarly, IIRI, which has worked 
extensively with intermediaries in the DRC, Uganda, and Sudan, notes that, in the 
context of the DRC, the Prosecution did not know enough about who was giving it 
information and why.  This “lack of expertise … was viewed as reducing the capacity of 
the office [in The Hague] to navigate the complex local politics.” Simply put, “‘They 
trusted anyone who called themselves civil society.”’488 The trial chamber in Lubanga 
drew a similar conclusion, finding that, “There was no formal recruitment procedure for 
selecting intermediaries.  An intermediary was simply someone who could perform this 
role; there was no process of candidacy or application and instead it was a matter of 
circumstance.”489 
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 Some strides have been made in this area. Draft Guidelines—described as an 
attempt to “provide a framework with common standards and procedures in areas where 
it is possible to standardize the Court’s relationship with intermediaries”490—were first 
circulated in 2010 and later revised. Importantly, the Guidelines address the existing legal 
and policy framework governing the ICC’s relationship with intermediaries and seek to 
provide greater clarity as to the rights intermediaries may expect from the ICC, including 
their selection, payment (where appropriate) of their expenses, and their protection when 
placed at risk. Text for these guidelines was agreed upon in April 2012; however, they 
were not formally promulgated for two more years. Initially, it was understood that the 
Guidelines required the consent of the ASP; however, at both the Assembly’s 2012 and 
2013 sessions, delegates only “took note” of them. As Deirdre Clancy notes, “While a 
fiscally sensitive ASP was clearly wary of institutionalising the intermediary role, reports 
by the Court to the ASP at the same time indicated that use of intermediaries was 
‘ultimately cost effective.’”491 Eventually, in April 2014, the Guidelines (including a 
Model Contract and the Code of Conduct) appeared on the ICC’s website, preceded, 
with little fanfare, by the appointment of a facilitator/focal point on intermediaries. 
Although the Guidelines are now formally in effect, the text accompanying the website 
notably describes them simply as “standards” to which the organs of the Court will 
“aspire.”492  
 
4. Linking Preliminary Examinations and Investigations  
 
 Reflecting on investigatory practices underscores the degree to which the ICC’s 
ability to function as a credible threat depends on the quality of its investigations and 
prosecutions. Indeed, if one part of complementarity is its sword—the Prosecutor’s 
ability to wrest cases away from member states, or to initiate proceedings where there are 
none—then the ICC’s record of convictions must itself be convincing. The OTP’s 
failings in this respect, with only two convictions to date in trials that were both heavily 
criticized, suggests that it has not sufficiently guarded the Court’s own catalytic potential 
and that, at an institutional level, investigative practices have been marginalized.493 This 
lack of prioritization appears to have been premised, at least initially, on a presumption 
that distancing the Court from local contexts would better preserve its impartiality and 
efficiency, although, in fact, it appears to have hobbled both.  
 
 Furthermore, this approach rests uneasily with the OTP’s rhetorical commitment 
to the guiding ethos of “positive” complementarity: responsible, cooperative engagement 
                                                
490 Notably, while many organizations (for, instance local NGOs) can also serve as intermediaries, the 
Guidelines only govern the ICC’s relationships with individuals. In addition to the Guidelines, a draft 
“Code of Conduct for Intermediaries” and a “Model Contract for Intermediaries” have also been created. 
See “ICC adopts Guidelines on Intermediaries,” at www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/legal%20texts%20and%20tools/strategies-and-guidelines/Pages/default.aspx.    
491 Deirdre Clancy, “‘They Told Us We Would Be Part of History’: Reflections on the Civil Society 
Intermediary Experience in the Great Lakes Region,” in Christian De Vos, Sara Kendall, and Carsten 
Stahn (eds.), Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015). See “Second Report on the draft Guidelines” (30 October 2013), 
which states that, “while there are unavoidable costs for the Court in implementing the draft 
Intermediaries Guidelines … the use of intermediaries is ultimately cost effective for the Court. 
Intermediaries undertake work that would be extremely costly for the Court to perform,” para. 19. 
492 The ICC’s webpage notes that, “[W]ith the exception of the model contract, Intermediaries guidelines 
are not legally binding, but represent standards for the Organs of the Court to aspire to in their 
interactions with intermediaries.” See “ICC adopts Guidelines on Intermediaries.”  
493 For similar criticism, see Human Rights Watch, “Unfinished Business: Closing Gaps in the Selection of 
ICC Cases” (September 2011).  
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with national-level actors.494 This dimension of complementarity, extolled by scholars like 
Burke-White and ratified by the Office itself, underscores the importance of cultivating 
meaningful relationships between prosecutorial authorities in The Hague and in-country 
actors. Such an orientation to the field would offer important opportunities to build the 
sort of beneficent relationship imagined for the Court and national jurisdictions, one in 
which the judicial intervention becomes a site for knowledge transfer and capacity 
building. It would also benefit the Court in the long run, providing greater opportunity 
to understand the political, social, and cultural contexts in which its examinations unfold. 
As one ICC senior analyst has noted, “Local expertise is indispensable to interpret the 
relevant information in its authentic social context, including aspects of culture, politics, 
economy and linguistics.”495 
 
 Like investigations, preliminary examinations are also an area where the potential 
of “positive” complementarity could be better realized. In particular, examinations are 
crucial because they provide a potentially greater dialogic space between the Court and 
national authorities, one that narrows substantially once the OTP moves from 
“situation” to “case.” Whereas investigations might necessarily initiate a more adversarial 
relationship with the state it does not appear that anything prohibits the OTP (assuming 
the state in question consents) from locating staff on the territory of countries under 
preliminary examination. Seils has advocated such an approach, noting that, “A longer 
presence on the ground should allow analysts to improve their understanding of the 
institutions that are of interest, both in terms of those providing information and those 
conducting national proceedings.”496 The Office’s Policy Paper likewise notes that, “for 
the purpose of analysing the seriousness of the information” it receives, it “may also 
undertake field missions to the territory concerned in order to consult with the 
competent national authorities, the affected communities and other relevant 
stakeholders, such as civil society organisations.”497 
 
 The Kenyan experience, where the failed prosecutions have done great damage 
to the Court’s credibility, illustrates the important link between these stages. For instance, 
it would appear that the OTP did not use the extended preliminary examination period 
to conduct more thorough independent inquiries in Kenya or, as discussed above, to 
develop a meaningful presence within the country or amongst affected communities. 
(The Prosecutor’s Article 15 request, for instance, makes no mention of any in-country 
inquiries that the Office undertook, relying instead entirely on the CIPEV and KNHRC 
reports, as well as those of other UN and NGO offices.) Nor does this approach appear 
to be unique to the Kenyan situation.498 In Seils’ words, “most of the preliminary analysis 
[is] carried out at the OTP’s headquarters in The Hague by very small teams.” This 
“prolonged distance from the country,” he argues, “may inhibit potential positive 
                                                
494 I was surprised to learn, for instance, that it was not until after the 2010 Rome Statute Review 
Conference in Kampala that the appropriate members of the Ugandan DPP came to even be aware of the 
ICC investigators acting in-country, and subsequently initiated contact with the Office. Interview with a 
senior DPP official, Kampala, December 2011.    
495 Xabier Agirre Aranburu, “Methodology for the Criminal Investigation of International Crimes3,” in A. 
Smeulers (ed.), Collective Violence and International Criminal Justice (2010), 359. 
496 Seils, “Making complementarity work,” 1000.  
497 OTP Policy Paper, para. 85.  
498 Speaking in 2005, Jane Odwong, a former Ugandan parliamentarian, criticized the ICC’s investigations 
for “operating in a clandestine manner.” In her words, “Nobody knows the  issues of the ICC even 
within our communities, and the country.” Jane Odwong (Kitgum), 23 March 2005.  
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impacts that could occur as the result of preliminary examinations.”499 By contrast, 
developing closer relationships with national-level interlocutors, particularly 
intermediaries, could better ensure that the Office “knows the lie of the land well enough 
to identify reliable and credible counterparts to begin the investigation.”500 Indeed, while 
the OTP’s missteps with respect to ill-intentioned intermediaries have dominated 
discussions about the topic, most intermediaries are committed advocates who have 




 If the ICC is to serve as a credible threat to states, greater capital must be 
invested in preserving the two areas where its catalytic effect on domestic proceedings is 
greatest: preliminary examinations and investigations. The OTP’s record of successful 
prosecutions to date, and the increasing dissatisfaction amongst affected communities 
with its performance, belies the desirability of the “light touch” approach to the field that 
Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo once championed.501 While deliberate, this approach has 
elided with larger constraints, ranging from a limited appetite by member states to 
appropriately resource the Court, to an institutional reluctance to assume the greater risks 
that a long-term ground presence might present.502   Such reluctance is more 
understandable in the context of coercive interventions (where the prospect of state 
cooperation is uncertain or unlikely) yet, as has been seen even in states that have invited 
the ICC in, the OTP’s field presence has been minimal; the composition of its staff 
predominantly, if not exclusively, international; and its relationships with local actors 
damaged by a unilateral approach to evidence gathering.  
 
 There have been promising policy changes under Prosecutor Bensouda’s 
leadership, though it is unclear the extent to which they have taken shape in practice. 
Notably, the Office’s 2012-2015 strategic plan announced a departure from the policy of 
“focused investigations” in favour of a principle of “in-depth, open-ended investigations,” 
and explicitly committed the Office to ensuring that its “cases at the confirmation 
hearings … are as trial-ready as possible.”503 In line with this reorientation, Bensouda 
promisingly noted in her inaugural speech to the ASP that the OTP is “sending longer 
                                                
499 Seils, “Making complementarity work,” 999. Phil Clark makes a similar point, arguing based on his 
extensive ethnographic research in the DRC that, “the Court has generally failed to foster meaningful 
relations with … ground-level institutions that are vital to its cause. … [T]he ICC has not always sought 
this collaboration and often perceived itself as the lead organisation to which all others are answerable.” 
Phil Clark, “If Ocampo Indicts Bashir, Nothing May Happen,” 13 July 2008, at 
http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/Clark_Final.pdf. 
500 Seils, “Making complementarity work,” 1000. The War Crimes Research Office similarly concludes that, 
the “selection of suspects and crimes that will be the focus of an investigation” would benefit from 
improving the OTP’s “understanding of the context in which ...crimes took place and its ability to gain the 
trust of those who may be in a position to provide useful information.” See WCRO Report, 6.  
501 By contrast, for a defense of ICC investigations, see Alex Whiting, “Dynamic Investigative Practice at 
the International Criminal Court,” Law & Contemporary Problems 76(3-4), 163-189. 
502 See, e.g., Sara Kendall, “Commodifying Global Justice: Economies of Accountability at the 
International Criminal Court,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 13(1) (2015). 
503 2012-2015 strategy. Perhaps drawing on the lessons of the Kenyan experience and the criticisms of the 
Lubanga case, the Office also announced a departure form its previously stated policy of prosecuting only 
those “most responsible” for crimes in favor of a strategy of “gradually building upwards,” wherein it “first 
investigates and prosecutes a limited number of mid-and high-level perpetrators in order to ultimately have 
a reasonable prospect of conviction for those most responsible.” 
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investigative missions with less frequent travel.”504  The Office’s proposed 2016-2018 
strategic plan maintains this approach, while also adopting a new strategic goal of 
developing “with partners a coordinated investigative and prosecutorial strategy to close 
the impunity gap.”505  
 
 It would therefore seem that the Office acknowledges some of the problems 
inherent in its earlier approach. To that end, it has actively sought greater budgetary 
assistance to support its expanding workload (including the hiring of additional situation 
analysts) and has increasingly endorsed the potential value of more open-ended 
preliminary examinations and investigations as a form of maintaining leverage on 
states.506 If implemented effectively, such an approach could better capitalize on both the 
cooperative dimension of “positive” complementarity—working with national 
authorities to provide technical assistance or advice, for instance—as well as its coercive 
potential. As the Kenyan experience suggests, however, “open-ended” examinations can 
also harbor risks, particularly where the threat of an ICC investigation is conditioned on 
the establishment of particular domestic benchmarks.  
 
 These changes suggest that, as with the more recent turn in the Court’s 
admissibility jurisprudence, the ICC may yet evolve into an institution that is more 
responsive to the domestic contexts in which it operates and, as a result, better able to 
capitalize on complementarity’s catalytic properties. At the same time, the unique 
dynamics of each ICC situation country underscores the fact that the leverage (or 
support) the prosecutorial function may bring to bear is necessarily limited. 
Notwithstanding the OTP’s evident missteps in Kenya, in retrospect it is unlikely that 
the threat of the Court alone was sufficiently great for the STK to receive the domestic 
political support it needed. Nevertheless, the failure of the Kenyan state to comply with 
this particular desired outcome does not mean that the ICC’s intervention there has been 
without effect. On the contrary, as the 2009 STK debates and those in the following 




                                                
504 Bensouda ASP Address. In the same speech, however, it was made clear that “there shall be no 
structural changes in the Office, neither shall there be a departure from established policies and methods 
of operation,” paras. 3, 6.  
505 International Criminal Court, Office of the Prosecutor, Strategic Plan, 2016-2018 (6 July 2015). 
506 As Bensouda has noted, “One of the main challenges faced not only by the Office but by the Court as 
whole is the question of resources. Over the years, the number of preliminary examinations, investigations 
and prosecutions has increased and yet resources are not matched to respond to this growing demand. 
There is therefore a real challenge in maintaining and ensuring high quality work without the necessary 






Competing, Complementing, Copying: Domestic Courts and Complementarity 
 
 This chapter examines the emergence of specialized domestic courts or chambers 
for international crimes as one of the most frequently cited effects catalyzed by the 
principle of complementarity. Because a fundamental “rule” of the complementarity-as-
catalyst framework is that national-level actors investigate and prosecute international 
crimes themselves, ensuring domestic venues for their prosecution is a key 
preoccupation for civil society state and non-state actors alike. The attendant focus of 
much complementarity discourse has thus been on the establishment of institutions at 
the national level that are capable of accommodating such prosecutions. As Human 
Rights Watch puts it, “The ICC’s authority to act only where national authorities are 
unable or unwilling … encourages the development of credible and independent judicial 
systems within national jurisdictions.”507  
 
Similarities and differences mark the domestic judicial arrangements of the three 
countries examined in this dissertation.  In Uganda, the establishment of a special 
division within the High Court in which to adjudicate Rome Statute crimes, now called 
the International Crimes Division, has been the key domestic institution whose creation 
was catalyzed by the threat of ICC intervention. In Kenya, efforts to create a Special 
Tribunal for the post-election violence represented a high-water mark in the 
establishment of a domestic accountability process in lieu of ICC proceedings. As the 
previous chapter argued, the failure to establish the STK suggests the limits of the 
Court’s catalytic potential; however, more recently, discussions in Kenya have also turned 
towards the establishment of an ICD within Kenya’s High Court system.  
 
In both cases, these divisions have been created or proposed to satisfy perceived 
obligations under the ICC’s complementarity regime, although there has been only one 
attempted domestic prosecution to date before the Ugandan ICD related to the LRA 
conflict. By contrast, in the DRC, domestic military courts have undertaken a far greater 
(if still limited) number of prosecutions. Significantly, however, these courts were not 
created in response to the ICC’s involvement in the country; rather, they have had 
longstanding jurisdiction over international crimes. A more recent turn to domestic 
prosecutions through the use of so-called “mobile” courts in the eastern DRC region 
represents a novel invocation of the complementarity principle; however, most of these 
efforts have been undertaken by international donors and NGO actors, who have 
deliberately sought to characterize the courts as an extension of and “complementary” to 
the ICC’s work.  
 
 This chapter’s aim is two-fold. First, it offers a descriptive account of these 
various domestic judicial institutions, highlighting the shifting ways and competing 
purposes in which complementarity has been invoked as a basis for their establishment. 
Here again the central premise is that the ICC’s role as catalyst rests on different 
conceptions of the complementarity principle. In certain cases, the threat of the Court’s 
jurisdiction has been used to prompt the setting up (or attempted setting up) of domestic 
legal bodies. In this sense, the ICC’s catalytic potential has been largely coercive. By 
contrast, recent descriptions of these bodies depict them more literally as institutional 
extensions of the ICC: rather than displacing the Court, they are meant to complement, 
                                                
507 Human Rights Watch, “Establishing a Special Tribunal for Kenya and the Role of the International 
Criminal Court: Questions and Answers” (25 March 2009), 3.  
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and even “complete,” its work. A related depiction has been of complementarity as a 
cooperative venture, wherein a managerial, division-of-labor approach between The 
Hague and national institutions is meant to facilitate the pursuit of accountability at the 
domestic level.  
 
But while the establishment of national courts specialized in the adjudication of 
serious crimes is typically presented as a normative good, their depiction as part of 
complementarity “in practice” has been largely directed towards an international 
audience of donors, norm entrepreneurs, and other states. In its second half, then, the 
chapter identifies several concerns that these institutions have produced at the domestic 
level. It focuses specifically on the manner in which these courts have evolved at the 
national level (located within the existing structures of state but often, given their 
exceptional status, standing apart from the broader judicial system), the donor economies 
that surround them, and the institutional tensions that are produced through this 
arrangement. A related concern is an apparent insistence on “international standards” as 
the means by which “compliance” with complementarity should be assessed. Finally, 
through a case study of the sole attempted trial before the Ugandan ICD, the chapter 
considers how the domestic invocation of complementarity also accommodates to state 
power, leading, in certain instances, to outcomes that are themselves at odds with 




 The first country in which the ICC intervened, Uganda was also the first situation 
country to set up a specialized judicial forum for the prosecution of Rome Statute crimes. 
Established in 2008 as the War Crimes Division (and later rebranded as the International 
Crimes Division), the forum is a specialized division of the Ugandan High Court with 
jurisdiction to try war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, as well as other 
serious transnational crimes, including human trafficking, piracy, and terrorism. 
Although it has yet to convict any individuals related to the LRA conflict, the court to 
date has received a great deal of attention. As Nouwen notes, it is “[p]ossibly the most 
visible effect indirectly catalyzed by complementarity in Uganda,” one that “has become 
the focus of donors’ transitional-justice interest.”508 
 
1.1 Complementarity as Coercion: The ICC and Juba 
 
 Although the establishment of the War Crimes Division (WCD) has often been 
depicted as a product of the ICC’s investigations,509 the history of the WCD’s 
establishment is more appropriately traced to the Juba peace talks that sought to bring a 
negotiated settlement to the government’s long running conflict with the LRA.510 The 
                                                
508 Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire, 179. 
509 See, e.g., Wes Rist, “Why Uganda’s New War Crimes Court Is a Victory for the ICC,” JURIST (29 May 
2008), at http://jurist.org/forum/2008/05/why-ugandas-new-war-crimes-court-is.php. Rist argues that, 
“the ICC has been the key player in using the threat of international criminal responsibility to create a 
judicial body that can address the same issues of war crimes and crimes against humanity at the domestic 
rather than international level.” 
510 A detailed history of the Ugandan conflict is not offered here, however, texts that were particularly 
useful in offering background context include Tim Allen, Trial Justice: The International Criminal Court and the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (London: Zed Books, 2006); Matthew Green, The Wizard of the Nile: The Hunt for 
Arica’s Most Wanted (London: Portobello Books, 2009); Tim Allen and Koen Vlassenroot (eds.), The Lord’s 
Resistance Army: Myth and Reality (London: Zed Books, 2010); Aili Mari Tripp, Museveni’s Uganda: Paradoxes of 
Power in a Hybrid Regime (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010); Adam Branch, Displacing Human Rights: 
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Ugandan government formally announced the referral of the “situation concerning the 
Lord’s Resistance Army” in January 2004.511  At the time, as many commentators have 
noted, the ICC referral suited the interests of both the ICC and Uganda. For the 
Museveni government, it was an opportunity to “rally international assistance for the 
arrest of the government’s military opponents,” as well as a savvy “international relations 
campaign.”512 Furthermore, it was a low-risk approach given the unlikelihood that the 
OTP, despite having re-characterized the referral as concerning the situation in northern 
Uganda (rather than the LRA alone), would pursue investigations against Ugandan 
military officials (UPDF). Meanwhile, for the ICC, the “voluntary referral of a 
compelling case by a state party represented both an early expression of confidence in 
the nascent institution’s mandate and a welcome opportunity to demonstrate its 
viability.”513 This view was endorsed by Pre-Trial Chamber II, which accepted the 
government’s contention that the ICC was the “most appropriate and effective forum” 
for investigating those bearing the greatest responsibility in the conflict, and its assertion 
that it was “unable” to arrest the LRA leadership.514  
 
 For these reasons, cooperation between the ICC and Uganda was the dominant 
logic in the early phase of the Court’s intervention. This logic began to change, however, 
in mid-2006 when, for the first time, the Ugandan government and the LRA entered into 
an internationally mediated peace negotiation. Although previous attempts at a 
negotiated settlement had proven unsuccessful, the Juba peace talks benefited from a 
changed political calculus on both sides: the Ugandan government was under increasing 
pressure to ameliorate the humanitarian situation in the north (and appeared no closer to 
apprehending Kony following the ICC referral), while the LRA had lost the support of 
the government of Sudan, its primary benefactor.515 The talks were thus seen as a 
credible attempt to find a peaceful solution to the conflict.516 After signing a cessation of 
                                                                                                                                      
War and Intervention in Northern Uganda (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Sverker Finnström’s Living 
with Bad Surroundings: War, History, and Everyday Moments in Northern Uganda (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2008) is an excellent anthropological account of the conflict in northern Uganda; see also Sverker 
Finnström “Reconciliation Grown Bitter? War, Retribution, and Ritual Action in Northern Uganda,” in 
Rosalind Shaw and Lars Waldorf, with Pierre Hazan (eds.), Localizing Transitional Justice: Interventions and 
Priorities after Mass Violence (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 135-156. 
511 OTP Press Release, “President of Uganda Refers Situation Concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) to the ICC,” 29 January 2004.  
512 Nouwen and Werner, “Doing Justice to the Political,” 949. The government’s previous attempts at 
defeating the LRA had chiefly been through unsuccessful military campaigns and a policy of forced 
displacement, resulting in a growing humanitarian crisis that was weakening the government’s (faltering) 
international standing. These campaigns included Operation North (Operation Simsim) in 1991, Operation 
Iron Fist in 2002, and Operation Iron Fist in 2004. While President Museveni had always favored a military 
approach, he had on occasion allowed peace initiatives, such as the one undertaken by Betty Bigombe, 
then Ugandan Minister for the Pacification of the North, in 1994. For a detailed history, see Branch, 
Displacing Human Rights. 
513 Payam Akhavan, “The Lord’s Resistance Army Case: Uganda’s Submission of the First State Referral to 
the International Criminal Court,” American Journal of International Law 99(2) (2005), 404. See also Clark, 
“Chasing Cases,” 1198-1202.  
514 Situation in Uganda, Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony, ICC-02/04-01/05-53, PTC II, 8 July 2005 (as 
amended on 27 September 2005), para. 37 (citing government letter from Uganda’s Solicitor General).. 
515 See International Crisis Group, “Northern Uganda: seizing the Opportunity for Peace,” Report No. 124 
(2007).  
516 Refugee Law Project, “Ambiguous Impacts: The Effects of the International Criminal Court 
Investigations in Northern Uganda,” Working Paper No. 22 (October 2012), 7. 
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hostilities agreement in August 2006,517 four additional agreements were concluded over 
the course of the next 18 months.518     
  
 In the shadow of these negotiations stood the ICC’s arrest warrants for Kony 
and four other senior LRA members, which had been unsealed in October 2005.519 
Despite the progress being made in Juba, one of the key points of contention was the 
question of accountability, as the LRA had demanded from the outset that the ICC’s 
warrants be withdrawn.  It was in response to this point of contention—a desire to 
displace the ICC in order to secure Kony’s support for a negotiated peace—that the 
Court, by reference to the principle of complementarity, catalyzed the creation of what 
would become the WCD. As Nouwen notes, “The closest thing the [government of 
Uganda] could offer the LRA was to conduct domestic proceedings so that it would be 
for it or the ICC suspects successfully to challenge admissibility on the basis of articles 
17, 19, and 20 of the Rome Statute.”520  
 
 The “Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation (A&R) between the 
Government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army,” signed in June 2007, laid the 
legal framework for these arrangements.521 This was followed by the signing of an 
Annexure in February 2008, which set out a framework for the A&R Agreement’s 
implementation.522  The Agreement states at the outset that its purpose is to “promote 
national legal arrangements … for ensuring justice and reconciliation with respect to the 
conflict.”523 Point 6.1 further reads: 
 
 Formal courts provided for under the Constitution shall exercise jurisdiction over 
 individuals who are alleged to bear particular responsibility for the most serious 
 crimes, especially crimes amounting to international crimes, during the course of 
 the conflict.”524  
 
Notably, the language of the A&R Agreement did not restrict itself to formal criminal 
justice mechanisms alone: it also acknowledged “reconciliation proceedings,” while the 
Annexure provided for a national truth-telling process, reparations, and a role for 
traditional justice mechanisms.525     
 
                                                
517 Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and Lord’s 
Resistance Army Movement (Agenda Item No. 1), 26 August 2006. 
518 Other agreements focused on comprehensive solutions; the disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration of LRA forces; and on a permanent cease-fire.  See Comprehensive Solutions Agreement 
(Agenda Item No. 2), 2 May 2007; Permanent Ceasefire Agreement (Agenda Item No. 4), 23 February 
2008; Agreement on Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of the LRA Forces (Agenda Item 
No. 5), 29 February 2008. All documents available at 
http://www.beyondjuba.org/BJP1/peace_agreements.php.  
519 The other warrants of arrest were for Vincent Otti, Raska Lukwiya (deceased), Okot Odhiambo and 
Dominic Ongwen. 
520 Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire, 133. 
521 Accountability and Reconciliation Agreement (Agenda Item No. 3), 29 June 2007 (“A&R Agreement”).   
522 Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, 19 February 2008 (“Annexure”), at 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/Annexure_to_agreement_on_Accountability_signed_today.pdf  
523 A&R Agreement., Clause. 2.1. 
524 Ibid., Clause 6.1. 
525 For instance, Clause 3.1 of the Agreement states: “Where a person has already been subjected to 
proceedings […] or has been subjected to accountability or reconciliation proceedings for any conduct in the 
course o the conflict, that person shall not be subjected to any other proceedings with respect to that 
conduct” (emphasis added).  
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 Although the A&R Agreement does not invoke the principle of complementarity 
by name, the Annexure does. In it, the parties recalled “their commitment to preventing 
impunity and promoting redress in accordance with the Constitution and international 
obligations and recalling, in this connection, the requirements of the Rome Statute of the 
[ICC] and in particular the principle of complementarity.”526 The Annexure further 
provided for the establishment of a “special division of the High Court of Uganda … to 
try individuals who are alleged to have committed serious crimes during the conflict,” as 
well as “a unit for carrying out investigations and prosecutions in support of trials and 
other formal proceedings.”527 In the end, however, the Final Peace Agreement (FPA)—a 
collection of the agreements reached over the course of the negotiations—was never 
signed. Kony, unconvinced that the A&R Agreement would indeed keep the ICC at bay, 
ignored the government’s ultimatum that the FPA be signed by the end of November 
2008.  Shortly thereafter, the Ugandan military renewed its military offensive against the 
LRA, which continues to operate today outside of the country, largely in remote eastern 
regions of the DRC.528  
 
1.2 International Crimes Division 
 
 Despite not being signed, the Ugandan government expressed its intention to 
unilaterally implement the FPA agreement to the extent that it could.  Of these, 
implementation of the provision for the proposed special division has advanced the 
furthest. Indeed, while the ICD is already operational, the other transitional justice 
measures foreseen under the A&R Agreement have developed only haltingly.529 
(According to Stephen Oola, the formal policy “has dragged on for eight years and, 
despite being now on its sixth draft, has yet to be finalised, let alone operationalized.”530) 
The court, however, was formally established as the WCD in July 2008 pursuant to an 
administrative notice issued by then Chief Justice James Ogoola, who ordered it staffed 
with judges and a registrar. This notice—an act of administrative fiat—effectively served 
as the statutory basis for the court. In 2011, by a similar act of fiat, the WCD was 
rebranded the ICD, with an expanded jurisdiction that includes the transnational 
offenses of piracy, human trafficking and terrorism.531 Its current docket has largely 
encompassed terrorism-related cases, notably the Kampala bombings of 2010. As 
discussed below, only one case related to the LRA conflict has actually come before the 
Division, although it has yet to advance beyond the pre-trial stage.  
 
 Structurally, the ICD sits as a panel minimally comprised of three judges, 
although the total Division consists of five judges. Uganda’s principal judge appoints 
them, in consultation with the High Court Chief Justice. One of the ICD judges serves as 
head of the Division, and is responsible for its administration, in cooperation with the 
registrar.532 Judges periodically rotate out of the Division since it is “common for judges, 
                                                
526 Annexure, Fifth Recital (emphasis added).  
527 Ibid., Clauses 7 and 10.   
528 See Branch on ongoing, joint military operations between the UPDF and AFRICOM, 216-239.  
529 Interview conducted with Uganda Law Reform Commission, Kampala, 13 December 2011. The 
government released a draft “Transitional Justice Policy” in mid-2013, but it has still not been finalized or 
adopted.  
530 Stephen Oola, “Will LRA Victims Get Justice?,” Saturday Monitor (11 August 2015). 
531 The High Court (International Crimes Division) Practice Directions, Legal Notice No. 10 (2011), 
Section 6.  
532 Interview with ICD judge, Kampala, 13 December 2011. Attached to the ICD are a series of relevant 
units. A unit of Uganda’s Directorate of Public Prosecutions (DPP) oversees the ICD’s prosecutorial 
function, although the prosecutors appointed to that unit may also be responsible for crimes not heard by 
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registrars, prosecutors, and investigators in Uganda to be frequently rotated on and off 
work relating to specific divisions.”533 The ICD is headquartered in Kampala (where the 
courtroom sign still reads “War Crimes Courts”), although it is mobile in the sense that 
the judges can travel; indeed, the proceedings related to Thomas Kwoyelo have to date 
taken place at the Gulu High Court in northern Uganda. Decisions of the ICD can be 
appealed to Uganda’s Constitutional Court and, in the final instance, to the Supreme 
Court.534    
 
 The ICD receives technical assistance through the Justice Law and Order Sector 
(JLOS), which is a government mechanism operating a “sector-wide approach” (SWAp”) 
to donor-driven judicial reform. A document prepared by JLOS describes SWAp as 
“bring[ing] together institutions with closely linked mandates of administering justice and 
maintaining law and order and human rights.”535 In 2008, JLOS established a high level 
Transitional Justice Working Group to “give effect to the provisions of the Juba Peace 
Agreement.”536 JLOS oversees the budgetary allocation of the ICD, a substantial portion 
of which, as discussed further below, relies on international donor support.  
 
1.3 Shifts in Complementarity 
 
  The creation of Uganda’s ICD initially placed the ICC and the Ugandan 
government in an antagonistic relationship. As the ICD has developed, however, its 
origins as an outcome of the A&R Agreement have evolved away from a competition-
based model of complementarity—a way to displace the ICC—towards a more 
harmonious, cooperative vision of the principle. The ICD’s website states that, “While 
originally meant to be part of a comprehensive peace agreement with the LRA, the 
International Crimes Division has come to be viewed as a court of ‘complementarity’ 
with respect to the International Criminal Court, thus fulfilling the principle of 
complementarity stipulated in the preamble and Article 1 of the Rome Statute.”537 A 
2010 publication of the Uganda Law Society likewise notes that, “the War Crimes 
Division of the High Court of Uganda has been set up as a complementary institution to 
the ICC,” while the Ugandan Victims Foundation’s legal advisor has suggested that a 
“running and well equipped WCD of Uganda has the potential of becoming a regional 
criminal tribunal which may complement well the work of the ICC.”538 And in the words 
of one judicial spokesperson, “[T]his court now complements the [International Criminal 
Court]. We now have the equivalent of Geneva or The Hague in Africa.”539 
                                                                                                                                      
the ICD. A similar unit resides within the Criminal Investigations Department and is responsible for 
investigating crimes that may be tried before the Division. 
533 Human Rights Watch, “Justice for Serious Crimes Before National Courts: Uganda’s International 
Crimes Division” (2012), 19.  
534JLOS, “Frequently Asked Questions on the International Crimes Divisions of the High Court of 
Uganda,” 5, at http://www.judicature.go.ug/files/downloads/ICD_FAQs.pdf .  
535 See JLOS, “Annual Performance Report 2009/2010” (September 2010), 9.   
536 “‘The Dust Has Not Yet Settled’: Victims’ Views on the Right to Remedy and Reparation, - A Report 
from the Greater North of Uganda,” United National Human Rights Office of the High Commissioners 
(Kampala, 2011), 59. The Transitional Justice Working Group is comprised of five thematic sub-
committees including: (1) war crimes prosecutions; (2) truth and reconciliation; (3) traditional justice; (4) 
Sustainable funding; and (5) integrated systems.  
537 International Crimes Division, available at www.judicature.go.ug.  
538 “Does the High Court of Uganda Have a Wider Jurisdiction than the ICC?,” Lawyers’ Voice (July-
September 2010), 5; Jospeph A. Manoba, “First Trial before the War Crimes Division of the High Court in 
Uganda,” VRWG Bulletin 17 (Winter 2010), 6.  
539 Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire,181 (quoting Cyprian Musoke, “Uganda: nation ready to try 
Col. Gaddafi,” New Vision, 11 June 2011).  
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 Burden-sharing thus appears to now define complementarity in Uganda, wherein 
the ICD and ICC are positioned as partners in a cooperative, joint enterprise. This shift 
is particularly striking when one considers the Ugandan government’s response to a 2008 
request by the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber for information on the implication of the 
Division’s establishment, where it averred that “those individuals who were indicted by 
the [ICC] will have to be brought before the special division of the High Court for 
trial.”540 The ICC never opined on this admissibility question given its prematurity; 
however, now, the government indicates that—notwithstanding the substantial 
investment of resources into the now functioning ICD—it does not intend to challenge 
the admissibility of the ICC cases, should Kony or other LRA members be captured.541 
Speaking at a 2012 conference, Uganda’s State Minister for Justice and Deputy Attorney 
General, Freddie Ruhindi, even indicated that while he was confident the Ugandan 
courts could try the LRA leader, Kony would nevertheless be sent to the ICC for trial.542 
The January 2015 arrest and transfer of LRA commander Dominic Ongwen to The 
Hague confirms Ruhindi’s statement. Questions about Uganda’s primary duty to 
investigate and prosecute Rome Statute crimes have thus become, as Nouwen notes, 
“increasingly detached from the possibility of actually using the right in order to 




2.1 From Special Tribunal to Special Division  
 
 As chapter four explained, a key recommendation of the Commission of Inquiry 
on Post-Election Violence was that a special tribunal be established to “seek 
accountability against persons bearing the greatest responsibility for crimes, particularly 
crimes against humanity.”544 Much like the A&R Agreements in Uganda, then, 
complementarity’s coercive dimension was the dominant logic behind the CIPEV’s 
recommendation. If a Special Tribunal was not established within a specified time frame, 
and if the government proved unwilling or unable to investigate and prosecute, the ICC 
might intervene. As noted, however, the rejection of the STK owed largely to the 
“unholy alliance” amongst those MPs who supported a domestic accountability process 
but had substantive objections to the bill put forward by then Minister for Justice Karua, 
and those who “considered the ICC card a bluff,” one that would take “too long to 
                                                
540 See Letter from Jane F.B. Kiggundu, Solicitor General, Reply to Request for Information from the 
Republic of Uganda on the Status of Execution of the Warrants of Arrest, ICC-02/04-01/05-285-Anx2, 
Government of Uganda, 27 March 2008; aee also Uganda Admissibility Decision.The letter further 
clarified that the government referred the situation to the ICC “because the leadership of the Lord's 
Resistance Army was beyond the borders of Uganda and the international community was not being 
helpful,” not because of “the competence of its courts to handle cases connected with the situation.”  
541 See Florence Ogola, “Uganda Victims Question ICC’s Balance,” Institute for War & Peace reporting 
(14 June 2010). A similar assessment was made in the course of my interview with a senior DPP official, 
Kampala, December 2011.   
542 See Mark Kersten, “Outsourcing Justice to the ICC – What Should Be Done?” (31 October 2012), at 
http://justiceinconflict.org/2012/10/31/outsourcing-justice-to-the-icc-what-should-be-done/.  
543 Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire, 237 
544 CIPEV Report, 472-473. 
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act.”545 Thus, by publicly calling for the ICC, the government “could look good yet not 
push the accountability issue.”546  
 
 The defeat of the STK, in turn, laid the seeds for current discussions around the 
establishment of an ICD in Kenya. Muthoni Wanyeki notes that the possibility of 
establishing a special division of the High Court was floated “half-heartedly” by the 
subsequent Minister for Justice, Mutula Kilonzo, as an alternative to a private members’ 
bill for a special tribunal that had been put forward in the wake of the STK’s defeat.547 
This proposal was “vigorously opposed,” however, by the governance, human rights and 
legal sectors of civil society groups who argued that, the investigative and prosecutorial 
arms of the judiciary were too compromised to be credible.548  
 
 Discussions around an ICD did not seriously reemerge until the appointment in 
2011 of Willy Mutunga as Chief Justice and President of the Supreme Court. A dedicated 
human rights advocate, Mutunga’s reformist credentials in Kenyan politics are well-
known: his appointment was widely seen as a victory for the Kenyan left, and a 
promising step in the country’s new constitutional dispensation.549 (By contrast, the 
appointment of Keriako Tobiko as Director of Public Prosecutions was considered a 
major defeat.550) In this capacity, Mutunga also chairs the Judicial Services Commission 
(JSC), whose mandate encompasses the appointment of judges and advising on 
“improving the efficiency of the administration of justice.”551 In May 2012, at Mutunga’s 
request, the JSC appointed a Working Committee to “look into modalities of establishing 
an international crimes division in the High Court, to hear and make determination on 
the pending post-election violence cases and deal with other international and 
transnational crimes.”552  
 
2.2 Proposed Structure 
 
 Chaired by the Reverend Samuel Kobia, the JSC’s Working Committee published 
an extensive report in October 2012 setting forth six recommendations, the first of 
which called upon “the Chief Justice to establish the International Crimes Division as a 
division of the High Court, to prosecute the pending post-election violence cases, 
international and transnational crimes.”553 As with the Ugandan ICD, the legal 
framework for such a Division would be rooted in the unlimited original jurisdiction of 
the High Court, while appeals would lie with the Kenyan Court of Appeal, and in the 
                                                
545 Maina Kiai, “Using International Justice to End Impunity and Prevent Further Atrocities in Kenya,” 
Consultative Conference on International Criminal Justice,” September 2009, 4, at 
http://www.internationalcriminaljustice.net/experience/papers/Maina_Kiai_Speech_Sept10_09.pdf.   
546 Ibid. 
547 Wanyeki, “The International Criminal Court’s cases in Kenya: origin and impact,” 9-10.  
548 Interview with Kenyan NGO director, Nairobi, 3 December 2012. 
549 Mutuma Ruteere, “Dr. Willy Mutunga: Why they fear him,” The Nairobi Law Monthly 2(6) (June 2011), 
31-39.  
550 Interview with Muthoni Wanyeki, Nairobi, 16 June 2011. 
551 “Judicial Service Commission – The Judiciary,” at http://www.judiciary.go.ke/portal/the-judicial-
service-commission.html 
552 The Judicial Service Commission, “Report of the Committee of the Judicial Service Commission on the 
establishment of an International Crimes Division in The High Court of Kenya” (30 October 2012), 32 
(“JSC Report”) (on-file).  
553 Ibid.,146. Section 8(2) of the International Crimes Act No. 16 of 2008 grants Kenya’s High Court 
jurisdiction to conduct trials over persons responsible for international crimes committed locally or abroad 
by a Kenyan, or committed in any place against a Kenyan as of January 2009. See chapter six for further 
discussion.  
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final instance, the Supreme Court. The Division’s proposed subject matter jurisdiction 
would include Rome Statute crimes (domesticated under the Kenyan International 
Crimes Act 2008), but could be expanded to include transnational crimes as well: money 
laundering, cyber-laundering, human trafficking, terrorism, and piracy. Other 
recommendations include the establishment of an independent prosecution unit with the 
DPP “to deal exclusively with international crimes,” fully funding the country’s existing 
(if underfunded) Witness Protection Agency, and setting up a “special fund to help 
victims.”554  
  
 The Commission’s recommendation that an ICD be formed for “international-
scale crimes”—including but not limited to the post-election violence—was partially 
endorsed in a May 2013 report by Kenyans for Peace Truth and Justice (KPTJ), an 
influential coalition of NGOs that came together following the disputed presidential 
election.  Although KPTJ expressed a firm preference for a Special Tribunal option, it 
acknowledged that, “[g]iven the lack of political will …, the Special Division option is 
more feasible, if not the only viable option in the near future.”555 The report 
recommended that “the overall structure of the accountability model take the form of a 
Special Division of the High Court,” although it went further than the JSC’s report, 
advocating as well for the establishment of a Special Prosecutor for the post-election 
violence cases and for the participation of international staff.556 To date, however, there 
is no indication that these proposals are under serious consideration.  
   
  Despite the focus of the JSC’s report on the post-election violence and the 
prosecution of international crimes in particular, it was chiefly Mutunga’s influence that 
led to the proposed expansion of the ICD’s jurisdiction to include other transnational 
crimes.557 This expansion has been of particular concern to civil society advocates who 
fear that the court may be more active as a forum for adjudicating transnational crimes, 
rather than post-election violence cases; in KPTJ’s words, “the proposed ICD could end 
up being a white elephant, with no cases to prosecute.”558 Many human rights advocates 
have also been skeptical of the proposed division, seeing it as yet another attempt to 
obstruct ICC proceedings in The Hague through the “appearance” of 
complementarity.559 As of 2014, support for the JSC’s proposal had appeared to further 
dim. Many civil society actors boycotted a February consultation convened by the 
government on the grounds that the process was not genuine, while statements 
attributed to DPP Tobiko at the same meeting “suggest his office does not believe the 
ICD is appropriate or necessary to prosecute post-election crimes.”560 
                                                
554 Ibid., 149.  
555 KPTJ, “Securing Justice: Establishing a domestic mechanisms for the 2007/8 post-election violence in 
Kenya” (May 2013), 49.  
556 Ibid., 51-53. 
557 The JSC report notes that, “The Chief Justice … prevailed on the Committee to, during its 
conceptualization and design of the architecture of this court, devise mechanisms of vesting on the court 
[an] expansive mandate to deal with other international crimes and transnational crimes other than having 
jurisdiction only limited to international crimes as proscribed in Kenya’s International Crimes Act, 2008,” 
31.  
558 KPTJ, “A Real Option for Justice? The International Crimes Division of the High Court of Kenya,” 9. 
559 See further the discussion in chapter four.  
560 Amnesty International, “Crying For Justice: Victims’ Perspectives on Justice for the Post-Election 
Violence in Kenya” (July 2014), 26. According to the same report, “as of June 2014, no concrete steps had 
been taken towards establishing the ICD,” 25-26. Additionally, in December 2013, President Kenyatta 
temporarily suspended six JSC members after the National Assembly requested an investigation into 
allegations of misconduct and misappropriation of funds. Although a subsequent High Court ruling 
reinstated the six members pending the outcome of their legal challenge against the investigation, the 
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2.3 From Coercing to Complementing  
 
 Whereas the threat of ICC intervention was clearly a catalyst for the attempted 
Special Tribunal in Kenya, the predominant driver behind the push for an ICD has been 
Chief Justice Mutunga. Following the STK’s defeat, domestic leadership on the issue of 
accountability for electoral violence has migrated almost totally to Kenya’s judicial 
branch, particularly in the wake of the 2013 election of Kenyatta and Ruto, former 
political rivals who aligned, under the banner of the Jubilee Alliance, in opposition to the 
ICC proceedings.561 The establishment of an ICD is also more feasible than any attempt 
to revisit the failed special tribunal as that would require parliamentary assent, a political 
impossibility at this point.  
 
 While the ICD remains a distant prospect in Kenya, the discourse there, as in 
Uganda, has shifted away from a threat-based model of complementarity to one that 
instead sees the Division as an extension of the ICC’s work, rather than an alternative to 
it. The JSC report appears to endorse, for example, a burden-sharing model of 
complementarity, wherein the ICD would “try middle and lower perpetrators of crimes 
against humanity as related to the post-election violence period,” while the ICC deals 
with those “who bear the highest responsibility for crimes against humanity that were 
perpetrated against citizens.”562 Aimee Ongeso of the Nairobi-based NGO Kituo cha 
Sheria, similarly writes that, “The ICD should be seen as complementary to the 
International Criminal Court that only holds those who bear the greatest responsibility to 
account.”563 The ICC’s outreach coordinator in Kenya has also said that the division 
would “serve the important role of complementing the ongoing ICC work.” In her 
words, “It is not a question of comparing the ICD and the ICC. It is a question of the 
complementing role the two institutions can play to bring about justice to victims. It is 
our hope that the ICD will meet international standards.”564  
 
3. Democratic Republic of Congo 
 
 Like the A&R Agreement in Juba and the National Accords in Kenya, the Sun 
City Accords—the 2002 peace agreement that brought a nominal end to the DRC’s long-
running conflict—also foresaw the creation of accountability mechanisms for atrocity 
crimes.565 In December 2002, participants in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (I-CD), 
                                                                                                                                      
allegations have further stalled steps that the JSC might take towards establishing the Division. See 
Mathews Ndanyi, “Setbacks for Kenya’s Special Court,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting (23 December 
2013), at http://iwpr.net/report-news/setback-kenyas-special-court.  
561 See JSC Report, 32, 40. The report notes that, “The JSC now finds itself in the position of having to 
play a gigantic and momentous historic role of putting in place mechanisms to deal with and eliminate the 
culture of impunity that has for years been deeply ingrained in the socio-political fabric of the Kenyan 
society.” 
562 JSC Report, 98.  
563 Aimee Ongeso, “An International Crimes Division in Kenya’s High Court: Meaningful justice or a 
white elephant?,” VRWG Bulletin 22 (Spring 2013), 3.  
564 Nzau Musau, “ICC welcomes international crimes court in Kenya,” The Star, 7 February 2014 (quoting 
Maria Mabinty Kamara).  
565 There is a vast literature on the conflict in the DRC, which is not recounted here. Useful texts consulted 
for this dissertation are Filip Reyntjens, The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-2006 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Jason K. Stearns, Dancing in the Glory of Monsters: The 
Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011); Michael Deibert, The 
Democratic Republic of Congo: Between Hope and Despair (London: Zed Books, 2013); and David van Reybrouck, 
Congo: The Epic History of a People (London: Fourth Estate, 2014). Notably, the ICC’s presence in the DRC is 
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meeting in Sun City, South Africa, reached a Global and Inclusive Accord (Accord Global 
et Inclusif) that included recommendations regarding the establishment of a truth and 
reconciliation commission and an international special tribunal for war crimes in the 
DRC.566 Subsequently, in September 2003, the transitional government approved a 
decision to refer the situation in the DRC to the ICC, and to request the creation by the 
UN Security Council of an international special tribunal to deal with crimes that fell 
outside the Court’s jurisdiction.567 Little is known about the DRC’s truth commission 
other than that its mandate ended in controversy in 2007, having opened no enquiries 
during its tenure and awarded no reparations.568 One commentator has noted that, the 
“presence of belligerents” in the TRC and the “lack of public engagement” in its creation, 
“fundamentally undermined it from the start.”569  
  
3.1 Complementarity as Cooperation 
 
 In 2004, President Kabila formally referred the situation to the ICC, initiating an 
engagement that has produced the greatest amount of prosecutorial and judicial activity 
for the Court to date.570 Yet whereas complementarity had an important coercive 
dimension in both Uganda and Kenya, this was not the case in the DRC. Indeed, from 
the outset, both the OTP and the Congolese government envisaged the ICC’s 
intervention as a burden sharing arrangement between international and domestic 
jurisdictions. As Kambale has argued, the Court’s intervention in the DRC was premised 
on a “clear division of labour whereby the ICC would prosecute a handful of individuals 
among those bearing the greatest responsibility, while the Congolese justice system, with 
the support of the international community, would take on other cases.”571  
 
                                                                                                                                      
barely mentioned (or mentioned only in passing) in most of these texts; of them, Deibert engages most 
with Court developments in the context of the continued fighting in eastern DRC.  
566 The Commission on Peace and Reconciliation—one of the five commissions established under the 
ICD—had been tasked with “recommending measures to ensuring lasting peace within the national 
borders and security in the region.” The Commission’s recommendations were adopted by all I-CD 
delegates. See P. Bouvier and F. Bomboko, Le Dialogue intercongolais, anatomie d’une négociation à la lisière du 
chaos, Cahiers africains No 63-64, (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004), 177-78. 
567 Ibid. 
568 Very little has been written about the DRC’s truth commission although its performance was deeply 
criticized in the UN’s Mapping Report’s in 2010. See “Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the 
most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the territory 
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003” (August 2010), paras. 
1063-1072, (“UN Mapping Report”) at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/CD/DRC_MAPPING_REPORT_FINAL_EN.pdf.  
569 Laura Davis, “Power shared and justice shelved: the Democratic Republic of Congo,” The International 
Journal of Human Rights 17(2) (2013), 302. Notably, the Kenyan truth commission was met with similar 
criticism over the initial appointment of Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat as its chair. Many human rights 
groups argued that Kiplagat was himself linked to human rights violations that the truth commission was 
expected to investigate, damaging its credibility from the outset. See Kimberly Lanegran, “The Kenyan 
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission: The Importance of Commissioners and Their Appointment 
Process,” Transitional Justice Review 1(3) (2015), 42. 
570 Letter of Referral from President Joseph Kabila to Prosecutor of the ICC (Kinshasa, 3 March 2004), 
ICC-01/04-01 /06-32-US-Exp-AnxAl 12-03-2006 1/1UM (letter reproduced as Appendix I in Godfrey 
Musila, “Between rhetoric and action: The politics, processes and practice of the ICC’s work in the DRC” 
(Institute for Security Studies Monograph 164, July 2009), 79-80).  
571 Pascal Kalume Kambale, “A Story of Missed Opportunities: The Role of the International Criminal 
Court in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” in Christian De Vos, Sara Kendall, and Carsten Stahn (eds.), 
Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015). 
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 The elements of such an arrangement were outlined in the letter that the OTP 
sent to President Kabila to seek his referral of the situation in the DRC in September 
2003: 
 
Since the International Criminal Court will not be in a position to try all the 
individuals who may have committed crimes under its jurisdiction in Ituri, a 
consensual division of labor could be an effective approach. We could prosecute 
some of those individuals who bear the greatest responsibility for the crimes 
committed, while national authorities, with the assistance of the international 
community, implement appropriate mechanisms to deal with others. This would 
send a strong sign of the commitment of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
to bring to justice those responsible for these crimes. In return, the international 
community may take a more resolved stance in the reconstruction of the national 
judiciary and in the re-establishment of the rule of law in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo.572 
 
The referral echoed Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo’s speech to the Assembly of States 
Parties earlier that month, where he noted that the Court and the DRC “may agree that a 
consensual division of labour could be an effective approach.” He added: 
 
 The Office could cooperate with the national authorities by prosecuting the 
 leaders who bear most responsibility for the crimes. National authorities with the 
 assistance of the international community could implement appropriate 
 mechanisms to deal with other individuals responsible.573  
 
The OTP’s announcement of the formal opening of investigations in June 2004—in 
which Moreno-Ocampo stated that his office would target only those “people that bore 
the highest responsibility”—reinforced the intention to pursue a joint approach.574  
 As a catalyst for accountability, then, complementarity in the DRC was 
envisioned less as a coercive arrangement than a cooperative one. Other benefits were 
also seen to accrue from this relationship, including the promise of state cooperation and 
a “positive” role for the Court in helping to build the state’s own capacity and will to 
undertake prosecutions. Unfortunately, as has been noted, this vision of the OTP’s role 
largely failed to materialize: little of the skills or knowledge transfer that was envisioned 
took place. One official in Kinshasa (responsible for overseeing requests between the 
DRC and the ICC) characterized the Court’s approach as “a one-way street,” with 
                                                
572 “Letter from Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo to H.E. Joseph Kabila, President of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo,” 25 September 2003 (quoted in Kambale, “The ICC and Lubanga: Missed 
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573 Second Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Report of 
the Prosecutor of the ICC, Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, 8 September 2003, at http://www.icc-
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574 OTP Press Release, “The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court opens its first 
investigation,” ICC-OTP-20040623-59, 23 June 2004. 
 123 
information flowing to The Hague but not in reverse.575 Similarly, as noted in chapter 
three, the OTP took a strong line against cooperation in the Katanga litigation, stating 
that, “the ICC was not created to be an international investigative bureau with resources 
to support national authorities.”576 Finally, over time, it became clear that the individuals 
for whom the Court had issued warrants were far from those who bore the highest 
responsibility.577 Amidst pressure to begin bringing cases, the promise of a division-of-
labor between the Court and the DRC proved difficult to implement in practice.  
3.2 Special Chambers/Court 
 
 The attempted creation of a special tribunal for the DRC for crimes committed 
dating back to 1993 reached a political turning point in late 2010, six years after the ICC 
began its investigations. The political momentum for what later came to be called the 
“Special Court” proposal owed largely to the publication in August 2010 of a long-
awaited “mapping” report on crimes committed between 1993-2003 in the DRC by the 
UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, which explicitly endorsed the 
creation of a “mixed judicial mechanism – made up of national and international 
personnel – [as] the most appropriate way to provide justice for the victims of serious 
violations.”578 More generally, the report lent renewed interest and impetus for the 
establishment of a domestic accountability mechanism, and prompted increasing 
pressure from international actors as well. The United States, in particular, put significant 
political weight behind the idea, building upon the momentum of a visit by former 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to the eastern Congo in 2009.579 To that end, in 
November 2010, the Ministry of Justice circulated a government-sponsored bill (projet de 
loi) for the creation of so-called chambres specialises (“Special Chambers”).580  
 
 The chief architect of the projet de loi was the DRC’s then Minister of Justice, 
Luzolo Bambi Lessa, although it was heavily influenced by the input of a number of 
international organizations. Though “clearly unfinished” when it was first circulated, the 
Ministry signaled unusual openness to external actors, convening a multi-sector 
conference of international and national NGOs to discuss improvements shortly after 
the bill was circulated.581 The initial draft prepared by the government made clear that the 
chambers were intended to function within the existing court systems, although it 
                                                
575 Interview with Colonel Muntanzini, Kinshasa, 27 June 2011. The Colonel noted in particular that one 
request for information had been made (in writing) to the OTP but, after an initial exchange, it was not 
followed up on. 
576 OTP Response to Katanga Admissibility Challenge, paras. 100-101. 
577 See, e.g., Clark, “Chasing Cases,” who argues that, “Lubanga is at best a middle-ranking perpetrator, 
with more senior regional actors responsible for the crimes committed,” 1191. Indeed, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber appeared to raise similar concerns when, following Lubanga’s confirmation hearing, it stated that 
the OTP’s charges failed to recognize the international nature of the conflict in eastern DRC, given the 
involvement of Rwanda and Uganda in arming opposition groups. See The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, Decision sur la Confirmation des Charges, ICC-01/04-01/06-806, PTC I, 5 February 2007. 
578 See UN Mapping Report, paras. 61-63. 
579 Interviews in the DRC confirmed that U.S. support for the mechanism was the most aggressive, in spite 
of persistent concerns about harmonization of the proposed projet de loi with Rome Statute implementing 
legislation.  
580 In the DRC, a projet de loi is a government supported draft law endorsed in most cases by by the Ministry 
of Justice. A proposition de loi is, by contrast, brought before Parliament by one or more parliamentarians, 
usually without government support (and occasionally with its explicit disapproval.) The Special Chambers 
legislation was a projet de loi, while the Rome State implementation legislation (discussed in chapter six) was 
a proposition de loi.   
581 Interview with EUPOL official, Kinshasa, 23 June 2011. 
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contemplated the possibility of appointing foreign judges and other international staff; 
hence, the proposal for “mixed” chambers. Following extensive input from international 
and Congolese human rights NGOs, a three-member drafting committee that was 
appointed to collate the proposals of the stakeholders submitted a report that 
recommended the establishment of such a mechanism.582 This proposal was later 
endorsed in the final version of the bill drafted by the Congolese Law Reform 
Commission, which submitted it to the National Assembly in April 2011.583  
 
 While non-state actors and donor states invoked complementarity in a literal 
sense in support of the Special Chambers proposal, government documents do not use 
the term at all. Instead, the Ministry of Justice’s rationale for the proposal (exposé des motifs) 
as presented to the National Assembly is a litany of the ICC’s failings and an indictment 
of the international community.584 Of the latter, the Ministry’s note recalls the I-CD’s 
support for a UN Security Council-sponsored tribunal to deal with crimes that fell 
outside of the ICC’s jurisdiction. It states that President Kabila “pleaded” for the 
creation of such a tribunal but that his “request was ignored by the United Nations and 
the international community,” leaving the DRC government to “give up” on the 
proposal for reasons of “feasibility, resources and finances, notably in the absence of 
support for the international community.”585 Having observed the international 
community’s “reticence” for the creation of international criminal tribunals, and in light 
of these tribunals’ “mitigated results,” the proposal further stated that the responsibility 
to prosecute grave crimes now “returns to Congolese jurisdictions, through the 
establishment of specialized chambers within [those] jurisdictions.”586 It also referenced 
the publication of the UN’s mapping report as indicating a new, “positive international 
dynamic, which the DRC intends to support for the repression of international 
crimes.”587 
 
 The government’s characterization of the ICC is more scathing. The Ministry’s 
proposal states that the Court’s engagement in the DRC could not produce “the desired 
results,” and that the cases it has pursued “do not realize the magnitude of the [impunity] 
deficit.”588 To that end, a separate document prepared for donor states in June 2011 
presented the projet de loi as a necessary alternative to the ICC, which, despite “nine years 
of cooperation with the DRC, has only realized three or four prosecutions, while the 
violence continues.”589 The document further criticized the ICC for entertaining the 
                                                
582 Ibid.  
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(11 April 2011) (“Projet de Loi”) (on-file). 
585 Ibid., 1 (author’s translation). 
586 Ibid.  
587 Ibid., 2  
588 Ibid., 1. The note concludes: “The ICC cannot, and is not intended, to judge all of these crimes; other 
mechanisms must be put in place.” 
589 Comite Mixte de Justice, “Compte Rendu de la Réunion Politique du Comite Mixte de Justice,” 28 June 
2011, 3 (“CMJ Note”) (on-file). Like JLOS, the Comite Mixte de Justice was established in an effort to 
coordinate government and international donor priorities and management. Interview with CMJ official, 
Kinshasa, 28 June 2011.  
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asylum petitions of three Congolese nationals who were transferred to The Hague to 
serve as defense witnesses in the Lubanga and Katanga/Ngudjolo Chui trials.590 In doing 
so, “the Court encroached on the jurisdiction of the DRC in its role as state party despite 
its exemplary cooperation with the ICC.” In its only (indirect) reference to 
complementarity, the government noted that, while it still maintains a “wise policy” 
towards the ICC despite “the treatment inflicted upon it,” in the coming days it would 
appear “before Parliament to present its views on the jurisdiction of the ICC in relation 
to Congolese national jurisdiction.”591 The government also noted that the proposed 
hybrid court would “be a good accompaniment to the [forthcoming] electoral process,” 
in order to “prevent the disturbances” that could arise as a result of “certain political 
ambitions.”592 
 
 Notwithstanding the executive branch’s support for a national approach to 
accountability and its withering critique of the ICC, most parliamentarians were deeply 
wary of the projet de loi.  In addition to the political implications, they were unsettled by 
the swiftness with which the proposed legislation was being pushed, as well as the 
outsized role of external actors in amending it.593 Moreover, important questions about 
the structure of the chamber, its scope of jurisdiction, and the applicable law—including 
its proposed relationship to Rome State implementation legislation, which was being 
considered at the same time through a separate bill—had yet to be resolved. Indeed, 
although the projet was being increasingly presented as a rival to the implementation 
legislation that had been proposed, it was clear that both bills complemented each 
other.594  Amidst these continued concerns, substantive debate was tabled until the last 
day of the Assembly’s spring session.595   
 
 In the face of these criticisms and in a desire to push the legislation through, 
Kabila’s government adopted a series of extraordinary measures. It first opted to have 
Minister Luzolo present a different authorization law (loi de habilitation) directly to the 
Senate, effectively bypassing the Assembly.596 This law asked the Senate to grant the 
executive exceptional powers to legislate in a number of areas of “heightened 
importance,” of which the proposed court was part, in advance of the presidential 
elections later in the year. This effort failed, but the Ministry of Justice then made a 
renewed effort at passage by putting the legislation on the agenda of a special summer 
session of Parliament.597 A moderately revised version of the bill—rather than Special 
                                                
590 On the applications of these three witnesses and the ensuing proceedings, see Jennifer Easterday, 
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595 Interview with EUPOL official, Kinshasa, 23 June 2011. 
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Chambers, the proposal now called for a stand-alone “Special Court”—was thus 
presented in August 2011. 
 
 The Senate rejected the proposed Court Spécialisée in strong terms, characterizing it 
as an intrusion by the international community in the DRC’s internal affairs.598 
Notwithstanding this opposition, the President of the Senate, Leone Kengo wa Dondo, 
forced the bill through to the Senate’s Political, Administrative and Judicial (PAJ) 
Committee.599 The senators there rebelled as well, objecting to the attempted 
circumvention of established parliamentary procedure. In strong words, the Committee 
rejected the bill outright, recommending that any such legislation should be merged with 
the Rome Statute implementing legislation.600 (That bill, whose deadline for 
parliamentary approval had since lapsed, was absent from this agenda.)  Committee 
members also voiced serious concerns about the potentially unsettling impact that the 
bill would have on the Congolese judiciary, raising questions about the compensation of 
foreign judges, the treatment of international magistrates alongside Congolese 
magistrates, and the orientation of resources and attention around a select number of 
crimes to the detriment of the legal system as a whole.601  
 
 The exceptional powers invoked by the executive in its attempt to force 
legislative assent of the Special Court bill underscores the degree to which Kabila’s 
government saw its establishment as a necessary concession to demands for 
accountability, particularly with presidential elections looming. Concerns articulated by a 
number of national actors and NGOs that the legislation needed further refinement were 
largely ignored, however, and the legislation was generally seen as a rushed effort driven 
by outside actors. In Kambale’s words, “a number of senators felt that the campaign 
amounted to an international conspiracy against Congolese sovereignty.”602 The failure to 
connect the Special Chambers bill with Rome Statute implementing legislation, explored 
further in the following chapter, was also a concern, making it appear “as if the 
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3.3 Military/Mobile Courts 
 
 In the absence of a special tribunal or mixed court, military courts remain the 
sole arbiter of international crimes in the DRC. In 2002, the government ordered an 
overhaul of the legal framework for its military court system, granting its courts exclusive 
jurisdiction over international crimes. Military courts have a long history in the DRC, 
however, dating back to the founding of the Congolese colonial state.604 The system has 
undergone numerous transformations since that time, including the introduction of a code 
de justice militaire (code of military justice) in 1972. This code, Marcel Wetsh’okonda Koso 
notes, “organized the military courts for the first time into a complete judicial system, 
distinct from that of ordinary courts.”605  
 
 Military justice thus became increasingly normalized in the post-1972 period. 
Efforts to reform the system—recognizing, for instance, its independence from the 
prosecutor’s office—were attempted in the early 1990s with the onset of a democratic 
opening in Congolese society, but were largely ignored following Mobutu’s fall from 
power.606 Indeed, in 1997, the new regime of then President Laurent Kabila established a 
single court, the Court d’Ordre Militaire (COM), “which reduced the independence of 
magistrates and wrecked the organization, procedures and jurisdiction of the military 
justice system.”607 During this time, the courts’ jurisdiction was progressively extended to 
encompass, in certain cases, civilians as well. 
 
 Growing criticism of the COM’s abuses helped augur further change in 2002, 
when the Inter-Congolese Dialogue adopted a resolution on reform of the system. This 
led, in turn, to the adoption of the new code de justice militaire and code penal militaire 
(military criminal code). The DRC ratified the Rome Statute that same year as well, 
providing the ICC with the possibility of prosecutions for grave crimes committed post-
2002. Notably, the code penal militaire incorporates, in large part, the Rome Statute’s crimes 
(discussed in further detail in chapter six), but none of these crimes have yet been 
incorporated into the country’s civil criminal code.608 Military courts therefore retain 
exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over international crimes, even as deep criticism 
about their lack of independence from the executive remains. It is particularly 
noteworthy that, since 2002, the system has “extended its material and personal 
jurisdiction to a degree unprecedented in its history,” including over civilians.609   
                                                
604 “The Democratic Republic of Congo: Military Justice and Human Rights – An urgent need to complete 
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 It is difficult to ascertain how many military trials have been conducted in the 
DRC to date; no official record is kept. A study published by Avocats Sans Frontiers in 
2009 identified 13 atrocity-related trials held by military courts between 2004 and early 
2009, concerning a total of 188 defendants belonging either to the DRC’s regular army 
or to non-state armed groups.610 Wetsh’oknda Koso suggests a similar figure,611 although 
a more recent article notes that, since 2011, “military courts have tried some 8,000 cases 
of sexual violence committed by soldiers.”612 Most of these proceedings have been by so-
called “mobile courts” (chambres foraines), meaning that the courts themselves travel to 
remote jurisdictions to conduct trials.613  
 
 Mobile courts have received increasing attention as a rule-of-law intervention 
amongst international donors, leading some commentators to wrongly suggest that they 
are a recent innovation. In fact, Congolese law specifically provides for their operation 
and has long done so.614 The Open Society Justice Initiative, which provided financial 
support for mobile courts operating in the DRC’s Kivu region, describes the courts as 
“not new in Congo; they have long been used by the central government to administer 
justice in its remote interior.”615 Wetsh’okonda Koso further notes that because the 
jurisdiction of the basic military courts (tribunaux militaires de garnison) is set at district level, 
accessing them is often difficult: they are typically situated far from the places where 
offenses are committed. Thus, “practically all the trials for international crimes recorded 
up to this point have been arranged as a result of hearings in the mobile courts.”616 
 
 To date, the courts largely operate in the eastern part of the DRC, where intense 
fighting has continued despite the 2002 power-sharing agreement. One of the largest 
programs to date has been run by the American Bar Association’s Rule of Law Initiative 
(ABA-ROLI).617 Operating principally in the North and South Kivu regions of the 
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country, two ABA-ROLI attorneys write that the courts “are deployed to remote 
locations to enable access to justice for victims unable to travel to courts in town and 
cities.”618 They add: 
   
 Everything about the courts is temporary: the court is housed in a community 
 centre or town hall, with magistrates, a registrar, a bailiff, defence attorneys and 
 lawyers brought in from the closest towns and cities.  Mobile courts remain in a 
 given location for a period of between one and two months, hearing as many 
 cases as possible.  While the mobile courts are primarily established to hear cases 
 relating to sexual violence, they do deal with other matters affecting the 
 community.619 
 
Informational material by donor organizations further describes the need for a 
“specialized approach” to the endemic sexual violence in the DRC region. However, 
while the courts’ specialization in gender issues is what “distinguishes” them, they also 
have “discretion to hear other cases,” such as murder and torture.620 
  
 The mobile courts have achieved some notable convictions and they have also, in 
certain instances, applied provisions of the Rome Statute directly.621 One of the most 
prominent cases to date was the trial in February 2011 of Colonel Kibibi Mtware, who 
was sentenced, along with ten of his commanding soldiers, to lengthy jail terms for their 
involvement in a mass rape (as a crime against humanity) in the town of Fizi, in South 
Kivu province, on New Year’s Day in 2011.622 Kibibi was the first commanding officer 
in the DRC to be so convicted; in so doing, the court applied the Congolese military 
criminal code. Another trial to receive significant attention was the conviction of 
Lieutenant Eliwo Ngoy and his co-defendants for crimes against humanity, for mass 
rapes committed in the town of Songo Mboyo in 2003. Sitting in Mbandaka, the capital 
of Équateur province, the court chose, in a novel development, to apply the Rome 
Statute directly in convicting the defendants, rather than Congolose national law.623 A 
2014 judgment of a military court sitting in Goma, North Kivu similarly applied the 
Rome Statute in the convictions of 26 (out of 39) members of the Congolese armed 
forces for acts of looting and pillaging committed in the town of Minova in November 
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2012, following their expulsion from Goma by M23 rebel groups.624 Notably, while 
widespread rape and sexual assault were perpetrated upon local civilians as well, the court 
delivered only two rape convictions.  
 
 As with courts in Uganda and Kenya, the ICC and complementarity loom large 
in descriptions of the DRC’s mobile courts program. The courts are typically depicted as 
completing and “complementing” the work of the ICC, even if, as elsewhere, there is 
little to any coordination or cooperation between them.625 Mark Ellis writes (incorrectly) 
that the courts were created to “prosecute persons who committed crimes under the 
ICC’s jurisdiction,” while Khan and Wormington describe the mobile courts as 
unfolding “alongside” the ICC’s efforts.”626  In a similar vein, the Open Society Justice 
Initiative explains that the mobile court was “designed … to support the concept of 
‘complementarity’—the principle that domestic courts have the primary responsibility to 
investigate and prosecute serious crimes—and hence to complement the work of the 
International Criminal Court in The Hague, which is tasked with prosecuting high level 
suspects otherwise outside the capacity of the domestic court system.”627 Kelly Askin, 
senior legal officer at the Justice Initiative, also suggests a burden-sharing relationship 
between the ICC and the mobile courts, with the former “going after the highest level 
accused often out of reach of domestic jurisdictions - and the local courts, including 
mobile courts, going after lower level suspects.”628  
 
4. Three Concerns 
 
 The attempted transformation of domestic judiciaries for the prosecution of 
atrocity crimes highlights the shifting, protean nature of complementarity. As the 
histories of Uganda and Kenya suggest, an initially threat-based relationship with the 
principle—spurred by the potential of ICC intervention—catalyzed efforts to establish 
credible bodies that could potentially displace the Court’s jurisdiction. Over time, 
however, complementarity has become a harmonious principle—a way to narrate the 
ICC’s influence on domestic jurisdictions even when the Court is itself absent. Many 
criminal justice and human rights advocates welcome the development of such 
specialized domestic fora, seeing their establishment as a step towards accountability, as 
well as an opportunity to invest in the successful functioning of the broader national 
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legal system.629 Yet tensions also beset these arrangements. In particular, the attention 
paid to initiatives like the ICD or the mobile courts—both of which are typically 
presented as extensions of the ICC’s work, or even as legacies of its intervention—reflect 
a preference by some actors to focus more on the Court’s purported “demonstration 
effects,” rather than on the equal development of national judicial institutions overall.630  
  
4.1 Special Courts for Special Crimes?  
 
 Exceptionalism—treating or giving something the status of being unique or 
special—has both positive and negative connotations in the context of criminal justice. 
Understood as the former, seeking criminal accountability for mass violence has typically 
required exceptional responses by the international community. Notable examples 
include the establishment of international ad hoc and/or hybrid tribunals, as well as the 
creation of “high risk courts” or even the exercise of military jurisdiction.631 
Exceptionalism may also be justified as an antidote: the failures of the “ordinary” 
criminal justice system necessitate the establishment of independent structures or, indeed, 
supra-national jurisdiction. As articulated by Wilfred Nderitu, former chair of ICJ-Kenya, 
in his testimony before the Waki Commission: 
 
 We find that depending on who is heading a particular unit within the security 
 agencies – then just by looking at him or by knowing what his name is in 90% of 
 the cases you will be able to know what kind of decision he would make with 
 regard to which particular community or you will be able to know whether he 
 will turn a blind eye to something that  is happening. So the issue of getting 
 people who are not unduly affected by the politics behind the violence coming to 
 help us, I think that … is very important.632  
 
Nderitu’s testimony illustrates the need for erecting mechanisms that function outside 
the normal structures of state. The creation of specialized institutions, personnel, and 
regulations can help inoculate transitional justice measures from the corrosive influence 
of a compromised justice sector but, more ambitiously, they also hold the potential to 
positively influence the development of the rule of law domestically.633 Indeed, it was on 
this basis that the UN’s “mapping” report recommended that a special mechanism in the 
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DRC should also contribute to strengthening and rehabilitating the national justice 
system.634  
 
 Yet in each of the country contexts described, the institutional forms that have 
emerged (or been proposed) in the wake of the ICC’s intervention raises concern about 
what several Congolese interlocutors called la pérennisation: the structure, resourcing, and 
functioning of these forms relative to the well-being of the broader domestic criminal 
justice system. As articulated by MP Danson Mugatana in his opposition to the proposed 
STK:  
 
 We are going to have another court for the ordinary mwananchi who was sent to 
 go and  actualize the ideas of these bigger crime suspects … entrenching a system 
 where we have  a special procedure for those who are going to be eminent people 
 or suspects and a different procedure for the ordinary.635 
 
As institutions that are rooted, to varying degrees, within the domestic structures of the 
state, the ICDs of Kenya and Uganda, the proposed Special Chambers in the DRC, and 
the mobile military courts reflect broader tensions over the role of external actors in their 




 The failed creation of the Special Chambers/Court in the DRC illustrates 
perhaps most directly the tension between the need for specialized jurisdiction and the 
concern for la pérennité of the broader justice system. The reasons enumerated by the 
Senate in its August 2011 rejection of the Ministry’s bill illustrate the divergent views 
held by international and domestic actors over the benefit of such a mechanism. As 
noted, Committee members voiced serious concerns about the potentially unsettling 
impact that a Special Court would have on the Congolese judiciary and the risk that it 
would “lead to a duplication of jurisdictions.”636 The incorporation of international staff 
also appears to have been one of the main reasons for the Senate’s rejection of the bill. 
In the Committee’s words:  
 
 The integration of foreign judges in this national jurisdiction, under the pretext 
 of ensuring the effectiveness and independence of the judiciary, would appear to 
 be an admission of powerlessness on the part of the Government, which itself 
 has the duty to  strengthen the capacities of Congolese judges and would be an 
 insult to them.637 
 
The Committee also noted that, “the adoption of a special status for the judges of this 
[Special] Court is likely to create discrimination between them on the one hand and the 
                                                
634 UN Mapping Report, paras. 1038, 1044, 1055. Notably, the DRC’s projet de loi also noted the ability of a 
“hybrid composition” to “reinforce the independence integrity and capacity of Congolese magistrates.”  
635 STK Amendment Bill, MP Danson Mungatana. 
636 Rapport Relatif au Projet de Loi (“la creation d’une Cour specialisee avec les memes competences 
entrainerait un dedoublement de juridictions, avec risqué de litispendance”) (author’s translation).  
637 Rapport Relatif au Projet de Loi (“l’intégration des magistrats étrangers au sein de cette juridiction 
nationale, sous prétexte d'assurer l'efficacité et l'indépendance de la justice, apparaitrait comme un aveu 
d'impuissance de la part du Gouvernement charge de renforcer les capacités des magistrats congolais et 
serait une injure pour ces derniers”) (author’s translation).  
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other judges in other jurisdictions, on the other.”638 Opponents of the proposed STK 
raised similar concerns during parliamentary debates.639  
 
 In some respects, concerns about the Special Court’s potentially distorting 
impact have been realized in the functioning of the DRC’s mobile courts, where 
international donor influence looms large. Here, exceptionalism extends in particular to 
the predominant focus on sexual violence crimes. Severine Autesserre, a political scientist 
who has conducted extensive fieldwork in the DRC, argues that the sexual abuse against 
women and girls is one of several dominant narratives that have “dominated the 
discourse on the Congo and oriented the interventions strategies … of some of the most 
powerful states and organizations,” such that other forms of violence are increasingly 
overlooked.640  She further notes that, “according to donors and aid workers, sexual 
violence is such a buzzword that many foreign and Congolese organizations insert 
references to it in all kinds of project proposals to increase their chances of obtaining 
funding.”641 A 2012 study of the DRC mobile courts by two Dutch academics similarly 
warns of the deleterious effects that such a singular focus can have. They argue that, 
“Although mobile courts should see all kinds of cases, they are almost uniquely 
organized around sexual violence cases and, linked with the predominant perception that 
sexual violence is caused by armed perpetrators, they are mostly targeting military 
justice.”642 
   
 Furthermore, while observers of the courts (many of whom are also funders) 
have noted that the mobile court proceedings meet fair trial standards, significant 
concerns remain about the independence of the Congolese military justice system. As a 
report of the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa notes: 
 
 [The] mobile court hearings are … sometimes not held in conditions that allow 
 military judges to issue rulings in a faithful and conscientious way, and with 
 complete freedom. This is the case when these hearings draw a significant crowd, 
 and there is public pressure for the accused to be sentenced. Judges are then very 
 strongly tempted to make decisions that will satisfy public opinion.643 
                                                
638 Ibid. (“l’adoption d’un statut special en faveur des magistrats de cette Cour est de nature a creer une 
discrimination entre eux, d’une part et entre ceux-ci et les magistrats de autres juridictions, d’autre part”) 
(author’s translation).  
639 MP Danson Mungatana, for instance, spoke out against the 2009 Bill in similar terms: 
 First and foremost, if you look at this tribunal, it is a huge monolith that is going to set up a 
 parallel legal system in this country. If you look at the Bill that has been circulated, we are going 
 to have several offices created. There is going to be the office of the public prosecutor, office of 
 the defender, office of the registrar, a trial chamber, special prosecution court and an appeals 
 chamber. This is a very big parallel structure to the legal system of Kenya that already exists (STK 
 Amendment Bill, 40).  
640 Séverine Autesserre, “Dangerous Tales: Dominant Narratives on the Congo and their Unintended 
Consequences,” African Affairs (2012), 13. Autesserre argues further that these dominant narrative have 
“diverted attention from much more needed policy actions, such as the resolution of grassroots 
antagonisms, the fight against corruption, and the reform of the state administration,” 11. For a similar 
argument in the context of the need for “local peacebuilding,” see also Séverine Autesserre, The Trouble with 
the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010).  
641 Ibid.  
642 Nynke Douma and Dorothea Hilhorst, “Fond de Commerce? Sexual violence assistance in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo,” Disaster Studies, Occasional Paper No. 2 (Wageningen University, 2012), 
11, at http://www.wmm.com/filmcatalog/study/justice_report.pdf.  




The effective “sponsoring” of mobile courts by non-state actors, presumably eager to see 
the impact of their own investments, also raises questions about the influence of donor 
money on due process. As the 2012 study notes, “NGOs pay for lawyers on the side of 
victims, while suspects are usually left with unpaid, and hence unmotivated, public 
defenders. This enhances the possibility for suspects to be convicted regardless of the 
evidence that is presented.”644  
 
 Finally, domestic advocates have expressed concern about the displacing effects 
of the mobile courts. One Congolese jurist noted that “ordinary” justice institutions are 
effectively stalled when the mobile courts are in session, as they draw personnel “from 
the closest towns and cities” away from those institutions for the duration of the time 
that the court is sitting.645 Another publication refers explicitly to the courts as “palliative,” 
noting their high cost and the fact that they depend almost entirely on the logistical 
assistance provided by MONUC, the UN’s mission to the DRC.646  Of their (relative) 
high cost, similar concerns have been expressed about the distortions such interventions 
can visit on the local economy, where the per diem offered for three days travel often 
well exceeds the compensation that a public court official would otherwise receive.647 A 
2009 needs assessment of the DRC’s justice system similarly noted that, “since more 
international actors get involved in mobile courts initiatives, magistrates have started to 
demand additional pay before agreeing to participate.”648 While the chambres foraines are 
thus part of the Congolese system, the resources necessary to activate them may well 




 The permanence of a structure like Uganda’s ICD is, in part, a response to 
concerns that the benefits of transitional justice mechanisms would not accrue to 
domestic justice systems. As Human Rights Watch describes it, “As a division of 
Uganda’s High Court, the ICD is a fully integrated part of Uganda’s domestic system, 
operating according to standard judicial procedure and practice.”649 Yet even such 
specialized divisions can produce tensions between and amongst other justice sector 
actors. In Uganda, for instance, the perception that the ICD is a “prized” Division, 
                                                
644 Douma and Hilhorst, “Fond de Commerce?,”11. The authors further note that, “legal personnel receive 
compensation (primes) during mobile hearings from the NGOs.” 
645 Interview with Congolese jurist, Kinshasa, 21 June 2011. 
646 “The Democratic Republic of Congo: Military Justice and Human Rights – An urgent need to complete 
reforms,” 34-35. 
647 Interview with MONUSCO official, 23 June 2011. The Open Society Justice Initiative likewise notes, 
“Judges who are usually reluctant to accept remote postings have eagerly participated in mobile courts for 
the per diem payments.” Putting Complementarity into Practice, 56.  
648 “Rebuilding courts and trust: An assessment of the needs of the justice system in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo,” An International Legal Assistance Consortium and International Bar Association 
Human Rights Institute Report (August 2009), 27. The report concludes that having mobile courts “run by 
the government, under specific and consistent guidelines, would contribute to solving the problem.” 
Similar tensions are described in a2004 report of Human Rights Watch, concerning a joint effort, known as 
REJUSCO, spearheaded by the DRC government and the European Commission to restore the criminal 
justice system in Bunia, Ituri. The report notes that, judges and investigate judges’ monthly stipend was “ 
‘worse than meaningless’” as it did “ ‘not even cover 30% of … monthly needs.’” It recommends that all 
parties involved “should reaffirm the principle that the burden of paying the salaries of judicial personnel 
should be borne by the government.” Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper, “Making Justice Work: 
Restoration of the Legal System in Ituri, DRC” (1 September 2004), 10.  
649Human Rights Watch, “Justice for Serious Crimes Before National Courts: Uganda’s International 
Crimes Division” (January 2012), 18. 
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attracting not only the interest of international NGOs, advocates, and academics, but 
also donor money, has contributed to a sense that it enjoys a special status within the 
High Court structure. 
 
 What this status confers ranges from the level of the seemingly mundane to the 
potentially constitutional.650 Several Ugandan jurists, for instance, pointed to the fact that 
ICD judges were receiving a paid legal assistant (something Ugandan judges do not 
traditionally use) as a form of patronage. Donors were in fact asked to consider 
supplemental funding for legal assistants for ICD judges in 2011, although this request 
was not funded (at the time).651 Judicial “training” has been another site of institutional 
tension, as ICD judges have received extensive training on a variety of topics in 
international law.652 The Institute for Security Studies, a think tank based in South Africa 
notes that, since March 2011, it has “provided the ICD with intensive training 
workshops on international criminal justice, counter-terrorism and mechanisms for 
international cooperation. The judges and the registrar of the ICD have also benefited 
from exchange programmes or study tours to the ICC and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda.”653 Given the resources invested in such trainings, concern has 
been expressed that the possible rotation of judges off of the ICD—an otherwise 
common practice within the High Court system—will now cause “a loss of developed 
knowledge and expertise in a specialized legal area.”654  
 
 Funding is again intimately intertwined with these tensions. JLOS is ostensibly 
meant to serve as the Ugandan government’s coordinating body for justice issues, but 
the interest in its transitional justice mandate, for which a working group was established 
in 2008, has attracted particular attention. Stephen Oola notes that JLOS “received 
significant donor money” in support of expediting the ICD’s first trial (that of Thomas 
Kwoyelo, discussed further below) and, “with it, pressure to abandon its earlier roadmap 
towards a more comprehensive transitional justice process.”655 Nouwen concludes that 
the establishment of a division specialized in ICC crimes is yet another iteration of 
Uganda’s expensive patronage system. In her words, “International donor money for 
such special bodies guarantees income outside the ordinary national budget,” while 
                                                
650 For instance, the JSC proposal that would vest jurisdiction for piracy and other transnational crimes 
with the Kenya’s ICD would likely face a constitutional challenge at some point (or require a change in 
legislation), as currently such cases are handled at the magistrate’s court level. Second interview with 
Kenyan NGO director, Nairobi, 3 December 2012. Similar constitutional issues are raised with special 
tribunals as well, as was the case in both Kenya and the DRC.  
651 In its recommendations to donors, Human Rights Watch included that they “consider prioritizing 
funding of legal assistants to support ICD judges.” See “Justice for Serious Crimes Before National 
Courts,” 27.  
652 See, e.g., Putting Complementarity into Practice, which notes that ICD judges, “have requested extensive 
additional trainings, including in plea-bargaining, as well as on-going trainings that address other particular 
challenges,” 72.  
653  Max du Plessis, Antoinette Low, and Ottilia Maunganidze, “African efforts to close the impunity gap: 
Lessons for complementarity from national and regional actions,” ISS Paper No. 241 (November 2012), 
17, at https://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper241.pdf. Other trainings—by the Public International Law 
and Policy Group, International Criminal Law Services, the Institute for International Criminal 
Investigations, and the International Center for Transitional Justice—have likewise been offered to 
investigators and prosecutors. 
654 Human Rights Watch, “Justice for Serious Crimes Before National Courts,” 20.  
655 Stephen Oola, “In the Shadow of Kwoyelo’s Trial: The ICC and Complementarity in Uganda,” in 
Christian De Vos, Sara Kendall, and Carsten Stahn (eds.), Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of 
International Criminal Court Interventions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
The sector secured over UGX 400m (apx. $115,000 USD) to initiate the Kwoyelo trial alone. See JLOS, 
“Annual Performance Report 2010/2011,” 72.  
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domestic patronage networks are rewarded by “secondment to a body that promises 
training with sitting allowances, access to international networks and travel abroad as 
fringe benefits.”656 The repeated recommendation of international organizations that the 
ICD is “under-staffed and under-resourced”657 arguably adds to the patronage potential 
of such bodies.  
 
4.2 Mimicry and “International Standards” 
 
 While the creation of specialized judicial divisions invests them with an 
exceptional status in the domestic legal sphere, they also demonstrate a striking 
uniformity with the institutional form of justice that the ICC represents, promoting in 
Mark Drumbl’s words, “the iconic status of the courtroom and the jailhouse as the best 
practice to promote justice in the aftermath of grave mass violence.”658 As chapter three 
argues, the ICC has abetted this process through a line of admissibility jurisprudence that 
privileges the “mirroring effect” of its procedures at the national level. Academics and 
policy makers have also encouraged this development, seeing it as salutary, an elevation 
of domestic criminal justice through greater adherence to “international standards.” Ellis, 
for instance, posits that the “importance of stressing international standards of justice is 
paramount,” while George Fletcher argues that “the long range-value of the ICC is that 
it will teach countries of the world how to do justice as they seek to apply repressive 
measures in the name of social protection.”659 Similarly, the European Commission, in 
assessing “whether impunity has been properly addressed,” asks: “Is the existing 
normative framework [constitution, penal code, procedural code…) in line with 
international standards on justice?”660 
 
 The suggestion that ICC practice is to be copied, coupled with the message of 
mediating organizations that “international standards” and “best practices” must be met, 
has been effectively transmitted to influential actors in both Uganda and Kenya (by 
contrast, this message was largely rejected by domestic political elites in the DRC). In 
2010, Principal Judge Ogoola, the first presiding judge of the Ugandan ICD, wrote: 
 
 The Court’s standards and procedures—including a trial bench of three Judges, 
 Prosecution, Investigation, and Defence Office, and in-house translation service 
 —all mirror those of the modern international criminal courts such as the Hague, 
 Arusha, Bosnia, Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, etc. In the legislation, we have sought 
 to go even further by, for instance, providing the opportunity for an 
 International Criminal Court observer at the hearings of cases by the [Ugandan 
                                                
656 Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire, 182.  
657 See, e.g., ISS at 18. Writing of the Kenyan ICD, one NGO also describes the costs of operationalizing 
the court as “enormous”; the Kenyan government is “expected to fund the ICD adequately in additional to 
international donor funding.” Ongesco, 3. 
658 Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law,198.  
659 Sovereignty and Justice, 8-10 (emphasis in original); George Fletcher and Jens David Ohlin, “Reclaiming 
Fundamental Principles of Criminal Law in the Darfur Case,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 3 (2005), 
540. 
660 European Commission, “Toolkit for Bridging the gap between international [and] national justice: Joint 
Staff working Document on Advancing the Principle of Complementarity,” SWD(2013), 1 January 2013, 
11. 
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 War Crimes Chamber]—let alone the  use of international experts to assist the 
 Court’s proceedings.661 
 
Ugandan Justice Akiki Kiiza, who later presided over the Division, has likewise stated 
that, “war crimes trials held in the country will function in a similar fashion to those in 
The Hague, with three judges officiating each case.”662 (Whereas single judges typically 
preside over judicial matters in Uganda, the ICD employs a three-judge bench in keeping 
with ICC practice.) These messages are furthered by key domestic NGOs. The Uganda 
Victims Foundation, for instance, has stated that, “Given the special international nature 
of the crimes coming before the WCD, a structure similar to the ICC should be upheld 
and adhered to.”663 
 
 The proposals for Kenya’s ICD mirrors the emerging practice in Uganda. 
Justices Ogoola and Kiiza’s remarks are nearly identical to those of Reverend Samuel 
Kobia, who, speaking at the annual Assembly of States Parties in November 2013, said 
that Kenya’s proposed ICD would be established “modeled on standards of the ICC – 
the same standards… with the same rules, with the same practice and with the same 
procedures.”664 To that end, the sub-committee proposed that the ICD sit “in panels of 
three judges with one extra judge in case one of the judges cannot sit.”665 The JSC’s 
report on the Kenyan division further concludes that: 
 
 Special rules of procedure and evidence should be formulated to provide the 
 procedure on the prosecution of crimes in this division. This is so because, this 
 division will be dealing with criminal matters with significant international 
 character and needs to be modeled in accordance with international standards of 
 the International Criminal Court and tribunals.”666  
 
Kenya’s nascent Witness Protection Agency, which has become a critical focus of 
“positive” complementarity-related efforts, describes its mission—to be “the leading 
Witness Protection Agency in the World”—in similarly ambitious terms.667 
 
 Procedural provisions are also considered part of “proper” adjudication. The 
ICC’s victim participation regime, for instance, has been frequently summoned as a 
necessary corollary of criminal proceedings in Kenya and Uganda, even though such 
participation is otherwise foreign to their common-law systems.668 Punishment, explored 
                                                
661 Justice James Ogoola, “Lawfare: Where Justice Meets Peace,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International 
Law 43 (2010), 184. Justice Ogoola references the work here of the Public International Law & Policy 
Group. 
662 Florence Ogola, “Uganda Victims Question ICC’s Balance,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting (14 June 
2010). 
663 Uganda Victims Foundation, “Statement on the International Crimes Bill of 2009” (4 November 2009).   
664 Simon Jennings and Thomas Bwire, “Kenyan Chief Justice Announces Special Court,” Institute for War 
& Peace Reporting (10 December 2012); Nzau Msua, “Kenya: Mutunga to Establish ICC Model Court,” The 
Star (26 February 2013). 
665 JSC Report, 144 
666 Ibid., 96. Because of the nature of crimes to be tried, the report recommends that, “before the court 
commences its trials, all measures should be put in place to ensure that the court room has modern ICT 
facilities e.g. cameras, videos etc.,” 145. 
667 The Witness Protection Agency, Republic of Kenya Service Charter (brochure on-file). 
668 See, e.g., UVF, “Statement on the International Crimes Bill of 2009,” which states “Whilst it is 
recognized that the Ugandan legal system does not normally provide for victims to participate in criminal 
proceedings (other than as witnesses) or to be legally represented, the UVF is of the firm belief that the 
special nature of the crimes coming before the WCD merits significantly greater involvement of victims in 
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further in the following chapter, has been another area of ICC mirroring, where a false 
understanding that the Rome Statute requires domestic prohibition of the death penalty 
further demarcates international crime adjudication from the broader criminal justice 
system. For instance, the Kenyan JSC report calls upon the government to “give an 
undertaking through a memorandum of understanding to the International Community 
and the ICC that any person charged, prosecuted and convicted for committing an 
international crime shall not be sentenced to death,” even as Kenya retains the death 
penalty for other criminal offenses.669 A similar disparity is evident in Uganda, which, 
despite a de facto ban on the death penalty, retains criminal punishment for certain 
ordinary crimes.670 
 Paradoxically, this insistence on conformity with standards can serve to stymie 
domestic proceedings, rather than catalyze them. As Elena Baylis notes, “the common 
approach has been to hold constant as an irreducible, unnegotiable value our 
commitment to trials that meet international due process standards and to do what it 
takes to achieve that commitment in the immediate term: that is, to hold trials on the 
international level insofar as possible and to discourage and criticize national trials that 
do not meet international standards.”671 Uganda’s ICD illustrates this tendency. Whereas 
a 2011 needs assessment of the Division concluded that, “the JLOS institutions are 
closer to being ready for war-crimes proceedings than some within those institutions 
believe,”672 a July 2012 speech by the ICD’s Registrar highlighted its ongoing deficiencies. 
In his words: 
 Positive Complementarity presupposes that national institution[s] like the ICD in 
 Uganda should have the necessary and vital tools to effectively and efficiently 
 handle  investigations and prosecutions of International Crimes under the 
 Statute. Many countries, Uganda inclusive, have problems in fulfilling these 
 obligations. This therefore, calls for the ICC and other International 
 Organisations, as well as governments of the other State Parties to facilitate the 
 young national institution to cope with the expected standards.673  
The pressures of accommodating a unique set of crimes within a permanent domestic 
judicial structure thus oscillate between a mutually reinforcing rhetoric of exceptionalism 




                                                                                                                                      
the process”; see also Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony et al., Observations on Behalf of Victims pursuant to Article 
19(1) of the Rome Statute with 55 Public Annexes and 45 Redacted Annexes, ICC-02/04-01/05-349, 
Office of Public Counsel for Victims, 18 November 2008.  
669 JSC Report, 150.  
670 On the “growing paradox” of excluding the death penalty for international crimes before international 
jurisdictions while national jurisdictions maintain it, see Boctor, “The Abolition of the Death Penalty in 
Rwanda.” 
671 Baylis, “Reassessing the Role of International Criminal Law,” 8. For a similar conclusion in the context 
of Uganda, see Phil Clark, “‘All these Outsiders Shouted Louder Than Us’: Civil Society Engagement with 
Transitional Justice in Uganda,” Working Paper SiT/WP/03/15, 13. 
672 “Final Report and Recommendations of Needs-Assessment Mission Experts,” 4 March 2011 (on-file).  
673 Remarks by His Worship Asiimwe Tadeo, “Effecting Complementarity: Challenges and Opportunities: 
A Case Study of the International Crimes Division of Uganda,” paper presented at regional forum on 
international and transitional justice organized by ASF-Uganda Mission and the UCICC (20 July 2012). 
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4.3 Uganda v. Thomas Kwoyelo: Complementarity and State Power 
 
 Commentators have already drawn attention to the fact that the “self-referrals” in 
situations such as Uganda and the DRC were themselves concessions to state power, 
resting on an implicit understanding that the referring government would not be a focus 
of the Court’s investigations.674 While the OTP’s choice of cases in these situations (to 
date) would appear to vindicate this criticism, less remarked upon has been the way in 
which the exercise of complementarity has likewise served to shore up existing domestic 
power structures. Uganda’s case against Thomas Kwoyelo is perhaps the most dramatic 
illustration of this phenomenon.  
 
4.3.1 Procedural History 
 
 Kwoyelo, a former LRA fighter and child soldier who himself had been abducted 
by Kony’s forces when he was 13, became the first war crimes suspect to face trial before 
Uganda’s ICD.675 Captured in March 2009, he was charged under the Geneva 
Conventions Act as well as Uganda’s Penal Code Act. The government alleged that he 
“committed his offences in the context of an international armed conflict that existed in 
Northern Uganda, Southern Sudan and North Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo 
between the LRA (with the support of and under the control of the government of 
Sudan), fighting against the government of the Republic of Uganda as by law established, 
between 1987 and 2008.”676  
  
 Kwoyelo was initially charged in June 2009 but applied for amnesty under 
Uganda’s Amnesty Act in January 2010.677 As the Act prescribed, the Amnesty 
Commission sent Kwoyelo’s application to the DPP for certification that he was not 
charged with offenses unrelated to the LRA activity (a condition of receiving amnesty); 
however, in this instance, the DPP failed to respond to the Commission’s request.678 
Whereas thousands of other combatants like Kwoyelo had received amnesty, the DPP’s 
refusal on this occasion to certify his application suggests that the ICD’s establishment, 
coupled with the swift passage in 2010 of long delayed Rome Statute implementing 
legislation and the forthcoming ICC Review Conference (for which Uganda was the host 
                                                
674 See, e.g., Adam Branch, Displacing Human Rights: War and Intervention in Northern Uganda (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011); Schabas, “‘Complementarity in Practice’: Some Uncomplimentary Thoughts.” 
675 Kwoyelo was captured in March 2009 in Ukwa, a northeastern part of the DRC during a joint military 
operation and as part of “Operation Lightning Thunder,” which was launched in December 2008, 
following the failed Juba peace process. See Uganda v. Thomas Kwoyelo alias Latoni, Constitutional Court 
of Uganda, Petition No. 036/11, 22 September 2011 (“Kwoyelo Constitutional Court Decision”), 3-4.  
676 Director of Public Prosecutions, International Crimes Division of the High Court of Uganda at 
Kampala, HCT-00-ICD-Case No. 02/10, Amended Indictment, 5 July 2011, para. 1.  
677 Interview with Amnesty Commission official, 13 December 2011. In January 2000, Uganda adopted an 
Amnesty Act (subsequently amended in 2002 and 2006) that provided amnesty for anyone who had 
engaged in armed rebellion against the government since the “26th day of January 1986” and who agreed 
to renounce and abandon such rebellion. The conditions for amnesty were broadly conceived, with the 
declaration that “amnesty means a pardon, forgiveness, exemption or discharge from criminal prosecution 
or any other form of punishment by the State.” See Amnesty Commission, “The Amnesty Act: An Act of 
Forgiveness” (August 2009), 26 (on-file). To date, more than 26,000 former combatants have received 
amnesty under the Act (approximately half of whom were former LRA members.) Ibid.  
678 Interview with Amnesty Commission official, 13 December 2011. My interlocutor indicated that the 
DPP typically certified within one month of the Commission sending the file, which it had done in March 
2010. The Department did not respond, however, instead filing its initial indictment against Kwoyelo in 
August of that year. See also, “The Amnesty Act: An Act of Forgiveness,” 12 (“The Role of the DPP”). 
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state), signaled a decision to make him an “example” of Uganda’s commitment to 
complementarity.679  
 
 Kwoyelo’s legal team raised several challenges in the first instance before the 
ICD (which sat in Gulu rather than Kampala for the proceedings), including whether the 
armed conflict between the LRA and the government was international in the sense of 
the Geneva Conventions, as well as his alleged torture during the time that he was held 
in pre-trial detention. The central question, however, was whether Kwoyelo was entitled 
to amnesty and whether the Commission under the Ugandan Constitution had accorded 
him equal treatment.680 Faced with these constitutional questions, the ICD referred the 
matter to the Constitutional Court in July 2011. In a turnabout from its previous 
position, the government responded that Kwoyelo was not entitled to amnesty because 
the Amnesty Act, which had been in existence for the previous ten years, was 
unconstitutional as it compelled Uganda to violate its “international legal obligation to 
punish grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions on war crimes.”681 
 
In November 2011, the Constitutional Court halted Kwoyelo’s trial. In a 
unanimous decision, it dismissed the Attorney General’s arguments and upheld the Act’s 
constitutionality; further, it found that Kwoyelo had been unequally treated. The Court 
also rejected the argument that Uganda’s Rome Statute obligations implied a duty not to 
grant amnesties, finding that it had “not come across any uniform international standards 
or practices which prohibit states from granting amnesties.”682 Upon remanding the case 
to the ICD, the Amnesty Commission sought renewed certification from the DPP to 
issue Kwoyelo’s amnesty, which it again refused to issue.683 Instead, the Attorney General 
appealed to the Ugandan Supreme Court (a higher appellate court), challenging the 
Constitutional Court’s decision. The Supreme Court had no quorum at the time, 
however, thus adding additional delay to the proceedings. 
 
Subsequent successful attempts by Kwoyelo to apply for bail (as an interim 
remedy) and for a writ of mandamus (to compel his release) in light of the Constitutional 
Court’s decision were likewise ignored by the DPP.684 Instead, the Attorney General 
sought to stay the orders of these lower courts by appealing to the Supreme Court, which 
convened, without quorum, a special one-hour sitting and then granted the government’s 
                                                
679  See, e.g., Samuel Egadu Okiror, “Ugandan Supreme Court ruling fuels debate over double standards in 
war crimes prosecution,” International Justice Tribune No. 180, 21 April 2015. 
680 Uganda v. Thomas Kwoyelo alias Latoni, Constitutional Reference No. 36 of 2011, Reference to the 
Constitutional Court, 25 July 2011. 
681 Uganda v. Thomas Kwoyelo alias Latoni, Constitutional Reference No. 36 of 2011, Attorney General’s 
Legal Arguments, 16 August 2011. 
682 Kwoyelo Constitutional Court Decision, 24. The court did not address another argument put forward 
by the government: that the Amnesty Act violates Uganda’s international treaty obligations under the 
Rome Statute.  
683 Interview with Amnesty Commission official, 13 December 2011. My interlocutor shared a copy of the 
DPP’s reply to the Commission (dated 17 November 2011), which stated that, “The grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions for which the accused is charged with constitute international crimes for which 
amnesty cannot be granted.” (Notably, Kwoyelo was not charged under the Geneva Conventions but 
rather the Geneva Conventions Act, which, like the Penal Code Act, would appear to fall within the 
Amnesty Act’s ambit.) 
684 Thomas Kwoyelo alias Latoni  v. Attorney General, High Court (Civil Division), HCT-00-CV-MC-
0162-2011, 25 January 2012 (Hon. Zehurikize) (on-file).  The DPP issued a press release explaining its 
contempt, stating, “This office maintains the position that under the principles of international law, no 
amnesty can be granted to persons accused of committing war crimes under the Geneva Convention. The 
war crimes he is charged with include killings and infliction of grave injuries.” See Edward Anyoli, “DPP 
rejects Kwoyelo amnesty,” New Vision (5 February 2012).  
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motion.685 The appeal against the Constitutional Court’s decision was finally heard on the 
merits in April 2014. In April 2015, the Supreme Court overturned the decision on the 
grounds that any crimes committed against innocent civilians or communities (including 
crimes under Article 8(2)(e) of the Rome Statute) cannot be categorized as “crimes 
committed in furtherance of the war or rebellion”; thus, Kwoyelo was not entitled to 
amnesty.686 More controversially, the Court also ruled that the DPP’s decisions as to 
whether or not to certify future amnesty requests were not entitled to judicial review, 
effectively granting the government unfettered discretion in such determinations.687  
 
As he awaits yet another return to the ICD, Kwoyelo has been kept in pre-trial 
detention since his proceedings began five years ago. In October 2012, facing no other 
domestic avenues for relief, he petitioned the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, challenging his continuing detention as arbitrary and a violation of his 
rights under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.688 That petition remains 
pending.  
 
4.3.2 Hijacked Justice? 
 
Kwoyelo’s proceedings point to a dark side to complementarity, particularly 
when domestic accountability is pursued by a state eager to be seen as making good on 
the investments of donor bodies and “compliant” with international norms. As a 
member of Kwoyelo’s legal defense team explained, “There is so much international 
pressure for [Uganda] to deal with the LRA.”689 In response to such pressure, many of 
the same “international standards” to which domestic systems must ostensibly comply 
have been violated: Kwoyelo has now spent five years in pre-trial detention, in defiance 
of repeated orders by Uganda’s own courts that he be released.  
 
Such defiance of the domestic judiciary is not new in Uganda,690 but it is 
noteworthy that many of the same international NGOs that are otherwise champions of 
due process have said so little about the Kwoyelo trial or his treatment.691 
Complementarity’s disciplinary dimensions can also be seen in the reaction of JLOS to 
the Constitutional Court’s decision, when it (incorrectly) insisted that the “principle 
would require those responsible for serious human rights violations to be excluded from 
                                                
685 See Oola, “In the Shadow of Kwoyelo’s Trial.”  
686 The Republic of Uganda in the Supreme Court of Uganda at Kampala, Constitutional Appeal No. 1 of 
2012, Uganda v. Thomas Kwoyelo, 8 April 2015, 41-42. 
687  Ibid. Notably, the judgment’s lead opinion also suggests a sequential approach to justice that would 
pursue accountability first before resorting to other “alternative” measures. See Sharon Nakandha, 
“Supreme Court of Uganda Rules on the Application of the Amnesty Act” (16 April 2015), at 
http://www.ijmonitor.org/2015/04/supreme-court-of-uganda-rules-on-the-application-of-the-amnesty-
act/.   
 688 Bill Oketch, “Rights body to assist Kwoyelo,” Daily Monitor (2 January 2013).  
689 Alexis Okeowo, “Thomas Kwoyelo’s Troubling Trial,” The New Yorker (21 July 2012).  
690 See, e.g., Mari Tripp, Museveni’s Uganda, 86-91; Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, “The ICC’s Possible Deferral of 
the LRA Case to Uganda,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 6 (2008), 808. Mari Tripp recounts a 
notorious scene from November 2005, when opposition leader Kizza Besigye was arrested (on charges of 
treason and rape) and brought to the High Court to be released on bail, only be to surrounded by 
members of the Black Mamba Squad, a paramilitary unit, in the courtroom and arrested extralegally; Apuuli 
notes similar acts were repeated in March 2007.  
691 Rather than drawing attention to the government’s failure to release Kwoyelo on bond, Amnesty 
International described the Constitutional Court’s decision as a “setback” for international justice. 
Amnesty International Public Statement, “Court’s decision a setback for accountability for crimes 
committed in northern Uganda conflict” (23 September 2011).  
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the amnesty process, and instead, be investigated by the national courts.”692 In its words, 
“The Amnesty Act presents challenges to Uganda’s ability to comply with the principle of 
complementarity.”693 In a “special report” issued following the decision, JLOS likewise 
stated that Uganda’s ratification of the Rome Statute represented an “international 
commitment to seek justice and accountability” and that its domestication “reinforces 
Uganda’s good reputation in ratification and domestication of international laws and its 
duty to apply the law.”694 
 
Kwoyelo’s trial thus presents vexing questions about the ways in which 
complementarity may be used in the interests of state power. Jelena Subotic’s work on 
what she calls “hijacked justice” is instructive here, as she argues that the rise in 
popularity of transitional justice institutions (including courts) and their increasing 
ubiquity are such that “states use these mechanisms to achieve goals quite different from 
those envisaged by international justice institutions and activists.”695 In Kwoyelo’s case, 
and as the Supreme Court’s decision suggests, the goal appears to be making him the 
public example of Uganda’s evolution from an earlier period wherein amnesty largely 
held sway as state policy to an increasingly retributive model, wherein criminal 
accountability is now the guiding norm. Yet this evolution has not been executed in a 
manner consistent with Kwoyelo’s own rights.  Similar concerns animate the Kenyan 
ICD, talk of which, critics contend, amounts to little more than “sham compliance” on 
the part of the state. Writing in the Daily Nation, Betty Waithherero, a Kenyan 
commentator, argues that,  
 
A lot of time, money and effort has … been put into what looks like just smoke 
 and mirrors; a political stillborn whose intention was to create the appearance of 
 complementarity while utilizing dubious methods to create [it].”696  
 
Such “domestic misuse of transitional justice norms,” Subotic concludes, can lead to 
“policy outcomes far removed from international transitional justice expectations.”697 
These outcomes may range from marginalizing domestic political opponents (as in the 
DRC), to obtaining material benefits (as in Uganda), or “gain[ing] membership in 




To varying degrees, complementarity animates and sustains the creation (or 
proposed creation) of specialized institutions, personnel, and regulations for the 
domestic prosecution of ICC crimes. Whether as admissibility rule or normative ordering 
principle, state and non-state actors alike have summoned the adaptive nature of 
complementarity as the basis for transforming and reforming domestic judicial systems, 
                                                
692 “Community Dialogue on the Future of the Amnesty Act” (March 2012). JLOS convened the 
“dialogue” in conjunction with UN Women and the UN Office of the High Commissioner with “a view to 
understanding community views on the current operation and future of the [Amnesty] Act.” See also 
JLOS, ‘The Amnesty Law (2000) Issues Paper, Review by the Transitional Justice Working Group (April 
2012).  
693 Ibid. (emphasis added).  
694 JLOS, “Justice at Cross Roads? A Special Report on the Thomas Kwoyelo Trial,” 4. 
695 Jelena Subotic, Hijacked Justice, 6. 
696 Betty Waitherero, “Can the International Crimes Division prosecute Kenya’s PEV cases?”, The Nation  
(8 February 2014).  
697 Subotic, 6. 
698 Ibid.  
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as well as their relationship to the ICC. Whereas complementarity was once a principle 
that Uganda sought to invoke to keep the Court at bay, the ICD now appears as the 
ICC’s institutional partner: Thomas Kwoyelo tried in Uganda, Dominic Ongwen tried in 
The Hague. Non-state actors in the DRC have invoked complementarity in a similar 
manner, even though the (limited) domestic proceedings there are not connected in any 
material way to, nor the direct result of, the ICC’s undertakings.  Indeed, the opposite 
has taken place: an initial promise of cooperation between the ICC and the government 
has given way to greater contestation between The Hague and Kinshasa. 
 
At the same time, the creation of specialized regimes or units for the prosecution 
of international crimes has arguably contributed to an ongoing bifurcation within these 
systems, often rigidly dividing international and national justice in a way that  
disadvantages the “ordinary” criminal justice system in the competition for attention and 
resources.699 The language of “international standards” and “best practices”— 
abundantly invoked by external technical “experts” as Rome Statute obligations—abets 
this phenomenon. Finally, the Kwoyelo proceeding highlights the vexed relationship 
between state power and complementarity, demonstrating how “compliance” with the 
latter can also facilitate abusive states practices. Although Kwoyelo cannot invoke 
complementarity as legal matter, the narrative of his trial has been built on the principle. 
Moreover, as a progress narrative, his prosecution marks an apparent shift in Ugandan 
policy from amnesty to accountability; it offers a picture to an international audience of 
complementarity “in practice.” But Kwoyelo’s is not a story that the ICC or its 
supporters should want to tell, built as it is on exceptionalism at the expense of due 
process. As these evolving histories suggest, the logic of complementarity shifts 




                                                
699 One such example is the Kenyan ICD proposal, which would vest jurisdiction for crimes like piracy and 
other “transnational crimes” within the division, even though the ordinary criminal justice system has long 





Implementation and Domestic Politics 
 
 While the adoption of the Rome Statute formally initiated the ratification process 
that brought the ICC into existence, it also inaugurated a far-ranging effort to embed the 
Statute in the legal framework of states. As one legal scholar has ambitiously 
characterized it, the Statute was a “quasi-legislative event that produced a criminal code 
for the world.”700 Conceived and led largely by the same network of global civil society 
actors that had campaigned for the ICC’s establishment, these campaigns for national 
implementation have again been intimately linked to the complementarity-as-catalyst 
framework. The CICC notes that, “For the principle of complementarity to become truly 
effective, following ratification, States must also implement all of the crimes under the 
Rome Statute into domestic legislation.”701 Similarly, Amnesty International claims that a 
state that fails to enact national legislation risks “being considered unable and unwilling 
genuinely to investigate and prosecute crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction.”702  
 
 As with the creation of domestic “complementarity” courts, implementation 
reflects a broader interest in routing governance objectives through international criminal 
law.703 To that end, this chapter continues the close examination of Kenya, Uganda, and 
the DRC by exploring the Rome Statute’s implementation in each of these three 
jurisdictions. Its contention is two-fold. First, implementation has become an 
increasingly sophisticated and technocratic exercise in applying the Statute as a “global 
script”704 to a diverse array of national contexts. Rome Statute “model laws” have 
emerged and a variety of international NGOs, advisors, and consultants—a growing 
“transnational expert” community of practice705—offer counsel to states  
on how best to harmonize their domestic legal and constitutional orders with the 
purported requirements of the Statute.  This emphasis on harmonization has, in turn, 
contributed to an increasingly strict interpretation of what complementarity purportedly 
requires.   
 
 Second, while the ICC’s intervention in these countries accelerated advocacy 
campaigns for the passage of national implementation legislation, it was not the direct 
catalyst for implementation in either Kenya or Uganda (the DRC has not yet passed such 
legislation.) Rather, other events, geared predominantly towards international audiences, 
precipitated the Statute’s implementation. In Uganda, the country’s role as host of the 
2010 Review Conference of the Rome Statute hastened a legislative process that had long 
stagnated, while, in Kenya, the desire to publicly demonstrate a departure from the 
election violence of 2007-08 led parliamentarians to “fast-track” implementation 
following the Waki Commission’s recommendation.  
                                                
700 Leila Nadya Sadat, The International Criminal Court and the Transformation of International Law: Justice for the 
New Millennium (Martinus Nijhoff, 2002), 263. 
701 Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC), at http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=ratimp.  
702 Amnesty International, “The International Criminal Court: Checklist for Effective Implementation” 
(2000). 
703 For instance, the CICC states that, “implementation of the Rome Statute provides an opportunity to 
reinvigorate reforms of the criminal and procedure codes, which, in the long term, will strengthen rule of 
law, peace, and security globally.” See CICC, at http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=romeimplementation.  
704 My use of the term “global script” borrows from Carruthers and Halliday’s use of the term as a 
“formalized expression or codification of global norms.” See Bruce G. Carruthers and Terence C. Halliday, 
“Negotiating Globalization: Global Scripts and Intermediation in the Construction of Asian Insolvency 
Regimes,” Law & Social Inquiry, 31(3) (2006), 535-536. 
705 Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law,135. 
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 The union of these two factors—uniformity of application and the power of 
external constituencies—was largely responsible for driving the implementation process 
in both countries, but it glossed over deeper political fissures about the desirability of 
international criminal law as a framework for domestic accountability. In Uganda, 
subsequent efforts to abandon the country’s long-standing amnesty program have been 
met with strong opposition, signaling significant discomfort with the domestic 
legislation’s retributive framework. Similarly, in Kenya, the initiation of ICC 
investigations in 2009 fractured the apparent unanimity of political elites over the 
desirability of the domestic legislation that had been ratified only one year prior, even as 
it united former political rivals Kenyatta and Ruto.706 By contrast, in the DRC, domestic 
politics have continually thwarted the efforts of a dedicated minority to press for 
comprehensive implementing legislation. While the release of the UN’s 2010 “mapping 
report” lent a similar urgency (and opportunity) for domestic political actors to be seen 
as “doing something” for a primarily international audience, implementation legislation 
has been unsuccessful to date as Congolese parliamentarians continue to regard these 
efforts with suspicion. 
 
 Furthermore, whereas passage of Rome Statute legislation in Kenya and Uganda 
was initially swift, later developments in both countries share with the DRC a growing 
suspicion about the aims and purpose of international criminal law, seeing it less as a 
catalyst for reform than a tool of exclusion. Indeed, the focus on identical 
implementation of the Rome Statute at national level raises troubling questions about the 
African continent’s equal and consensual participation in the creation of this body of law. 
Rather than focusing on implementation merely as something the ICC did (or did not) 
catalyze, then, this chapter also illustrates the costs that “a liberal orthodoxy about what 
international criminal law should be” might pose to other normative ideals, such as legal 
pluralism or deliberative, democratic debate.707 
 
 This chapter proceeds in five parts. Drawing on the arguments that have 
animated why implementation of the Rome Statute should be understood as a duty of 
ICC member states, the first section focuses on how international NGOs and the 
capacity building sector—communities of practice with a shared interest in embedding 
the ICC’s normative framework—have drawn on these arguments in their promotion of 
implementation guidelines and “model laws.” I suggest that these tools, while not 
without value, have contributed to a view of implementation as an increasingly 
disciplinary exercise, one that privileges conformity with the Rome Statute. Part two 
turns to the particular experiences of Uganda and Kenya to show how it was not the 
ICC’s intervention itself, but again the mediated influence of external actors and events 
that pushed the formal implementation process forward. However, as the third section 
illustrates, key political questions that were overlooked in this process soon re-emerged. 
The fourth section dwells on the experience of the DRC, noting some initial similarities 
with Kenya and Uganda in the relationship between implementation and political action, 
but also fundamental differences. Based on these histories, the chapter concludes by 
focusing on three dimensions of implementation: as purity, as politics, and as 
“performance,” i.e., a form of political theatre.  
  
 
                                                
706 On shifts in the Kenyan political order, see Sara Kendall, “‘UhuRuto’ and Other Leviathans: the 
International Criminal Court and the Kenyan Political Order,” African Journal of Legal Studies 7 (2014), 399-
427.  
707 Mégret, “Too Much of a Good thing? Implementation and the uses of Complementarity,” 386.  
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1. Implementation, Standardization, and Compliance 
 
 The incorporation of treaty protections is one form that the legal protection of 
human rights may take at the domestic level. Implementation thus reinforces not only 
the primacy of states in international law but also a general rule: states, in general, have 
far-going freedom as to the manner in which they give effect to their international 
obligations.708 Notwithstanding this principle, chapter two examined how 
complementarity became, over time, a site of influence for norm entrepreneurs to argue 
that member states are obliged to implement the Rome Statute’s provisions in their 
domestic legal orders. This duty is rooted in a purposive reading of the Statute, 
particularly its preambular language, which recalls “that it is the duty of every State to 
exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.”709 Yet, 
as noted, the text of the Statute requires only that a country’s domestic law facilitate 
cooperation with the ICC and that it criminalize offenses against the “administration of 
justice”; there is no obligation as such to implement its substantive (or procedural) 
provisions.710  
 
 The difference between “ordinary” and international crimes has also been 
advanced as a basis for domestic implementation; however, while this distinction was 
critical to the criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia,711 the Rome 
Statute makes no such distinction. States are permitted to prosecute international crimes 
as ordinary crimes, provided that their doing so is not deliberately designed to shield 
perpetrators from criminal responsibility. Indeed, as illustrated by the Statute’s drafting 
history, states explicitly rejected a proposal that would have made a case admissible 
before the ICC where the national proceeding failed to consider the international 
character or grave nature of a crime.712 Recalling the “same conduct” test that has 
emerged in ICC jurisprudence (explored at greater length in chapter three), the Statute 
refers instead to the conduct of an accused, “to make clear that a national prosecution of 
                                                
708 As Ward Ferdinandusse argues, however, the extent of this freedom can be, “easily overestimate[d],” 
particularly in the context of international criminal law. Ward Ferdinandusse, Direct Application of 
International Criminal Law in National Courts (Academisch Proefschrift, 2005), 148. Scholars have argued that 
the special character of international humanitarian law distinguishes it from other crimes, thus requiring 
greater fidelity to the manner of its implementation at the national level. Similar arguments point to the 
uniquely expressivist function of international criminal law as requiring its identical enunciation in national 
law. 
709 Para. 6, Rome Statute. As two NGOs noted, for instance, in an amicus curiae submission to the Court in 
the case against the LRA, “The use of ordinary offenses in lieu of international crimes itself fails to capture 
the gravity and aggravated nature of the international crimes.” The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot 
Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, Amicus Curiae submitted by The Uganda Victims’ Foundation and the Redress 
Trust, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II (15 November 2008). 
710 Article 88. Further, as a matter of treaty interpretation, the preambular recital is not part of the Statute’s 
operative text; rather, it “recalls” a suggested pre-existing duty, not one arising from the treaty itself. While 
states may be obliged to investigate or prosecute crimes based on other rules of international law, the 
Statute itself does not so oblige. See Robinson, “The Mysterious Mysteriousness of Complementarity,” 94-
95.  
711 Further, both of the ICTY and ICTR statutes explicitly allow for the retrial of persons who had already 
been tried by a national court if “the act for which he or she was tried was characterized by an ordinary 
crime.” See ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Michel Bagaragaza, Decision on Rule 11 bis Appeal, ICTR-05-86-AR11bis, 
Appeals Chamber, 30 August 2006. 
712 Article 20(3), Rome Statute. As Jo Stigen notes, the ordinary crime criterion, initially endorsed by the 
[ILC], “was proposed but rejected [in the negotiations] as it met too much resistance.”  Stigen, The 
Relationship between the International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions, 335.  
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a crime—international or ordinary—did not prohibit ICC retrial for charges based on 
different conduct.”713 
   
 Such threat-based approaches to complementarity have been central to the ICC-
as-catalyst framing. More broadly, however, implementation discourse also reflects 
anxieties about fragmentation in international law.714 As Carsten Stahn and Larissa van 
den Herik note, “One of the inherent features of international criminal law is a desire for 
uniformity,” which “flows from the need for “certainty, stability and predictability” [that] 
is required in criminal proceedings.”715 A related concept is that the Statute establishes a 
common criminal floor—it reflects the international community’s desire “to maintain 
some semblance of ‘uniformity’ in the way the world combats” international crimes.716 
Cattin, for instance, sees the Statute as posing a “minimum standard for national criminal 
justice systems exercising their primary responsibility: States can do more, but shall do no 
less, than what the Rome Statute prescribes, so as to ensure that all crimes against 
humanity, war crimes and acts of genocide be duly incorporated in the relevant legal 
order and not left unpunished.”717 If complementarity means that accountability will (and 
should) increasingly migrate from the ICC to national courts, then the idea of minimum, 
or “international,” standards is attractive, particularly when the “landscape of domestic 
justice is diverse and partly schizophrenic.”718 To that end, “the play between … unity 
and diversity, is one of the discursive patterns used by the [legal] discipline to deploy 
criticism and propose reform projects.”719 
 
 Faithful domestication of the Rome Statute is one such project. Indeed, while 
implementation is a political process—an act of state—human rights NGOs have been 
perhaps the most influential contributors to popular understandings of what 
domestication requires.720 As a report of the Southern Africa Litigation Centre notes, 
“implementing legislation has been a key focus area of civil society,” and “CSOs have 
been instrumental in the drafting and adoption process [of implementing legislation].”721 
There now exists an array of implementation materials prepared by such organizations. 
As early as 2000, Amnesty International created a “Checklist for Effective 
Implementation,” while Human Rights Watch and the International Centre for Criminal 
Law Reform published similar manuals shortly thereafter.722 As part of its “Global 
                                                
713 Heller, “A Sentence-Based Theory of Complementarity,” 224.  
714 See Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the Fragmentation of International Law, 
“Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law,” UN Doc. A/61/10 
(2006). 
715 Carsten Stahn and Larissa van dan Herik, “‘Fragmentation,’ Diversification and ‘3D’ Legal Pluralism: 
International Criminal Law and the Jack-in-the-Box?,” in The Diversification and Fragmentation of International 
Criminal Law, 58 (citing Appeals Chamber, Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Judgment, 24 March 2003, IT-95-14/1-
A, para. 101). 
716 Ada Sheng, “Analyzing the International Criminal Court Complementarity Principle Through a Federal 
Court Lens,” ILSA Journal of International and Comparative Law 13 (2006), 426. 
717 Cattin, “Approximation or Harmonisation as a Result of Implementation of the Rome Statute,” 373. 
718 Stahn and van dan Herik, “‘Fragmentation,’ Diversification and ‘3D Legal Pluralism,” 39. 
719Anne Charlotte Martineau, “The Rhetoric of Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International Law,” 
Leiden Journal of International Law 22(1) (2009), 2-3.  
720 The CICC is one international NGO that has made implementation a centrepiece of its work; however, 
others like Amnesty International, Avocats Sans Frontiers, the International Federation for Human Rights 
(FIDH), No Peace Without Justice, PGA, and Human Rights Watch have all been similarly engaged.   
721 Southern Africa Litigation Centre, “Positive Reinforcement: Advocating for International Criminal 
Justice in Africa,” 45.  
722 AI Updated Checklist; Human Rights Watch, “Making the International Criminal Court Work: A 
Handbook for Implementing the Rome Statute” (September 2001) (“HRW Handbook”); ICCLR, 
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Advocacy Campaign for the International Criminal Court,” the CICC maintains a 
detailed chart of those states that have either enacted, or are in the process of enacting, 
“Rome Statute Crimes Legislation” and/or “Cooperation Legislation.”723 The Coalition 
also includes a resource page with links to “model” national implementation laws, as well 
as “template statutes” endorsed by various regional organizations like the 
Commonwealth Secretariat.724 
 
 The Commonwealth’s Model Law—of particular relevance to Kenya and 
Uganda—is a 58-page document with prepared language that closely tracks the text of 
the Rome Statute. While noting that, “there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution to the 
complex process of domestic implementation,” the Law presents itself as “model 
legislation (i.e. a textual basis to be modified and adapted to a given national system).”725 
Interested states are invited to insert the name of their country at relevant points 
throughout the document, and to include select optional additional provisions, ranging 
from the appropriate penalties for crimes (‘imprisonment for a term not exceeding 30 
years or a term of life imprisonment when justified by the extreme gravity of the crime’) 
to extending the Law’s coverage to violations of the Geneva Conventions.726  
 
 Various “best practice” tools for implementation supplement such material. One 
such tool is the National Implementing Legislation Database (NILD). NILD seeks to 
provide users with “access to a fully-searchable, relational database of national 
implementing legislation.”727 Part of the ICC’s Legal Tools project,728 NILD further 
allows states that have adopted legislation to “monitor the impact of their legislation on 
other States and undertake necessary amendments if the content of the Rome Statute 
changes, or if improvements are deemed necessary.”729 One publication highlights not 
only NILD but other Legal Tools projects as well—Case Matrix, a Means of Proof 
Digest—as examples of access to legal information. It notes that such access “should be 
provided in line with this new paradigm shift towards positive complementarity that 
focuses on strengthening domestic capacity and empowering national actors.”730  
 
                                                                                                                                      
“International Criminal Court: Checklist of Implementation Considerations and Examples Relating to the 
Rome Statute and the Rules of Procedure & Evidence” (April 2002). 
723 See CICC webpage. 
724 The Secretariat describes itself as “provid[ing] guidance on policy making, technical assistance and 
advisory services to Commonwealth member countries.” For further information, see 
http://thecommonwealth.org/organisation/commonwealth-secretariat. 
725 Commonwealth Secretariat, “Cover Note: International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute and 
Implementation of the Geneva Conventions,” SOLM(11)10, May 2011, para. 3(a).  
726 Ibid., Annex B, Model Law to Implement the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. See, 
e.g., Part II (“International Crimes and Offences Against the Administration of Justice”). 
727 National Implementing Legislation Database of the International Criminal Court Statute (“NILD 
Database”), http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/hrlc/documents/projectsummaries/pdfs/projectnild.pdf. 
NILD is managed by the legal academic Olympia Bekou, who has contributed an extensive literature on 
complementarity and implementation. See, e.g., Olympia Bekou and Sangeeta Shah, “Realising the 
Potential of the International Criminal Court: The African Experience,” Human Rights Law Review 6(3) 
(2006), 499-544; Olympia Bekou, “Crimes at Crossroads: Incorporating International Crimes at the 
National Level,” Journal of International Criminal Justice 10(3) (2012), 677-691. 
728 See “ICC Legal Tools,” http://www.legal-tools.org/en/go-to-database/. 
729 NILD Database.  
730 Morten Bergsmo (ed.), Active Complementarity: Legal Information Transfer (Torkel Opsahl Academic 
EPublisher, 2011), vi; see also Morten Bergsmo, Olympia Bekou, and Annika Jones, “Complementarity 
After Kampala: Capacity Building and the ICC’s Legal Tools,” Goettingen Journal of International Law 2(2) 
(2010).  
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 These tools accompany the literature of NGOs, which, consist with the framing 
of complementarity as a catalyst for “compliance,” endorses a similarly maximalist 
approach to implementation. According to Amnesty’s implementation checklist, 
“principles of criminal responsibility in national legislation should be at least as strict 
as … the Rome Statute.”731 This includes, for instance, that “all crimes of accessory 
criminal responsibility such as aiding, abetting, and direct and public incitement as 
contained in Article 25 [of the Statute] should be punishable under national law.”732 
Conformity with the Statute has also been presented as encompassing far-reaching 
procedural requirements: Human Rights Watch notes that whether states “guarantee the 
highest international standards for fair trials at the national level” will “be important in 
the determination of the admissibility of a case by the ICC.”733 Such standards would 
include not only programs of victim and witness protection but even procedural regimes 
unique to the Rome Statute, such as a trust fund for victims or provisions for victim 
participation. A related issue is punishment: effective implementation, it is strongly 
suggested, would be inconsistent with the death penalty.734  
 
 Thus, even where commentators and NGOs acknowledge that the Rome Statute 
contains no positive obligations to implement its substantive (or procedural) law 
provisions, complementarity is framed in their literature in a manner that nevertheless 
compels it. As a technique of governance, then, the approach is increasingly disciplinary 
and coercive: failure to abide by the purported requirements of the Rome Statute opens 
states up to the risk that the ICC will intervene. This view has been furthered by much 
academic commentary on implementation (noted above and in previous chapters), which 
overwhelmingly focuses on fidelity to the Rome Statute’s text.735 Thus, just as the 
coercive pull of complementarity could catalyze national proceedings, it might also  
“induce national courts … to conform to a variety of modalities that mimic those found 
in international criminal law regarding sanction (i.e., no death penalty) and procedure (i.e., 
a fair trial).”736 The proliferation of “model laws” abets this process. Indeed, as will be 
seen, the Kenyan and Ugandan ICC laws are themselves largely identical, insofar as they 
are both drawn from the Commonwealth Secretariat’s model legislation.  
 
 
                                                
731 AI Updated Checklist, 17.  
732 Ibid. 
733 HRW Handbook, 19. 
734 In Amnesty’s words, “it would be inappropriate for national courts to impose a more severe penalty for 
a crime under international law than the one chosen by the international community itself.” AI Updated 
Checklist. 
735 As an example, see the articles gathered in the “Symposium on National Implementation of the ICC 
Statute,” which appeared in two parts in the Journal of International Criminal Justice, 2(1), March 2004 and 5(2), 
May 2007. In the second installment, editor Luisa Vierucci notes that, “states tend to stick to the definition 
of the crimes as contained in the ICC Statute” and that this “seems … to be a response to the states’ 
inherent concern to avoid the risk of possibly adverse decisions on complementarity by the ICC.” Luisa 
Vierucci, “National Implementation of the ICC Statute (Part II): Foreword,” Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 5(2) (2007), 419-20. For a critique of Rome State implementation from a gender perspective, see 
Bonita Meyersfeld, “Implementing the Rome Statute in Africa: Potential and problems of the prosecution 
of gender crimes in Africa in accordance with the Rome Statute,” in Kai Ambos and Ottilia A. 
Maunganidze (eds.), Power and Prosecution: Challenges and Opportunities for International Criminal Justice in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Göttingen Studies in Criminal Law and Justice, 2012). 
736 Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law, 139. My discussion of implementation here can be 
likened to Drumbl’s use of the term “legal transplants,” which, he argues have a “homogenizing effect on 
the kind of sanction visited upon atrocity perpetrators,” 70. 
 151 
2. Implementation in Practice: Uganda and Kenya 
 
2.1 Uganda: The ICC’s Host State 
 
 Like many treaties that Uganda has signed but not domesticated, Nouwen argues 
that the government ratified the Rome Statute in June 2002 because it was 
“internationally fashionable and improved the [government’s] image in the eyes of 
European donors.” 737  The adoption of implementing legislation at the time appeared 
“bleak,” however, as it was not seen as a priority for either the executive or the 
legislature. Nevertheless, as a result of the attention increasingly paid to the government’s 
conflict with the LRA, and following President Museveni’s referral of that situation to 
the ICC in 2003, international human rights organizations and their national-level 
partners prioritized implementation of the Statute there.  
 
 After receiving authorization to prepare a draft implementation bill, Uganda’s 
Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs assembled a first draft in 2004. It used 
Canada and New Zealand’s ICC legislation as an example, and the Commonwealth 
Secretariat reportedly provided “technical support” and “drafting assistance.”738 Groups 
like PGA also “conducted seminars and workshops on the Rome Statute for MPs, and 
facilitated relevant contacts for them with others, including the European Union, the 
ICC, and local civil society.”739 Notably, the rationale for the legislation was intended less 
as a potential basis for challenging the admissibility of any future ICC cases, but rather to 
“provide a legal framework for the ICC intervention”740 and to “smooth the progress of 
Court proceedings.”741 
 
 Yet political developments on the ground soon stalled any desire to press for the 
ICC Bill’s passage. After the ICC’s warrants for the LRA’s leaders were unsealed in mid-
2005, the legislation was seen, much like the Court itself, as a hindrance to the 
advancement of peace negotiations. As explained in a letter by the Uganda Coalition for 
the International Criminal Court (UCICC) for its “Domestication Campaign 2008,” the 
Bill had “been proposed and has lapsed in Parliament before because too many 
legislators feared that adopting these laws means that the ICC would take jurisdiction 
away from Uganda and potentially interrupt the peace process.”742 Preparations for 
multi-party elections in 2006, along with “backlogs in Parliament,”743 further delayed 
consideration of the Bill and it ultimately lapsed with the prorogation of Parliament. 
 
 A substantially similar version of the Bill was reintroduced in late 2006.744 The 
executive, however, “prioritised commercial laws for debate” and commentators have 
noted that Parliament was instructed to “go slow” with the legislation because its passage 
                                                
737 Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire, 194. 
738 International Criminal Court Bill, XCVII(26) Uganda Gazette, 28 May 2004; e-mail communication from 
Ministry of Justice, Uganda (on-file).  
739 Putting Complementarity Into Practice, Open Society Foundations (2010), 61-62. See also remarks of Mr. 
Wacha in The Eighth Parliament of Uganda, Third Reading, The International Criminal Court Bill, 2006, 
10 March 2010, 10950 (“ICC Bill Third Reading”).  
740 Barney Afako, “Country Study V: Uganda,” in Unable or Unwilling? Case Studies on Domestic Implementation 
of the ICC Statute in Selected Africa Countries, 93. 
741 Ibid., 196. 
742 UCICC, Domestic Campaign 2008, 10 July 2008 (letter on-file). 
743 Afako, “Country Study V: Uganda,” 94. 
744 International Criminal Court Bill, XCVIX(67), Uganda Gazette, 17 November 2006.   
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was still “thought to send the wrong message in relation to the ongoing Juba talks.”745 As 
the then Deputy Attorney General Freddie Ruhindi testified during parliamentary debate 
over what would become the 2010 Act: 
 
[T]he long time taken on deliberating on this matter was not by accident. 
 Interestingly, we are not even recalling that the first one was a 2004 Bill, which 
 lapsed with the Seventh Parliament. Then we came out with the Seventh 
 Parliament. Then we came out with the 2006 Bill and at one point, you may recall 
 that we were in very serious negotiations with the Kony group and everyone of 
 us was actually quite reluctant to disturb that process by coming on the Floor of 
 the House and at the end of the day derailing the process. But as we speak, that 
 has gone bad and there is nothing to stop us from going ahead with the 
 enactment of this law in full swing.746  
Thus, whereas there were a variety of competing and superior interests during the 
previous six years that implementation legislation was pending, this calculus had shifted 
by 2010.  Peace negotiations were no longer a confounding variable, while the imminent 
arrival of delegates from around the world to Kampala for the first-ever “Review 
Conference of the Rome Statute” provided the necessary push for adoption.747  
 
 The significance of Uganda’s hosting the conference is evident from public 
documents. During the Bill’s second reading, Ruhindi noted that, “on the sidelines of the 
substantive debate on this Bill, Uganda is privileged … [to] be hosting the first ever 
review conference.”748 In its annual report, the Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS)— a 
government mechanism operating a “sector-wide approach” to donor-driven judicial 
reform—stated that, “one of the conditions that was set by the ICC to allow [Uganda] to 
host the conference was domestication of the Rome Statute.’749 Mirjam Blaak, Uganda’s 
ambassador to The Hague, confirms this view. In her words, “It was important to have 
the bill signed before the review conference took place. They wouldn’t have cancelled 
the review conference if it hadn’t been, but it was an understanding that we would.”750  
 
 In the end, the Act as passed in 2010 was nearly identical to the version that was 
put forward almost six years before.751 Substantively, the ICC Act proscribes war crimes, 
genocide, and crimes against humanity in a manner identical to the Rome Statute; the 
                                                
745 Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire, 197. Ugandan jurist Afako also describes the “prospects of 
Uganda implementing a suitable national scheme in the next two years … as “low” (on a scale of ‘unlikely 
– low – fair – good – highly likely’).” See Afako “Country Study V: Uganda.” 
746 The Eighth Parliament of Uganda, Second Reading, The International Criminal Court Bill, 2004, 10 
March 2010, 10941 (Mr. F. Ruhindi) (“ICC Bill Second Reading”). Notably, although the title of the 
second reading is “The International Criminal Court Bill, 2004’, the MPs clarified that ‘the committee 
chairman [was] reading a report entitled, “The International Criminal Court Bill 2006.”’ Ibid., 10932 
(remarks of Mr. Kawuma). 
747 Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire, 198; see also Christopher Mbazira, “Prosecuting international 
crimes committed by the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda,” in Chacha Murungu and Japhet Biegon 
(eds.), Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa (Pretoria University Law Press, 2011). Mbazira argues, “It 
appears that the hasty passing of the overdue Bill was catalyzed by Uganda’s hosting of the ICC Review 
Conference from 31 May to 1 June 2010,” 215. 
748 ICC Bill Second Reading, 10931.  
749 “JLOS Annual Performance Report 2009/2010” (September 2010), 65. 
750 Bill Oketch,” Uganda Set for First War Crime Trial,” Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 14 July 2010; 
personal interview with Ambassador Blaak, The Hague, 25 May 2011. 
751 See, e.g., ICC Bill Third Reading, 10950 (remarks of Mr. Wacha.) Mr. Wacha notes that, “the two Bills: 
the 2004 Bill and this particular Bill were not any different, they were the same.” 
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latter’s definitions were incorporated by reference into the Act, as were the modes of 
responsibility and the Statute’s “general principles of criminal law.”752 The Act also grants 
the Ugandan High Court first-instance jurisdiction to hear cases of war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and genocide.753 Those amendments that were made focused on minor 
procedural issues.754 This mirror imaging belied the concerns of some parliamentarians, 
however, who in an otherwise non-contentious debate, raised questions about the scope 
of the Rome Statute’s protection and whether Uganda was entitled to amend it. Geofrey 
Ekanya, an MP from Tororo County, asked: 
 
 I want to find out from the Attorney-General and the committee chairperson, 
 what harm would it cause to expand the definition of the Bill as regards the 
 crimes against humanity, to include plunder. As we speak now, the international 
 community has been facilitating some countries to plunder natural resources in 
 Africa and I think this should be part of the crimes against humanity. I am 
 talking about DRC, for example; I am talking about the conflicts we had in other 
 parts of Africa. The guns come from the West to facilitate conflicts; to plunder 
 Africa and then they take the minerals; but the Bill does not talk about those who 
 facilitate plundering because this is what leads to conflict and finally crimes 
 against humanity. So, would it be wrong for us to expand the definition of crimes 
 against humanity to include the agents who facilitate plunder?755  
 
Ekanya also expressed concern that “certain provisions within the Rome Statute”—
particularly concerning presidential immunity—were “not in consonance” with Ugandan 
law, and urged that these questions be “taken care of so that we and innocent people are 
not used as guinea pigs.”756 Other MPs raised similar concerns: John Kawanga agreed 
that, “at another stage we shall have to deal with commercial crime, corruption and 
things of the kind,” while Alice Alaso asked what passage of the law would “mean with 
our amnesty law,” whether it would “put the final nail on the peace process,” and ‘the 
place of traditional justice vis-à-vis the ICC Bill.”757  
 
 The interventions of these MPs raised questions about the place of the ICC Act 
within Uganda’s broader transitional justice architecture, as well as the state’s ability to 
tailor the Statute to suit its particular national context. In reply to Ekanya’s concerns, MP 
Stephen Tashobya, who chaired the Committee on Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, 
replied (incorrectly) that “you may not actually go beyond what [the Rome Statute] says 
and, therefore, you have to confine yourself” to its text.758 Furthermore, as Ms. Alaso’s 
                                                
752 International Criminal Court Act, 2010, Uganda Gazette No. 39, Vol. 103, 25 June 2010, sections 7-9; 19. 
Those amendments that were made focused on minor procedural issues. For instance, the Act states that 
consent for prosecution under the ICA would be required from the Department of Public Prosecutions, 
rather than the Attorney General. Further, jurisdiction was to vest with the Ugandan High Court, not the 
Magistrate Court. See Report of the Sessional Committee on Legal and Parliamentary Affairs on the 
International Criminal Court Bill, 2006 (“Sessional Committee Report”), March 2010, 4-5. 
753 The legislation makes no reference to the specialized division that has become the ICD, even though 
that division was established by administrative decree in 2008, two years before the ICC Act became law 
(see further chapter five). 
754 For instance, the Act states that consent for prosecution under the ICA would from the Department of 
Public Prosecutions, rather than the Attorney General. Further, jurisdiction vests with the Ugandan High 
Court, not Magistrates’ Courts.  
755 ICC Bill, Second Reading, 10935.  
756 Ibid., 10936. 
757 Ibid., 10938-30 (remarks of Messrs. Kawanga and Kyanjo); see also 10934 (remarks of Ms. Alaso).  
758 Ibid., 10936. MP Tashobya added, “But as to whether we can amend the Rome Statute, I do not know. 
You are intending to expand and that will be an amendment of the Rome Statute.” 
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comments indicate, the Bill as passed offered no provisions on alternative criminal 
justice proceedings, nor did it address the role of Uganda’s Amnesty Committee, which 
had been issuing amnesties to former combatants, including those from the LRA, for the 
past 10 years.759 Indeed, whereas the 2004 version of the ICC Bill included a proposed 
amendment by MP Jacob Oulanyah that would have recognized “alternative criminal 
justice proceedings” in addition to “formal” criminal proceedings,760 no such proposals 
were later considered or debated. Similarly, whereas previous versions of the bill had 
provided for application of the death penalty, the 2010 Act provides that the maximum 
applicable penalty is life imprisonment.761 Although the Ugandan Penal Code (UPC) 
recognizes the death penalty as a permissible form of punishment, according to the 
parliamentary committee that reviewed the 2010 Bill, such “inconsistency” between it 
and the Rome Statute required amending the maximum penalty available for “extremely 
grave crimes.”762 Thus, by 2010, an increasingly Hague-centric framework for 
punishment had taken hold.763 
 
 Hastened by a perceived need to pass the legislation prior to the start of the ICC 
Review Conference, a similar mindset informed the influential network of Ugandan 
justice sector donors. Stephen Oola notes, for example, that an initial agreement by 
JLOS to present to Parliament in 2009 the ICC Bill together with a proposed National 
Reconciliation Bill—in order to generate a “comprehensive national discussion on 
Uganda’s justice needs”—was scuttled when donor governments made it clear that they 
wanted the ICC Bill fast tracked.764 As a result, Oola argues that, “the ICC Act was 
rushed through Parliament with little consultation and without much-needed 





                                                
759 See Amnesty Commission, “The Amnesty Act: An Act of Forgiveness,” 15-24 (“The Amnesty 
Commission”). 
760 Jacob Oulanyah, “Proposed new Part to ICC Bill; Part X – Alternate Proceedings,” 12 December 2004 
(proposed amendments on-file). Oulanyah’s proposal suggested a possible truth commission model, not 
unlike that adopted in South Africa. The “alternative proceedings” would, for instance, “provide a system 
of individual accountability,” including “public and open hearings,” “participation of victims and affected 
persons,” “full disclosure of all relevant facts,” a “written determination of the case,” and “sanctions.” 
761 International NGO’s that had pushed the implementation bill saw the exclusion of capital punishment 
as the result of their “input and advocacy.” E-mail communication, March 15, 2010. 
762 Report of the Sessional Committee, 4-5. 
763 Uganda’s ICC Act did not incorporate provisions for victim participation similar to those of the Rome 
Statute, even though many NGOs had lobbied to include participatory rights in Ugandan proceedings.  A 
special session of the Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Committee of the Ugandan Parliament was held in 
July 2009, co-sponsored by the PGA and attended by ICC Judge Daniel Nsereko, which included 
proposals to amend the proposed legislation with specific provisions on victims’ participation, protection 
and reparations. These were themselves extracted from a similar ICC domestication law passed in Uruguay 
in 2006, referred to by the PGA as an “exemplary incorporation of the rights of victims of Rome Statute 
crimes into a national system.” See Note from PGA to the Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Committee, 
Parliament of Uganda, and Other Concerned Legislators and Members of PGA in the Parliament of 
Uganda (on-file).   
764 The Bill proposed, in part, the establishment of a National Truth and Reconciliation Commission to 
“facilitate the process of reconciliation within the country and to investigate the circumstances under 
which the gross violations and abuses of human rights were committed, including their motives, 
perpetrators and victims and to disclose the truth with respect to the violations in order to prevent a repeat 
of the violation or abuses in future.” National Reconciliation Bill, draft of 10 June 2011 (copy on-file).  
765 See Oola, “In the Shadow of Kwoyelo’s Trial: The ICC and Complementarity in Uganda.” 
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2.2 Kenya: “Becoming a Global Village” 
 
 As in Uganda, international pressure was a key dynamic that drove the passage of 
Kenya’s domestic implementing legislation.  Following the election of President Kibaki 
in 2002, the government ratified (as an executive act) the Rome Statute in 2005. Little is 
known about the administration’s intentions in choosing to do so other than that, in the 
wake of an ostensibly reformist political moment, ratification of the Statute was seen as a 
positive step by the new administration. One prominent Kenyan activist described the 
ratification as “one of those things you do to look good,”766 while Yvonne Dutton’s 
analysis suggests that Kenya’s classification as a democracy in the post-Kibaki era played 
a role in the government’s decision to join the Court.767 International NGOs also seized 
on the moment. The CICC, for instance, chose Kenya as a target country on which to 
focus its efforts, noting that ratification would send an “important signal to other African 
states who have yet to ratify about Africa’s growing commitment to international justice 
and the rule of law.”768  
 
 At the time, Kenya did not have any laws in place that would have enabled it to 
prosecute international crimes as such. Neither the Kenyan Penal Code (KPC) nor the 
Armed Forces Act, which governs the Kenyan military, contained any such provisions, 
nor had a Kenyan court ever dealt with crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
genocide.769 Following ratification, then, the Kenyan National Commission on Human 
Rights began drafting a bill that sought to implement provisions of the Statute 
domestically.  At the time, however, the country was also undergoing its constitutional 
review process, with a referendum set for November 2005. As a result, the draft 
International Crimes Bill was temporarily shelved. It went through an initial reading in 
Parliament in June 2006 but, before it could proceed further, the 2007 elections had 
arrived.  
 
 In the wake of the electoral violence, a process that might have otherwise 
proceeded as a quiet, internal manner was quickly internationalized. Following its 
hearings, a key recommendation of the Waki Commission was that implementation of 
the Rome Statute be “fast-tracked for enactment by Parliament to facilitate investigation 
and prosecution of crimes against humanity.”770 Likewise, as Antonina Okuta notes, the 
Commission’s recommendation that a special local tribunal be created to try the alleged 
perpetrators brought “into sharp focus the country’s national legislation as well as its 
capacity to handle the investigation and prosecution of international crimes.”771  
 
  
                                                
766 Personal interview conducted in Nairobi, Kenya, 30 November 2012. 
767 See Yvonne Dutton, Rules, Politics, and the International Criminal Court: Committing to the Court (Routledge 
Press, 2013).    
768 CICC, “Global Coalition Calls on Kenya to Ratify International Criminal Court” (11 January 2005). 
769 Antonina Okuta, “National Legislation for Prosecution of International Crimes in Kenya,” Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 7 (2009), 1063. The one exception was Kenya’s Geneva Conventions Act, 
which, like Uganda, incorporated into Kenyan law the “grave breaches” provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions. Of course, this Act would not have been applicable for Kenya’s post-2007 election violence, 
as that did not occur in the context of an international conflict.  
770 CIPEV Report, 476. See also Karuti Kanyinga, “Hobbling along to Pay-offs: The Kenya Grand 
Coalition Government” (April 2009) (on-file). Kanyinga argues that “fast tracking” was part of a broader 
political dispensation post-2008, in which longstanding debates about constitutional reform that has been 
“paralyzed … for over 10 years” were “fast tracked during the crisis,” 9.  
771 Okuta, “National Legislation for Prosecution of International Crimes in Kenya,” 1065.  
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 As in Uganda, the Commonwealth Secretariat played an influential role in the 
drafting process.  At the bill’s second reading in May 2008, Kenya’s then Attorney 
General Amos Wako stated that the government had been “well guided” by the United 
Nations and the Commonwealth Secretariat, which had “developed model legislation to 
guide the countries.”772 He continued: 
 
Mr. Speaker, Sir, we talk about the world being a global village. It is, indeed, 
 becoming a global village, whether it is from the perspective of communications; 
 that is telephones, mobile phones, television and so on, but for institutions such 
 as the national State and so on. Also, from the point of view of issues relating to 
 law and order, there can be no state as such which does not have a criminal 
 justice system.  Therefore, to the extent that the international community is 
 developing an international criminal justice system, we are indeed and truly 
 becoming a global village.773 
 
Reflecting the perception that states are legally bound to implement the Statute, Wako 
added in his remarks that, “[B]y the mere fact we have ratified this Rome Treaty, we are, 
as a State, under an obligation to domesticate the Treaty, so that it has a force of law in 
Kenya.”774  
 
 Unlike the narrowly defeated STK Bill, the parliamentary debate on the 
International Crimes Act (ICA) records no opposition to its passage. The Attorney 
General’s proposal was supported by Martha Karua (architect of the failed Bill and then 
Minister for Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs), as well as MP 
Danson Mungatana (an STK opponent), who “[took] the opportunity to thank the 
Attorney-General for, once again, rising to the occasion and bringing our country’s laws 
in line with the international community, especially in criminal jurisprudence.”775 MP 
Farah Maalim, a leading figure in the Orange Democratic Movement and himself a 
member of PGA, made the most extensive remarks on the Bill, supporting its passage 
but expressing skepticism about the limitations of international criminal law. In particular, 
Maalim endorsed the “need to redefine … the definition of the UN of what genocide is,” 
calling for it to encompass “cultural” and “economic” genocide.776 In his words:  
 
 It is easier for the West to arm, facilitate and finance the warlords, while they take 
 away the timber from the Congo Forest. All these raw materials end up in the 
 West. The money [that] is stolen from the continent often ends up in Switzerland, 
 American and European banks. ... Economic genocide should have been 
 included in the Statute more than anything else. The permanent impoverishment 
 of the black man, the slavery and the colonization that we suffered is still what 
 keeps us where we are. There has been no compensation and responsibility for 
 what happened. The context of the Statute tells us how little the black continent 
 participated in the formulation of this Statute.777  
 
                                                
772 Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard), The International Crimes Bill, Second Reading, 7 
May 2008, 907 (“ICA Second Reading”). 
773 Ibid., 906.  
774 Ibid., 907.  
775 Ibid., 913. 
776 Ibid., 917. 
777 Ibid., 918. In response to MP Maalim, the Attorney General replied: “Sir, a lot was spoken about 
economic genocide. This Bill is not concerned with what one may call ‘economic genocide.’ Important as it 
is, it is only concerned with criminal genocide,” 927  
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Maalim further lamented the absence of Kiswahili “as one of the languages of the ICC.” 
He opined: “I have seen that they have included Russian, Spanish, Arabic, English and 
Chinese. There are more speakers of Kiswahili than Russian. Our own Governments, 
and the continental body, would have been done a lot of pride if we also had Kiswahili as 
one of the languages in the ICC.”778  
  
 Despite MP Maalim’s remarks, the ICA, as a model for the Ugandan legislation 
that followed, imports directly almost all provisions of the Rome Statute. It refers 
entirely to the Statute’s definition of international crimes (none of which were previously 
provided for in the KPC), 779 while provisions on command responsibility, statutes of 
limitation, and superior orders are likewise directly imported.780 Similarly, the Act 
provides that the maximum penalty is life imprisonment, even though the ordinary penal 
code maintains the death penalty for crimes such as murder, armed robbery, and 
treason.781  
 
 The ICA was tabled and passed with remarkable speed, coming into operation on 
January 1, 2009. As in Uganda, it is one of the few international treaties to be 
domesticated into Kenya’s national law. Standing in support, MP Ekwee Ethuro took 
note of the ICA’s rapid passage: 
 
 I am aware of many of the international protocols and statutes that have been 
 consented to by the Government, that have not seen the Floor of this House. 
 That is  not the proper way to do it. I want to believe the business of knee-jack 
 reaction--- Maybe the greatest motivation of the International Crimes Bill to even 
 see the walls of this House, is a consideration of what we have gone through in 
 terms of the Waki Report. …  All the protocols and any other international 
 protocols that the Government of Kenya has committed itself to should be 
 domesticated.782 
 
3. Surfacing Political Discomforts: Post-Implementation Domestic Politics 
 
3.1 Uganda: The End of Amnesty? 
 
                                                
778 Ibid., 917. 
779 The International Crimes Act, 2008 (“ICA 2008”), Art. 6(4). One significant difference between 
Kenya’s ICA and the Rome Statute is its provisions on immunity. Rather than incorporate Article 27 of the 
Rome Statute, which makes official capacity irrelevant to immunity, the ICA’s Section 27 only provides 
that the official capacity of a person shall not be used as a reason to refuse a request for the surrender of 
that person to the ICC. Thus, while there is no immunity for purposes of transfer or surrender to the 
Court, the President’s constitutional grant of immunity would prevail for the purpose of domestic 
prosecutions in Kenya under the ICA. A similar immunity exception was also debated in the Ugandan 
context; however, the provision there was ultimately defeated, again owing largely to the vigorous efforts 
of civil society. See M. Ndifuna, J. Apio, and A. Smith, “The Role of States Parties in Building the ICC’s 
Local Impact: Findings from Delegates’ Visits to Uganda,” (2011), which notes that the ICC Bill “faced 
delays throughout 2009-10, reportedly in part due to efforts … to provide immunity for Heads of State,” 
11 (on-file).  
780 ICA 2008, Art. 7(1)(f), (g), (k).  
781 Ibid., Art. 7(5)(b0).  
782 ICA Third Reading, 4084. MP Githae (now the Kenyan ambassador to the U.S.) likewise took the 
occasion to state, ‘”[N]ow that the Attorney-General is in the mood of domesticating international 
agreements, we have so many of them that we have not domesticated in this country, which Kenya has 
ratified. I would like to ask him to bring them to this House so that we can domesticate them.” Ibid  
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 In Uganda, Parliament’s rushed support for the ICC Act’s passage—seen at the 
time as a necessary and symbolic precondition for hosting the 2010 Review 
Conference—soon gave way to a deeper set of political concerns over the future of the 
Amnesty Act and, by extension, to the dominance of the complementarity framework.  
This was not surprising. Uganda had passed the Amnesty Act in 2000, within a year of its 
first signing the Rome Statute, but “without considering any possible inconsistency in 
obligations.”783 Furthermore, while some MPs had raised questions about amnesty’s 
future in light of the ICC Act, at the time Attorney General Ruhindi had assured them 
that, “International criminal justice does not throw away our own initiatives to try some 
of these renegades.” He noted, correctly, that, “you can actually have amnesty internally 
or domestically under the complementarity principle.”784  Nevertheless, the possibility of 
conflict was apparent. What might happen, for instance, if an amnesty applicant became 
a target for domestic prosecution under Ugandan law?   
 
 This precise question confronted Parliament only one month after the ICC Act’s 
passage, when the executive sought a “carve out” declaration for the eligibility of four 
individuals to receive amnesty: Thomas Kwoyelo and three of the ICC’s named suspects.  
The Minister of State for Internal Affairs purportedly sought the exemption because 
these individuals “have been engaged and continue to engage in acts that are contrary to 
international standards and are rebellious and injurious to the citizens of this country and 
the neighbouring states.”785  At this point, as noted in chapter five, Ugandan authorities 
had seized Kwoyelo and he had already applied for amnesty under the existing law. This 
led one MP who opposed the government’s motion to note that it was in a “catch-22” 
situation: 
 
 The minister is telling us that the fourth person [Kwoyelo] is already in the hands 
 of the security agencies; they do not know what to do with him. Actually, they 
 just want us to pass this request so that they can have this person prosecuted, 
 because they can’t grant him amnesty; they can’t release him, and they can’t take 
 him to court while the  peace process is going on. Why should we operate like 
 that?786  
 
Another MP from northern Uganda raised similar objections, expressing confusion as to 
the criterion used in selecting Kwoyelo for prosecution.787 She added: 
 
 Now, I want to know the effects of the declaration beyond the indictment. 
 Suppose tomorrow, Kony comes out and says, ‘I want to sign for amnesty and I 
 will stop all this suffering for the people of Sudan, DRC and for the people of 
 Central African Republic.’ What will be the political decision of Uganda, DRC 
 and Sudan for the sake of their people, what will be the effect of this? Is this 
 decision written in stone, or can it be undone?788  
 
                                                
783 Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire, 206.  
784 ICC Bill Second Reading, 10942 
785 Request for Parliament to Approve the Declaration of Named Individuals as Persons Not Eligible for 
Amnesty, 13 April 2010 (on-file); remarks of Mr. M. Kasaija, 785.  
786 Ibid., 787 (remarks of E. Lukwago). Notably, Hon. Lukwago (now mayor of Kampala) had also served 
as a member of the Committee of Legal and Parliamentary Affairs that considered the ICC Bill before it 
went to the floor of Parliament. See Sessional Committee Report. 
787 Ibid., 788 (remarks of B. Amongi). 
788 Ibid. 
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In the end, the Ministry withdrew its motion; however, the failed attempt soon 
inaugurated a more concerted effort to cease the issuing of amnesties entirely. Indeed, 
although amnesty remained strongly supported by Ugandans in the north and amongst 
their political representatives, its continuance increasingly conflicted with Uganda’s 
carefully crafted image as a “complementarity state.”  JLOS, for instance, which was 
meant to act as a “neutral” justice coordinator, undertook a more aggressive effort to 
discontinue the Act, arguing that it was incompatible with Uganda’s obligations under 
international law.789 Organizations like Amnesty International took a similarly hard line. 
Following the Constitutional Court’s decision halting the Kwoyelo trial, it issued a 
statement calling the decision a “setback” for accountability and urged the Ugandan 
government to “revoke any amnesty applicable to crimes under international law.”790 
 
 A more urgent crisis thus presented itself in mid-2012, when, the Ministry of the 
Interior did not renew Part II of the Amnesty Act, which was the provision that 
empowered the Commission to grant amnesties.791 The provision’s lapsing—largely 
understood as a response to the Ugandan Constitutional Court’s halting of Kwoyelo’s 
trial in September 2011, on the grounds that he was entitled to amnesty—was met with 
intense opposition. Oola notes that it “angered many victims and leaders from the 
conflict affected sub-regions in northern Uganda,” so much that local leaders and 
domestic civil society groups petitioned the Speaker of Parliament, condemning the 
“illegal and unconstitutional manner” in which the amnesty provision had been 
removed.792 Ultimately, the matter was referred to the Parliamentary Committee on 
Defense and Internal Affairs, which proceeded to undertake extensive consultations with 
key stakeholders.  
 
 In its final, 45-page report, published in August 2013, the Committee concluded 
that the lapsing of Part II of the Act was “premature and out step with the sentiments of 
affected communities’, and recommended that it be “restore[d] in its entirety.”793 Far 
more than the debate over the ICC Act, the Committee’s report surfaces the complexity 
of Uganda’s post-conflict landscape. It reviews, for instance, the arguments in favor of 
amnesty—the fact that “the vast majority of rebels were forcibly abducted, many at a 
very tender age”; the concern that there is “now no legal protection for returnees from 
prosecution”—and assesses the executive branch’s contention that the granting of 
amnesty “was inconsistent with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(1998) (domesticated in Uganda in 2010).”794 It notes that JLOS and the UCICC played a 
leading role in advancing this argument, along with “diverse external pressure from some 
of Uganda’s development partners as well as agencies of the United Nations and other 
international commentators who have policy objections to the amnesty.”795 In the 
                                                
789  See, e.g., The Amnesty Law (2000) Issues Paper, Review by the Transitional Justice Working Group, 
JLOS (April 2012).   
790 Amnesty International Public Statement, “Court’s decision a setback for accountability for crimes 
committed in northern Uganda conflict,” AFR 59/015/2011, 23 September 2011. 
791 Statutory Instruments 2012 No. 34, The Amnesty Act (Declaration of Lapse of the Operation of Part 
II) Instrument, 2012 (23 May 2012, issued by MP Hilary Onek, Minister of Internal Affairs) (on-file). 
792 Oola notes that, in addition to the suspicious manner of the lapsing, it was procedurally improper: 
Under the Amnesty Act, the decision to renew or lapse any part of the law is at the discretion of the 
Minister of the Interior. Here, the Chief Justice and Attorney General both were alleged to have 
improperly intervened in the process. For a more detail account of this episode, see Oola, “In the Shadow 
of Kwoyelo’s Trial: The ICC and Complementarity in Uganda.” 
793 Report of the Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs on the Petition on the Lapsing of Part II of 
The Amnesty Act (“Committee Report – Amnesty Lapse”), August 2013, para. 13.1. 
794 Ibid., para. 9.8. 
795 Ibid., paras. 9.4, 9.6. 
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Committee’s view, these external actors “appear to have exerted a disproportional 
influence on the Executive’s approach to the amnesty issue, by promoting their own 
policy preferences.”796 
 
 The Committee’s conclusions also dispel a number of the misconceptions about 
complementarity’s purported obligations. It notes, for instance, that there “is in fact no 
provision of [the Rome Statute] which outlaws amnesties, neither does the Statute 
impose any express obligations upon states to prosecute relevant crimes.”797 It further 
notes the common view encountered by Committee members that the Statute “imposes 
upon states parties a general obligation to establish international crimes courts and to 
introduce criminal legislation in order to prosecute ICC crimes nationally.”798 In perhaps 
its strongest passage, the report concludes: 
 
 There is …  a broader political issue at stake here, which relates not only to 
 Uganda, but generally to the African continent: it concerns the extent to which 
 African values  and priorities inform the content of international law. There is a 
 greater need for African states to be more assertive in ensuring that their values 
 are reflected in the development of international law.799  
 
Following the Committee’s conclusions, the Ugandan government reinstated the 
Amnesty Act in its entirety. It remains in effect until May 2015.  
 
3.2 Kenya: A Return to the Political 
 
 The politically contested nature of amnesty in Uganda, and the relative 
detachment of that debate from the ICC Act’s passage, resonates in the Kenyan context 
as well. There, the swift approval of the ICA was soon followed by political stalemate on 
the attendant institutional question of whether or not to establish, as the Waki 
Commission had also stipulated, a Special Tribunal for Kenya that would be empowered 
to retroactively judge alleged perpetrators of the election violence. As previously noted, 
the defeat of the STK was largely the product of an “unholy alliance” between politicians 
who feared that genuine, independent domestic proceedings would never be possible 
through Kenyan courts, and those who saw such a tribunal, at the time, as a greater 
threat than the ICC itself. The phrase “Don’t be vague, go to The Hague” emerged as 
part of the country’s political lexicon, ostensibly indicating a preference for the ICC’s 
involvement, even if it signaled that the Court was the more limited threat.  
 
 Unlike the ICA, which saw minimal debate as to the incorporation of its 
substantial obligations into Kenya’s legal framework, the STK Bill was deeply contested. 
Parliamentarians rejected the overt directives of the executive to vote in favor of the 
STK, raising questions about its comportment with the Kenyan Constitution as well as 
the risk of creating a parallel structure to the country’s broader legal system. Repeated 
attempts by the Kenyan Parliament to withdraw from the Rome Statute and to repeal the 
ICA also reflect the deeply contested nature of the ICC’s intervention.800 At the time of 
the Court’s summons, domestic legislation was, in fact, tabled seeking to repeal the ICA. 
                                                
796 Ibid., para. 9.38.  
797 Ibid., para. 9.18. 
798 Ibid., para. 9.21.  
799 Ibid., para. 9.39.  
800 See, e.g., Nicholas Kulish, “Legislators in Kenya vote to quit global court,” International Herald Tribune, 5 
(6 September 2013).  
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Although the government took no action on the bill, only one parliamentarian (former 
Justice Minister Karua) opposed the motion.801 Furthermore, in contrast to the “global 
village” invoked by Attorney General Wako only three years before, at a special session 
of the Senate in December 2013 (and following a similar debate by the National 
Assembly in September), senators spoke of cooperation with the ICC as “singing the 
tune of the whites”; of “playing politics with the boundaries of this country and the flag 
and the national anthem of our nation”; and of an “unsupervised prosecutor who can …  
arrest people who he thinks do not suck up to international neo-colonial ideology.”802  
 
 This discourse has increasingly cast civil society as shadowy hands conspiring 
against the Kenyan state and people—“evil society” in the words of Kenyatta’s 2013 
presidential campaign.803 Furthermore, according to the Senate Majority Leader: 
 
 What has happened … is that a few people especially from the Non-Government 
 Organisations (NGOs) world decided to convert the misery and the tragedy that 
 befell our country into a money-minting business where a few citizens have 
 converted themselves  into running rings and organisations in the name of 
 victims support. These are people who have been responsible and have been 
 used by foreigners to cook up the stories and bring up the kind of friction that is 
 now being witnessed before the [ICC]. As I said, we should be all ashamed as 
 Kenyans.804 
 
The Senate ultimately passed a motion expressing its intention to bring forward a bill 
that would compel the government to withdraw from the ICC. Like the ICA’s passage, 
however, this motion may be largely symbolic: to date, no bill has been tabled. 
 
4. Democratic Republic of Congo: Resistance and Contestation 
   
 The DRC was the 60th state to ratify the Rome Statute, thus formally bringing 
the ICC into existence.  It is unclear whether this symbolic threshold played a role in 
President Kabila’s decision to ratify the Statute in 2002; however, the symbolism has 
itself been summoned by many advocates in their long-standing effort to have the 
Congolese Parliament pass implementing legislation. For example, Olivier Kambala 
notes that, “it was the [DRC’s] 60th ratification that triggered the Statute’s entry into 
force—and made the human rights community applaud the birth of something 
                                                
801 See Peter Opiyo, “Isaac Ruto: Kenya Should Pull Out of ICC,” Standard Digital, 15 December 2010; 
Thomas Obel Hansen, “Transitional Justice in Kenya? An Assessment of the Accountability Process in 
Light of Domestic Politics and Security Concerns,” California Western International Law Journal, 42(1) (2011).   
802 Parliament of Kenya, Convening of Special Sitting of The Senate to Debate Motion on Withdrawal of 
Kenya from the Rome Statute, Official Record (Hansard) (“Senate Debate”), 10 September 2013; 
comments at 46 (Senator Keter) and 14,16 (Senator (Prof.) Kindiki). Unlike previous legislative debates on 
the ICC Act and the establishment of the STK, the various Rome Statute withdrawal motions have been 
debated in both the Senate and the National Assembly, following the introduction of a bicameral 
legislature in March 2013. 
803 John Githongo, “Whither Civil Society?,” The Star, 6 April 2013. 
804 Senate Debate, 22. See also Parliamentary Debates, National Assembly Official Report (Hansard), 15 
October 2014, in which one MP suggests that the Open Society Initiative in East Africa is a “terrorist 
organisation,” and that NGOs such as the Africa Centre for Open Governance, Kenyans for Peace Truth 
and Justice, and the Kenya Human Rights Commission “bears the greatest responsibility for the post-
election violence.”  In his words, “The forest might be different at different times but the monkeys are 
always the same” (remarks of Hon. Moses Kuria).  
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impossible to envision fifty year earlier.”805 The publication in June 2010 of the United 
Nations’ long awaited mapping exercise of crimes committed between 1993 and 2003 
also brought renewed international pressure for accountability, including for national 
implementation of the Statute. The performative dimension of implementation thus 
loomed large in the DRC as well.   
 
 Unlike Kenya and Uganda, however, international crimes have been crimes under 
Congolese law since well before the ICC’s establishment. Genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity were first codified in the 1972 Code of Military Justice (code de 
justice militaire) and the Parliament enacted new criminal (code penal militaire) and judicial 
codes (code judiciaire militaire) for the military in 2002.806 The preamble to the revised 
Military Criminal Code (MCC) further acknowledges that the DRC ratified the Statute, 
even if the definitions of crimes under Congolese law depart from it in certain 
respects.807 Not unlike the “mirroring” effect observed in Uganda and Kenya’s domestic 
ICC legislation, most of the limited commentary on the DRC has drawn attention to 
these differences. Scholars have noted, for instance, that the conscription of minor 
children into the armed forces is not criminalized under the MCC; that the Code 
“seemingly merges the current normative understandings of crimes against humanity and 
war crimes”; and that “the domestic law of crimes against humanity in the DRC is not as 
clearly defined as the current norms of international law.” 808 At the same time, the MCC 
also offers more expansive definitions than the Rome Statute. Political groups are a 
protected class under the DRC’s definition of genocide, while the “destruction of natural 
heritage” and “universal culture” may constitute crimes against humanity.809  
 
 Draft implementation legislation for the DRC—intended to transpose the Rome 
Statute’s definitions into the code pénal ordinaire—existed well before 2010 as well. 
Cooperation legislation was drafted as early as 2002 and later revised in 2003 “after 
consultation with a variety of entities, including civil society.”810 A later version of a 
government-led projet de loi was also published in 2005, following “a number of expert 
meetings supported by Human Rights First, Human Rights Watch, the NGO Coalition 
for the International Criminal Court, and the African Association for the Defense of 
Human Rights, a Congolese non-governmental organization.”811 Despite these numerous 
campaigns, this legislation was never put on the parliamentary agenda. Godfrey Musila 
                                                
805 Olivier Kambala wa Kambala, “International Criminal Court in Africa: ‘alea jacta est,’” Oxford 
Transitional Justice Research Working Paper Series (12 July 2010). Several interlocutors expressed similar 
sentiments to the effect that the “ICC exists thanks to the DRC; it brought the Court into existence.” 
806 Thus, under Congolese law, Rome Statute crimes committed during any period prior to 2003 would fall 
under the 1972 Code, while crimes committed post-2003 would fall under the 2002 codes or, as some 
domestic courts have determined, the Rome Statute. The 2002 criminal code is Loi No. 024/2002 du 18 
Novembre 2002 Portant Code Pénal Militaire (“2002 Code Pénal Militaire”); it is included in a 
compendium of the DRC’s criminal law, published as “Code Pénal Congolais: Décret du 30 janvier 1940 
tel que modifie jusqu’au 31 décembre 2009 et ses dispositions complémentaires” (2010) (on-file). The 
judicial code is Loi No. 023/2002 du 18 Novembre 2002 Portant Code Judicaire Militaire, at 
http://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/Droit%20Judiciaire/Loi.023.2002.18.11.2002.pdf.  
807 See Règlement du 10 septembre 2010 relatif aux éléments de crime, para. 1 (in “Code Pénal 
Congolais”). 
808 See, e.g., Antonietta Trapani, “”Bringing National Courts in Line with International Norms: A 
Comparative Look at the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Military Court of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo,” Israel Law Review 46(2) (July 2013), 239-240; Labuda, “Applying and ‘Misapplying’ the 
Rome Statute”; UN Mapping Report, paras. 820-825.  
809 See 2002 Code Pénal Militaire, Arts. 164, 169(9), 169(10). 
810 Musila, “Between rhetoric and action,” 16. Earlier versions of this legislation (from 2001 and 2002) are 
appendixed in Musila’s monograph; see Appendices 3 and 4. 
811 Ibid.  
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suggests that this may be attributed to the law “not [being] considered a priority in view 
of other issues that … occupied the government and legislators’ time,” as well as 
“perceptions among some people that the ICC’s work ... is a project of the executive, 
directed at destroying its political enemies.”812 (The arrest and transfer of Kabila’s main 
political rival, Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, to The Hague in 2008 did little to allay such 
perceptions.) Furthermore, the 2004 signing of a comprehensive Agreement on Judicial 
Cooperation between the government and the Office of the Prosecutor—similar to 
cooperation agreements signed with the OTP in Kenya and Uganda—may have obviated 
the perceived need for more comprehensive legislation.813  
 
 Discussion of domestic implementation thus remained stalled in the DRC until 
the release of the UN’s mapping report in 2010.814 (Again reflecting a duty-based 
understanding of complementarity, the report noted that, “by ratifying the Rome Statute, 
the DRC subscribed to the obligation to adapt its domestic legislation to the law enshrined 
in the Statute.”815) Several months after the report’s release, however, proposed 
implementation legislation (proposition de loi de mise en oeuvre) finally emerged on the 
National Assembly’s agenda. Two MPs, the Honorable Mutumbe Mbuya and Professor 
Nyabirungu mwene Songa, a well-known Congolese intellectual and human rights 
activist,816 had first introduced this legislation in March 2008, but no previous action had 
been taken on it.817 
 
 Patryk Labuda, who closely followed the legislative process for the propositon, 
notes that the bill had four main objectives: (1) to incorporate the Rome Statute’s 
classification of international crimes into domestic criminal law (the bill “copied most of” 
the Statute’s definition of crimes); (2) to transfer jurisdiction over international crimes to 
civilian courts, not military tribunals; (3) to provide for a greater number of fair trial 
guarantees, “especially relating to defendant rights, victim participation and witness 
protection”; and (4) to establish a “coherent framework regulating collaboration between 
the ICC’s field units and domestic Congolese judicial and governmental authorities.”818  
In addition to these practical objectives, compliance and complementarity were again 
rhetorically marshaled in support of the legislation’s passage. A briefing note prepared by 
the ICTJ states that “[y]ears have lapsed” since the DRC ratified the Rome Statute, “but 
the DRC government has yet to meet its legal obligation to incorporate the statute into 
                                                
812 Ibid., 16, 17. 
813 Judicial Cooperation Agreement between the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Office of the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (reproduced as Appendix 2 in Musila, “Between rhetoric 
and action,” 81-90). 
814 While this chapter focuses on the 2010-11 parliamentary period, there have been other efforts to pass 
such legislation. Most recently, in June 2015 (with presidential elections again looming), the National 
Assembly voted for the adoption of a “Law to Implement the Rome Statute” in the domestic legal order, 
which, at the time of writing, awaits Senate approval. See Patryk Labuda, “Whither the Fight Against 
Impunity in the Democratic Republic of Congo?” (24 June 2015), at http://justicehub.org/article/whither-
fight-against-impunity-democratic-republic-congo. 
815 UN Mapping Report, para. 1022 (emphasis added).  
816 Nyabirungu has been an important figure in Congo’s legal and political landscape and has been the focal 
point for a number of international organizations engaged in domestic complementarity efforts. He and 
mwene Songa both are also members of Parliamentarians for Global Action. Interview with ICTJ staff, 
Kinshasa, 21 June 2011; interview with PGA consultant, Kinshasa, 27 June 2011. 
817 See ICTJ, “The Democratic Republic of Congo Must Adopt the Rome Statute Implementation Law” 
(April 2010) (“Two Congolese members of parliament introduced a draft bill before the National 
Assembly, Congo’s lower house, in March 2008.”). 
818 Labuda, “Applying and ‘Misapplying’ the Rome Statute.” 
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national law.”819 Further, adopting such legislation “is essential to ensure 
complementarity between domestic Congolese courts and the ICC” and to “strengthen 
the country’s legal system.”820 
 
 Despite having languished for two and a half years, “heated” and “stormy” 
debates on the draft bill were held within the Assembly in November 2010 whereupon, 
under Congolese parliamentary procedure, it was declared admissible (recevable) and 
transferred to the National Assembly’s PAJ Committee for further consideration.821  In 
spite of its advancement, the debates on the law – as with the competing Special 
Chambers/Court legislation – underscored the opposition expressed by many MPs, 
reflecting a critical discourse akin to the post-implementation discomforts later seen in 
Kenya and Uganda. The involvement of outside actors in advocating for the bill’s 
passage was both seen and described as a form of neo-colonialism and a threat to 
national sovereignty.822 Again, a particular point of contention was punishment: the DRC 
legislation, at least in its earlier iteration, prohibited the application of the death penalty. 
By contrast, under the MCC, Congolese military courts have discretion to impose the 
death penalty for crimes against humanity, genocide, as well as certain war crimes.823 
Most Congolese MPs found this provision unacceptable and it became a central point of 
contention during the Assembly’s debate.824 
 
 Such opposition has largely been presented as a distraction to the substantive 
issues raised by the bill. As elsewhere, however, many proponents of the ICC’s 
normative framework did see implementation of the Statute as an opportunity to push 
for abolition of the death penalty. Indeed, a bill to that effect was introduced at the same 
time as the Rome Statute implementation bill, which, though unsuccessful, was 
supported by a prominent Congolese NGO on the grounds that it was “a valuable 
opportunity for the DRC to conform with international instruments it had ratified, 
notably the Rome Statute of the ICC.”825 Another NGO circulated an advocacy paper 
during the time of the debate urging passage of the law, in part, because: 
 
                                                
819 ICTJ, “The Democratic Republic of Congo Must Adopt the Rome Statute Implementation Law.” The 
ICTJ also states that it, ASF, and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation convened in 2008 “and issued a 
memorandum of suggested amendments to the draft bill to maximize conformity with the Rome Statute.” 
Ibid. 
820 Ibid. 
821 The debates were characterized as such in the following press releases: CICC Press Release, “Global 
Justice Coalition Welcomes Advances in the Criminal Law Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” 
9 November 2010; CN-CPI Press Release, “The DRC Coalition for the ICC welcomes the admission of 
the law proposal on the implementation of the Rome Statute,” 5 November 2010. 
822 See Kambale, “Mix and Match.” 
823 See 2002 Code Pénal Militaire, Arts, 65, 164, 167, 169, 171, 172.  
824 See, e.g., PGA Press Release, “La loi de mise en oeuvre du statut de Rome déclare recevable par 
l’Assemblée Nationale de la République Démocratique du Congo,” 4 November 2010. The release notes 
that the “intense” debate lasted more than 2½ hours with a total of 15 interventions, which “attracted 
criticism” for not retaining the death penalty as a form of punishment (author’s translation).  
825 See Ligue Pour la Paix et les Droits de l’Homme, Commique de Presse No. 006/CN/LIPADHO/2010, 
“La Majorité des Députes s’opposent a l’abolition de peine capital,” 18 November 2010 (author’s 
translation). On the fate of this bill and its imbrication with debates over Rome Statute legislation, see also 
Lievin Ngondji Ongombe, “RDC: la peine de mort, l’adoption de la loi de mise en oeuvre du statut du 
Rome,” in Kai Ambos and Ottilia A. Maunganidze (eds.), Power and Prosecution: Challenges and Opportunities for 
International Criminal Justice in Sub-Saharan Africa (Göttingen Studies in Criminal Law and Justice, 2012). 
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 The definitions of international crimes are different in the Rome Statute and the 
 Congolese military judicial code. Moreover, the sentences are not the same in 
 both systems (death penalty and no sentence for war crimes in the DRC.)826 
  
Similarly, a 2009 concept paper by the PGA for an “international parliamentary 
conference on justice and peace” includes the following: 
 
 It is time for the DRC to undertake this historic step to implement the Rome 
 Statute of the ICC and equip itself with a strong arsenal of laws against impunity, 
 and this legislation could also represent a definitive step towards abolishing the 
 death penalty, even if the Rome Statute itself leaves to each State Party the 
 sovereign decision to legislate on penalties for international crimes that are 
 adjudicated before domestic Courts.827 
 
Punishment was thus an integral part of the implementation debate in the DRC. As with 
insisting on “international standards,” advocates and norm entrepreneurs saw in 
implementation an opportunity to route broader political objectives through the 
principle of complementarity. 
 
 Even with the draft implementation law advancing to the PAJ, it remained a 
relatively low political priority. It was not until June 2011—eight months after having 
been declared recevable—that a special sub-committee of the PAJ finally convened, to 
review and revise the bill.828 By this point, however, the executive was vigorously 
advancing its separate projet de loi. As noted, despite the pressure being placed on them by 
the executive, Congolese MPs declined to vote on that draft law’s admissibility. Unlike 
Kenya and Uganda, where legislative actors assented to hastily presented legislation, 
Congolese MPs objected to the railroading of the specialized chambers bill. This led to a 
further political divide between the legislative and executive branch: Parliament refused 
to endorse the government’s projet de loi, and government largely ignored the Rome 
Statute implementing bill.829 Indeed, although the government presented a revised 
version of the Special Court bill to the Senate in August 2011 under an exceptional 
procedure, the implementation bill of MPs Mbuya and Mwene Songa was not included 
as part of that legislative package. In the end, no formal vote on it was ever taken.  
                                                
826 Le Club des Amis du Droit du Congo, “The Repression of International Crimes by Congolese 
Jurisdictions” (December 2010) (on-file). See also UN Mapping Report, para. 63 (noting, in reference to a 
proposed hybrid mechanism that, “Such a mechanism should also … not include the death penalty among 
its sentences, in compliance with international principles”). 
827 Parliamentarians for Global Action, “International Parliamentary Conference on Justice and Peace in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Great Lakes Region and Central Africa,” 10-12 December 2009, at 
http://www.pgaction.org/pdf/pre/Kin%20TOR%20EN.pdf, p. 3. As noted in the terms of reference, 
this event was co-organized with, inter alia, the ICTJ, ASF, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, and the 
DRC’s National Coalition for the International Criminal Court.   
828 République Démocratique du Congo, Assemblée Nationale, Commission Politique, Administrative et 
Judiciaire, “Proposition de loi modifiant et complétant le Code Pénal, le Code de Procédure Pénale, le 
Code Judiciaire Militaire et le Code Pénal Militaire en vue de la mise en œuvre du Statut de Rome de la 
Cour Pénale Internationale” (June 2011) (on-file).  At the bottom of this document, March 2008—the 
original date on which the legislation was introduced by Mutumbe Mbuya and mwene Songa—appears to 
be crossed out and replaced with June 2011.  
829 See Human Rights Watch, “DR Congo: Commentary.” HRW underscores the “importance of 
harmonizing the draft legislation creating specialized chambers and the draft ICC implementing 
legislation,” and states, “We rely on the Congolese government to urge Parliament to also pass the ICC 
implementing legislation, which contains important features such as incorporating definitions of Rome 
Statute crimes into Congolese law, and arrangements for effective cooperation with the court.”  
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5.  Implementation Reconsidered 
 
 The histories recounted herein suggest three tentative fault lines around 
implementation of the Rome Statute and its relationship to complementarity.  
 
5.1  Implementation as Purity 
  
 Rather than a catalyst for Rome Statute domestication, complementarity is better 
understood as the axis and rationale around which advocacy for implementation has 
turned. Domestic NGO coalitions were stimulated and supported by larger, international 
organizations who saw implementation not only as a way to facilitate cooperation with 
the ICC or enable domestic prosecutions, but also as a step in broader criminal justice 
reform. Abolition of the death penalty and the inclusion of domestic victim participation 
regimes are perhaps the clearest illustration of such reform efforts. The normative stake 
of many of these actors, however, as well as legal academics, is to preserve the Rome 
Statute in its technically correct or “pure” form, transplanting its complex substantive 
and unique procedural provisions into national legal frameworks. The proliferation of 
“model laws” and legal tools—most of which copy the Statute in content and form—can 
be understood as a means towards this end.   
 
 Yet “distortions” in implementation are an issue of legal pluralism; they are an 
inevitable product of importing new legal principles into an established legal system.830 In 
her work on the “translation” of international law into local justice, the anthropologist 
Sally Engle Merry contends that the efficacy of human rights depends on their “need to 
be translated into local terms and situated within local contexts of power and meaning”; 
they need “to be remade in the vernacular.”831 Merry helpfully defines translation as “the 
process of adjusting the rhetoric and structures of … programs or interventions to local 
circumstances,”832 but she notes that the process can also yield replication: rather than a 
merger of global frames with local forms (hybridization), they are appropriated wholesale. 
In a similar vein, Drumbl notes that, “Pressures emanating from dominant international 
norms [can] narrow the diversity of national and local accountability modalities.”833 
 
 Analogized to the implementation efforts detailed herein, there is little evidence 
of vernacularization at work in Kenya or Uganda. In both countries, the Statute’s core 
substantive and procedural provisions were copied, based almost entirely on “model” 
ICC legislation that had been prepared for export. Rather than an opportunity to tailor 
domestic legislation to reflect more localized concerns and desires—to encompass, for 
instance, suggestions that it incorporate the crime of pillage or corporate liability, or to 
accommodate other transitional justice measures—implementation was instead an 
exercise in mimicry. Rather than being “remade in the vernacular,” domestic versions of 
the Rome Statute, much like the domestic complementarity courts described in chapter 
five, largely mimic international juridical and institutional forms. By contrast, whereas the 
DRC’s revised MCC reflects greater hybridity, the little attention these laws have 
                                                
830 On the relationship between “legal transplantation” and ICL, see Cassandra Steer, “Legal Transplants 
or Legal Patchworking? The Creation of International Criminal Law as a Pluralistic Body of Law,” in Elies 
van Sliedregt and Sergey Vasiliev (eds.), Pluralism in International Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2014).  
831 Sally Engle Merry, Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating International Law into Local Justice (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2006), 1.  
832 Ibid., 135. 
833 Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law, 121. 
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received focus on their departures from international—understood as “minimum”—
standards. 
 
 This lack of attention is not accidental. As noted previously, much of the 
academic literature has deliberately presented complementarity as requiring uniformity 
with the Rome Statute, while the ICC itself has adopted the language of the “mirror” 
between it and national jurisdictions. NGO implementation materials and other capacity-
building programs have been similarly designed. Even though international law certainly 
permits amendments in the form of broader protection at the national level, few (if any) 
of these materials encourage them.  
 
6.2 Implementation as Politics 
 
 While often presented as a seemingly technical exercise, implementation is 
fundamentally a political process. In Uganda, the passage of implementing legislation was 
delayed because it was not a sufficient political priority (indeed, it was at odds with other 
political priorities) and then passed swiftly because it became important enough to 
external constituencies and carried little political cost. A similar dynamic animated the 
Kenyan experience following the release of the Waki Commission’s report. In both 
countries, then, the politics that enabled implementation were one of wanting to be seen 
as compliant states: implementation was evidence of putting complementarity “into 
practice” and a means of signaling to external constituencies the governments’ purported 
commitment to accountability.  
 
 At the time the acts were passed, these priorities briefly outweighed other 
domestic concerns. In Uganda, what passage of the ICC Act might mean for the 
continued practice of granting amnesties was glossed over, but quickly returned to (and 
remains at) the political fore. Similarly, Kenya’s charged domestic politics are largely 
absent from the 2008 parliamentary debate on the ICA’s passage, yet the unexpected 
swiftness of the ICC’s intervention there has since radically altered the political landscape; 
indeed, most “regard the leadership of the Jubilee Alliance as a political marriage forged 
to protect” Kenyatta and Ruto from the Court.834 This, in turn, has led to repeated 
efforts to nullify the domestic legislation, withdraw from the ICC, and derail its 
proceedings.  
 
 The intensity of these debates, and their relative absence from earlier discourse, 
suggests a decoupling from the politics of the Rome Statute’s enactment and the text of 
the legislation itself. A focus on the “ceremonial conformity”835 of Uganda’s ICC Act and 
Kenya’s ICA with the Rome Statute—their near symmetry with the latter’s substantive 
and procedural provisions—can be understood as a desire to gain or maintain 
international legitimacy, but it also reflects the power and influence of private, non-state 
actors—influential NGOs, legal academics, ICC staff— to mediate the relationship 
between the international and national spheres.836 It also underscores their influence in 
the social construction of a new norm of complementarity, one that is increasingly freed 
from its legal constraints as an admissibility principle in the service of broader 
governance goals. These goals may be normatively desirable; however, they also risk 
                                                
834 Chatham House, “The ICC Intervention in Kenya,” AFP/ILP 2013/01, February 2013. 
835 Marion Fourcade and Joachim J. Savelsberg, “Global Processes, National Institutions, Local Bricolage: 
Shaping Law in an Era of Globalization,” Law & Social Inquiry 31(3) (2006), 516. 
836 For a trenchant critique of a similar power dynamic in the context of post-Soviet countries, see Mertus, 
“From Legal Transplants to Transformative Justice,” 1377-1384. 
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supplanting democratic deliberation with what Drumbl has called “a treaty-centered 
international administrative bureaucracy,” contributing to a “whittling down of 
democratic input in important aspects of national lawmaking.”837 The presentation of 
implementation as an international duty rather than a choice (or even a priority) amongst 
domestic political actors has arguably contributed to such “whittling down.”  
 
 Unlike Kenya and Uganda, complementarity’s coercive power was largely absent 
in the DRC, in favor of what was intended to be from the outset a more “positive” 
arrangement.  However, here, too, political considerations were the primary drivers of 
domestic action: with presidential elections on the horizon, the need to be seen as “doing 
something” led Kabila’s administration to push strongly for a Special Chambers/Court 
bill of the sort that the UN’s report had recommended, while the parliamentary proposition 
de loi (as well as the UN’s recommendation for another truth commission) withered. Yet 
the DRC, which could otherwise be seen as a “failure” for not yet having ICC legislation 
in place, has also approached implementation more deliberatively, raising pertinent 
questions about the impact of legal transplants (and their political economy) on domestic 
institutions. Furthermore, even as the trappings of complementarity might appear to be 
absent in the DRC—there is no dedicated international crimes division, there is no 
Rome Statute legislation as such—it has nevertheless prosecuted the most conflict-
related cases to date. 
 
6.3 Implementation as “Performance” 
    
 Contrary to popular accounts, the ICC itself was not a catalyst for 
implementation of the Rome Statute. The passage of Uganda’s ICC Act did not come 
until eight years after the Court had formally intervened there but, crucially, the ICC’s 
arrival brought with it an array of transnational non-state actors who summoned 
complementarity (and the “shadow” of the Court) to pursue broader reform projects. 
Moreover, it is now clear that it was Uganda’s role as host state for the ICC Review 
Conference, part of an orchestrated performance for international donors, which pushed 
forward legislation that had otherwise languished. In this sense, the conference itself was 
the catalyst for the ICC Act. Its passage also dovetailed with a new chapter in the 
relationship between Uganda and the principle of complementarity. Whereas 
complementarity—understood as jurisdictional rivalry with the ICC—was the dominant 
logic for the creation of a specialized court in 2008, by 2010 the principle had a new 
meaning: Uganda’s law and institutions would complement The Hague, not compete 
with it. 
 
 The desire to be seen as a compliant, cooperative state in the eyes of 
international actors likewise motivated Kenyan politicians, at least in the early phase of 
the post-election violence. At that stage, in 2008, the imminence of ICC intervention still 
appeared quite remote—indeed, it was the remoteness that led many MPs to reject the 
Special Tribunal bill—but passage of the ICA was seen as a politically strategic move. As 
a standalone recommendation of the Waki Commission it was an opportunity to signal a 
break with the past, even as the Act’s own retrospective applicability to those events 
appeared doubtful. The ICA may have been, in the words of the director of a leading 
                                                
837 Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law, 135. For a similar critique in the context of 
constitutional drafting, see Sara Kendall, “‘Constitutional Technicity’: Displacing Politics through Expert 
Knowledge,” Law, Culture and the Humanities 11(3) (2015). 
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Kenyan NGO, the country’s “never again” moment but, unlike the STK, the political 
price it threatened to extract was low. 
 
 Similarly, although the DRC remains without a Special Chambers or 
implementing legislation, the most concerted efforts to pass both came in the wake not 
of the ICC’s initiation of its investigations, but the release of the UN Mapping Report 
seven years later. While the Court’s work was symbolically summoned to press the need 
for accountability that the report’s recommendations raised anew, the opposition of 
many Congolese parliamentarians to much of this proposed legislation reflected a deeper 
resistance in the DRC to international intervention. Congolese parliamentarians raised 
many of the same concerns about implementation—the risk of exceptionalism, the threat 
to constitutionalism, an encroachment on sovereignty—which Kenyan and Ugandan 
politicians would raise later as well.  
 
 These histories suggest that implementation is better understood not as an effect 
of the ICC’s intervention but a form of political theatre.838  In both Kenya and Uganda, 
passage of domestic ICC legislation was hailed for its swift passage with large majorities, 
demonstrating the entrenchment of global norms domestically and vindicating the ICC’s 
catalytic potential. In fact, however, implementation of the Statute was accelerated in 
order to “perform” complementarity for predominantly international audiences, and to 
signal, in the Kenyan context, a return to the “global village.” Much like the international 
criminal trial itself, then, implementation served a symbolic function, even as the post-




 Implementation narratives often present the process as part of a progress march 
towards global consensus—as something above the state, rather than a part of it. Model 
laws and toolkits facilitate this process; however, as this chapter has suggested, such 
questions of technique overwhelmingly privilege uniformity with the Rome Statute, often 
stifling deeper political debates within the state itself. The outsized role of external actors 
and constituencies in these processes (most of who regard deviation from the Statute 
with suspicion) thus raises questions about who the agents of implementation are, as well 
as the content and form of the domestic legislation that is enacted. Efforts to 
progressively narrow discussions about alternative forms of justice from the Ugandan 
ICC Act, or the mistaken belief that a domestic Rome Statute could not incorporate 
economic crimes in Kenya, suggests a view of implementation driven less by domestic 
political interests than replicating the Statute as a “global script.”  
 
 Furthermore, despite the passage of Rome Statute legislation in both Kenya and 
Uganda, implementation appears to have had little influence on national investigations 
and prosecutions. Of the handful of cases related to the ICC referrals that have been 
prosecuted domestically, they have been for ordinary crimes. Similarly, in the DRC, 
judges have drawn interpretive guidance from the Rome Statute in the adjudication of 
international crimes but the codification of these crimes domestically long predated the 
                                                
838  On the symbolic function of the criminal trial, see Martti Koskenniemi, “Between Impunity and Show 
Trials,” in J.A. Frowein and R. Wolfrum (eds.), Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Volume 6 (The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2002), 1-35. On ritual and “performance” in the context of state 
transition, John Borneman, Settling Accounts: Violence, Justice, and Accountability in Postsocialist Europe 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 20-25. 
 170 
Statute, and ICC legislation itself has not been the source of law for prosecutions before 











The idea that all international problems will dissolve with the establishment of an 
international court with compulsory jurisdiction is an invitation to political indolence. It 
allows one to make no alterations in domestic political action and thought, to change no 
attitudes, to try no new approaches and yet appear to be working for peace. 
        
       Judith Shklar (1964)839 
 
[I]n the prospect of an international criminal court lies the promise of universal justice. 
That is the simple and soaring hope of this vision. We are close to its realization. We will 
do our part to see it through till the end. We ask you, as lawyers and tribunes of justice to 
do your utmost in our struggle to ensure that no ruler, no state, no junta, and no army 
anywhere can abuse human rights with impunity. Only then will the innocents of distant 
wars and conflicts know that they, too, may sleep under the cover of justice; that they, 
too, have rights and that those who violate those rights will be punished. 
        
       Kofi Annan (1997)840 
 
1.  Reassessing Complementarity as a Catalyst   
 The ICC remains a pivotal institution in the growing juridification of 
international politics. At the same time it faces many challenges, ranging from the 
damaging breakdown of the Kenyan cases to increasing criticism that it is a neo-colonial 
project targeting African states.841 This increasingly fragile political space in which the 
Court finds itself is, to some extent, captured in the dueling views of Annan and Shklar 
above. The certitude of Annan’s remarks is rooted in the vision of a progressive, 
cosmopolitan legal order, of which the ICC is both agent and apex; by contrast, Shklar 
warns against seeking such certitude in the law or its institutions.842 These competing 
conceptions inform a number of the themes that this dissertation has sought to trace in 
its examination of the ICC’s “catalytic effect” in Uganda, Kenya, and the DRC.  
 First, because the ICC was understood from early on as needing to be more than 
the sum of its parts – a vehicle for retributive justice, but also an engine for 
accountability at the domestic level – complementarity has multiple meanings. Such a 
project is at once progressive and disciplinary: it is driven by Annan’s vision that all 
                                                
839 Shklar, Legalism, 134.  
840 Kofi Annan, “Advocating for an International Criminal Court,” Fordham International Law Journal 21(2) 
(1997), 366.  
841 See, e.g., the March 2012 issue of the New African, with the title “ICC, Why Africa Will Always Lose.” 
More critical scholarship has also increasingly questioned the triumphalism surrounding international 
criminal law, as well as its own exclusions. See, e.g., Christine Schwöbel, Critical Approaches to International 
Criminal Law: An Introduction (Routledge, 2014); Tor Krever, “Dispensing Global Justice,” New Left Review 
85 (January-February 2014).  
842 For a thoughtful reflection on Shklar and the ICC, see Samuel Moyn, “Judith Shklar versus the 
International Criminal Court,” Humanity (Winter 2013), 473-500. These polarities also recall Martti 
Koskenniemi’s insights into the dynamics of the international legal field: the ICC and its body of law 
oscillates between deference to the power of states, and openness to more cosmopolitan visions. See 
Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: the Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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might “sleep under the cover of justice,” but insists that, in order to do so, states follow 
certain rules. Complementarity, in turn, has become more than a question of 
admissibility but the juridical logic through which these rules have been articulated. As 
chapter two illustrated, it has been effectively reshaped from shield—a principle 
protective of sovereignty—to sword. In Mégret’s words, “Complementarity has become 
part of the way in which international criminal lawyers project a sense of the 
‘international criminal law acquis,’ a sort of global package of norms that have to be 
developed by states that become part of the ICC club.”843 Two principal conceptions of 
complementarity animate this global package. One is as a tool for cooperation (a “gentle 
incentivizer”), the other as an instrument of coercion. Both interpretations, however, 
position the Court as a catalytic body: the threat of ICC intervention prompts states to 
undertake their own accountability efforts, while the promise of assistance and 
cooperation encourages them to do so. 
 
 A central feature of this new norm is the commonly held understanding that 
complementarity imposes explicit duties on states, thus linking the ICC-as-catalyst frame 
to the dominant discourse of compliance in international law. Indeed, although legally 
inaccurate, this duty-based conception of complementarity—with its attendant domestic 
obligations of implementation, investigation, and prosecution—has come to dominate 
the popular understanding of the principle. The reflection and advancement of this 
understanding in a vast array of literature demonstrates how, in Robinson’s words, 
“collective belief can influence our understanding not only of history but also of text.”844  
 
 In so doing, the domestic forms and possibilities for post-conflict justice have 
increasingly been cast within a compliance-oriented model as w, with attention 
predominantly paid to criminal prosecution and punishment rather than the plural 
approaches more commonly associated with transitional justice. Thus, while 
complementarity might once have been thought to spur pluralism—to enable greater 
“ownership” of national or local level judicial processes—ICC primacy has instead taken 
root. The Court’s admissibility jurisprudence has contributed to this phenomenon. As 
chapter three demonstrated, it has largely followed a strict approach in its admissibility 
decisions, suggesting that a state’s domestic proceedings must effectively mirror Court 
proceedings in order to successfully retain (or assert) control over them. (The application 
of this test has been even stricter when brought by an accused under Article 19(2)(a).) At 
the same time, the Court’s jurisprudence on “positive” complementarity remains thin 
and underdeveloped.  
 
 Second, although complementarity was initially seen as a mechanism to catalyze 
state actors in the pursuit of criminal accountability, its effects on non-state actors appear 
to have been far more profound. While the evolution in complementarity’s meaning was 
perhaps inevitable given the ICC’s institutional limitations, its speed and spread owes 
largely to the critical role that private actors and organizations have played in the process. 
As part of a highly networked, transnational community of practice, these norm 
entrepreneurs have not only played the most active role in shaping and transforming the 
normative content of complementarity, but they have also increasingly reoriented their 
own advocacy agendas towards the ICC. In this sense, as Emily Haslam has elsewhere 
argued, civil society organizations are both object and subject of the Court’s “catalytic 
                                                
843 Mégret, “Implementation and the Uses of Complementarity,” 362. 
844 Robinson, “The Controversy over Territorial State Referrals and Reflections on ICL Discourse,” 380.  
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effect”: they seek to expand complementarity’s normative influence, while having 
themselves been transformed by it.845  
 
Third, it is clear that, in all aspects of the ICC’s work, law and politics are deeply 
entwined. While legalism remains a seductive (and perhaps necessary) fiction in the 
pursuit of a rules-based global order, the effects of ICC interventions in Uganda, Kenya, 
and the DRC underscore how, returning to Leebaw, “international standards [do] not 
transcend the influence of local politics or the impact of global asymmetries.” Rather, 
these asymmetries, as well as the patronage networks they produce and sustain, are 
intimately entwined with the catalytic project. This reality is particularly acute for the 
Office of the Prosecutor. Situated at the nexus of The Hague and situation countries, the 
OTP’s decision of whether and when to open preliminary examinations and 
investigations is arguably the defining question of whether the ICC’s engagement can 
trigger domestic criminal proceedings. The Office’s use of preliminary examinations 
holds some promise for catalyzing domestic accountability processes but the conduct of 
these examinations is highly dependent on political context and timing, as the Court’s 
early intervention in Kenya suggests.  Investigations, which are similarly contingent on 
political context and cooperation, are also an important site where certain goals of 
“positive” complementarity—knowledge transfer, technical assistance to national 
jurisdictions, strengthening domestic prosecutorial capacity—could be meaningfully 
enacted but, to date, such an approach has been limited in practice.  
 
 Fourth, the developments traced here at national level make clear that the 
“catalytic effect” of complementarity should be understood as part of a complex political 
process, rather than a singular desired outcome. Judged by the latter, the outcomes that 
the ICC was meant to catalyze—domestic investigation and prosecution of international 
crimes—have only rarely and sporadically materialized. But while complementarity has 
not necessarily produced greater criminal accountability, the absence of criminal 
proceedings has not meant that these states are inactive.846 Indeed, the Court has been 
deeply alive in the political discourse and decision-making of all three countries: from 
Uganda, where it loomed large in the government’s peace negotiations with the LRA, to 
Kenya, where it helped forge a political alliance united in opposition to The Hague. 
Moreover, as chapter five illustrated, it has influenced the strategies and priorities of 
numerous NGOs and donor states. In the DRC, these actors have invoked 
complementarity—not as an admissibility principle, but the idea that the ICC 
symbolically complements domestic accountability efforts—to support important (if 
limited) prosecutions at the national level. 
 
Finally, compliance with ICC standards and procedures belies the outsized 
influence of external constituencies as to what activities states undertake in the name of 
complementarity. Even in the absence of domestic proceedings, much attention has been 
focused on the creation (or proposed creation) of ICDs in both Uganda and Kenya. 
While Uganda’s ICD initially emerged out of a coercive relationship with the ICC’s 
investigations (“classical” complementarity), this has shifted in recent years to 
complementarity in a literal sense; it is less an alternative forum for domestic prosecution 
than the ICC’s domestic twin. The proposed Kenyan ICD has been characterized in a 
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846 On dyadic tensions in the structuring of arguments, see Darryl Robinson, “Inescapable Dyads: Why the 
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similar fashion, as have the mobile courts in the DRC. These juridical bodies have 
frequently been portrayed as helping to strengthen domestic justice systems in the wake 
of conflict; however, as I have argued, there is a tension between the exceptionalism 
associated with their origin and functioning—particularly the donor agendas and 
economies upon which they draw—and the desire to fortify “ordinary” domestic systems. 
Indeed, in demonstrating an excessive homology with The Hague, they can produce 
significant micro-tensions in the competition for attention and resources.  
 
 The perceived duty to implement the Rome Statute in its identical form at the 
domestic level is another telling illustration of the relationship between the power of 
external constituencies and compliance. As chapter six argued, it was less the threat or 
actuality of ICC intervention that catalyzed the passage of national implementation 
legislation (in Uganda, the ICC had already been engaged for many years; in Kenya; the 
threat of its intervention was then perceived to be remote); rather, identical 
implementation of the Statute was accelerated in order to “perform” complementarity 
for predominantly international audiences. In particular, the imminence of Uganda 
serving as host state for the Rome Statute Review Conference drove the passage of its 
2010 legislation, while in Kenya the recommendation of the Waki Commission was the 
catalyst for Kenya’s ICA. The appearance of “performance” for the international 
community was significant in the DRC as well, insofar as the release of the 2010 UN 
Mapping Report served, at the time, to catalyze renewed proposals for the establishment 
of a Special Chambers/Court and for passage of implementing legislation. A related 
concern is thus whether implementation of the Statute, when seen as something merely 
to be copied or transplanted, may in fact stymie the pursuit of other legal reform efforts 
that might be more meaningful to affected communities. 
 
2.  Ways Forward 
 
In light of these complex histories, what paths might the ICC and criminal justice 
advocates chart in the years ahead? The trajectory traced here suggests that, while the 
Court is an important actor in the criminal justice landscape, the weight of too many 
expectations has been placed on its shoulders. Furthermore, while advocates and norm 
entrepreneurs have continually summoned the symbolic power of the ICC and the 
polysemy of complementarity to serve a variety of reformist agendas, this strategy has 
not been without cost to other normative values like legal pluralism, local “ownership,” 
and democratic deliberation. Below I offer five broad areas for reflection.    
 
2.1 Beyond Compliance 
 
 Although compliance with the Rome Statute’s purported obligations has 
animated much of the interest in complementarity, ICC interventions have precipitated 
developments that are not limited to domestic criminal proceedings alone. In this sense, 
thinking of the ICC as a “catalyst for compliance” is too narrow a lens to capture the 
complex legal and political alchemy that Court interventions produce, or the diverse ways 
in which actors have oriented their own objectives around the principle of 
complementarity. As Robert Howse and Ruti Teitel argue, the lens of rule compliance 
can lead “to inadequate scrutiny and understanding of the diverse complex purposes and 
projects that multiple actors impose and transpose on international legality.”847  
                                                
847 Robert Howse and Ruti Teitel, “Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why International Law Really 
Matters,” Global Policy 1(2) (May 2010), 127. 
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 In order to better appreciate the ICC’s catalytic power, then, legalism—
compliance with a particular set of rules—cannot be the dominant framework. Indeed, 
the question that should be asked is not merely whether states comply with international 
norms or duties, but how and why they do so. Such an orientation can better capture not 
only what norms infiltrate a state in the process of an international judicial intervention, 
but if, how, and why those norms are implemented in practice. As Subotic notes, 
“Although international organizations may initiate international justice projects for all the 
noble reasons, their effects may be quite different when they are strategically adopted by 
local political actors in the context of domestic political contention and mobilization.”848 
For these reasons, an understanding of domestic political context is essential.  
  
 The importance of political context also casts in doubt the coercive potential of 
complementarity. Although this approach might yield results in certain contexts, it would 
appear that the reputational cost of domestic inaction by states in the face of ICC activity 
may be lower than was first presumed, and that the Court, ultimately, does not possess 
“the type of primacy or finality akin to the ideal of sovereign coercive actors.”849 The 
wisdom of a predominantly disciplinary approach to complementarity, wherein domestic 
jurisdictions are encouraged to “mirror” the standards and practices of the ICC, is thus 
worth reflecting upon.850 In particular, the OTP and the ASP should consider anew a 
more robust investment in the cooperative dimensions of the principle, focusing on how 
the Court itself can help strengthen domestic capacity and commitment.851 While 
legitimate questions persist about the propriety of an international court carrying such an 
assistance mandate, the circumscribed interactions between The Hague and national 
jurisdictions to date, and the OTP’s own limited capacities, suggest that this approach 
merits further examination.  
 
2.2 Towards a Place-Based Court 
 
 Just as a shift away from the language of compliance might open up a space to 
better understand the range of effects of the ICC’s “shadow” at national level, greater 
resources must also be invested in its presence. Numerous expectations by state and 
non-state actors alike have been attached to the Court, without an attendant 
                                                
848 As Lucy Hovil argues, “Supported by the assumption that any intervention working to ‘end impunity’ is 
somehow above reproach, there is an unwillingness to critically evaluate these well meaning, but 
sometimes unwanted and even harmful, interventions.” Lucy Hovil, “Challenging International Justice: 
The Initial Years of the International Criminal Court’s Intervention in Uganda,” Stability 2(1) (2013), 1. 
849 Antonio Franceschet, “The International Criminal Court’s Provisional Authority to Coerce,” Ethics & 
International Affairs 26(1) (Spring 2012), 100. See also David Bosco, Rough Justice: The International Criminal 
Court in a World of Power Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Nouwen, Complementarity in the 
Line of Fire, 26 (concluding that, “even in countries where sovereignty and reputation costs are considered 
high, complementarity has not catalyzed domestic proceedings because there are other costs that are even 
higher”). 
850 See, e.g., Heller, “A Sentence-Based Theory of Complementarity,” 132 (describing the “hard mirror” 
and soft mirror” theses as “both … based on the assumption—almost never questioned—that the goals of 
the ICC will be best served if states are either required [the “hard mirror”] or pressured [the “soft mirror”] 
to prosecute international crimes as ordinary crimes”). 
851 For a helpful, early assessment of the ICC’s ability to serve as a “supporting institution for national 
courts,” see Jenia Iontcheva Turner, “Nationalizing International Criminal Law,” Stanford Journal of 
International Law 41(1) (2004), 30-37. For a more recent iteration, see Serge Brammertz, “International 
criminal court: now for Kony and Bashir,” The Guardian, 13 June 2012; Brammertz contends that the fact 
that “national capacity building is not happening in parallel to the [ICC’s] work” is “a missed opportunity 
and should be reconsidered.”   
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commitment of material resources and political support. From two unfunded UN 
Security Council referrals (Sudan and Libya) to continued non-cooperation in the arrest 
and transfer of suspects, the rhetorical commitments to Annan’s “promise of universal 
justice” appear to be increasingly overshadowed by the political costs those 
commitments would entail.852 Such political assessments are, of course, stitched into the 
Court’s constitutional fabric, but the ICC’s troubled history suggests that its current 
trajectory is unsustainable in the long term.   
 
 Furthermore, within the Court itself the promise of “positive” complementarity 
has functioned far more in theory than practice. The OTP’s Hague-centric approach to 
the conduct of preliminary examinations and investigations is but one clear illustration of 
an institutional reluctance to engage more deeply in the complicated terrain of “the field.” 
A senior, Nairobi-based Court official, whose previous assignments have spanned both 
the ICC and ICTY, expressed this reluctance well:  
 
 For the first time in many years, I see the benefit of a field office. I see that the 
 Court is here, not in The Hague. We have to deal with the impact here. The 
 victims are here, not in The Hague. But we spend such time having to defend 
 what we do … [for those] who don’t realize the context in which we operate.853  
 
Such a field-based orientation—ranging from more place-based (or proximally-based) 
examinations and investigations, to more fulsome outreach programs, to greater use of in 
situ proceedings—would look quite different than the Court that currently exists.854 But if 
the ICC is to be a catalyst for change, then it too must change.   
 
2.3 Defining Deference 
 
 Much of the ICC’s complementarity jurisprudence supports an excessive 
homology with the OTP’s charging practices, suggesting that failure to pursue the “same 
conduct” as the Court’s Prosecutor would per se render a case admissible. This strict 
approach to complementarity tacitly furthers the “mirror image” between The Hague 
and domestic jurisdictions; arguably, it can also deter states that may be willing to pursue 
criminal investigations and prosecutions but see little hope of successfully doing so. Put 
another way, through the Court’s current admissibility regime, states are perpetually 
seeking to “catch up” with the ICC. In this vein, scholars like Drumbl have called for 
“qualified deference” in the allocation of institutional authority, one that “strikes a 
middle ground between subsidiarity and complementarity.”855  
 
                                                
852 See Philipp Ambach and Klaus U. Rackwitz, “A Model of International Judicial Administration? The 
Evolution of Managerial Practices at the International Criminal Court,” Law and Contemporary Problems 
76(3&4) (2013), 148-153. Ambach and Rackwitz clearly state, “As desirable as the referral of yet another 
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853 Interview with ICC outreach official, conducted jointly with Sara Kendall, Nairobi, 27 November 2012. 
A similar disconnect is palpable in a 2009 piece on the early stages of the Lubanga proceedings. See Adam 
Hochschild, “The Trial of Thomas Lubanga,” The Atlantic, 1 December 2009.  
854 On the value of in situ proceedings, see Clark, “Peace, Justice and the International Criminal Court,” 
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proceeding in country (in DRC and Kenya both, and most recently Uganda) but has not done so to date.  
See, e.g., Judge Sir Adrian Fulford, “The Reflections of a Trial Judge,” Criminal Law Forum 22 (2011), 215-
223; David Kaye, “What to Do With Qaddafi,” New York Times, 31 August 2011.  
855 Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law, 188. 
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 As an orienting principle, subsidiarity recalls other deference doctrines such as 
the margin of appreciation, which originated in human rights adjudication but could be 
fruitfully applied in the context of ICC admissibility determinations as well. As developed 
by the European Court of Human Rights, the doctrine is premised on the understanding 
that, while the European Convention binds all member states, they have substantial 
leeway as to the means by which those obligations are implemented. In this sense, the 
“machinery of protection established by the Convention is subsidiary to the national 
systems safeguarding human rights.”856 Subsidiarity then, like “classical” 
complementarity, is a protective principle: it is rooted in the sovereignty of states. 
 
 Such an approach to admissibility could better navigate the tensions between the 
legal test for complementarity, which is rooted in the degree of similarity between an 
ICC case and national jurisdictions, and its policy-based elements, wherein domestic 
proceedings are to be encouraged amidst a much larger “universe of criminality.”857 In 
Drumbl’s words, deference  “creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of local or 
national institutions that, unlike complementarity, does not search for procedural 
compatibility between their process and liberal criminal law and, unlike primacy, does not 
explicitly impose liberal criminal procedure.”858  Thus, rather than “bear[ing] the burden 
of proof” to show evidence of “concrete and progressive investigative steps,” a 
rebuttable presumption would afford a lower threshold for indicia of investigative 
activity at the domestic level. Whether that activity was indeed genuine would be a 
subsequent matter for the Court to determine as a matter of unwillingness.  
 
 An approach that draws from subsidiarity would also avoid an outright 
jettisoning of the established “same conduct” test, while tempering the incentives 
towards mimicry. The Appeals Chamber’s endorsement of a “substantially the same” 
approach to conduct appears to be a step in this direction but, as noted, it remains a 
relatively restrictive standard that has been inconsistently applied. A more clearly 
articulated and consistent application of a deference principle could thus permit the 
Court to maintain its current case-by-case approach to admissibility determinations 
without “radically depart[ing] from the framing of admissibility structures.”859 A margin 
of appreciation would, however, be incompatible with the excessively exacting “same 
incident” approach to domestic proceedings, which, unlike the “same conduct” test, 
finds no textual basis in the Statute. While the ICC Prosecutor has periodically 
referenced an incidents-based test to support the admissibility of certain cases, the Court 
has notably yet to opine on the issue.  
 
 There has also been significant attention paid to the question of whether the ICC 
might play a more formal monitoring role over domestic proceedings, suggesting a form 
of “qualified” or “conditional” admissibility not unlike the “reverse complementarity” 
approach that came to later define the ICTY and ICTR’s relationships with national 
jurisdictions.  There would appear to be little support in the Statute for such a procedure; 
however, as Stahn has noted, “If a Chamber is entitled to make a final finding on 
admissibility, based on the criteria of Article 17, it must have the power to rule on the 
                                                
856 Handyside v. United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights (1976), para. 48.  For a thoughtful 
exploration of subsidiarity’s relevance to international law and governance, see Paolo G. Carroza, 
“Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law,” American Journal of International 
Law 97 (2003), 38-79. 
857 Rod Rastan, “Situation and Case: Defining the Parameters,” 442.  
858 Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law, 188. 
859 Stahn, 258. 
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steps leading to that result.”860 Deference would thus constitute, in effect, “an interim 
decision on inadmissibility.”861  
 
 Yet it is far from clear that a conditional admissibility approach, particularly one 
that is judicially engineered, would not ultimately reinforce the primacy that qualified 
deference should guard against. More dramatically, it may also imperil the Court’s fragile 
political standing with member states. To that end, a more fruitful area of practice would 
be to make greater use of the Rome Statute’s cooperation and dialogue regimes. Articles 
89 and 94, for instance, provide for consultation between a state and the Court in cases 
where an ICC request conflicts with domestic investigation of prosecution—that is to 
say, in relation to a different case—yet these provisions have received scant attention to 
date. According to Darryl Robinson, “The ICC has never rejected, nor has it ever 
received, a request for postponement from a state wishing to pursue a suspect for a 
different case.”862  
 
 Article 18(2) offers a similar opportunity in the context of the same case: the 
OTP could suspend or conditionally defer its investigation(s) (subject to re-initiation if 
domestic proceedings prove inadequate), while perhaps also undertaking a monitoring 
and/or advisory role in the process.863 In short, although Article 17 applications have 
been the crucible through which states have sought to accommodate their interaction 
with the ICC, they are a blunt instrument: the space they create for dialogue between 
states and organs of the Court is exceedingly limited. Greater attention to the Statute’s 
cooperation and consultation regimes is thus needed. 
 
 Finally, although the Court’s admissibility decisions in the Libyan cases were 
increasingly clear that an exacting standard of due process is not required for states 
undertaking domestic proceedings, this has mattered little in the broader meaning of the 
term, where conformity with “international standards” continues to permeate discussions 
about implementation at the domestic level. To that end, deference must also mean the 
necessary acceptance that the goal of accountability—whether sought alongside ICC 
proceedings, in the shadow of them, or without them at all—is necessarily contingent on 
the numerous political, material, and technical challenges that confront states. As Elena 
Baylis writes of military courts in the DRC:  
 
 [T]he goal in the Congo cannot be justice absolute, ideal and untarnished, but 
 rather must be partial justice—justice for at least some victims, through 
 imperfect processes, with the meager but nonetheless ambitious aim of ending 
 the certainty of impunity, rather than ending impunity itself.864   
 
This reality need not mean that the language of legal obligation should be relinquished, 
nor must it limit more abundant aspirations for justice. It should, however, temper them. 
 
 
                                                
860 Stahn, 257. 
861 Ibid.  
862 Robinson, “Three Theories of Complementarity,” 182. On “sequencing” in the context of Articles 
89(4) and 94, see Carsten Stahn, “Libya, the International Criminal Court and Complementarity: A Test for 
‘Shared Responsibility,’” Journal of International Criminal Justice 10(2) (2012).  
863 Article 97, by way of analogy, may offer a similar opportunity for consultation in the context of a same 
case (although it relates to the Court’s cooperation regime rather than admissibility).  
864 Elena Baylis, “Reassessing the Role of International Criminal Law,” 9.   
 179 
2.4 Geographies of Justice 
 
At the same that the ICC demands greater investment, another important 
approach would be to seek out other, potentially more creative avenues for encouraging 
accountability at the international, regional, sub-regional, national, and sub-national 
level.865 Judicial “romanticism” for international criminal tribunals has too often invited 
and encouraged a mono-institutional approach to accountability.866 Indeed, as the 
experiences recounted herein suggest, the ICC has been regarded more often than not as 
the sole institutional locus of power or influence, even as it exists within a transnational 
network of institutions participating in and/or supporting national proceedings 
(MONUSCO for instance, the UN mission that continues to operate in the DRC). This 
has resulted in a narrow approach towards the Court’s relationship with domestic 
jurisdictions that puts it too often above, rather than nested within, a broader network of 
judicial actors.  Moreover, as noted, such ICC-centrism harbors a risk: it places a heavy 
performance burden on the Court, one that the institution has largely failed to meet.   
 
Disproportionate focus on the Court also overlooks other hybrid arrangements 
that, by their design, have a deeper relationship to national jurisdictions and may thus 
have a more lasting effect on strengthening domestic capacity. An instructive example is 
the work of the Guatemala International Commission against Impunity (CICIG), a novel 
institution that was created in late 2006, in the wake of Guatemala’s long-running 
conflict, as a treaty-level agreement between the United Nations and the government. By 
mandate, CIGIG operates as an independent body to support the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office and the National Police, as well as other relevant state institutions, in the 
investigation and prosecution of crimes committed by organized criminal enterprises, 
and engages alongside state institutions in the dismantling of these groups’ strong ties to 
Guatemala’s political and security sectors.  
 
In its near ten-year existence, CICIG has played a key role in strengthening state 
investigative and prosecutorial institutions (resulting in a number of high-level 
convictions against former senior state and military officials for corruption), improving 
prosecutorial capacity, and establishing “high risk” courts for the prosecution of 
organized crime and other complex cases.867 Indeed, it was one such court (and the 
extraordinary efforts of Guatemala’s former Attorney General, Claudia Paz y Paz) that 
led to the remarkable 2013 trial and conviction for genocide and crimes against humanity 
of Efraín Ríos Montt, Guatemala’s former President.868 The Ríos Montt trial and, more 
recently, criminal proceedings against former President Perez Molina, are the most public 
in a series of important domestic investigations, but it was an outcome that owed to 
years of close, concerted work between CICIG and its national counterparts.   
 
                                                
865 See, e.g., Alexandra Huneeus, “International Criminal Law By Other Means: The Quasi-Criminal 
Jurisdiction of the Human Rights Bodies,” American Journal of International Law 107 (January, 2013), 1-44. 
866  See McMahon and Forsythe, “The ICTY’s Impact on Serbia: Judicial Romanticism Meets Network 
Politics.” 
867 For more on the impact of CICIG’s work, see Open Society Justice Initiative, “Unfinished Business: 
Guatemala’s International Commission against Impunity”; Morris Panner and Adriana Beltrán, “Battling 
Organized Crime in Guatemala,” Americas Quarterly (Fall 2010).  
868 See, e.g., Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “The Trial of Ríos Montt,” Aportes DPLf 18(6) (December 2013). For 
additional history of the Montt trial relevant to this point, see Elizabeth Oglesby and Amy Ross, 
“Guatemala’s Genocide Determination and the Spatial Politics of Justice,” Space and Polity 13(1) (April 
2009), 21-39.  
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As a form of cooperation and assistance not unlike that imagined for “positive” 
complementarity, CICIG speaks to the importance of international(ized), yet 
nationally/locally situated, mechanisms that can work with judicial and political actors to 
seek accountability in ways that might resonate more meaningfully with domestic 
communities.869 Indeed, despite CICIG’s significant later contributions to international 
criminal justice, its work (and legitimacy) owes largely to its achievements in joining 
accountability with other crucial efforts in post-conflict Guatemala, such as investigating 
and prosecuting cases of corruption and other economic crimes. Similar creative 
initiatives have taken root elsewhere in national courts, including the use of domestic 
litigation to enforce ICC arrest warrants (as in Kenya), or the novel use of universal 
jurisdiction principles, rooted in the domestic ICC legislation of states, to press for 
national investigations of Rome Statute violators (as in South Africa).870 These promising 
initiatives suggest that the empowerment of independent domestic judicial actors and the 
strengthening of ordinary domestic courts likely deserve more attention than they have 
received to date. Such approaches take inspiration from the principle of complementarity 
but do so in ways that creatively expand the geographies of justice beyond The Hague.  
 
2.5 Promoting Pluralism  
 
 An attendant phenomenon of ICC-centrism is mimicry. As interpreted by many 
norm entrepreneurs and advocates, the language of complementarity has increasingly 
been cast in the idiom of “best practices” and “international standards,” while the ICC’s 
jurisprudence suggests to national prosecutors that states should hew towards its 
procedures. This mirroring phenomenon is institutional as well as normative, ranging 
from what domestic courtrooms should look like to the content of national 
implementation legislation.871 While such an interpretation of the Rome Statute is 
progressive in its reading of state obligations under complementarity it is potentially 
regressive as well, insofar as those obligations can have the effect of calcifying the form 
and substance of justice at the national/local level. Indeed, just as the creation of special 
criminal divisions (as in Uganda) or the passage of national implementing legislation (as 
in Kenya) were “fast tracked” for international audiences, so-called alternative justice 
measures—from enfeebled to truth commissions to indolent “transitional justice 
policies”—have been slow walked.   
 
 Here, too, the concept of margin of appreciation, as an orientation that seeks to 
“develop a geographically and culturally plural notion of implementation,” could be 
                                                
869 See, e.g., David A. Kaye, “Justice Beyond The Hague: Supporting the Prosecution of International 
Crimes in Domestic Courts,” Council on Foreign Relations (Council Special Report No. 61, June 2011). 
Kaye further notes that, the “compartmentalization of ‘accountability’ and ‘rule of law’ programming 
means that support for one does not benefit the other.” The two should be “integrated as a central aspect 
of building rule of law in the wake of conflict,” 15.  The Open Society Justice Initiative has supported a 
similar approach. See, e.g., International Crimes, Local Justice: A Handbook for Rule-of-Law Policymakers, Donors, 
and Implementers (Open Society Foundations, 2011).  
870 See, e.g., Southern African Litigation Centre and Zimbabwe Exiles Forum v. National Director of Public 
Prosecutions, High Court of South Africa (North Gauteng), Case No. 77150/09, Judgment (8 May 2012). 
State efforts to improve mutual legal assistance for the national prosecution of international crimes are also 
a promising step forward in this respect. See, e.g., Ward Ferdinandusse, “Improving Inter-State 
Cooperation for the National Prosecution of International Crimes: Towards a New Treaty?” ASIL Insight, 
21 July 2014.   
871 For another articulation of this view, see Sarah M.H. Nouwen and Wouter G. Werner, “Monopolizing 
Global Justice: International Criminal Law as Challenge to Human Diversity,” Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 13(1) (2015). 
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usefully applied.872 As Mégret notes, complementarity may be better understood as a 
“device to accommodate diversity … not only because this diversity exists, but because it 
has normative value in itself.”873 Approaching complementarity in this way—as more 
than ceremonial fidelity to the Rome Statute—could free a space in which to think 
critically about its productive potential as part of a politically fraught and dynamic 
process. Echoing Drumbl, a “richly multivalent approach” to justice is needed.874 
 
 Such an approach would, for example, encourage expanding the scope of 
national legislation to include corporate liability and economic crimes,875 as well as 
supporting the establishment of judicial arrangements that may fall outside of the ICC’s 
framework.876 It would also encompass a deeper, more nuanced grappling with the 
relationship between criminal accountability and other transitional justice approaches, as 
the experience of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission once 
exemplified.877 The proposed peace agreement between the Colombian government and 
the FARC, which foresees a similar exchange of testimony in return for eligibility for a 
system of “alternative justice,” suggests a return to the South Africa’s admixture of 
accountability and truth. The ICC’s preliminary examination in Colombia is notable in 
this regard, but it is unclear the extent to which the terms of the proposed arrangement 
were influenced by the OTP’s involvement or rather emerged in spite of it.878  
 
 Finally, a “multivalent approach” would also require a loosening of the grip that 
the monarchical language of “international standards” and “best practices” currently 
commands over much of the accountability discourse. Doing so could open more spaces 
for experimentation and innovation, as well as contestation. Indeed, it is precisely the 
hybridity of systems and processes—their contingency as well as their possibility—that, 
in Baylis’ words, “provide opportunities for multiple voices to be heard in multiple 
contexts, [and] in order to genuinely accommodate those multiple interests and 
communities.”879 
                                                
872 Frédéric Mégret, “Nature of Obligations,” in Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah, and Sandesh Sivakumaran 
(eds.), International Human Rights Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 132.  
873 Mégret, “Implementation and the Uses of Complementarity,” 390. For a compelling exploration of this 
theme, see Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
874 Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International Law, 181. Drumbl likewise advances a philosophy of 
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875  It is worth noting that the recently adopted protocol on amendments to the statute of the African 
Court of Justice includes jurisdiction over ICC crimes, as well as, inter alia, the crimes of corruption, money 
laundering, and illicit exploitation of natural resources.See Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on 
the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, Arts. 28A, 28E, 28I, 28I Bis, 28L Bis (on-
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court,” the Hybrid Court of South Sudan (HCSS), in accordance with Chapter V (3) of the Agreement 
reached by the South Sudanese parties, as “an African-led and Africa-owned legal mechanism” (emphasis 
added).  
877 For a compelling argument favoring this approach in the Ugandan context, see Erin Baines, “Spirits and 
Social Reconstruction after Mass Violence: Rethinking Transitional Justice,” African Affairs 109(436) 
(2010), 409-430; on amnesties, see Louise Mallinder and Kieran McEvoy, “Rethinking amnesties: atrocity, 
accountability and impunity in post-conflict societies,” Contemporary Social Science 6(1) (2011), 1-7-128.  
878 See Louisa Reynolds, “Colombia looks towards peace rather than punishment in FARC deal,” 
International Justice Tribune No. 186, 30 September 2015.  
879 Elena Baylis, Reassessing the Role of International Criminal Law,” 72. See also Mégret, who suggests 
that the idea of “ownership” might better accommodate such multiplicity, in that it “lends itself well to the 
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2.6 From Management to Modesty 
 
 Although the ICC may be accused of having too quickly put itself at the center of 
contentious accountability debates, many private actors and organizations have helped 
put it there.880 The desire to catalyze domestic judicial reform or threaten governments 
into action may have been the reason for doing so, but it is not always clear that the 
political consequences of these strategies have been sufficiently thought through. The 
ICC Prosecutor, for instance, may be perceived as an ally by civil society but, ultimately, 
the choices she makes have consequences for national-level advocates that may do more 
harm than good. The near ubiquitous refrain amongst Court officials and international 
NGOs of the need to  “manage the expectations” of victims and affected communities 
suggests a similar phenomenon. At the same time, it is many of these same expectations 
that drive the belief in the ICC’s “catalytic effect.”  
 
 Rather than “management” of expectations, then, these uncertainties speak to the 
need for greater modesty about what the ICC is able to achieve. To that end, it also calls 
for more careful consideration and sober reflection about the wisdom of soliciting the 
Court’s intervention in a country, before the scale of civil society’s ambitions is publicly 
tested by its doctrinal and/or institutional limits. Finally, as the case studies here suggest, 
the ICC is but one factor among many that influence and shape the choices of domestic 
political actors. Consistent with a more process-based approach, then, Court 
interventions can be more productively seen as one tactic that might, over time, alter a 
domestic political environment in favor of greater accountability. As Karen Alter 
suggests, “The existence of an international legal remedy empowers those actors who 
have international law on their side, increasing their out of court political leverage.”881 
 
3. Epilogue: Une belle époque? 
 I close this dissertation with a more recent encounter. In late March 2015, I was 
in Brussels for a high-level conference convened by the Belgian government. Entitled 
“Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights, our shared 
responsibility,’” the conference marked the culmination of Belgium’s six month chairing 
of the Council of Europe, an alphabetically rotating honor that this small country would 
not hold for another twenty years. Amidst increasing fears of the United Kingdom 
withdrawing from the European Convention on Human Rights, and other, similar 
rumblings in countries throughout the Council, the conference was intended to reaffirm 
the “deep and abiding commitment” of member states to the European Convention and 
to the “full, effective and prompt execution” of the judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights.882 Negotiations on a text had been underway for the previous five 
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881 Alter, The New Terrain of International Law, 19. For a similar assessment in the context of the ICC’s 
engagement in situations of armed conflict, see Philipp Kastner, “Armed Conflicts and Referrals to the 
International Criminal Court: From Measuring Impact to Emerging Legal Obligations,” Journal of 
International Criminal Justice 12(3) (2014), 471-490. 
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months and it was at the conference that the final “Brussels Declaration” was to be 
adopted.  
 I attended the conference not as a researcher but as an advocate for an 
international NGO that I joined in early 2013. Now a norm entrepreneur myself, being 
there was a bit how I imagined the summer of 1998 might have felt in Rome. As the 
conference began, there was still uncertainty as to whether agreement on a final text had 
been reached; hushed conversations over coffee and croissants made clear that 
implementation was a verb that states were more comfortable with in theory than 
practice. And the parallels to the ICC were striking: another revered but overburdened 
court; another bold experiment in the taming of sovereignty through law; another appeal 
to states, reminding them that it was their primary responsibility to protect and defend 
human rights at the national level. Rather than complementarity, the diplomats here 
spoke of subsidiarity, but the logic was the same: like The Hague, Strasbourg, too, was a 
place of last resort.   
 When the Declaration was adopted at the end of the second day—after all 47 
states had expressed their support, and their reservations—everyone stood and 
applauded, flush with political commitments renewed. As the delegates slowly drifted out 
for the final reception, I spoke casually with an old friend from Amnesty International’s 
office in Brussels, whom I had once worked for (as an intern, on Belgium’s domestic 
implementation of the Rome Statute) in 2001, but whom I had not seen since. Our 
meeting felt at once accidental and purposeful —as Adler says, “communities of practice 
have no fixed membership; people ‘move in and out’ of them”883—but it was a pleasure 
to reconnect.  Eventually joined by other Belgian colleagues, I listened as the group’s 
conversation turned to the future of not only the European Court but other human 
rights institutions as well. They were clearly worried. There was a feeling that the human 
rights movement’s best moments were perhaps behind it: Belgium’s once pioneering 
universal jurisdiction law, now neutered; the signing of the Rome Statute in 1998, the 
ICC in what now felt like disarray; the promise of the International Court of Justice’s 
Yerodia decision, now at risk of obscurity. Ça c'était une belle époque, said one member of 
the group, to wistful nods.884   
 My colleagues’ sense of a progress narrative interrupted, as well as the 
circumstances that brought us together, touch upon a number of themes that this 
dissertation has sought to surface. As their recollections attest, the role of international 
criminal law in global governance has grown ever larger but, as I have suggested herein, 
it has also increasingly narrowed into the face of one institution at the transnational top: 
the ICC. The Court’s performance woes have unfortunately complicated this 
phenomenon while dovetailing with a resurgent discourse of sovereignty, leaving many 
advocates to wonder, as those gathered in Brussels did, whether the hard won 
achievements of the international human rights movement may be eroding.885  
                                                
883 Emanuel Adler, “Communities of practice in International Relations,” 15. 
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 More than a decade later the soaring rhetoric that accompanied the ICC’s 
establishment feels dimmed. But while the Court remains a key actor in the international 
legal and political landscape, it is hardly the only one. The mere fact that it exists cannot 
be, as Shklar warns, an invitation to indolence. Furthermore, the close examination 
offered here of Uganda, Kenya, and the DRC illustrates that the ICC’s practices on the 
ground, as well as its institutional limitations, provide reason for sober reflection. Such 
inquiries from the proverbial “field” may temper our faith in how catalytic a force the 
Court or the principles summoned in its name can actually be, but that is a necessary 
reckoning. Our ambitions should be measured by more realistic expectations, while 
seeking new possibilities on the horizon.  
  
                                                                                                                                      
also the February 2015 debate issued by the ICTJ, “Is the International Community Abandoning the Fight 




Sinds de oprichting van het Internationaal Strafhof is een van de voornaamste 
bekommernissen van en voor het Hof het vermogen om het streven naar 
verantwoordelijkheid op het nationale niveau te “katalyseren”. Het 
complementariteitsbeginsel is de dominante juridische logica door middel waarvan deze 
katalytische relatie zich gemanifesteerd heeft, maar dit op zich is een transformatie. Eerst 
opgevat als een ontvankelijkheidsvereiste—een manier om prioriteit van rechtsmacht 
vast te stellen tussen het ISH en nationale rechters—is complementariteit sindsdien 
uitgegroeid tot een transnationaal proces en een adaptieve strategie voor het realiseren 
van een reeks doelstellingen, met inbegrip van het stimuleren van nationale vervolgingen 
en, meer algemeen, de hervorming van binnenlandse rechtssystemen. Academici, op hun 
beurt, onderzoeken sinds kort of deze ambities in de praktijk gerealiseerd zijn. Als 
onderdeel van een breder momentum in “global governance”, stellen deze academici niet 
enkel de vraag of internationale juridische instellingen het gedrag van staten kunnen 
beïnvloeden, maar ook hoe en waarom ze dat doen. 
 
Dit proefschrift draagt bij aan deze doctrine door te onderzoeken of en hoe de 
interventies van het ISH in Oeganda, Kenia, en de Democratische Republiek Congo 
inderdaad gediend hebben om binnenlandse onderzoeken en vervolgingen te katalyseren. 
Het onderzoek stelt drie belangrijke vragen: Ten eerste, hoe is het begrip van 
complementariteit geëvolueerd sinds de oprichting van het ISH en welke rol hebben 
niet-statelijke actoren, in het bijzonder, gespeeld in deze evolutie? Ten tweede, hoe 
hebben de rechters van het ISH de complementariteitsvereiste begrepen en 
geïnterpreteerd in de rechtszaal, en hoe heeft het Parket van de Aanklager van het Hof 
getracht het te implementeren als deel van zijn beleid? Tot slot, in welke mate en hoe 
hebben de interventies van het ISH in Oeganda, Kenia en de DRC de institutionele en 
normatieve kaders voor het uitvoeren van strafrechtelijke vervolgingen op nationaal 
niveau beïnvloed? 
 
De meeste literatuur over het vermogen van het ISH om binnenlandse 
onderzoeken en vervolgingen te katalyseren heeft complementariteit geïnterpreteerd als 
een kwestie van het naleven van regels, met inbegrip van een wettelijke verplichting voor 
lidstaten om het Statuut van Rome om te zetten in hun nationale strafrecht; om ervoor te 
zorgen dat hun rechtbanken in staat zijn om de internationale misdrijven te vervolgen; en, 
zoals de taal van de preambule van het Statuut bevestigt, om een onderzoek in te stellen 
naar de verantwoordelijken en hen te vervolgen. Deze op regels gebaseerde benadering 
heeft op haar beurt twee belangrijke strategieën voor complementariteit voortgebracht: 
complementariteit fungeert als een dwingende stimulans voor nationale jurisdicties (de 
dreiging van een interventie door het ISH zal staten aanzetten tot handelen), terwijl het 
ook een meer coöperatieve, leidinggevende functie vervult. In deze opvatting, 
ondersteunt of, letterlijk, “complementeert” het ISH nationale jurisdicties. 
 
Beoordeeld onder deze voorwaarden lijkt het alsof het ISH weinig bereikt heeft 
in deze drie landen. In Kenia heeft tot dusver geen hoge ambtenaar of politieke leider 
verantwoording moeten afleggen voor misdrijven begaan tijdens de uitbraak van geweld 
in de nasleep van de verkiezingen van 2007-08. Bovendien hebben parlementaire 
inspanningen om op nationaal niveau een speciaal tribunaal op te richten herhaaldelijk 
gefaald. Er hebben meer, maar nog steeds beperkt, binnenlandse vervolgingen 
plaatsgevonden in de DRC via mobiele militaire rechtbanken. Dit is echter voornamelijk 
te danken aan de inspanningen van mensenrechtenverdedigers die complementariteit 
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inroepen als een beginsel van lastenverdeling en samenwerking (eerder dan 
ontvankelijkheid) om hun werk te ondersteunen. Het ISH als instelling is zelf nauwelijks 
aanwezig geweest. Tot slot is er in Oeganda tot op heden slechts één poging geweest tot 
vervolging van een voormalig lid van het Lord's Resistance Army door de Divisie 
Internationale Misdrijven, een procedure waarin schendingen van het recht op een eerlijk 
proces schering en inslag waren. 
 
De afwezigheid van nationale vervolgingen betekent echter niet dat deze staten 
inactief zijn geweest als gevolg van het werk van het ISH. Integendeel, het Hof was sterk 
aanwezig in het politieke debat en de besluitvorming in de drie landen: van Oeganda, 
waar het regelmatig opdoemde in de vredesonderhandelingen tussen de regering en het 
LRA, tot Kenia, waar het Hof een politieke alliantie hielp smeden, verenigd in weerstand 
tegen Den Haag. Een aanpak die zich voornamelijk focust op de uitkomst, namelijk 
binnenlandse vervolging, benadrukt inderdaad de mate waarin legalisme het katalytisch-
/complementariteitskader vormgeeft. Dit kader en legalisme hebben gemeen dat ze de 
nadruk leggen op de naleving van regels, waarbij politieke problemen grotendeels 
ondergeschikt zijn aan het juridische. Dit proefschrift benadrukt daarentegen het 
primordiaal belang van de politieke context om  het effect van ISH interventies te 
begrijpen en om te begrijpen hoe binnenlandse actoren, zowel statelijke als niet-statelijke, 
hierover onderhandeld hebben op nationaal niveau. Het beargumenteert dat deze 
interventies en de doelen die ze willen bereiken de politiek niet overstegen hebben; ze 
worden gevormd door de politiek. 
 
Methodologisch steunt dit proefschrift voornamelijk op tekst- en discoursanalyse, 
evenals op veldonderzoek uitgevoerd in Kenia, Oeganda, de Democratische Republiek 
Congo en Den Haag tussen augustus 2010 en december 2012. De studiereizen stelden 
mij in staat interviews af te nemen met een breed scala aan actoren betrokken bij ISH-
gerelateerde werkzaamheden en lieten mij toe documenten—gerechtelijke beslissingen, 
parlementaire debatten, wetsontwerpen—te verzamelen die doorgaans niet beschikbaar 
waren buiten deze landen. Hoewel geworteld in juridische analyse, beoogt dit 
proefschrift bij te dragen aan een groeiend vakgebied van de interpretatieve sociale 
wetenschappen dat interdisciplinaire, kwalitatieve methodes gebruikt om een breder, 
meer context-specifiek beeld te schetsen van de waarde en de impact van globale 
juridische instellingen. Structureel is dit proefschrift opgedeeld in de volgende zes 
hoofdstukken. 
 
1. Een Idee Opsporen, een Norm Bouwen: Complementariteit als een Katalysator 
 
Dit hoofdstuk onderzoekt hoe complementariteit geëvolueerd is van een 
juridische vereiste voor ontvankelijkheid—een organiserend beginsel voor de regulering 
van samenloop van rechtsmacht—en verworden is tot meer, nu het ook een instrument 
van beleid is. Dit beleid, vaak aangeduid als “positieve complementariteit”, promoot het 
ISH en het “Statuut van Rome Systeem” als proactieve vertegenwoordigers voor 
binnenlandse verantwoordelijkheid. Om inzicht te krijgen in de betekenis en het doel van 
deze evolutie, betoogt het hoofdstuk dat de opkomst van deze meer ambitieuze 
verwoording van de relatie die het ISH heeft met nationale jurisdicties het werk 
reflecteert van normatieve ondernemers die in toenemende mate getracht hebben een 
meer proactieve visie te articuleren voor het Hof en een breder scala aan 
beleidsdoelstellingen. Ze hebben op overtuigende wijze de opvatting van 
complementariteit als een katalysator bevorderd, door het voor te stellen als een reeks 
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verplichtingen voor staten om internationale misdrijven op nationaal niveau in wetgeving 
op te nemen, te onderzoeken en te vervolgen. 
 
Bij het nagaan van de ontstaansgeschiedenis van het ISH betoogt het hoofdstuk 
dat deze evolutie van complementariteit in contrast staat met het vroegere, eerste begrip 
van complementariteit als een beginsel van beperking. In tegenstelling tot de ad hoc 
tribunalen voor Rwanda (ICTR) en voormalig Joegoslavië (ICTY), hebben de opstellers 
van het Statuut ervoor gekozen om het ISH geen voorrang te verlenen op nationale 
jurisdicties. Deze kwestie was erg betwist tijdens de onderhandelingen over het Hof en 
reflecteerde een delicaat proces dat supranationale jurisdictie in evenwicht trachtte te 
brengen met een bestendige bezorgdheid om staatssoevereiniteit. Bovendien werd, in lijn 
met dit proces, een bewuste keuze gemaakt om staten aanzienlijke bewegingsruimte te 
geven in het vervolgen van internationale misdrijven, met inbegrip van, bijvoorbeeld, het 
vermogen om de misdrijven in het Statuut van Rome te vervolgen als “gewone” 
misdrijven. 
 
Ondanks deze zorgvuldige onderhandelingen is complementariteit geëvolueerd 
van een technische ontvankelijkheidseis, voornamelijk opgesteld door staten, naar een 
meer katalytische visie, voornamelijk gedreven door niet-statelijke actoren. Deze visie 
werd al snel onderschreven door het Parket van de Aanklager als beleid, en had als 
intellectueel precedent de ervaringen van het ICTR en ICTY, waarvan de 
voltooiingsstrategieën een belangrijke rol gespeeld hebben in de academische literatuur 
over het concept van positieve complementariteit, die, op hun beurt, de vroege 
beleidsontwikkelingen binnen het Parket van de Aanklager van het ISH beïnvloed 
hebben. In dit proces is complementariteit geïnterpreteerd op een manier die een 
weerspiegeling van het normatieve en institutionele kader van het ISH bevoorrecht (ook 
al is dit niet juridisch vereist). Nationale verantwoordelijkheid wordt dus steeds meer 
begrepen en gemeten in vergeldings- en resultaatgerichte termen. 
 
Tot slot stelt dit hoofdstuk de vraag hoe dit verruimde begrip van 
complementariteit—gezien de mate waarin het de vermeende verplichtingen van staten 
veranderde, en de mate waarin staten die perceptie hebben bekrachtigd—met dergelijke 
schijnbare snelheid geëvolueerd is. Hier wordt gesuggereerd dat de gecombineerde rol 
van normatieve ondernemers en transnationale netwerken van cruciaal belang geweest is 
in het bevorderen van deze ambitieuzere opvatting van complementariteit. Zoals 
bemiddeld door een dicht, onderling verbonden web van niet-statelijke actoren—NGO's, 
ISH-ambtenaren, mensenrechtenactivisten, en academici—heeft complementariteit niet 
alleen meerdere betekenissen aangenomen (zowel een ontvankelijkheidseis, als een 
katalysator), maar ook twee dimensies (zowel coöperatief, als dwingend). Ik suggereer 
ook dat een groeiende literatuur over transnationale “praktijkgemeenschappen”, een 
concept ontwikkeld door de politicoloog Emanuel Adler, een handige lens biedt om de 
verspreiding van deze nieuwe norm te begrijpen. 
 
2. Spiegelbeelden: Complementariteit in de Rechtszaal 
 
Dit hoofdstuk maakt de overgang van discours naar doctrine en richt zich op 
complementariteit in de rechtszaal: het geeft een gedetailleerd overzicht van Artikel 17 
rechtspraak. Hierbij betoogt dit hoofdstuk dat het ISH jurisprudentie heeft 
voortgebracht die staten in praktijk verplicht om de veeleisende procedures van het ISH 
te weerspiegelen (of na te bootsen) als voorwaarde om een zaak niet-ontvankelijk te 
verklaren. Hoewel deze aanpak strookt met de dwingende dimensie van 
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complementariteit, voor zover het staten beoogt te dwingen tot naleving van het Statuut 
van Rome, plaatst het ook een zware last op de staten, een die ze mogelijks niet willen (of 
niet kunnen) dragen. 
 
In deze reeks van testen ligt de nadruk op de vraag of een procedure gestart door 
het ISH en een staat die de ontvankelijkheid succesvol zou willen betwisten elkaar 
voldoende “weerspiegelen”. Uit de rechtspraak van het Hof blijkt dat een staat, om 
succesvol ontvankelijkheid aan te vechten, meer bepaald binnenlandse procedures moet 
voeren met betrekking tot dezelfde “zaak” als in het ISH, zodanig dat zij betrekking 
hebben op dezelfde persoon, hetzelfde gedrag, en mogelijk zelfs dezelfde feitelijke 
incidenten. Bovendien hebben rechters van het ISH, wanneer zij geconfronteerd worden 
met concurrerende claims over binnenlandse procedures (met name vorderingen 
ingesteld door een individuele verdachte op grond van Artikel 19(2)(a)), een relatief 
oppervlakkige evaluatie verricht en tegelijkertijd een hoge bewijsdrempel ingesteld voor 
eisers om aan te voldoen. Het Hof heeft ook de mogelijkheid om een bezwaar aan te 
tekenen tegen de ontvankelijkheid effectief verkleind door de omvang van de toetsing 
door Kamers van vooronderzoek te beperken bij het beslissen of er een arrestatiebevel 
uitgevaardigd moet worden.  
 
De gerechtelijke behandeling van Artikel 93(10), dat de juridische basis biedt 
voor het beleid van “positieve” complementariteit, is daarentegen schaars geweest, voor 
zover het Hof ervoor gekozen heeft om de behandeling van verzoeken om 
samenwerking met het ISH, een pijler van “positieve” complementariteit, te scheiden van 
bezwaren tegen ontvankelijkheid. Complementariteit blijkt dus minder een ruimte voor 
constructieve betrokkenheid en dialoog dan een reeks verenigende criteria waaraan 
landen moeten voldoen. Hoewel de meer recente rechtspraak van het Hof in het kader 
van de ontvankelijkheidbezwaren geuit door Libië dit spiegelende regime enigszins op 
losse schroeven gezet heeft, is het goed mogelijk dat een dergelijke strikte interpretatie 
van complementariteit binnenlandse vervolgingen belemmert, eerder dan katalyseert. 
Sommige commentatoren hebben op zulke kritiek gereageerd met een poging tot het 
opsplitsen van de gerechtelijke behandeling van complementariteit en de politieke 
dimensies van complementariteit. Ik stel echter dat deze opdeling op zichzelf 
symptomatisch is voor legalisme: het berust op een kunstmatige scheiding tussen het Hof 
als een juridische en politieke actor.  
 
3. Complementariteit en het Parket van de Aanklager 
 
Dit hoofdstuk verlegt de aandacht van het juridisch kader van complementariteit 
naar de beleidsdimensies zoals ontwikkeld door een andere cruciale actor binnen het Hof: 
het Parket van de Aanklager. Gesitueerd binnen het institutionele centrum van het ISH 
in Den Haag en de verschillende nationale contexten waarin het actief is, geeft het 
Parket—door het uitoefenen van de beoordelingsvrijheid van de Aanklager en de 
toegang tot de lokale actoren die op het terrein werken—niet alleen vorm aan het 
algehele werk van het Hof, het kan ook een belangrijke invloed hebben op de contouren 
van de inspanningen tot binnenlandse vervolging. Het hoofdstuk onderzoekt dus op 
welke manieren het Parket getracht heeft het gedrag van staten te beïnvloeden in het 
voordeel van binnenlandse vervolging in twee kerngebieden van zijn werk: 
voorbereidende onderzoeken en onderzoeken. 
 
Terugkomend op de dubbele eigenschap van complementariteit als zowel 
dwingend als coöperatief, onderzoek ik eerst hoe het Parket van de Aanklager in 
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toenemende mate steunt op voorbereidende onderzoeken als een voorbeeld van de 
dwingende kracht van complementariteit en een belangrijk instrument in haar 
inspanningen om nationale jurisdicties tot actie te bewegen. Als enig land van de drie 
onderzochte landen dat onderworpen werd aan een uitgebreid voorbereidend onderzoek, 
biedt Kenia een voorbeeld van hoe het Parket getracht heeft deze periode als potentieel 
pressiemiddel te gebruiken om aan te dringen op de oprichting van een binnenlands 
straftribunaal in 2009. Deze inspanning was uiteindelijk onsuccesvol, wat zowel het 
context-specifieke karakter van het voorbereidend onderzoek benadrukt als de complexe 
politieke dynamiek waarin ISH interventies verlopen. In het bijzonder lijkt het erop dat 
het Parket van de Aanklager onvoldoende afgestemd was op de politieke ontwikkelingen 
in Kenia, onder meer omdat het er niet in geslaagd was een sterkere, lokale aanwezigheid 
in het land te ontwikkelen, tijdens de kritieke periode waarin de mogelijkheid van een 
binnenlands tribunaal ernstig in overweging genomen werd. Wat van meer belang is, er 
lag een paradox ten grondslag aan de kern van het Keniaanse experiment: terwijl het 
Parket van de Aanklager de dreiging van een interventie trachtte te gebruiken als 
drukmiddel voor de creatie van een binnenlands tribunaal, zagen veel Keniaanse 
slachtoffers en activisten, wiens steun essentieel was voor de inspanningen van het Hof, 
ISH rechtszaken als een noodzakelijke voorwaarde voor een dergelijk proces. 
 
De tweede helft van het hoofdstuk behandelt de onderzoekspraktijken van het 
Parket, wat ten dele belangrijk is omdat het ISH’s slechte track record inzake 
bevestigingen van tenlastegelegde feiten en veroordelingen het vermogen van het Hof 
om te dienen als een geloofwaardige dreiging in gevaar kan brengen. Verder 
beargumenteer ik dat het onderzoek een wezenlijke fase is waarin een meer positieve, 
coöperatieve aanpak van complementariteit aangenomen zou kunnen worden. Tot op 
heden heeft het Parket van de Aanklager echter grotendeels het tegenovergestelde 
gedaan, door ervoor te kiezen om zijn onderzoekers niet te vestigen in de situatie-landen 
en geen meer duurzame lokale aanwezigheid te ontwikkelen. Terwijl het Parket 
voornamelijk gesteund heeft op haar relaties met lokale informanten die bekend staan als 
“tussenpersonen” om deze leemte op te vullen, heeft het al te vaak een eenzijdige aanpak 
gebruikt voor bewijsverzameling en is het er niet in geslaagd om hun zorgen en 
prioriteiten in het onderzoeksproces te integreren. In dit verband wordt bijzondere 
aandacht besteed aan Oeganda en de DRC, waar zelfs bij “uitnodigende” verwijzingen, 
de lokale aanwezigheid van het Parket in het land minimaal is geweest. Ook al was dit 
een bewuste aanpak, deze aanpak heeft te kampen gehad met grote beperkingen, 
variërend van een beperkte bereidheid van lidstaten om het ISH te voorzien van de 
nodige middelen, tot een institutionele terughoudendheid om de grotere risico’s te 
nemen die een langdurige aanwezigheid op het terrein met zich zou kunnen meebrengen. 
Deze beperkingen, betoog ik, vormen een belangrijke uitdaging voor het vermogen van 
het Hof om binnenlandse vervolgingen te katalyseren. 
 
4. Concurrerend, Aanvullend, Kopiërend: Nationale Rechtbanken en 
 Complementariteit 
 
Van actoren gevestigd in Den Haag naar actoren op nationaal niveau, dit 
hoofdstuk onderzoekt hoe complementariteit de oprichting (of het voorstel tot 
oprichting) van gespecialiseerde instellingen, personeel, en de regulering voor de 
binnenlandse vervolging van ISH misdrijven bezielt en draagt. In Oeganda is de Divisie 
Internationale Misdrijven, opgericht als een speciale afdeling binnen de Hoge Raad om 
de misdrijven in het Statuut van Rome te berechten, de belangrijkste binnenlandse 
instelling waarvan de creatie werd gekatalyseerd door de dreiging van een ISH interventie. 
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In Kenia waren mislukte pogingen om een Speciaal Tribunaal te creëren voor het geweld 
in de nasleep van de verkiezingen een hoogtepunt in de poging een binnenlands 
verantwoordingsproces op poten te zetten in plaats van ISH-procedures. Meer recente 
discussies blijken echter zich echter ook te richten op de creatie van een Divisie 
Internationale Misdrijven in Kenia’s Hoge Raad. In beide gevallen zijn deze divisies 
gecreëerd of voorgesteld om te voldoen aan vermeende verplichtingen onder het 
complementariteitsregime van het ISH en om steun te bieden voor hypothetische 
ontvankelijkheidsbezwaren. 
 
In de DRC daarentegen hebben binnenlandse militaire rechtbanken, in 
toepassing van het Congolese krijgsrecht, een veel groter (maar nog steeds beperkt) 
aantal vervolgingen ondernomen. Het is opmerkelijk dat deze rechtbanken niet opgericht 
werden in reactie op de betrokkenheid van het ISH in het land: zij hebben al jarenlang 
rechtsmacht over internationale misdrijven gehad, ook al zijn de procedures zelf relatief 
recent. De meer recente evolutie van binnenlandse vervolgingen door middel van 
zogenaamde “mobiele” rechtbanken in het oostelijke regio van de DRC 
vertegenwoordigt een nieuwe inroeping van het complementariteitsprincipe; het 
merendeel van deze pogingen is echter ondernomen door internationale donoren en 
NGO actoren, die opzettelijk getracht hebben de rechtbanken te karakteriseren als een 
uitbreiding van en “complementair” aan het werk van het ISH, ook al is het Hof zelf 
nauwelijks aanwezig geweest in hun activiteiten. 
 
Het hoofdstuk belicht dus de veranderende manieren waarop en de 
concurrerende doeleinden waarvoor complementariteit ingeroepen is als basis voor de 
oprichting van deze nationale rechtbanken. Het centrale uitgangspunt is opnieuw dat de 
rol van het ISH als katalysator gebaseerd is op verschillende opvattingen van het 
complementariteitsprincipe. In bepaalde gevallen is de dreiging van de bevoegdheid van 
het Hof gebruikt om het opzetten van binnenlandse juridische instituties te 
bewerkstelligen, zoals Oeganda’s Divisie Internationale Misdrijven of de voorgestelde 
speciale tribunalen in Kenia en de DRC; in die zin is het katalytische potentieel van het 
ISH grotendeels van dwingende aard geweest. Daarentegen presenteren de recente 
omschrijvingen van deze instituties hen ook letterlijk als institutionele uitbreidingen van 
het ISH: eerder dan het Hof te vervangen, zijn ze bedoeld om het werk van het ISH aan 
te vullen en zelfs te “vervullen”. De logica van complementariteit verandert dus 
afhankelijk van de politieke prioriteiten en doelstellingen van degenen die het inroepen. 
 
De tweede helft van het hoofdstuk onderzoekt de zorgen die ontstaan zijn door 
deze instellingen, in het bijzonder de blijvende spanningen tussen de uitzonderlijkheid 
die inherent is aan de oprichting van speciale rechtbanken en hun relatie tot normale 
strafrechtelijke rechtssystemen. Terwijl de oprichting van nationale rechtbanken 
gespecialiseerd in de berechting van internationale misdrijven doorgaans gepresenteerd 
wordt als een normatief goed, is hun weergave als onderdeel van complementariteit “in 
realiteit” grotendeels gericht geweest op een internationaal publiek van donoren, 
normatieve ondernemers, en andere staten. De donoreconomieën die deze rechtbanken 
omringen, en de institutionele spanningen die gecreëerd worden door hun relatie met het 
gewone rechtssysteem, worden vaak over het hoofd gezien. Een gerelateerde zorg is een 
schijnbare aandrang op slecht gedefinieerde “internationale standaarden” als het middel 
waarmee naleving van complementariteit moet worden beoordeeld. Tot slot gaat het 
hoofdstuk, door middel van een case study van het Kwoyelo proces, na hoe het 
binnenlandse beroep op complementariteit ook ruimte kan bieden aan staatsmacht, wat 
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onder bepaalde omstandigheden tot resultaten leidt die zelf in strijd zijn met 
mensenrechtennormen. 
 
5. Implementatie en Binnenlandse Politiek 
 
Dit hoofdstuk zet het onderzoek naar de effecten van het ISH op nationaal 
niveau verder door de normatieve impact te verkennen van de interventie van het Hof 
op het binnenlands wettelijk kader in de drie landen. Terugkerend naar de 
spiegelingskritiek van de vorige hoofdstukken, beargumenteert dit hoofdstuk eerst dat 
implementatie een gesofisticeerde en technocratische oefening geworden is in het 
toepassen van het Statuut van Rome als een “globaal script”. Dit heeft op zijn beurt 
bijgedragen tot een steeds meer disciplinaire benadering van implementatie, een 
benadering die overeenstemming met het Statuut bevoordeelt. Ten tweede, de 
implementatie van het Statuur werd niet zozeer bespoedigd door de dreiging van ISH 
interventie, maar wel door andere gebeurtenissen die overwegend gericht waren op een 
internationaal publiek. In Oeganda heeft de rol van het land als gastheer van de 
Toetsingsconferentie in 2010 een wetgevend proces versneld dat lang gestagneerd was. 
In Kenia leidde het verlangen om publiekelijk afstand te nemen van het electoraal geweld 
in 2007-08 parlementariërs ertoe de implementatie op een “fast-track” te zetten, op 
aanbeveling van een internationale onderzoekscommissie; in die tijd leek de mogelijkheid 
van een ISH interventie echter veraf. 
 
De combinatie van deze twee factoren—uniformiteit in toepassing en de kracht 
van externe belangengroepen—was grotendeels verantwoordelijk voor het aansturen van 
het implementatieproces, zowel in Kenia als Oeganda, maar het verdoezelde diepere 
politieke tegenstellingen over de wenselijkheid van internationaal strafrecht als kader 
voor binnenlandse verantwoordelijkheid. In Oeganda werden daaropvolgende 
inspanningen om het jarenlange amnestieprogramma stop te zetten beantwoord met 
hevig verzet, wat aangeeft dat er heel wat onbehagen is over het vergeldend kader van de 
nationale wetgeving. Ook in Kenia betekende de opening van het ISH onderzoek in 
2009 een breuk van de schijnbare eensgezindheid van de politieke elites over de 
wenselijkheid van de nationale wetgeving die slechts een jaar eerder geratificeerd was en 
verenigde zelfs de voormalige politieke rivalen Uhuru Kenyatta en William Ruto. In de 
DRC daarentegen dwarsboomde het politieke wantrouwen in internationale juridische 
interventies tot voor kort het aannemen van alomvattende implementatiewetgeving (ook 
al waren internationale misdrijven al misdrijven onder Congolees recht lang voor de 
oprichting van het ISH). Op basis van deze geschiedenis sluit het hoofdstuk af door te 
focussen op drie dimensies van implementatie: als zuiverheid, als politiek, en als 




Het laatste hoofdstuk biedt een aantal afsluitende observaties. Ten eerste, 
complementariteit omvat meerdere betekenissen: het is niet alleen een 
ontvankelijkheidseis, maar ook de juridische logica waardoor de katalytische werking van 
het ISH zich uitgedrukt heeft. Ten tweede, hoewel complementariteit aanvankelijk gezien 
werd als een mechanisme om de keuzes van statelijke actoren te beïnvloeden, lijkt het 
effect op niet-statelijke actoren veel diepgaander te zijn geweest. In deze zin zijn 
organisaties uit het maatschappelijk middenveld zowel object als subject van het 
“katalytisch effect” van het Hof: zij pogen de normatieve invloed van complementariteit 
uit te breiden, maar worden zelf beïnvloed door complementariteit. Ten derde, terwijl 
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legalisme centraal staat in het streven naar een op regels gebaseerde wereldorde, 
benadrukken de gevolgen van de ISH interventies in Oeganda, Kenia, en de DRC hoe 
globale asymmetrieёn, en de patronaatsnetwerken die ze produceren, sterk verweven zijn 
met het katalytische project. De toenemende focus op “naleving” van de standaarden en 
procedures van het ISH is ten dele een functie van deze asymmetrieën: het weerlegt de 
buitenmaatse invloed die externe belanghebbenden kunnen hebben over welke 
activiteiten staten ondernemen in naam van complementariteit. Tenslotte, en om deze 
redenen, kan het “katalytisch effect” van het ISH op staatsgedrag beter begrepen worden 
als onderdeel van een complex politiek proces dan als een simpel gewenst resultaat. 
 
In het licht van deze observaties concludeer ik met een aantal suggesties voor 
toekomstig onderzoek en voor de praktijk. Ten eerste, om de katalytische kracht van het 
ISH beter te waarderen, kan naleving niet het dominante kader voor complementariteit 
zijn; het is een te smalle lens om de complexe juridische en politieke alchemie door te 
bekijken die interventies van het Hof voortbrengen. Ten tweede, het ISH zou een meer 
lokale oriëntatie moeten aannemen in zijn werk: dit omvat meer onderzoeken en 
opsporingen op het terrein (of in dichte nabijheid), meer uitvoerige outreach 
programma’s en een groter gebruik van in situ hoorzittingen. Ten derde, een meer 
respectvolle benadering van ontvankelijkheidsbezwaren door het ISH zou wenselijk zijn: 
het Hof zou beter kunnen omgaan met de spanningen tussen de juridische test voor 
complementariteit, die geworteld is in de mate van overeenstemming tussen een ISH-
zaak en de nationale jurisdicties, en de elementen gebaseerd op beleid, waarbij 
binnenlandse procedures aangemoedigd zouden moeten worden te midden van een veel 
groter universum van criminaliteit. Bovendien, hoewel ontvankelijkheidsverzoekschriften 
het kanaal vormen waardoor staten getracht hebben te communiceren met het ISH, is de 
ruimte die deze creëren voor dialoog zeer beperkt. Meer aandacht voor samenwerkings- 
en overlegregimes zoals voorzien in het Statuut van Rome is dus gerechtvaardigd. Ten 
vierde, een disproportionele focus op het ISH heeft ertoe geleid dat andere hybride 
regelingen over het hoofd gezien worden die, door hun opzet, een diepere band met 
nationale jurisdicties kunnen hebben en een meer blijvend effect op het versterken van 
de binnenlandse capaciteit. Er zou meer geïnvesteerd moeten worden in deze regelingen, 
en in een kritische oriëntatie die internationale strafrechtelijke gerechtigheid verwelkomt, 
minder als een kwestie van het volgen van regels, maar eerder als een project van 
wereldwijd juridisch pluralisme. Hierdoor zou meer ruimte geboden kunnen worden aan 
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